The US as a Variable
in Ukraine's Security
What has changed in Washington's policy in 2025–2026, how critical it is and what Kyiv can do before April 2027
View in PDF formatFrom anchor to variable. Since January 2025, most of Washington's actions have made Ukraine's position harder
We found no evidence of an alliance with Moscow. This is pressure on the side that depends more heavily on the US.
US administration actions weakened Ukraine. 13 strengthened it, 10 were neutral (our classification)
of Patriot missiles reach Ukraine through the PURL mechanism, which the US threatened to halt
of Americans support military assistance to Ukraine (February 2026)
Sources: our classification of 64 events, Appendix A of the report; Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 23.07.2026; FT via Militarnyi, 11.10.2026; Chicago Council / Ipsos, 12.02.2026
Missile defence is at a critical level; room for manoeuvre is narrow but real
The decisive period runs until 7 April 2027. On that day, the US licence to import Russian diesel expires. If it is extended, Washington is making new concessions to Moscow; if not, pressure on Russia returns (our assessment).
How to read the colours
Missile defence is at a critical level
US Patriot stocks have fallen almost threefold; CNN, citing an anonymous source, reports that Ukraine has run out of missiles
More →Pressure on Kyiv is recurring
33 of 56 US administration actions weakened Ukraine. The cycle: pressure on Kyiv – a threat to Moscow – stalling – rollback
More →The biggest risks come before spring
A PURL pause, restrictions on intelligence, an imposed deal on Donbas and a winter without Patriots
More →America is not of one mind
In Congress, votes on Ukraine and sanctions win 54–89% support; 57% of Americans back military assistance
More →The strongest arguments are American
Laws passed by Congress, drones and jobs in the US, European money for American weapons
More →Source: UIF report 'The US as a Variable in Ukraine's Security', 16 Oct 2026
Eight terms you need to read on
Explanations are simplified for a general audience. Details are in the report.
What has changed
64 events from 20 January 2025 to 16 October 2026: how many of Washington's actions helped Ukraine, and how many harmed it.
33 of 56 US administration actions weakened Ukraine, 13 strengthened it
We compiled 64 events from 20 January 2025 to 16 October 2026. Of these, 56 are actions by the US administration. Eight actions by Congress, SpaceX and other actors are not included in the count. All events are counted equally: a statement and a law carry the same weight.
* up to 16 Oct 2026
Even excluding reports from a single source or anonymous sources, actions against Ukraine are almost twice as numerous: 25 to 13.
Source: Appendix A of the report, our classification. Excluding events from anonymous and officially denied sources – 29 to 13.
Pressure on Kyiv returned every few months, pressure on Moscow less often
In 2026, pressure again focused on Kyiv: 13 actions against Ukraine and 5 in its favour.
Sources: key events from Appendix A of the report: US Treasury, Reuters, AP, FT, Kyiv Independent
October 2026: four levers of pressure on Kyiv in a single week
Sanctions
After a call between Trump and Putin, the US Treasury allowed Russian diesel to be imported until 7 April 2027. The volume is around 4.8 million tonnes, less than two weeks of US consumption
General License No. 135. The sum is small; the timing of the decision matters morePublic statements
Trump: 'I think it's time for Ukraine to get a new president.' The next day – an 'energy ceasefire' that Zelensky learned about from the news
Russia continued its strikes on energy infrastructureIntelligence and PURL
FT, Kyiv Independent and Washington Post: the US threatens to stop intelligence sharing and purchases through PURL if strikes on Russian refineries continue
anonymous sources; Trump deniesStarshield communications
Terminals moving faster than 160 km/h lost connectivity. These include drones, among them Shahed interceptors, as well as aircraft and helicopters
Reuters: the order came from the White House; the US denies itSources: OFAC, 09.10.2026; AP, 09.10.2026; Al Jazeera, 10.10.2026; Al Jazeera, 11.10.2026; FT via Militarnyi, 11.10.2026; Reuters via ThePrint, 15.10.2026; Fox News, 14.10.2026; CNN via ABC17, 15.10.2026
Why this is happening
The recurring cycle and Washington's motives: fuel prices and the burden on Europe explain more than the hypothesis of an alliance with Moscow.
The cycle repeats: pressure on Kyiv, threat to Moscow, stalling, rollback
Pressure on Kyiv
pauses in weapons and intelligence, an ultimatum to 27 Nov 2025, threats regarding PURL (according to anonymous sources)
Threat to Moscow
'the easy way, or the hard way', 50 days, sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil
The Kremlin plays for time
summit in Anchorage, business offers worth USD 14 trillion, meetings without a ceasefire
Rollback
ceasefire demand dropped (Aug 2025), oil waivers (Mar and Apr 2026), diesel licence (Oct 2026)
The cycle: 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 1.
I'm going to beat you up, and my concession is that I stopped beating you up.This is how Fiona Hill, former White House adviser on Russia, describes the Kremlin's negotiating method
Sources: events from appendix A of the report; The Hill via Yahoo, 08.2025
Fuel prices and the burden on Europe explain Washington's actions better than an alliance with Moscow
Motive and how well it explains the administration's actions (our assessment)
Trump: lower prices are 'my Greatest Priority'; the diesel licence was issued 25 days before the congressional elections
2026 National Defense Strategy: the homeland first, then China
Kyiv was given deadlines, including agreeing a framework deal by 27 Nov 2025
Ukraine depends on US intelligence, communications and Patriot systems; Russia does not
USD 14 trillion of 'joint projects'; the White House does not confirm this
Admiral Paparo, Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command: 'a fantasy'
Against the hypothesis of an alliance with Moscow
- According to the WSJ, in October 2025 the US agreed to provide Ukraine with intelligence for strikes on Russian refineries and power plants
- Trump signed the Graham Act, although the House of Representatives lacked the two-thirds majority needed to override a veto
- PURL is operating; the State Department is approving transfers of Patriot missiles to Ukraine from German stocks
- On 2 October, the US–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund approved its first projects in energy and critical materials
Sources: AP, 09.10.2026; CSIS, 27.01.2026; Kyiv Independent, 19.02.2026; WSJ via Kyiv Independent, 02.10.2025; US Treasury, 02.10.2026; ISW via UkraNews, 14.02.2026
How critical it is
Threat levels by area, the state of Patriot stocks, a risk map and scenarios for the next 6–12 months.
Missile defence faces a critical level of threat; four other areas face a high level
Four of the five areas depend on political decisions in Washington. The Patriot shortage also has an objective cause: US expenditure in the war with Iran.
Level of threat to Ukraine on a 1–5 scale (5 – critical), our assessment as of 16 Oct 2026. Basis: Sections 2–6 of the report.
According to CSIS, the US has 759–827 Patriot missiles left and produces around 600 a year
February 20262 330
April 20261 030
July 2026759-827
Output is set to rise to more than 2,000 a year under a seven-year agreement with the Pentagon. On 8 July, Trump promised Ukraine a licence to produce Patriot missiles; on 31 July he said: 'We have not agreed to that.'
of Patriot missiles reach Ukraine through PURL, so a threat to halt PURL is a threat to the entire missile defence system
a year is provided in the US defence budget for 2026 and 2027. Congress has not allocated other major new funding since April 2024
missiles contracted by Ukraine, but most will arrive only in years (Defence Minister Yevhen Khmara)
Sources: CSIS estimate via AP, 28.07.2026; Defense News, 06.01.2026; Defense News, 12.10.2026; Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 23.07.2026; CRS, 31.08.2026
The four biggest risks before spring: PURL, intelligence, an imposed deal and a shortage of Patriots
Our assessment as of 16 Oct 2026. Dark cells – highest-threat zone: critical impact with possible or higher likelihood. Sources for the indicators: Section 6 of the report.
Most likely – managed tension: pressure on Kyiv eases but does not disappear
Managed tension
After the US congressional elections on 3 November, pressure eases; PURL and intelligence sharing operate with disruptions
Escalating coercion
The US suspends PURL or intelligence sharing; new restrictions on communications
Imposed deal
Pressure to withdraw from Donbas and hold elections in Ukraine; partial lifting of sanctions on Russia
Pivot to pressure on Russia
The new Congress and the Graham Act force the White House to impose tough sanctions
In our assessment, only in the least likely scenario does the US move to tough pressure on Russia. The assessment should be updated after the elections on 3 November 2026.
Likelihoods over 6–12 months are our expert judgement, not a calculation. Colours: orange – the worst scenarios for Ukraine, graphite – the best.
Room for manoeuvre
Congress, public opinion, American laws and mutual benefit: where Kyiv can influence the outcome.
Congress backs Ukraine with votes from both parties: 54–89% in favour of decisions on Ukraine and sanctions
The Speaker did not bring H.R. 2913 to a vote. A discharge petition gathered 218 signatures – a majority of the House – and on 4 June the bill was passed, with 18 Republicans voting in favour. The Senate has not considered it.
senators, six from each party, demand that the Russian diesel licence be revoked
I do believe there's a legitimate case for saying the president's not following the law
Republican Senator Thom Tillis, 11 Oct 2026
Sources: OSW, 19.12.2025; Euromaidan Press, 14.05.2026; LegiScan, H.R. 2913; NPR, 07.08.2026; Paul Weiss, 09.2026; NPR, 13.10.2026; Reuters via Al-Monitor, 11.10.2026
Most Americans back Ukraine, but support among Republicans is only 43%
Military assistance to Ukraine
in favour (Chicago Council, February 2026)
Territories
oppose Russia gaining new territories in eastern Ukraine
oppose Russia keeping the territory it has already seized
Sympathies in the war (YouGov, October 2026)
4% – Russia; the rest – no answer or neutral
Confidence in Trump's decisions on the war fell from 40% (August 2025) to 32% (March 2026), Pew
The main reserve is Republican voters. They should be addressed in the language of benefits for the US: jobs, drones, resources.
Sources: Chicago Council / Ipsos, 12.02.2026; YouGov, 14.10.2026; Pew, 23.04.2026
Ukraine's strongest arguments are American laws, not international documents
- Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, 2022The ban can be lifted only under three conditions; the main one is an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops accepted by Ukraine
- Graham Act, 2026Sanctions can be waived only with a written justification based on US national interests and a report to Congress
- NDAA defence budget, 2026The Pentagon must notify Congress immediately of any halt to intelligence sharing with Ukraine
- CAATSA 2017 and Crimea Declaration 2018Non-recognition of border changes by force: in the law and in a State Department statement
- Budapest Memorandum, 1994'Assurances', not guarantees; the US regards it as a political commitment. Paragraphs 1, 3 and 6: borders, no economic coercion, consultations
- UN Charter, Art. 51A right to collective self-defence, not an obligation to help
- US–Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement, 2024In the event of an attack or threat – a meeting at the request of either party, if possible within 24 hours
The documents are weak, but consultations under the memorandum and the 2024 agreement will force the US to state its position officially. In our assessment, this is a quick and almost cost-free step.
Sources: Congress.gov, P.L. 117-109; Paul Weiss, 09.2026; OSW, 19.12.2025; GovInfo, CAATSA; Lawfare; United24, 13.06.2024
Ukraine and its partners already give the US money, jobs and expertise; Russia offers only promises
- 201specialists in countering Shahed drones sent by Ukraine to the Gulf states (March 2026)
- 300+jobs – an assembly centre for Ukrainian drones under construction in Ohio, due by the end of 2029
- USD 6.7 billionpaid by Ukraine's partners to American manufacturers through PURL in the first year
- USD 76 billionrecord US-approved arms sales to Europeans in 2024 (Bruegel)
- ≈USD 30 millionthe Reconstruction Investment Fund's first critical materials deal (according to Reuters)
Limitations: Trump: 'We don't need their help in drone defence'; a large 'drone deal' has not been signed; the amounts are still small; some resources are in occupied territories.
- USD 14 trillionof 'joint projects' offered by Kirill Dmitriev, Putin's special envoy, in exchange for lifting sanctions
- Arctic, metals, assetsfuture deals the Kremlin promises Washington
Sources: Euromaidan Press, 17.03.2026; DroneXL, 25.07.2026; Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 23.07.2026; Bruegel via Kyiv Independent, 11.2025; Kyiv Independent, 03.10.2026; Yevropeiska Pravda, 13.03.2026; Kyiv Independent, 19.02.2026; WSJ via To Vima, 29.11.2025
Kyiv gains most where it controls the outcome itself: Congress, drones, communications and air defence
What not to do
A pivot to China. China is Ukraine's main trading partner: 16.8% of foreign trade. But Beijing will not replace Washington: according to the SCMP, Wang Yi said that China cannot afford for Russia to lose. China has already restricted supplies of components for Ukrainian drones.
Public accusations. They will not bring back missiles; they will only strengthen those in Washington who want to wind down assistance (our assessment).
Sources: our assessment; OSW, 17.03.2026; SCMP via Kyiv Post, 07.2025; NV, 2025
What to do
Nine steps for Kyiv with those responsible and deadlines, and eight warning signals to watch.
Five priority steps: four by the end of January 2027, one by 7 April
Our proposals. Urgency is set by the date: consultations and the missile swap have short windows. Step 3 begins with the new Congress and has no end date.
Nine steps: who is responsible and by when
| № | Step | Who | Deadline | Sign of success | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Diplomacy | 1 | Formally request consultations under para. 6 of the Budapest Memorandum and under the 2024 security agreement | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the President | by 31 Oct 2026 | Consultations held |
| 2 | Inform both the White House and Congress of the consequences of the Starshield restrictions and of the threats to stop intelligence sharing | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy in the US | by 3 Nov 2026 | Requests from congressional committees | |
| 3 | Work with the new Congress: an analogue of H.R. 2913, a bill on reviewing the easing of sanctions | Embassy, Verkhovna Rada | from 3 Jan 2027 | Bills introduced | |
| Sanctions | 4 | Together with the EU and senators, press for enforcement of the Graham Act and non-renewal of the diesel licence | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU partners | by 7 Apr 2027 | Licence 135 not renewed |
| Economy | 5 | Sign a framework ‘drone deal’ with the Pentagon that creates jobs in the US | Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economy | Q1 2027 | Agreement signed |
| 6 | New Reconstruction Investment Fund deals (lithium, titanium); political and war risk insurance with the DFC and MIGA | Ministry of Economy, the Fund | by 31 Mar 2027 | New deals and first policies | |
| Defense | 7 | Swap: Europe transfers 300 Patriot missiles from its stocks, and Ukraine gives it its places in the queue for new missiles | Ministry of Defence, partners | by 31 Dec 2026 | Missiles received |
| 8 | Raise PURL contributions for 2027 | Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EU | by 31 Jan 2027 | At least USD 15 billion* | |
| 9 | Back-up communications (OneWeb, EU government communications) and stronger air defence (SAMP/T, FREYA) | Ministry of Defence, General Staff | by 30 Jun 2027 | ≥ half of units have backup channel |
Our proposals. Orange background – priority steps. * USD 15 billion is PURL's annual requirement (Komersant, Feb 2026); contributions for 2026 as of February – USD 584 million. The cost of the steps was not estimated in the report.
Eight warning signals will show where US policy is heading, and each has its own response
Graham Act
a written presidential waiver of sanctions after 18 Oct 2026
PURL
a package delayed by more than a month
Early warning
repeated strikes without warning from partners
Starshield
new limits or shutdowns
Donbas and elections
an election date or withdrawal from Donbas as a US condition
Licence 135
extension beyond 7 Apr 2027
Senate
blocking of bills on sanctions and assistance
Republicans
support for military assistance below 40% (43% in February 2026)
Step numbers refer to the table above; the mapping is our assessment. Where to monitor: OFAC, Congress.gov, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Ukrainian Air Force, Chicago Council, Pew, YouGov.
Ukraine needs its own strategy towards the US, not a response to every individual move by Washington.
request for consultations under the memorandum and the 2024 agreement
300 Patriot missiles from European stocks
diesel licence not renewed, 'drone deal' signed
What partners and business can do: European governments – fund PURL for 2027; American and Ukrainian companies – show Congress the jobs and benefits that cooperation brings.
Methodology and key sources
64 events from 20 January 2025 to 16 October 2026 are drawn from official documents of the US, the UN and Ukraine, Reuters, AP, US, European and Ukrainian media, and think tanks.
An event is counted if the US administration's action directly affects Ukraine's defence, its negotiating position or pressure on Russia. The classification is ours; each event has been checked against a linked source.
The Starshield restriction is counted as an administration action on the basis of Reuters reporting; the White House denies it.
Reports from anonymous sources are marked. Threat levels, risks, scenarios and the roadmap are our assessments and proposals.
Some FT, WSJ, CNN and Reuters material is cited through open republications, as the originals are paywalled.
Data are as of 16 October 2026. Full list: 139 sources in the report.
- OFAC, 09.10.2026ofac.treasury.gov
- CSIS estimate via AP, 28.07.2026news4jax.com
- CNN via ABC17, 15.10.2026abc17news.com
- Reuters via ThePrint, 15.10.2026theprint.in
- FT via Militarnyi, 11.10.2026militarnyi.com
- Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 23.07.2026mod.gov.ua
- Chicago Council / Ipsos, 12.02.2026globalaffairs.org
- YouGov, 14.10.2026yougov.com
- NPR, 13.10.2026wlrn.org
- Paul Weiss, 09.2026paulweiss.com
- US Treasury, 02.10.2026govdelivery.com
- Congress.gov, P.L. 117-109congress.gov