In 1990, Ukraine had a better starting position than Poland: GDP per capita at purchasing power parity stood at $9,000, compared with Poland’s $8,000. By 2024, the ratio had reversed — $16,320 in Ukraine versus $45,000 in Poland, a gap of more than 2.5 times.
An analytical paper by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, “Why Ukraine Did Not Succeed” (author: Anatoliy Amelin, Executive Director and Co-Founder of UIF), shows that the gap did not emerge from a single failed event or decision. Rather, the key mechanisms of state governance — property rights, the party system, business regulation, management of natural resources — keep returning to the same state after every attempt to change them. In February 2026, the OECD confirmed this: according to the organisation, the allocation of the strategic planning function among Ukrainian government bodies remains unclear.
Three revolutions, one result
The Orange Revolution of 2004, the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, and the electoral protest of 2019 each brought new parties and new people to power. Each time, real results followed — the ProZorro e-procurement system, the creation of NABU, land reform after a 30-year moratorium. But staff appointments at state-owned enterprises and government bodies continued to be made through personal connections rather than competition after every change of power — including after 2019, when 80% of MPs entered parliament for the first time.
The scale, in numbers
Property rights. Voucher privatisation in the 1990s took place without law enforcement or independent courts. Today, of 3,116 state-owned enterprises, 56% are completely non-functional, with total debt of around $23 billion.
Parties. Party membership in Ukraine is under 1% of the adult population; the EU average is 4.7%. Each new parliament is an almost complete replacement of MPs, with no institutional memory from the previous term.
Regulation. In the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom ranking, Ukraine fell from 109th place in 2020 to 150th out of 165 countries in 2024 — a significant one-year drop.
Natural resources. The Constitution defines natural resources as the property of the people, but there is no mechanism to implement this right. In 2024, subsoil-use subventions totalled approximately UAH 38.8 billion (~$900 million) — all of it went into the general budget, with no dedicated fund. By comparison, Norway, applying the same principle (oil belongs to the nation), has built a fund worth $1.9 trillion.
Shadow economy. According to the Ministry of Economy, 23–28% of GDP; international studies put the figure as high as 40–45%.
A window for change — 2–3 years after victory
Once the war ends, Ukraine will enter a period when three conditions for reform align at the same time: public consensus, the legitimacy of power, and pressure from the EU. According to the paper, this window will last a maximum of 2–3 years. After that, the system reverts to its previous equilibrium — as it already has five times over 35 years.
What the Ukrainian Institute for the Future proposes
The paper outlines eight structural decisions, including:
- full constitutional reform rather than piecemeal changes — eliminating dual executive power, constitutional protection for NABU, NAZK and NEURC, and a mechanism to implement Article 13 of the Constitution on natural resources;
- a Ukrainian Resource Fund, to which 30% of subsoil-use revenues would be directed, under independent management — but only after an independent audit of all assets the state manages on the people’s behalf;
- reform of the party system — open regional lists, mandatory primaries, and limits on media concentration in the hands of a single owner;
- a moratorium on changes to key taxes more often than once every 2–3 years;
- judicial reform with external filtering in the selection of judges and constitutional protection for the HACC.
Unlike another package of reforms, institution-building requires choosing a model of the state in advance — liberal, developmentalist, or social-democratic. Ukraine made none of these choices in 1991, nor after any of its three revolutions. As the paper concludes: today, taxes are paid by those who cannot avoid them, not by those who earn significant income — and that is just one consequence of a system that needs to change.
This material was produced by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future NGO with support from the Askold and Dyr Fund, administered by ISAR Ednannia within the project “Civil Society Strengthened — A Driving Force for Reform and Democracy in Ukraine,” funded by Norway and Sweden. The content of this publication is the responsibility of the Ukrainian Institute for the Future NGO and does not reflect the views of the governments of Norway, Sweden, or ISAR Ednannia.
