This UIF study argues that if current approaches remain unchanged, Ukraine’s electricity market risks entering a destructive inertial scenario. Shrinking physical volumes of electricity transmission are forcing the regulator to raise transmission and distribution tariffs. Consumers respond to higher costs with energy efficiency, their own generation or reduced production, and the transmission base narrows further. The author calls this a ‘tariff burden spiral’: rising prices trigger lower demand, which in turn leads to a further round of increases in regulated tariffs. Meanwhile, the public service obligation (PSO) is draining liquidity from state-owned generation, and debts on the balancing market are deterring investors from energy storage systems, which the power system needs most. In the author’s view, the current market model has exhausted its margin of safety. The destructive trends can be reversed only by changing the approach to pricing and payment policy.
Research objective
To identify the trends that have emerged in Ukraine’s electricity market during the full-scale war, forecast how they will develop under an inertial scenario and propose regulatory steps capable of reversing it.
The study examines Ukraine’s electricity market, focusing on its transformation under wartime challenges.
The study draws on statistical data on prices and tariffs in Ukraine and neighbouring European countries, on available capacity and consumption, and on balancing market debts. Sources include data from the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission (NEURC), the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), JSC Market Operator, the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform, Eurostat, the Euratom Supply Agency, the Main Department of Statistics in Kyiv Oblast and the consultancy ExPro Consulting.
Summary
Ukraine’s electricity market, already burdened by excessive regulation and debt before the full-scale invasion, has faced unprecedented structural shocks. The loss of cheap baseload generation, large-scale destruction of infrastructure and a 30–35% fall in consumption have fundamentally changed the operating conditions of the power system. Replacing lost capacity with more expensive flexible generation and imports, compounded by macroeconomic pressure from inflation and currency depreciation, has produced a persistent upward trend in wholesale prices. At the same time, lower physical volumes of electricity transmission have forced the regulator to raise transmission and distribution tariffs to cover network operators’ fixed costs and emergency restoration costs.
If current approaches persist, the market risks entering a destructive inertial scenario. The boom in distributed solar generation, while strengthening the resilience of individual consumers, is narrowing the consumption base of the integrated grid. This accelerates the ‘tariff burden spiral’ and makes system balancing critically more difficult because of sharp swings in power output. In parallel, retaining an undifferentiated PSO for households acts as a hidden tax that drains liquidity from state-owned generation, while consumers protected from disconnection generate balancing market debts running into billions. This liquidity crisis effectively rules out investment in the energy storage systems and highly flexible capacity that the system critically needs.
Overcoming these destructive trends requires a wide-ranging review of regulatory policy. Its core element should be a shift to a transmission and distribution tariff model that includes a charge for guaranteed connected capacity. This would stabilise network companies’ revenues regardless of consumption volumes and encourage businesses to plan rationally. At the same time, flattening the load curve requires the launch of system-wide demand-side management through dynamic tariffs (real-time prices), the involvement of aggregators and the use of smart infrastructure so that consumers respond automatically to price signals.
Financial stabilisation of the market is possible only if inefficient mechanisms of hidden cross-subsidisation are abandoned. Easing the PSO burden by narrowing the gap with cost-reflective tariffs must be accompanied exclusively by targeted cash assistance for vulnerable groups. Support for strategically important energy-intensive enterprises should be provided through dedicated state funds rather than at the expense of energy companies. Resolving the debt crisis on the balancing market also requires immediate financial clearing among market participants and a thorough audit of the list of protected consumers to stop new arrears from building up.
Strategic recommendations
The author proposes five steps as a basis for a professional discussion of a new market design.
Connected capacity charge. Link part of the transmission and distribution tariff to guaranteed connected capacity, not only to consumption volumes. Businesses planning their own generation will then factor in the cost of a backup grid connection.
Demand-side management. Multi-zone meters, real-time tariffs linked to hourly wholesale market prices, demand aggregators and automatic transmission of dispatch signals via open protocols. This requires updating the market codes and approving a methodology for calculating baseline load.
Easing the PSO. Gradually narrow the gap between the household tariff and the cost-reflective price, and provide targeted cash assistance to vulnerable households.
Support for industry. Subsidise prices for strategic energy-intensive industries only where the macroeconomic benefit exceeds the cost, and only through dedicated state funds, without placing the burden on energy companies.
Resolving balancing market debts. Settle ‘circular’ debts through clearing backed by a dedicated tranche, audit the list of protected consumers and strictly regulate how the list is compiled.
This publication was produced by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future with the support of the Askold and Dir Fund, administered by ISAR Ednannia within the project ‘Strong Civil Society of Ukraine – a Driver towards Reforms and Democracy’, funded by Norway and Sweden. The content of this publication is the responsibility of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future and does not reflect the views of the Governments of Norway and Sweden or ISAR Ednannia.





