


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**INTERNATIONAL
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ATLAS

OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM



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1. Исключительно восточная Европа с советской стороны подтверждается в интересах СССР и Восточной Европы. С германской стороны указывается о ее полной политической неинтересности в этих областях.

4. Этот протокол будет сохраняться обеими сторонами в строжайшем секрете.

Москва, 23 августа 1939 г.

Генеральный секретарь СССР
Молотов

За Германию
Риббентроп

PREFACE



The phenomenon of Russian imperialism confronts academic researchers, publicists, and politicians with an insoluble dilemma: whether to interpret it as universal, identical to all other imperialisms, or as unique and unparalleled. Unfortunately, the latter approach has proven far more widespread worldwide.

Russia, as a country, is not unique, however. Like any other country, it is distinctive in its own way, but it is not the only exceptional one in the world. To recognize Russia as a unique thing in itself is, in the literal sense, to play into Vladimir Putin's hands. It is precisely his proclaimed separateness of the Russian "*state-civilization*" that forms the basis of contemporary Kremlin ideology and serves as the justification for its imperialist foreign policy and totalitarian domestic policy. To insist on Russia's special otherness is to grant the Putin regime additional legitimacy. The same applies to Russian imperialism in the past — it was distinctive in its own way, but not unique.

Western academia (*not to mention politics and public commentary*) has, for the most part, assessed Russian imperialism incorrectly (*with several important exceptions*). There are four reasons for this.

First, the West has been far too fixated on itself and on its maritime empires, which, despite their scale, are exceptions rather than the rule in the history of imperialism. First, the fascination with the "*white man's burden*," and later devastating self-criticism (*from the abolition of courses on the history of Western civilization at universities in the 1980s to BLM*), obstructed the analysis of non-Western imperialism. The passions surrounding decolonization and racism made academic criticism of continental Indigenous American, African, and Eurasian imperialisms, including the Russian one, almost impossible.

Second, Western academia has mostly compared Russia with the Western maritime empires it is familiar with, rather than with the typologically closer Eurasian empires. Despite all the differences, the "*classical*" Western European imperialisms (*whether in their Spanish or British version*) have far more in common with one another than with the Russian one. The Russian Empire, by contrast, differs from both European and purely Asian empires, although it shares features with both.

There are three main types of empire: sedentary land empires, nomadic land empires, and maritime empires. Sedentary empires were historically the first and remain predominant in terms of the number of examples — from the empire of Sargon through the Assyrian and Persian empires to the Roman Empire, all the Chinese empires, the empire of Timur, the Ottoman and Safavid empires, the Aztec and Inca empires, including the Habsburg Empire and the German empires up to the Third Reich. All Russian empires, including the Soviet and the contemporary one, belong to this type.

To measure all imperialisms by a single standard derived from the Western European model is methodologically unsound. Since such comparisons revealed more differences than similarities, the Russian case was often excluded from the concept of imperialism. This does not mean those comparisons are entirely wrong; they are important as well. But, like, should be compared first and foremost with, like.

Third, a significant portion of Russianists and Sovietologists came from Russia itself or were trained by émigré professors. Therefore, Western academia often views the people subjugated by Russia exclusively through Russian eyes. Nor should one discount the sincere admiration many Americans and Europeans felt for Russian culture, which influenced their indulgent attitude toward the Russian state.

And fourth, in some cases, there was outright bribery of Western academics with Russian money or the promise of privileged access to archives.

Such an approach not only leads to an incorrect interpretation of Russian history but also obstructs an adequate analysis of the present. This is not a subjective value judgment; it is an acknowledgment of the real state of affairs. Despite numerous warnings in the 2000s from both authors from countries neighboring Russia and some Western scholars, analytical and socio-political thought in the West as a whole remained indifferent to the threat of Russian imperialism — even after the invasion of Georgia in 2008. Only the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale aggression in 2022 tore the blinders from many Western researchers who, until then, had been blinded by their own frameworks and excessively enamored with Russia (*the PACE declaration on the need for the decolonization of the Russian Federation was adopted only on April 17, 2024*).

What has been said above does not mean that Russian imperialism lacked its own specific features. It obviously did, but only to the same extent that every other imperialism had its own specific features. Thus, the researcher's task is to find a balance between the typical causes, practices, and consequences of Russian imperialism, like any other imperialism, and its specific features. This requires extraordinary effort, because it presupposes the study not only of Russian imperialism, but also of world imperialism, as well as the anti-imperial history of the peoples subjugated by Russia — for what can one know about Russia if one knows only Russia? But there is simply no other way to arrive at correct answers.


The "*Atlas*" presented to your attention does not open, and still less does it close, the question of Russian imperialism and colonialism. It is only one brick in the edifice of our knowledge about the state with whose neighborhood we are fated to live.



CHAPTER 1

SLAVIC COLONIZATION OF ZALISSIA

6TH-12TH CENTURIES



- Areas of non-Slavic tribes and peoples of Zalissia at the beginning of the 9th century
- Territory of the Grand Principality of Vladimir at the beginning of the 13th century
- Territory of the Principality of Murom at the beginning of the 13th century
- Territory of the Principality of Ryazan at the beginning of the 13th century

Across most of present-day Ukraine and Belarus (*the forest and forest-steppe zones*), the Slavs may be regarded as an autochthonous population. The Upper and Middle Dnieper regions largely formed part of the original Slavic area after the breakup of the Balto-Slavic community. In contrast, most of the territories on which Russia later emerged were initially inhabited predominantly by Finno-Ugric tribes, and to a lesser extent by Balts, Turks, and Samoyeds.

The area around Lake Ilmen, including present-day Novgorod, was settled from the south by the Slovene in the 8th century. It appears that they remained a minority in the region for quite a long time. Novgorodian colonization of the northern and eastern territories began only in the 11th century (*see the next chapter*).

More complex was the process of Slavic colonization of Zalissia — the Volga–Oka interfluvium, separated from the Dnieper basin by the impassable Bryansk forests. Initially, the region was inhabited by the Finno-Ugric peoples of the Merya, Meshchera, Mordva, and Muromians, as well as the Baltic tribe of the Golyad. The first of these was already paying tribute to the Varangians in 859. In 862, Rostov already existed and was inhabited by the Meria.

However, Slavs appeared here even before the Rus'. The first to arrive were the Vyatichi from the Oka in the 6th–10th centuries, the second were the Krivichi from the Volga in the 8th–11th centuries, and the third were the Vyatichi from the Don in the 9th–10th centuries. Novgorodians resettled in the region twice: first farther south in the 9th–10th centuries, and then farther north in the 11th–12th centuries.

There is no evidence of mass killings during this period, but Slavic colonization did not pass without consequences for the Finno-Ugric peoples. From 907 onward, the Meria disappeared from the chronicles, suggesting assimilation. However, they did not vanish without a trace, leaving the local Slavs certain anthropological traits, features of pronunciation (*akan'e*), toponymy, and a distinctive worldview. The remainder of the Meria retreated eastward (*the Mari are either descendants of the surviving Meria or a related tribe that avoided assimilation*). The Golyad were assimilated completely. The Meshchera and the Muromians were absorbed among the Slavs and the Mordva, the only people in the region who successfully resisted the colonists.

The oldest cities of Zalissia of the 9th–10th centuries were built by Rus' princes, and all of them became islands of Slavic colonization in a Finno-Ugric sea: Beloozero — in the land of the Ves' tribe; Murom — of the Muromians; Uglich, Suzdal, and Yaroslavl — of the Meria; Ryazan arose on the border of Mordvin lands. The "*original*" Rostov, now known as Sarskoye Gorodishche, was the tribal center of the Meria, and a hundred years later, a Rus' city arose nearby that adopted the old name.

Rostov was the seat of rule of Yaroslav the Wise, and later of his son Vsevolod. The city and the entire land belonged to the grand princes of Kyiv, who sent their deputies or children there. One of these was Vladimir Monomakh. The Council of Liubech in 1097 confirmed Rostov and Suzdal as his possessions.

Monomakh appointed his son, Yuri Dolgorukiy, to rule there; after his father's death, he effectively became the first ruler of Zalissia.

If, in the century from Yaroslav the Wise to Monomakh, only six cities known from the chronicles were built, under Dolgorukiy, another 23 were added. All cities received stone churches, and most also citadels.

Zalissia was the only region of Rus' whose rulers were not satisfied with natural colonization but actively stimulated it. Dolgorukiy did not merely invite people to settle in his domains as free farmers; he also provided them with loans to establish themselves. Thanks to this "open-door" policy, not only local Slavs together with Finno-Ugric peoples settled in the cities of the Suzdal land, but also Turkic peoples from the Volga. Particularly significant was the migration from the Dnieper region in the 11th–12th centuries. Along with the population, the names of cities and even rivers "*moved*" northward.

However, Dolgorukiy successfully contested the grand princely throne and even died in Kyiv; only under his son, Andrey Bogolyubsky, did the Rostov-Suzdal Principality finally emerge from Kyiv's authority. Andrey sought, and not unsuccessfully, to turn the Vladimir-Suzdal Principality into an alternative to Kyiv. Under Andrey's brother and successor, Vsevolod the Big Nest, the Grand Principality of Vladimir became one of the four most powerful lands of former Rus'. After his death, Zalissia entered an era of appanage fragmentation.


Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Ves' (*a Finnic tribe*).
- ② Zavolotskaya Chud' (*a group of Finnic tribes*).
- ③ Meria (*a Finnic tribe, probably with Slavic elements*).
- ④ Golyad (*a tribe of the Dnieper Balts*).
- ⑤ Meshchera (*a Finnic tribe*).
- ⑥ Muromians (*a Finnic tribe, probably with Slavic elements*).
- ⑦ Mari/Mari people (*a Finnic people*).
- ⑧ Mordva (*a Finnic people*).
- ⑨ Sedentary Turkic peoples of the Middle Volga region.

CHAPTER 2

THE NOVGORODIAN TYPE
OF COLONIALISM

11TH-14TH CENTURIES



The Slavic colonization of the Novgorod region is divided into two stages. In the first period, during the 11th–12th centuries, the Ilmen Slovenes predominantly seized territories around Novgorod by force, partly displacing and partly assimilating the local Finnic tribes. At the same time, some tribes (*such as the Korela*) entered into alliances with the Novgorodians against other tribes (*the Yami/Yemi*).

This stage was characterized by the emergence of hundreds of small fortified settlements and townlets in the colonized lands. During this period, the leading role was played by spontaneous popular colonization. However, the Slavic settlement of other regions of what would later become Russia proceeded similarly.

As a result of wars with Sweden and the crusaders in the Baltic region in the mid-13th century, the borders of Novgorod Land proper were formed. At the same time, even within it, the Slavs populated only the southern half of the state territory. The Finnic tribes in the northern half were placed under direct control. Novgorodian laws were extended to them; Novgorodian landowners expropriated their lands; and they were either voluntarily or compulsorily Christianized.

From the mid-12th century, a new stage of colonization began, during which a distinctly “*Novgorodian*” type of colonialism took shape, different from the earlier Vladimir and the later Muscovite models. The following features characterize it:

1. The main instrument was the dispatch of expeditions to collect tribute: regular from sedentary tribes, irregular from nomadic Samoyeds. At the same time, this concerned an orderly collection in accordance with previously agreed norms, rather than arbitrary requisitions or contributions. Periodically, killings of Novgorodian tribute collectors occurred if they exceeded taxation norms. The second instrument was unequal trade. Furs collected in this way (*and in the Urals, also silver*) formed the basis of Novgorod’s exports to the West. In contrast, agriculture played a noticeable role within Novgorod Land proper.

2. The Novgorodians did not interfere in the socio-political or religious organization of their tributaries, did not resettle them from place to place, did not depose loyal princes, did not leave permanent garrisons, and did not demand the participation of indigenous contingents in their campaigns. However, with the help of troops, they brought rebellious volosts to obedience. Instead, the tribes of Novgorod Land proper were required to side with the metropolis in external wars, and defection to the enemy was punishable by death (*for example, among the Vod’ tribe for alliance with the Livonian Order in the late 1230s*).

3. The Novgorodians settled among the tributary tribes on an extremely limited scale; they did not live everywhere, even within the territory of Novgorod Land proper. Instead, within its borders, the Novgorodians built fortresses on the lands of Finnic tribes — both to defend against foreigners and to prevent rebellions (*for example, the Korela, an allied tribe, became hostile from the 1270s to the 1330s*). Some towns, such as fortresses and customs posts, were built in the nearest tributary volosts, but their number was small.

At this stage, the principal drivers of colonialism in the tributary territories had already become the state apparatus, representatives of the boyar elite, and monasteries. At the same time, the role of the lower strata was reduced to a minimum. During this period, more than 200 settlements of Novgorod Land proper ceased to be fortified; walls and ramparts were preserved in approximately 20 towns.

Another feature of Novgorodian colonialism was the peaceful separation of Pskov Land from Novgorod in 1348 — not as an appanage, but as an independent state. For future Muscovite colonialism, the voluntary loss of “core” territories would be inconceivable.

However, phenomena common to the late Novgorodian and Muscovite types of colonialism included:


- a) the use of some tribes to fight against other tribes;
- b) the taking of hostages to guarantee the payment of tribute, including women and children;
- c) participation in tributary campaigns not only by professional warriors but also by volunteers from the lower social strata.

Around 1250, the Novgorod state reached its territorial maximum — at least **1.6 million km²**, not counting territories of joint tribute collection with Sweden and Norway, as well as Trans-Ural Yugra.

CHAPTER 3

THE RISE OF MOSCOW

1300-1450S



The Moscow Principality emerged only in 1263 and, until 1300, did not undertake any territorial annexations. Muscovite colonialism had two primary sources:

1. The Slavic colonization of Zalisia. Naturally, later Muscovite princes did not bear responsibility for the settlement processes of earlier principalities or for their outcomes — the assimilation of the indigenous peoples there. However, the Kremlin leaders fully benefited from the demographic and political consequences of the early Slavic colonization of the territories under their control.

2. The overcoming of appanage fragmentation in Zalisia. The very process of unifying a homogeneous region around a single center is not, in itself, imperialism — it was characteristic of most Eurasian political formations at the end of the Middle Ages, and the territories annexed to Muscovy did not differ politically or culturally. However, the reasons why Moscow specifically became the center of the “*gathering of lands*,” as well as the methods of this “gathering,” shaped the distinctive features of later Russian imperialism.

The reasons the small Moscow Principality became the largest state of Zalisia are divided into contingent and structural. The contingent reasons were:

- a) the small size of the princely family;
- b) the presence among the Moscow princes of two outstanding statesmen — Ivan Kalita and Dmitry Donskoy — who, thanks to their personal qualities, managed to strengthen Moscow’s position.

The main structural reasons for the rise of the Moscow Principality were:

1. Its central location in Zalisia. Contrary to a widespread belief, Moscow was not a crossroads of trade routes. However, this principality was one of only three that, at the time of its emergence, did not share a common border with the Golden Horde or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus’, and Samogitia (*Žemaitija*). It did not spare Moscow from major wars with external adversaries, but it significantly reduced the number of small-scale predatory raids by neighboring states. In Muscovy’s history, there were periods of 40–80 years without any foreign invasions. In search of security, many peasants, servicemen, boyars, and princes from the steppe frontier moved to Moscow, strengthening it.

2. During the first century of rule, the Moscow princes relied on the closest possible cooperation with the Horde. When an anti-Horde uprising broke out in Tver in 1327, the Moscow prince Ivan Kalita led the campaign to suppress it, devastating the rival’s land completely. Muscovy itself remained untouched. The Moscow princes ransomed captives from the Horde and settled them on their own lands. By encouraging corruption within the Horde in 1328, Kalita secured the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir; thereafter, with a few isolated exceptions, the status of formal head of Zalisia remained with the Kremlin rulers.

3. The Horde transferred the collection of taxes from all of Zalisia into the hands of the Grand Prince of Vladimir and Moscow. Kalita arranged matters so that part of the funds collected remained in his possession. This allowed him to reward servicemen’s loyalty more effectively and, for the first time in Zalisia’s history, to purchase principalities from their rulers. In 1332–1333, when

Novgorod failed to pay its share of the Horde’s “tribute,” Kalita took from the republic the tributary territory of Perm. The Christianization of the local population in the 1380s, achieved through the creation of the Zyrian alphabet and preaching in the native language, marked the first such episode in Muscovite colonization.

4. One of the most important factors was the support of the Orthodox clergy. In the age of Kalita, the metropolitans of Kyiv definitively established their residence in Moscow (1325/1326), later consistently supporting the Muscovite princes in their confrontations with neighboring rulers through interdicts and excommunications, and at times even by breaches of oaths. Muscovite hierarchs also resorted to agitating the population of other principalities through epistles.

Thus, collaborationism contributed to Moscow’s elevation during the first century of the principality’s existence. Its rulers were no longer merely first among equals, but, thanks to Horde legitimation, stood a step above others — in political, economic, and military terms. All opponents of the Kremlin had to reckon with the danger of Horde invasions or ecclesiastical prohibitions.


The Moscow princes employed five strategies of territorial expansion, most of which became possible precisely due to Horde supremacy: purchasing principalities from their owners (*Kalita’s innovation*), acquisition by service contract or inheritance, purchase of *yarlyks* for possession in the Horde, direct seizures, and the settlement of non-Slavic territories beyond the Volga. At the beginning of its existence, the territory of the Moscow Principality amounted to approximately **20,000 km²**, and by the 1460s it had increased to **450,000 km²** (*including the Kasimov Khanate and several seized Novgorodian towns, but excluding Muscovite–Novgorodian joint possessions and the Permian vassal principalities*).

When the Golden Horde fell into decline (1360s), the Moscow princes led the general resistance to Horde domination. The first attempt to liberate Zalisia proved unsuccessful — in 1382, Khan Tokhtamysh captured Moscow. However, the restoration of Horde authority over Zalisia did not mean the cessation of Moscow’s “*gathering of lands*.”

CHAPTER 4**THE SUBJUGATION OF NOVGOROD AND THE
FORMATION OF THE
FIRST RUSSIAN EMPIRE**

1450S-1480S

PART I



The subjugation of Veliky Novgorod and its former possessions became the first stage in the transformation of the Grand Principality of Moscow into an empire.

In the 1330s, due to Novgorodian arrears in paying tribute to the Golden Horde, the Grand Principality of Moscow assumed fiscal functions in Novgorod's Perm volost. In 1451, Moscow appointed vassal princes there. The principality had seized part of the republic's territory at the end of the 14th century, while another part was formally considered a Muscovite–Novgorodian condominium.

The first war between Moscow and Novgorod (*January–February 1456*) ended in the Novgorodians' defeat and the conclusion of the Yazhelbitsy Peace. Under the treaty, Novgorod lost the right to conduct an independent foreign policy and to issue laws, and city seals were replaced with grand-princely ones. In addition, the republic paid the grand principality a contribution of 8,500 rubles.

The political struggle in Novgorod in the spring of 1471 between the pro-Moscow and pro-Lithuanian parties was perceived by the Grand Principality of Moscow not merely as a violation of the peace treaty, but also as a *"betrayal of Orthodoxy."* Moscow justified its foreign-policy claims by reference to Kyivan history. Ivan III, preparing for a campaign against Novgorod, declared to its inhabitants: *"This is my patrimony, people of Novgorod, from the beginning: from our grandfathers and great-grandfathers, from Grand Prince Vladimir, who baptized the land of Rus'."*

The second war (*May–August 1471*) also ended in Novgorod's defeat and the signing of the Korostyn Treaty. The most important provisions were the declaration of Novgorod Land as the patrimony of the Moscow grand prince and the reduction of Novgorod's territory. Foreign policy and courts were definitively subordinated to grand-princely authority, and the Novgorod archbishop to the Moscow metropolitan. The defeated paid the victors 15,500 rubles (*almost twice the usual Horde tribute*). As a result of the war, the Grand Principality of Moscow became a maritime power, while the weakened and divided Novgorod became its vassal.

The subordination of Novgorod and the unwillingness to share the requisitioned revenues led to a Horde campaign against Muscovy in 1472. However, it failed, and thereafter Moscow ceased paying tribute to the Horde altogether, effectively amounting to a declaration of independence. After the failure of the Horde campaign of 1480 (*"the Stand on the Ugra"*), the independence of the Grand Principality of Moscow from foreign rulers became generally recognized.

The third Muscovite–Novgorodian war (*September 1477–January 1478*) ended with Novgorod's capitulation. The republican system was abolished, all possessions were annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow, and Muscovy's territory doubled. Leaders of the resistance were arrested, and their lands and property were confiscated in favor of the grand prince personally, as were 10 volosts of the archbishop and half of the lands of the six largest monasteries.

The fall of Novgorod allowed Moscow to complete the process of regional centralization by seizing Tver in 1485 and, four years later, destroying the last republican alternative — Vyatka (*Khlynov*).

The territory of the Grand Principality of Moscow grew from **450,000 km²** to more than **2.2 million km²** (*including vassal entities in Kasimov and Perm*).

In the 1470s and 1490s, two censuses of Novgorodian lands were conducted. In 1483–1484, mass arrests of Novgorodian boyars and townspeople were carried out, accompanied by the confiscation of their lands. In 1486–1488, the first full-scale deportation in the history of Muscovy occurred — more than 7,000 boyars, townspeople, merchants, family members, and servants were forcibly removed from Novgorod Land and resettled in the central regions of Muscovy, while their lands and homesteads were transferred to twice as many Muscovites. A similar fate befell the urban and merchant strata of Khlynov in 1490. In 1499, the grand prince confiscated, for his own benefit, three-quarters of Novgorodian monastic and church estates and distributed them to the Muscovite sons of boyars.

Before these transformations, private and ecclesiastical landownership in Novgorod Land exceeded **90%**; afterward, it was reduced to **9%**, with the remainder held by the state. Of this land, **36%** was allocated as estates to Muscovite servicemen.

Novgorod lost both its independence and its own elite — the custodians of republican traditions. In a certain sense, *"in childhood"* perished the Novgorodian people with their own language, trading economy, and democratic politics — the future fourth East Slavic people. Conversely, the Muscovite political culture of centralized authoritarianism became without alternative, and the economy and armed forces of Muscovy were sharply strengthened through the redistribution of Novgorodian lands.

CHAPTER 5

THE SUBJUGATION OF NOVGOROD AND THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1450S-1480S

PART I

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① **The Kasimov Khanate.** Formed through the grant in 1446 to Khan Qasim of Zvenigorod, and in 1452, in exchange for New Nizovoy Gorod (from 1471 — *Kasimov*), Meshchera lands were purchased by Dmitry Donskoy. By the end of the 15th century, it was a vassal khanate under its own dynasty. In the mid-16th century, it effectively became an appanage. Annexed in 1681.
- ② **Perm Vychegodskaya (Lesser).** A Novgorodian volost; from the 1330s — a tributary territory of the Grand Principality of Moscow, a zone of Muscovite–Novgorodian armed confrontation. From 1451, a principality under the rule of the local Vym dynasty, a vassal of the Grand Principality of Moscow. Capital — Ust-Vym. Annexed in 1502.
- ③ **Perm Kamskaya (Greater).** A Novgorodian volost or a zone of periodic economic exploitation. From 1451, a principality under the rule of the Vym dynasty (the first *Kama prince* was the son of the first *Vychegda prince*), a vassal of the Grand Principality of Moscow. Capital — Cherdyn. The principality pursued a relatively independent policy until 1472, when Muscovite troops seized it. Annexed in 1505.


	Generally recognized territory of the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1449
① ② ③	Vassal lands within the GPM
④ ⑤	Novgorodian territories, seized by the GPM by the mid-15th century
⑥ ⑦	Novgorodian territories, incorporated into the GPM in 1471
⑧ ⑪ ⑫	Southern territories, annexed to the GPM in the 1460s–1480s
⑬ ⑭	Novgorod Land, seized by the GPM in 1478
⑩ ⑮ ⑯	Novgorodian territories, incorporated into the GPM in 1478
⑰	Muscovite–Lithuanian condominium from 1478 to 1494
⑨ ⑱ ⑲	Independent states, occupied or seized by the GPM in the 1460s–1480s
⑳ ㉑ ㉒ ㉓	Territories not included in the GPM

- ④ **Vologda.** A Novgorodian territory seized by Muscovite troops at the end of the 14th century. Under the agreement of 1456, Vologda was considered to belong to Novgorod, but in fact remained under Moscow's control. Annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1471.
- ⑤ **Zaozerye and Kubena.** At the beginning of the 15th century, it was an appanage of the Grand Principality of Yaroslavl. The western part was seized by the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1447, the eastern part around 1451.
- ⑥ **The Vaga Land.** A checkerboard of Rostov, Muscovite, and Novgorodian possessions and co-possession. Novgorodian boyars colonized several Rostov and Muscovite lands in the first half of the 15th century, but those were partially returned under the 1456 agreement and annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1471.
- ⑦ **Volok Lamsky.** At the beginning of the 15th century, a Muscovite–Novgorodian co-possession was periodically seized by Muscovite troops. Under the agreement of 1456, Volok Lamsky was considered to belong to Novgorod, but in fact remained under Moscow's control. Annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1471.
- ⑧ **Tula.** A Ryazan possession obtained by the Grand Principality of Moscow under an agreement with the Grand Principality of Ryazan at the turn of the 1450s/60s.
- ⑨ **The Grand Principality of Yaroslavl.** An independent state, finally bought out by the Grand Principality of Moscow from the local princes in 1463 (*nominally retained separateness until 1471*).
- ⑩ **Zavolochye (the Dvina Land).** A Novgorodian volost, an arena of Muscovite–Novgorodian armed confrontation at the end of the 14th century. Part was seized and annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1471; the remainder was annexed in 1478.
- ⑪ **"The Meshchera and Mordvin places."** The Grand Principality of Moscow seized the Great Horde's possessions in the 1470s as part of its liberation from the Great Horde's supremacy.
- ⑫ **The basin of the Mecha River and Yelets.** Horde possessions were seized from the Great Horde in the 1470s and divided between the Grand Principality of Moscow and the Grand Principality of Ryazan.
- ⑬ **Novgorod Land.** The core territory of Lord Veliky Novgorod (*Lord Novgorod the Great*) (*the city, suburbs, and pyatinas*) was seized and annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1478.
- ⑭ **Torzhok.** In the first half of the 14th century, a Muscovite–Novgorodian co-possession, an arena of conflict in 1456 and 1471, was incorporated into the Grand Principality of Moscow after Novgorod's fall in 1478.
- ⑮ **Kolopern and Tre.** Novgorodian volosts were incorporated into the Grand Principality of Moscow following the fall of Novgorod in 1478.
- ⑯ **Pechora.** A Novgorodian volost was incorporated into the Grand Principality of Moscow following the fall of Novgorod in 1478.
- ⑰ **Velikiye Luki and other "chernokunny volosts."** Until 1478 — a Novgorodian–Lithuanian co-possession; then until 1494 — formally a Muscovite–Lithuanian co-possession, in fact immediately seized by the Grand Principality of Moscow.
- ⑱ **The Grand Principality of Tver.** An independent state was seized and annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1485.
- ⑲ **The Vyatka Land.** A Novgorodian volost; from 1378 — within the Grand Principality of Nizhny Novgorod–Suzdal; from 1401/03 — the Grand Principality of Moscow. From 1452, it became a de facto independent republic. From 1459 — a nominal vassal of the Grand Principality of Moscow; in 1468–69 — under the protectorate of the Kazan Khanate. From 1485, it became a de facto independent state. Seized and annexed to the Grand Principality of Moscow with the final liquidation of the republican system in 1489.
- ⑳ **Yugra.** A Novgorodian volost. In 1465–1500, an arena for a series of campaigns by Muscovite troops that did not result in the actual inclusion of this territory in the Grand Principality of Moscow.
- ㉑ **Territory of joint tribute collection by Norway and Novgorod** until 1478. Not included in the Grand Principality of Moscow.
- ㉒ **Territory of joint tribute collection** by Sweden and Novgorod until 1478, by Sweden and Muscovy until 1536. Not included in the Grand Principality of Moscow.
- ㉓ **Co-possession and disputed territories** among the Grand Principality of Moscow/Russia, Sweden, and Norway were not demarcated until 1826.

CHAPTER 6

THE WARS FOR THE “KYIVAN HERITAGE” AND THE BEGINNING OF EXPANSION TO THE WEST

1490S-1503



The aspiration to seize all the lands of ancient Rus' became the cause of five wars between Muscovy and Lithuania. References to the dynastic succession of the Moscow princes in relation to the ancient Kyivan princes became the main argument used to justify this expansion.

The first war between the Grand Principality of Moscow (GPM) and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus', and Samogitia (GDL) occurred in 1368–1372; the Lithuanians twice besieged Moscow, but no territorial changes resulted.

After the second war of 1406–1408 between the two states, a treaty was concluded and a border established. Muscovy lost influence over several bordering so-called Upper Principalities, whose rulers thereafter recognized Lithuanian supremacy but retained the right to transfer to another suzerain (*of these, only Kozelsk was seized by the GPM in 1436 and annexed to the GDL in 1447*). The Muscovite Rzhev land was also under Lithuanian control in 1448–1449.

In 1449, an “eternal peace” was signed between Moscow and Vilnius. Until the liberation of the GPM from Horde supremacy (1472–1480), Grand Princes Vasily II and Ivan III adhered to a policy of neutrality toward Casimir IV, simultaneously Grand Duke of the GDL and King of Poland.

However, Muscovy's final independence, its absorption of Novgorod and Tver (under Lithuanian protection), and Ivan III's alliance with the Crimean Khan Mengli I Giray (*an enemy of the GDL*) led to a deterioration of Lithuanian–Muscovite relations. In 1473 and 1486, border clashes broke out between them.

In 1480, a Crimean attack on Podolia prevented Casimir IV from coming to the aid of Khan Akhmat during the Stand on the Ugra — the last attempt by the Great Horde to restore its domination over Muscovy. In 1482, Mengli I captured and devastated Kyiv and ten other towns, and contemporaries directly linked this attack to a request from Ivan III.

The final straw was the escalation of the situation in the Upper Principalities. In the summer of 1487, several of the local princes “departed” to the service of the Moscow grand prince, one of them together with his town. Casimir IV did not recognize this transfer, resulting in another border conflict.

During this period, the justification for Russian expansion into Ukraine was articulated through “*historical-dynastic*” arguments, namely, the succession of the current Moscow princes in relation to the ancient Kyivan princes. In 1490, Ivan III wrote in a letter to Maximilian I of Habsburg, the future German emperor, that he intended to reclaim “*my patrimony, the Grand Principality of Kyiv, which is held by Casimir, the King of Poland, and his children.*”

Following Casimir IV's death in 1492, the war assumed full-scale character. The initiative lay on the Muscovite–Crimean side, and the peace treaty of February 1494 recorded the defeat of the GDL. Part of Lithuanian territory (33,000 km²), including Vyazma, passed to the GPM; Ivan III was recognized with the title “*sovereign of all Rus'*,” and further “departures” of appanage princes were prohibited.

Olena, the daughter of the Muscovite ruler, married the new Grand Duke of Lithuania, Alexander.

In the conquered lands, Moscow repeated the “*Novgorod practice*”: in 1495, landowners of the Vyazma Principality were resettled eastward, and their possessions were distributed to servicemen from other regions.

Conflicts associated with the “*clarification*” of the new borders, open seizures of Lithuanian lands by Muscovite troops, and the “*departures*” of appanage princes to Moscow, together with towns (*including Chernihiv*), provoked another war — 1500–1503. The Lithuanian army, led by Konstanty Ostrogski, suffered a defeat on the Vedrosha River (14 July 1500). As before, Crimea fought alongside the GPM.

Under the truce of March 1503, the GDL lost more than a quarter of its territory (*to Muscovy passed Bryansk, Starodub, Novgorod-Severskyi, Chernihiv, Putyvl, Rylysk, and other towns, as well as uninhabited steppe territories with a total area of 253,000 km²*), and the new border lay only 50 kilometers from Kyiv. As Ivan III acknowledged in a message to Mengli Giray, he wanted “*to take back my patrimony — all the Rus' land,*” and concluded the truce only in order to give his troops respite. In 1504, the Muscovite prince once again outlined his claims to the Lithuanian ruler: “*all the Rus' land, Kyiv and Smolensk, and other towns which he holds to himself within the Lithuanian land, by God's will from ancient times, from our forefathers, are our patrimony, and their patrimony is the Polish land and the Lithuanian.*”

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Principality of Perm Vychegodskaya.
- ③ The Principality of Perm Kamskaya.

CHAPTER 7

THE WARS FOR THE "KYIVAN HERITAGE" AND THE CONTINUATION OF EXPANSION TO THE WEST

1507-1537

	Main territory of the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1507–1537
	Vassal lands within the GPM
	Territories annexed to the GPM after 1508
	Independent states seized by the GPM in 1510 and 1521
	Territories seized by the GPM in 1512–1522
	Territories seized by the GPM in 1534–1537
	Territories lost by the GPM during 1507–1537

In 1505, Grand Prince Ivan III of Moscow died, and his heir was Vasily III. In 1506, Grand Duke Alexander of Lithuania died, and power was inherited by Sigismund I.

At the beginning of 1507, the Third Lithuanian-Muscovite War broke out, in which the Crimean Khanate acted as an ally of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Samogitia (GDL). This time, the initiative was on the Lithuanian side, so under the “*Eternal Peace*” of October 1508, Vilnius regained control over part of the previously lost territory (3,000 km²), in particular by cutting off the Grand Duchy of Moscow (GDM) from access to the Dnieper. However, the chances of the GDL for a full-scale revanche were thwarted by Mikhail Glinsky’s large-scale rebellion in the rear (the future great-uncle of Ivan the Terrible).

In 1512, the Fourth War began (*with Crimea as Lithuania’s ally*). After several attempts, Muscovite forces captured Smolensk in 1514, a city they had been unsuccessfully contesting since 1502. However, they soon suffered a crushing defeat at Orsha (8 September 1514) at the hands of the army of Kostiantyn Ostrozky. Intense military operations continued until 1520, but neither side gained a decisive advantage. In 1521, the Crimean army laid siege to Moscow. Under the 1522 truce, the Grand Duchy of Moscow retained the conquered lands (23,000 km²). Shortly thereafter, the removal of Smolensk boyars and townspeople into the interior of Muscovy began.

In 1533, Vasily III died, and power was formally inherited by Ivan IV (*the future Ivan the Terrible*), though in reality it passed to his mother, Elena Glinskaya.

In 1534, the GDL launched a new war, in which Crimea again sided with it. It was the first confrontation during which border princes began to “*depart*” to Lithuania.

Strategic initiative shifted back and forth: the Lithuanians managed to recover part of the previously lost territories (6,200 km²), while another part was lost (1,600 km²). In February–March 1537, the parties concluded a truce: the border was drawn along the line of contact. This time, the treaty was renewed four times and lasted for almost a quarter of a century.

In parallel, the last independent Russian states of the region — the Pskov Republic and the Grand Principality of Ryazan — came under Moscow’s authority in a voluntary-compulsory manner. After the wars for the “*Kyivan heritage*” and the completion of the unification of Zalissia, the total territory of Muscovy, including vassal lands, reached **2.5–2.8 million km²**.

The struggle for the “*Kyivan heritage*” demonstrated the superiority of the Muscovite pomest’e army over the Lithuanian noble levy, as well as the internal weakness of aristocratic Lithuania compared with despotic Muscovy. At the same time, Moscow did not allow “*departures*” to Lithuania.

Moscow skillfully exploited religious contradictions within its neighbor, drawing Orthodox appanage princes dissatisfied with the growing influence of Catholicism to its side. In Lithuania, preference in appointments to the highest offices was indeed given to Catholics, but there was no forced conversion, and there were important exceptions to this rule. Thus, in 1497, the Orthodox Ostrogski, who was also the largest landowner in Volhynia, was appointed Grand Hetman of Lithuania.

Of the five wars, the GDL won one, drew another, and lost three, losing a third of its territory in total. Lithuania’s forces were so exhausted that only the Polish army saved it from complete collapse — thus, the unification of the two states became a matter of time. In particular, the Kraków–Vilnius Union was concluded in 1499, and the Mielnik Union in 1501.

But the closer the ties between the GDL and Poland became, the lower was the loyalty of Orthodox Ruthenian princes to Vilnius, which in turn facilitated Moscow’s “*gathering of lands*.” However, the main prize of half a century of struggle — Kyiv — never became Muscovite.


Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② Liubech and the left bank of the Dniro, reconquered by the GDL during the war of 1507–1508.
- ③ Lithuanian–Ukrainian lands ceded to the GPM, probably by peaceful means after the war of 1507–1508.
- ④ Lithuanian–Ukrainian lands seized by the GPM in 1503 and returned to the GDL, probably by peaceful means after the war of 1507–1508.
- ⑤ The Pskov Republic (“*Lord Pskov*”). A state independent of Novgorod since 1348; from the 1460s, a de facto vassal of the GPM. Finally absorbed by Muscovy in 1510, after which 300 Pskov families of landowners and merchants were deported into the interior of the country.
- ⑥ The Grand Principality of Ryazan. Under the protectorate of the GPM from 1456 to 1464 and from 1483. Seized in 1519 and finally annexed to the GPM in 1521. Thousands of Ryazan inhabitants were removed to the interior of the country.
- ⑦ Buyhorodok, seized by the GPM in 1503, returned to the GDL in 1508, and again seized by the GPM during the war of 1512–1522.
- ⑧ Smolensk and other Lithuanian–Belarusian lands were seized by the GPM during the 1512–1522 war.
- ⑨ Sebezh and Zavolochye were seized by the GPM during the 1534–1537 war.
- ⑩ Homel and other Lithuanian–Belarusian territories reconquered by the GDL during the war of 1534–1537.

CHAPTER 8

THE WARS FOR THE "HORDE HERITAGE" AND THE
BEGINNING OF THE CONQUEST OF
THE VOLGA REGION

1502-1552



The disintegration of the Golden Horde in the mid-15th century brought to the fore the question of a new balance of power in Eastern Europe.

The first khan of an independent Crimea, Hacı Giray, in the 1450s–1460s, was in fact a junior partner of Casimir IV, preventing incursions by the Great Horde (the core of the former Golden Horde) into the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus', and Samogitia (GDL) and the Kingdom of Poland. However, already under his successors, Crimea reoriented itself toward relations with the Grand Principality of Moscow (GPM), culminating in the conclusion of a Crimean–Muscovite alliance in 1474. In response, the GDL drew closer to the Great Horde.

The alliance between Crimea and the GPM proved more durable than the opposing one. By the beginning of the 16th century, the GDL had lost nearly a third of its territories to Moscow, while the Great Horde ceased to exist altogether (1502). However, after this, the former allies turned into adversaries.

The imposition of suzerainty replaced alliances. The two main rivals — Crimea and Muscovy — sought to place dependent rulers on the thrones of post-Horde states. The Crimean Girays, as descendants of Chinggis Khan, demanded recognition of their supremacy in the Turkic-Muslim world of Eastern Europe and proposed members of their own dynasty as khans. Crimea acted primarily through diplomacy, while the Muscovite Rurikids, lacking such dynastic authority, relied more on bribery and coercion.

The main arena of the struggle for the Horde's heritage became Kazan. From its inception, the Kazan Khanate was an antagonist of Muscovy in political, economic, and religious respects. Over 114 years, the two states were at war or engaged in large-scale invasions 12 times, not counting dozens of minor Kazan raids. Kazan was besieged five times, Moscow twice.

During this period, the GPM installed its protégé on the Kazan throne eight times, while the throne was occupied twice by the Crimean Girays. Between 1487 and 1505, the khanate was de facto a Muscovite protectorate, and in 1524–1531, a nominal vassal of the Ottoman Empire. Overall, pro-Moscow and pro-Crimean khans ruled Kazan for approximately equal periods.

However, Muscovite and Horde understandings of vassalage differed substantially. In the Tatar khanates, an oath was regarded as temporary by definition, valid only between incumbent rulers, and its renunciation to conclude another agreement was entirely acceptable. The Muscovite ruler regarded even a single payment of tribute as a sign of eternal subjection of a given territory, and the refusal of vassalage as perjury and state treason.

Overall, the Muscovite strategy of suzerainty, for dynastic and religious reasons, proved less successful than the Crimean one; consequently, the GPM shifted to the direct conquest of Kazan.

In 1523, Muscovy built the first fortress on the Kazan side of the border, which became a bridgehead for further advance — Vasilyevsk. In 1535, the town of Mokshan was in the Mordvin lands of the khanate. More than **25,000 km²** came under Russian control.

In the spring of 1551, the fortress of Sviyazhsk was

built on the bank of the Volga, almost opposite Kazan. In August of the same year, the population of the western part of the khanate took the “Sviyazhsk oath” of allegiance to the tsar, and the then khan was forced to agree to the inclusion of half of his state into Russia.

In March 1552, Moscow abolished khanly authority, appointed the Sviyazhsk voivode as governor of Kazan, and brought the population of the khanate's capital to an oath of allegiance. The eastern part of the state, inhabited by Muslims, was to be preserved as a separate self-governing unit within Russia, and the Tatar aristocracy was to be accorded equal rights with the Russian aristocracy. However, another coup in the city and the invitation of a different khan put an end to this plan, and Russian troops had to take Kazan by storm on 2 October 1552.


Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The interflow of the Moksha and Sura rivers, inhabited by Mordvin tribes within the borders of the Kazan Khanate. A territory under the de facto influence of Muscovy from the 1530s, formally annexed to Russia in 1551.
- ③ The “*High Side*” — the right bank of the Volga within the borders of the Kazan Khanate. A territory de facto seized and simultaneously formally annexed to Russia in 1551.
- ④ The “*Meadow Side*” — the left bank of the Volga and the Kama basin within the borders of the Kazan Khanate. A territory formally annexed to Russia in 1552, de facto conquered by 1557 (see the next section).

CHAPTER 9

THE COMPLETION OF THE CONQUEST OF THE
VOLGA REGION AND THE
BEGINNING OF ITS COLONIZATION

1552-1557



During the assault on Kazan, women and children were taken captive, and warriors captured with weapons in their hands were killed. Both khans, the old and the new, were taken to Moscow and baptized. The leadership of the “pro-Moscow party” was also resettled to the center of Russia and to Kasimov; some were forced to convert to Orthodoxy, and some of those who refused were drowned. Almost all representatives of Kazan’s “anti-Moscow party” were destroyed.

The conquest of a land that had never previously been part of Muscovy–Russia required ideological justification. Thus, on the one hand, Muscovite clerics insisted that the Volga Bulgars had once paid tribute to the Kyivan Prince Volodymyr. Accordingly, the successors of the former were to submit to the heirs of the latter. On the other hand, the capture of Kazan was framed as a crusade. All mosques in Kazan were dismantled, and the city was rebuilt with churches. However, under Ivan the Terrible, the ordinary population of the former khanate was not compelled to convert.

The fall of the capital did not mean the immediate destruction of the khanate. The surviving Kazan aristocracy and the population of the left bank of the Volga continued armed resistance (*the First Cheremis War*) until 1557. After their defeat, Russia’s colonizing advance intensified. All the Tatar population of Kazan (*except for nine families*) was expelled beyond the city walls; residence within the city was forbidden to them, and in their place the authorities relocated 7,000 Russian families from the central regions of the country.

The middle stratum of Kazan society — loyal Muslim murzas and the newly baptized — was admitted to the tsar’s service under the pomestie system, becoming the new aristocracy. Tatar horsemen fought as part of the Russian army.

The lower strata of the khanate’s population remained in their previous condition, paying yasak in the same amounts as before (*until 1724*). Russian nobles were forbidden to enserf non-Russian peasants (*at least until the last quarter of the 17th century*).

The landholdings of the khan and the princes were confiscated and distributed to landlords. In total, within 15 years after the fall of Kazan, the number of new ethnic Russian landowners on the left bank of the Volga exceeded that of the old Turkic and Finno-Ugric landowners by a factor of three.

The authorities also established towns and fortresses in the annexed lands, where the main population consisted of service Cossacks and plowmen musketeers. Such military colonists not only secured the state’s external borders but also guaranteed the loyalty of the inhabitants of the surrounding villages.

To govern the territory, “*Tatar heads*” were appointed from among Russians, while elected sotniks and elders from the local population operated only at the level of volosts and rural communities. Noble self-government did not develop in the conquered lands; instead, a system of voivodeships — military-civil administration — was formed there and later extended throughout Russia.

The subjugation of the Hajji-Tarkhan Khanate was similarly achieved.

In 1554, a pro-Moscow khan was forcibly installed on the throne, but two years later, he shifted his orientation toward Crimea; in 1556, his state was conquered by Russia. Two years later, near the abandoned capital, construction of a new center, Astrakhan, began. To justify the seizure of this territory, a version was advanced in Moscow that Hajji-Tarkhan was the ancient Tmutarakan, that is, part of Rus’.

In the very first month after the conquest of Hajji-Tarkhan, Russian voivodes deprived the surrounding Nogais of the right to cross the Volga freely, and the local Tatars of fishing and ferrying rights. Since most of the old townspeople had fled, the voivodes populated the new Astrakhan with Nogais who had been specially captured for this purpose. Some nomads voluntarily settled near the city to escape famine, but were forced to provide Russian hostages.

In the mid-16th century, the nomadic Bashkir tribes in the southern Urals were either part of the Kazan Khanate or under the suzerainty of the Nogai Horde and the Siberian Khanate. After the conquest of Kazan, Moscow offered the Bashkirs to enter its allegiance. This voluntarily-compulsory process began in 1554, was accompanied by internal conflicts, and was completed in 1557.

The Bashkirs entered Russia on the condition that land ownership, Islam, and the traditional system of governance and justice be preserved, and that their aristocracy be granted rights equal to those of the Russian nobility. In return, they undertook to pay yasak and perform military service.

To administer the conquered territories of the Volga region and Bashkiria, a separate Kazan Prikaz existed from the late 1550s until the 1708 reform. As a result of the conquest of the Volga region and the annexation of Bashkiria, the territory of Muscovy (*including vassal lands, but not counting Cossack territories*) increased to **3.3 million km²**.

In the Stoglav of 1551 — a compilation of decisions of the council of the same name — the use of the phrase “*Russian Tsardom*” is recorded for the first time in an official document. The term “*Russia*” was definitively established in the tsar’s title in 1613.


Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Hajji-Tarkhan Khanate.
- ③ The course of the Volga River.
- ④ Bashkir lands under Nogai control until the mid-16th century.

CHAPTER 10

THE WARS FOR THE "HORDE HERITAGE" AND THE BEGINNING OF EXPANSION INTO THE CAUCASUS

1552-1570



The seizure by Muscovy–Russia of the Volga khanates opened the way for its expansion beyond the Volga and into the Caucasus.

In 1555, the then-Siberian khan Ediger recognized himself as a tributary of the tsar. Still, by 1563, the new khan, Kuchum, had effectively ceased paying tribute and, from 1572, entered into armed conflict with Russia. The Russian conquest of the northern Trans-Urals (*the Siberian Khanate and its neighbors*) began only in the following decade.

The Nogai Horde in the mid-16th century experienced famine and large-scale internecine strife, during which one faction aligned itself with Moscow. In 1557, the Nogai bey Ismail recognized dependence (*but not subjection*) on Russia, which provoked a split within the horde.

Clans dissatisfied with the bey's decision crossed the Volga to the North Caucasus and Kuban, where they formed the Lesser Nogai Horde or, after the name of their leader, Murza Gazi, the "*Gaziyev Ulus*" (from 1560 — a vassal of the Crimean Khanate).

However, the Trans-Volga Greater Nogai Horde's dependence remained purely declarative — its beys regularly attacked Russia, and Cossacks twice burned the Nogai capital (1573 and 1581). Only from 1600 did the Greater Nogais become real vassals of Moscow.

In 1552 and 1557, several Kabardian princes from the Sunzha-Kuban interfluvium accepted Ivan the Terrible's allegiance, and in 1561 the tsar married the daughter of one of them. Russian troops undertook several campaigns into Kabarda in support of their vassals (1563 and 1565–1566), but in 1570 the Kabardians, defeated by Crimean forces, swore allegiance to the khan.

The Tumen Principality in the interfluvium of the Kuma and Terek in the first half of the 16th century was alternately in vassalage to the Ottoman, Crimean, and Safavid (*Iranian*) states, and in 1558 requested transfer of allegiance to the tsar, which (*and only nominally*) lasted just one year. In 1560, Russian troops briefly invaded the Caucasian Tumen for the first time. Over the next two decades, this territory remained under sporadic Russian control.

At the same time, in the 1550s, Cossacks began to settle near and directly on the territory of Caucasian Tumen: Greben Cossacks — along the course of the Sunzha, Terek Cossacks — at the mouth of the Terek. As independent ("*free*") entities, Cossack communities actively pursued pro-Moscow policies in the region.

To consolidate its influence in the Caucasus, Russia built fortresses near the mouth of the Sunzha (1567–1570, 1577–1579), twice abandoning them under pressure from Crimea and Turkey. After the construction of the second fortress, the Terek Cossacks and a smaller part of the Greben Cossacks effectively found themselves under Russian protection, performing service and receiving pay. Officially, they were included in the garrison of the Terek fortress at the river mouth in 1668. However, most Greben Cossacks retained de facto independence until the early 18th century (*their lands are not marked on the map*).

Also, during the struggle against the Crimean Khanate, the lower course of the Psel River from 1556 to early 1562 was occupied by Russian troops, and in 1558, the townlet of Psel was founded on the banks of the Dniipro.

However, with the start of the Livonian War in 1558, the pace of Russian advance southward declined; instead, territories of the Livonian Order and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were seized. Russian troops voluntarily abandoned the Psel fortress in the winter of 1561/1562.

The collapse of the Great Horde in 1502 opened the way for Cossack settlement of the middle and lower reaches of the Don and its tributaries: the Siversky Donets, Medveditsa, Khoper, and Buzuluk. From 1552 — the capture of Kazan — until the 18th century, the Don Cossacks served as junior allies of Russia. From 1570, Russia exercised a de facto protectorate over the lands of the Don Cossacks; from the 1590s, payments to the Don Cossacks are recorded annually (*interrupted during the Time of Troubles and restored in 1618*). However, the first oath of the Don Host to the tsar was sworn only in 1671.

Between 1554 and the second half of the 1580s, free Volga Cossacks existed on the right bank of the middle course of the Volga, and were later displaced by Russian troops to the Don and the Yaik.

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Psel townlet.
- ③ Caucasian Tumen (*the Tumen Principality*).
- ④ The land of the Greben Cossacks (*partially under Russian protection*).
- ⑤ The land of the Terek Cossacks.
- ⑥ Kabarda.
- ⑦ Narva, Dorpat, and other Livonian territories, seized by Russia in 1558 and 1563.
- ⑧ Polotsk and other Lithuanian–Belarusian territories, seized by Russia in 1563.
- ⑨ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑩ The land of the Volga Cossacks.

CHAPTER 11

THE OPRICHNINA AND THE
FORMATION OF RUSSIAN AUTOCRACY

1565-1572



Defeats during the Livonian War (*see the next section*), the flight to Europe of Russian aristocrats dissatisfied with the strengthening of autocracy, and the manic suspiciousness of Ivan the Terrible triggered a deep internal crisis in Russia in 1562–1564. At the end of 1564, the tsar executed several princes; in response, the Russian elite began to hatch plans for a coup.

In early January 1565, Ivan the Terrible moved from Moscow to the Alexandrovskaya Sloboda, where he announced the beginning of the “*oprichnina*” — the de facto division of Russia into two states under the rule of a single sovereign.

Within the territory of the oprichnina, its own administrative and tax system was established, along with a separate army, while the rest of Russia's lands, the “*zemshchina*,” continued to function under the old rules. The oprichniki (1,000, later 6,000 men) were directly subordinate to the tsar and swore not to maintain ties with the zemshchina.

The oprichnina was de facto Ivan's personal domain, in which he could fully realize the concepts of autocratic rule over a centralized state, without regard for the opinions of the boyars and clergy. In correspondence with Andrei Kurbsky, the tsar emphasized: “*We are free to reward our slaves, and likewise free to execute them.*” At the same time, the tsar continued to govern zemstvo institutions such as the Boyar Duma, while zemstvo boyars were deprived of any authority within the oprichnina.

After its initial formation in 1565, the territory of the oprichnina was expanded twice. Outside the boundaries shown on the map, Alexandrovskaya Sloboda and Gorokhovets were entirely within the oprichnina, whereas Moscow and Novgorod were considered to be partially within the oprichnina. However, even within oprichnina territories, there could be zemstvo towns.

The oprichnina encompassed the most developed cities, as well as territories with a significant proportion of service nobility. Large boyar landholdings were concentrated in the zemshchina. The economy of the oprichnina was based on trade with England, whereas agriculture remained the principal occupation of the zemshchina. A contribution was levied on the zemshchina when the oprichnina was introduced; zemstvo districts paid taxes twice as high as those of the oprichnina. It was also the zemshchina that bore the main burden of the Livonian War and resistance to the Crimean Khanate.

The establishment of the oprichnina marked the beginning of government terror against the population of Russia. Initially, this was limited to the resettlement of disloyal aristocrats (6,500 people, not counting their servants) through the confiscation of patrimonial lands and isolated executions. However, from 1568, repression became mass in character, affecting not only the highest nobility (for example, the Metropolitan of Moscow) but also ordinary Russians, not only in the oprichnina but also in the zemshchina.

The activities of the oprichnina detachments resembled raids by foreign armies, and the victims of brutal killings regularly included the families of the accused together with their children. The apotheosis was the campaign of the oprichnina army from Moscow to Pskov in Decem-

ber 1569 – February 1570, during which Klin, Torzhok, Tver, and Pskov were plundered, while the population of Novgorod was almost completely exterminated (*both as a result of mass killings and because of the ensuing famine*).

Terror, devastation, and the low combat effectiveness of the oprichnina army led to catastrophe in May 1571, when the forces of Khan Devlet I Giray burned Moscow to the ground. The repetition of the Crimean campaign the following year forced Ivan the Terrible to abolish the oprichnina and halt mass terror, although the separateness of his court persisted formally.

The consequences of the oprichnina included numerous victims — several tens of thousands of people — as well as the devastation of the Russian economy through excessive taxes, resettlements, and the plundering of patrimonial estates. Overall, across the country, approximately 50% of arable land at the turn of the 1570s and 1580s remained uncultivated, and in some regions, up to 90%.

In an attempt to keep peasants in central Russia, Ivan the Terrible introduced the so-called “*forbidden years*,” during which movement from one landowner to another was prohibited — a move that marked the beginning of serfdom.

Overall, the oprichnina was the first, but not the last, attempt by a Russian ruler to govern the state not through institutions but directly, overcoming elite and bureaucratic resistance through terror. After the oprichnina, the level of authoritarianism of Russian autocrats far exceeded that of European absolute monarchs.

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② Caucasian Tumen (*the Tumen Principality*).
- ③ The land of the Greben Cossacks (*partially under Russian protection*).
- ④ The land of the Terek Cossacks.
- ⑤ Kabarda.
- ⑥ Narva, Dorpat, and other Livonian territories.
- ⑦ Polotsk and other Lithuanian–Belarusian territories.
- ⑧ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑨ The land of the Volga Cossacks.

CHAPTER 12

THE LIVONIAN WAR AND THE SUSPENSION OF EXPANSION TO THE WEST

1558-1583

①	Vassal lands within Russia
②	Territories under sporadic Russian control
③ ④ ⑤ ⑥	Lands of the free Cossacks under Russian protectorate
⑦ ⑧	Territories under temporary Russian control
-----	Boundary of the maximum advance of Stefan Batory's forces in 1581
⑨ ⑩ ⑪	Territories lost by Russia to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1582
⑫ ⑬	Territories lost by Russia to Sweden in 1583-1595
	Main territory of the Russian Tsardom in 1583

If the first Russian push to the West in the first half of the 16th century succeeded — with an expansion of more than **300,000 km²** — then the second attempt in the second half of the century, known as the Livonian War, ended in failure.

In the mid-16th century, the Livonian Confederation (*a union of the order of the same name, several bishoprics, and cities*) was in complete decline. However, it remained an obstacle to Russian trade in the Baltic, preventing merchants from moving westward and European craftsmen from moving eastward. Russia had access to the sea, but the turnover of its own ports was not comparable to that of Riga and Reval (*Tallinn*).

Under the 1554 treaty, the Livonians were to pay Moscow the so-called “*Yuriev tribute*,” which they had owed to the Pskov Republic since the late Middle Ages but had never paid. In addition, the positions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus', and Samogitia — hostile to Russia — were strengthening in Livonia. Finally, Ivan the Terrible could not come to terms with the spread of Lutheranism in the Baltic.

Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, and Denmark also had plans to expand into the confederation's territory. In 1557, a secret agreement on a Polish-Livonian alliance was concluded.

The Russian invasion of Livonia in 1558 aimed to resolve economic disputes and was conceived as a short-term measure. However, the order proved so fragile that, within a year, it suffered a complete defeat: its eastern territories were occupied by Russia, and in 1560 the central part of the country came under Moscow's control. Atrocities accompanying the Russian invasion were so widespread that they became the subject of European pamphlets.

Also in 1560, the island of Ösel (*Saaremaa*) was occupied by Denmark, and the following year, Reval came under Swedish control. At the end of 1561, the Union of Vilnius was concluded, which legally ended the Livonian Confederation: the order was abolished, and most of Livonia entered the GDL — partly as the vassal Duchy of Courland, partly directly. The Kingdom of Sweden became an ally of Russia.

The union marked the beginning of another Lithuanian-Russian war. At the beginning of 1563, the Russians took Polotsk, after which a Jewish pogrom occurred in the city. But already the following year, the troops of Ivan the Terrible suffered defeat, and the most famous Russian émigré — Prince Andrei Kurbsky defected to the Lithuanian side. In response, Ivan the Terrible introduced the oprichnina in 1565.

A second front was opened in the Sivershchyna, where Lithuanian troops with the participation of Ukrainian Cossacks inflicted several defeats on the Muscovite forces in 1562–1565 and even besieged Chernihiv and Starodub in 1563, but both fortresses held.

In 1569, the GDL and the Kingdom of Poland united to form the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which, the following year, concluded a truce with Russia. But in that same year, 1570, Sweden took up arms against Russia, and on Russian-occupied lands a puppet state — the Livonian Kingdom — was created as a vassal of the Russian Tsardom. In 1572–1577, Russian troops occupied almost the entire western and southern parts of Livonia.

In 1576, Stefan Batory became the new king of the Commonwealth, and hostilities resumed the following year. In 1578, western Livonia was liberated from Russian rule, and in 1579, Polotsk was liberated; thereafter, the war spread into Russian territory.

Unable to resist two opponents, with a rear devastated by the oprichnina and the Crimeans, Ivan the Terrible began seeking peace at the end of 1580. In January 1582, Russia concluded the Treaty of Yam-Zapolsky with the Commonwealth and, in May–August 1583, the Truce of Plussa with Sweden.

Russia lost all the lands it had seized in Livonia and Lithuania after the war began, and also returned to the Commonwealth a number of Belarusian-Ukrainian cities and territories that Muscovy had held since the first third of the 16th century (**50,000 km²**). In return, the Commonwealth returned the cities taken by Batory, and Russia retained access to the Baltic Sea at the mouth of the Neva River.

Sweden retained both the Livonian and Russian lands it had seized during the war (**65,000 km²**), but Moscow refused to recognize Sweden's *de jure* losses. They were returned under the Treaty of Tyavzin following the 1590–1595 war.

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② Caucasian Tumen (*the Tumen Principality*).
- ③ The land of the Greben Cossacks (*partially under Russian protection*).
- ④ The land of the Terek Cossacks.
- ⑤ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑥ The land of the Volga Cossacks.
- ⑦ The Livonian Kingdom (*a vassal of Russia*) during the period of maximum expansion in 1577–1578.
- ⑧ Polotsk and other Lithuanian-Belarusian territories.
- ⑨ Velizh and other Belarusian lands included in the GDL (*within the Commonwealth*).
- ⑩ The left bank of the Sozh River, the date of whose transfer to the Commonwealth remains disputed: 1537, 1582, or 1618/19.
- ⑪ Nizhyn, Pryluky, Ripky, and other Ukrainian lands included in the Kingdom of Poland (*within the Commonwealth*).
- ⑫ Koporye and Ivangorod.
- ⑬ Korela.

CHAPTER 13

THE WARS FOR THE “HORDE HERITAGE” AND THE CONFRONTATION WITH CRIMEA

1502-1594



The defeat of the Great Horde in 1502 deprived the Crimean–Muscovite alliance of its purpose. The grand princes did not support the khans' claims to hegemony in the Wild Fields, while Crimea no longer wished to tolerate Moscow's supremacy over Kazan.

Lacking Russia's demographic and technical resources, the Crimean Khanate could not conquer hostile territories. Instead, the Crimeans were able to conduct short raids on Russian lands almost every year, undermining the enemy's economy. In total, there were 43 raids in the first half of the 16th century and 48 in the second.

Against this backdrop, four full-scale wars took place, during which Moscow was besieged three times. In 1521, combined Crimean–Kazan forces defeated the Muscovites beneath the walls of the capital, after which the grand prince recognized himself as a vassal of the Crimean Khan Mehmed I (*this period in Muscovite history lasted less than two weeks*).

In 1551–1561, Russian expansion took place, as a result of which the entire Volga region, as well as significant territories of the North Caucasus and the Wild Fields, came under Moscow's control. However, Ivan the Terrible's attempts to resolve the "*Crimean question*" in the same manner as the "*Kazan question*" proved unsuccessful.

In 1555, Crimean Khan Devlet I inflicted a crushing defeat on the Russian army at Sudbishchi, and Cossack–Russian raids on Crimea in 1556 and 1559 had no consequences. Where Moscow could not deliver heavy artillery by boats, it achieved no success. After this, Russia no longer attempted to subjugate Crimea by force of arms, concentrating instead on building static defenses of its borders — the abatis lines (*see the next section*).

After 1556, the struggle was waged not so much for legal possession of the Wild Fields, nor even for their actual settlement, as for the preservation of the tributary system. Moscow's failure to pay "*commemorative payments*" and "*requested monies*" to Bakhchisarai almost guaranteed Crimean invasions, although even timely payment did not always secure Russia.

The joint Crimean–Ottoman campaign against Astrakhan in 1569 was unsuccessful; the city remained under Russian control. However, the khan's campaign against Moscow in 1571 ended not only with the burning of the Russian capital, but also with the tsar's agreement to cede Astrakhan to Crimea. Nevertheless, the failure of the Crimean campaign the following year prevented the realization of this plan.

Until 1577, a balance of power persisted; thereafter, Crimea plunged into internal turmoil. Between 1585 and 1591, two relatives of the khan, capable of occupying the Crimean throne, served in the tsar's service. Astrakhan became the bridgehead for the future conquest of Crimea (*the "possession" of Murad Giray in 1586–1590*). However, real risks for Moscow outweighed potential opportunities, and both claimants were poisoned.

Only in 1591 did Khan Gazi II turn the tide. In that year, Crimean forces besieged Moscow for the last time, and although they were not defeated in a field battle, they were forced to retreat. After several years of negotiations

and campaigns, the khan concluded a treaty with Russia in 1594, in which he recognized the tsarist title of the Russian ruler, Fyodor. This served as evidence of the nominal equality of both sides and marked the end of the entire war for the Horde's inheritance.

Russia forcibly appropriated most of the Horde's physical heritage (*territory and population*). Nominally, the Crimean and neutral lands of the Wild Fields were settled by Cossacks allied with the Kremlin. The tsars also achieved recognition of legal equality with the Crimean khans. However, Crimea not only retained independence and parts of the Black Sea region, the Kuban, and the North Caucasus, but also reserved the right to receive tribute from Moscow.


Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The "*possessions*" of Murad Giray.
- ③ Caucasian Tumen (*the Tumen Principality*).
- ④ The land of the Greben Cossacks (*partially under Russian protection*).
- ⑤ The land of the Terek Cossacks.
- ⑥ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑦ Territories of the Siberian Khanate held by Cossacks during 1582–1585.

CHAPTER 14

THE FIRST ABATIS LINES AND THE BEGINNING OF THE COLONIZATION OF THE WILD FIELDS

SECOND HALF OF THE 16TH CENTURY



The capture of a region's center or the taking of its ruler into allegiance did not mean the establishment of Moscow's actual authority there. While the nominal possessions of Russia and its Cossack allies extended southward as far as the mouth of the Don, in reality, only individual fortresses and their surroundings constituted parts of the state.

In the second half of the 15th century, the first permanent defensive line began to take shape along the Oka, consisting of several old fortresses (*Kolomna*, *Serpukhov*), new fortresses, and abatis between them. The defense of this line was entrusted to the so-called "Coastal Service." In the first decade of the 16th century, the first continuous abatis line was formed, known as the "Coast." The defensive line of the Coast ran along the Oka from Peremyshl to Pereyaslavl-Ryazansky (*modern Ryazan*). The Coast became the model for constructing other abatis lines.

The abatis themselves were made in forests, which came to be known as "abatis forests," where unauthorized tree cutting and road building were prohibited. In treeless sections, the line consisted of earthen ramparts and/or wooden palisades along ravines. Observation towers were built on suitable hills, and stockades at points of passage through the abatis. The fortifications themselves exceeded 40–60 meters in depth, and, together with the forests, the total length exceeded 40–60 kilometers. The line was guarded by the abatis watch (30–35,000 men), organized into stanitsas. Patrol detachments carried out forward reconnaissance. A special levy — the "abatis money" — was collected for the maintenance of the line.

Immediately after the Crimean–Kazan siege of Moscow in 1521, construction began on a new line of fortifications, later known as the Great Abatis Line. The "first stage" ran along the route: the source of the Zhizdra — Bolokhov — Belyov — Odoev — Krapivna — Tula — Venyov — Ryazan. In certain sections, the line consisted of two, three, and even four rows of fortifications. The "second stage" ran from Skopin and Ryazhsk through Shatsk and Temnikov to Alatyr and Tetyushi. Overall, construction was completed in 1566 (*the Tetyushi abatis — in the second half of the 1570s*). The total length of the Great Abatis Line was 1,000 kilometers, encompassing 40 towns and fortresses.

To the east of the "second stage," approximately in a single line, lay the towns of Dankov, Epifan, Dedilov, and Orel, built in the 1550s–1570s, as well as the ancient Novosil.

Thus, the actual borders of Russia in the mid-16th century ran precisely along the Great Abatis Line and the line of new towns to Rylysk and Putyvl — south of this, there was no permanent Russian population (*only Cossacks and nomadic vassals*). In the 1580s, the territory actually controlled by Russia expanded to the Kursk–Livny line, and only after the defeat of the Crimeans near Moscow in 1591 did a large-scale colonization of the Wild Fields between the Dniro and the Don begin.

Overall, the total area of Russia (*including vassal lands and excluding Cossack territories*) at the time of Ivan the Terrible's death in 1584 amounted to **3.5 million km²**. The territory of the Siberian Khanate, whose conquest

had only just begun, is not included here.

It is noteworthy that, despite the conquest of the Volga region as early as 1556, the first patrols of the guard service did not begin descending from Nizhny Novgorod to Astrakhan until Tsar Boris, at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries. Russian colonization of the Volga–Don interfluvium began only in the 1640s.

Numbered designations indicate:


- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The "possessions" of Murad Giray.
- ③ Caucasian Tumen (*the Tumen Principality*).
- ④ The land of the Greben Cossacks (*partially under Russian protection*).
- ⑤ The land of the Terek Cossacks.
- ⑥ The land of the Don Cossacks.

CHAPTER 15

THE CONQUEST OF THE SIBERIAN KHANATE AND THE YUGRA PRINCIPALITIES

1582-1598

PART I



Territories west of the northern part of the Ural Range entered the sphere of Novgorodian interests as early as the first third of the 11th century. From the 12th to the late 15th century, these lands were partially colonized as tributary possessions of Novgorod, until they came under the control of the Grand Principality of Moscow.

Territories east of the northern Ural Range experienced the overlapping influence of two state traditions: the Novgorodian–Muscovite tradition from the west and the Golden Horde from the south. As a result, the local Finno-Ugric and Yeniseian tribes formed several chiefdoms, referred to in chronicles as principalities. They became collectively known as Yugra.

In 1455, an attack by one of the Yugra princes on Moscow-controlled Perm Vychevodskaya was recorded for the first time; ten years later, the first campaign of Muscovite and Permian troops beyond the Urals took place. Military actions of varying intensity continued until 1500, and the captured Yugra princes generally acknowledged the Moscow grand prince's supremacy and returned to their domains.

In 1484, a treaty was concluded in Ust-Vym between the Grand Principality of Moscow and the rulers of the Konda, Kazym, Obdorsk, and Sosva principalities. Traditionally, Moscow regarded this agreement as recognition of its supremacy (*Ivan III would soon expand his title to include the designation "of Yugra," and Vasily III — to "of Obdoria and Kondia"*). For the Yugrans, however, it was rather a non-aggression pact and a defensive alliance directed against the Sosva prince, while dependence on Moscow was limited to irregular tribute payments.

In 1499, the first permanent Muscovite base beyond the Urals — the Lyapin stockade — was established on the territory of the Lyapin Principality. Still, at that point, the advance of the conquerors came to a halt.

Muscovite expansion in 1450–1500 did not result in the incorporation of the Northern Urals into the Grand Principality of Moscow. The Pelym and Lyapin principalities remained adversaries of Muscovy — from 1531, the Pelym princes regularly raided Great Perm. The Konda and Tabary principalities were vassals of Pelym and, together with it, fought against Russia. A situational ally of the Yugrans was the Tumen/Siberian Khanate, whose rulers from 1506 regularly attacked the Permian lands.

By contrast, the nomadic Samoyeds (*Samoyedic peoples*) along the Arctic coast voluntarily became tributaries of the Grand Principality of Moscow in 1525 in exchange for assistance against the Yugra princes. The Cis-Ural Samoyeds paid tribute regularly; the Trans-Ural ones did so from time to time.

An attempt by the Russian Tsardom to establish control over Yugra is recorded following the Siberian khan Ediger's recognition of Moscow as his tributary in 1555. A charter of 1556/7 (*a copy of an earlier document*) promised the Yugra prince Pevgiy "*favor and protection on all sides*" in exchange for tribute "*of one sable from every person.*"

Although Ivan the Terrible simultaneously appended the title "*sovereign of all the Siberian land and the Northern country,*" it is unknown whether this tribute was actually collected from the Yugrans.

This unstable situation persisted until 1563, when Kuchum seized power in the Siberian Khanate. During his reign, the khanate's territory reached its maximum extent, and most Yugra principalities recognized his suzerainty. Kuchum ceased paying tribute to the Russian Tsardom.

In 1570, the Russian merchant Stroganovs founded their first settlement east of the Urals. As early as 1572, these territories were recaptured by the Siberian Khanate, and a year later, Kuchum's forces attacked Perm.

Military operations of varying intensity continued until 1582.

Цифрами позначені:


- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The "*possessions*" of Murad Giray.
- ③ Caucasian Tumen (*the Tumen Principality*).
- ④ The land of the Greben Cossacks (*partially under Russian protection*).
- ⑤ The land of the Terek Cossacks.
- ⑥ The land of the Don Cossacks.

CHAPTER 16

THE CONQUEST OF THE SIBERIAN KHANATE AND THE
YUGRA PRINCIPALITIES

1582-1598

PART II



In 1582, the Cossack ataman Yermak captured the capital of the Siberian Khanate. After Yermak died in 1585, his Cossacks returned to Russia; therefore, the conquest of the khanate by regular forces had to be resumed. In 1586, the first Russian town in Siberia, Tyumen, was founded. The process of conquest continued until the end of 1598, when Kuchum was killed.

Some of the Yugra principalities acknowledged vassalage to Russia, while others were conquered. Vassal princes retained their domains and internal self-government, received grants in food and goods, and also Moscow's assistance in struggles for the throne. In return, they were obliged to field their troops for further Russian conquests.

Most of the population continued to lead a traditional way of life, paying *yasak* (most often in furs of forest animals) to their former princes or to Russian voivodes. To ensure regular payment of tribute, the Russians widely employed the system of "*amanatstvo*" — the taking of hostages from among the elite.

Even after the formal liquidation of vassal principalities and the transformation of their territories into "*inorodets volosts*," some ruling dynasties, in exchange for paying yasak, retained their personal domains and privileges, as well as the right to collect tribute from their tribesmen and to judge them. Other former princes and their descendants, after baptism, refused to pay yasak and entered Russian service (*sometimes as common soldiers*).

In total, by the beginning of the Time of Troubles, Russia had taken control of more than **1.6 million km²** of territory in the Urals and Western Siberia (*thus its total area grew to more than 5.1 million km²*). Initially, the small Russian population was concentrated in only 14–15 towns and stockades, controlling only the main routes of communication rather than the entire territory. However, over the following century (1579–1679), the population of the Urals increased more than fifteenfold due to Russian settlement.

Numbered designations indicate:


- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The "possessions" of Murad Giray.
- ③ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ④ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑤ The Siberian Khanate (*central part*).
- ⑥ The Koda Principality. An ally of the Siberian Khanate in 1563–1583. An ally of the Russian Tsardom in 1583–1584. An ally of the Siberian Khanate in 1585–1586. A vassal of Russia from 1586, its territory expanded at the expense of parts of other principalities. Annexed in 1643.
- ⑦ The Belogorye Principality. A vassal of the Siberian Khanate in 1563–1583. In 1583, it was subordinated to the Koda Principality and incorporated into it as a vassal. In 1586, there was an unsuccessful uprising. The Belogorye princes remained vassals of the Koda rulers until the early 1630s.
- ⑧ The Kazym Principality. An attempt to impose Muscovite suzerainty in 1557. A vassal of the Siberian Khanate from 1563 to 1585. Dependent on Moscow from 1586, annexed in 1593. The princely line retained its status at least until 1607.
- ⑨ The Lyapin Principality. Dependent on Moscow from 1586. In 1607, following an unsuccessful uprising, it fragmented and was incorporated directly into the Russian state. The princely line retained its status until the early 19th century.
- ⑩ The Obdorsk Principality. A vassal of the Siberian Khanate from 1563 to 1585. Defeated by Russian–Kodan forces and recognized as dependent on Moscow in 1593, it was annexed two years later. In 1607, there was an unsuccessful attempt to restore independence through an armed uprising. The princely line retained its status until the early 19th century.
- ⑪ The Yamal Peninsula. Under Russian control from 1595.
- ⑫ The Pelym Principality. An ally of the Siberian Khanate from 1563, at war with Russia from 1572. Conquered by Russian and Koda forces in 1593–1594.
- ⑬ The Konda Principality. A vassal of the Pelym Principality. Conquered by Russian and Koda forces in 1594, the region experienced armed resistance by the local population until 1600. The princely line retained its status until the first half of the 19th century.
- ⑭ The Tabary Principality. A vassal of the Pelym Principality. In 1594, it was incorporated into the Russian Tsardom. The Tabary princes were elected from among the nobility until 1598.
- ⑮ The Sosva Principality. A vassal of the Siberian Khanate in 1563–1583. Probably incorporated into the Russian Tsardom no later than 1594. The princely line retained its status until the 18th century.
- ⑯ The two Demyansk principalities (*Boyan and Nimnyuyan*), the Nazym and Narym principalities. Vassals of the Siberian Khanate in 1563–1582. The Principality of Boyan voluntarily became the first Russian vassal during Yermak's campaign; the rest were subdued by force and finally incorporated into Russia no later than 1594.
- ⑰ The Tyumen Principality. Occupied in the late 1580s, annexed in 1594.
- ⑱ The Bardakov Principality. A vassal of the Siberian Khanate in 1563–1583, later neutral. In 1594, it was captured and made a vassal of the Russian Tsardom. In 1602 and 1610, it expanded at the expense of parts of the Ryabaya Horde and the Koda Principality and was annexed after an unsuccessful uprising in 1619.
- ⑲ The Ryabaya ("*Piebold*") Horde. An ally of the Siberian Khanate from 1563. An opponent of the Koda Principality in 1592–1593. A vassal of the Russian Tsardom in 1594–1595, over the next two years at war with it. From 1597, the Horde recognized Moscow's supremacy while retaining self-government. After an unsuccessful revolt in 1602, it was divided into volosts, which were incorporated directly into Russia. The princely line retained its status until the mid-17th century.
- ⑳ The Endirey Principality. Under Russian control in 1589–1605 (*see the next section for details*).

CHAPTER 17

THE CONQUEST OF THE TRANS-VOLGA REGION AND THE SUSPENSION OF EXPANSION INTO THE CAUCASUS

1586-1605

	Main territory of the Russian Tsardom (including unsettled districts) in 1590
	Vassal lands within Russia
	Territories seized by Russia by 1598 and incorporated into it
	Lands of the free Cossacks under Russian protectorate
	Territories under temporary Russian control



After a several-year pause caused by deteriorating relations with the Ottoman Empire, Russian expansion in the North Caucasus resumed.

Probably in 1586, Alexander II, King of Kakheti, agreed to enter Moscow's allegiance in exchange for a promise to "*protect him from all his enemies*." Still, the oath he swore had no real consequences, and in 1605, he was killed by his own son.

In July 1588, a number of Kabardian princes sher-tovali (*gave a written oath of allegiance*) to Tsar Fyodor to remain loyal to him and his heirs in exchange for protection, but this oath had no practical consequences. From time to time, Russia issued charters to its supporters, granting them the title of "*senior prince*," sometimes backing them with troops, but this did not mean automatic recognition by the other princes of Kabarda. In the mid-17th century, the Crimean Khanate's supremacy over the region was restored.

Another Russian fortress in the Caucasus — the Terek Fortress — was built in 1588, this time at the mouth of the Terek, opposite or directly on the site of Tyumen, the capital of the principality of the same name. From that point on, Caucasian Tyumen was effectively occupied by Russian troops and lost its access to the sea. In 1594, the Russians captured the last residence of the local prince on the Sulak River, and the Tyumen Principality ceased to exist.

In 1589, Russian troops occupied the interfluvium of the Terek and the Sulak, where the Endirey Principality was located — a vassal of the Tarkov Shamkhalate (*modern Dagestan*). Subsequently, two stockades were built there.

In 1590, the fortress at the mouth of the Sunzha was restored and renamed the Sunzha Stockade. Those Greben Cossacks who lived on the banks of the Terek once again came under Russian protection. The rest of the Greben Cossacks, settled along the Sunzha, retained their independence until their resettlement to the Terek in 1711–1712.

In 1590, in connection with the poisoning of Murad Giray, his "*possession*" in Astrakhan, which had existed since 1586, ceased to exist.

At the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, four principalities and one horde remained in Siberia and Yugra as vassals, while the remaining territories were incorporated directly into Russia.

Despite advances in Siberia and the Caucasus, Russia managed to accumulate sufficient forces for another war with Sweden in 1590–1595. Under the Treaty of Tyavzin, territories lost under the Truce of Plussa in 1583 returned to Moscow's control.

Twice (*in 1594 and 1604–1605*), Russian troops and Cossacks launched campaigns against the Tarkov Shamkhalate, both of which were unsuccessful. After the defeat of 1605, the mouth of the Sulak and the two stockades were abandoned, and Russia's southern border for the next century was established along the Terek.

At the same time, a new Cossack land emerged along the Yaik River (*now the Ural*). During the 1580s, as government fortresses were built along the Volga, the local free Cossacks were forced to move to the Don and the Yaik. From 1591, the Yaik Cossacks were under Russian

protection. The Yaik Host swore an oath of allegiance to Tsar Mikhail Romanov (*according to different sources, in 1615 or in 1632*).

In parallel, the Great Nogai Horde finally passed under Russian suzerainty, its pastures shrinking to the interfluvium of the Volga and the Yaik. Although Bey Ismail had recognized the protection of Ivan the Terrible as early as 1557, the Nogais never became true vassals of Russia and continued to raid Moscow's possessions. However, the burning of the Nogai capital Saraychik by Cossacks (1581), the formation of the Yaik Host (1591), and the Russo-Crimean peace (1594) led to fundamental changes within the horde.

In 1600, the Nogai murzas appealed to Tsar Boris Godunov to appoint a bey for them, and the ceremony took place in Astrakhan. After this, the Great Nogai Horde became (*with an interruption during the Time of Troubles*) a full-fledged Russian vassal.

As a result, at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, the territory of Russia (*including vassal and uninhabited lands, but excluding Cossack territories*) exceeded **5.2 million km²**.

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The "*possessions*" of Murad Giray.
- ③ The Obdorsk Principality.
- ④ The Lyapin Principality.
- ⑤ The Koda Principality.
- ⑥ The Bardakov Principality.
- ⑦ The Ryabaya Horde.
- ⑧ The Great Nogai Horde.
- ⑨ The territories of the former Caucasian Tyumen (*Tyumen Principality*).
- ⑩ Territories of Sweden.
- ⑪ Territories of the former Siberian Khanate and the Yugra principalities.
- ⑫ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ⑬ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑭ The land of the Yaik Cossacks.
- ⑮ The Endirey Principality.

CHAPTER 18

ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONAL AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA

SECOND HALF OF THE 16TH CENTURY



Imperial expansion and the centralization of power in Russia provoked resistance among the Kremlin's subjects. The most widespread strategy in anti-colonial and anti-government struggles was emigration abroad for the aristocracy and to the state's peripheries for commoners.

There were also seizures of noble property by peasants and killings of individual landowners and officials. In several cases, the population resorted to armed uprisings.

Outbursts of purely anti-government struggle recorded in central Russia in 1546–1550 remained unique for more than half a century. From that point on, however, the leading role was taken by anti-colonial national uprisings in the Volga region.

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Obdorsk Principality.
- ③ The Lyapin Principality.
- ④ The Koda Principality.
- ⑤ The Bardakov Principality.
- ⑥ The Ryabaya Horde.
- ⑦ The Great Nogai Horde.
- ⑧ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ⑨ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑩ The land of the Yaik Cossacks.
- ⑪ The Endirey Principality.
- ⑫ Kolomna (1546). A mutiny of the streltsy for an unknown reason.
- ⑬ Moscow (1547). An urban uprising provoked by a massive fire against the Glinsky clan, accused of arson. The main cause was dissatisfaction with the results of the "boyar rule" during Ivan the Terrible's youth. The uprising had a clearly anti-elite character while remaining pro-tsarist. The rebels occupied the Kremlin without a fight (26 June), but laid down their arms a week later.
- ⑭ Ustyug (1549). An uprising of the urban lower classes.
- ⑮ Pskov (1550). An uprising of the urban lower classes.
- ⑯ The First Cheremis War (1552–1557). An uprising of Tatars and Mari of the left-bank part of the former Kazan Khanate against Russian rule in general and the collection of yasak in particular. Udmurts joined

the uprising, while representatives of the Chuvash and Mordvins fought on both sides. Despite initial successes (*the capture of Arsk, the construction of their own capital-fortress, the siege of Kazan*), the rebels were defeated. Isolated disturbances were recorded in 1567.


- ⑰ The Second Cheremis War (1571–1574). An uprising on the left bank of the Volga aimed at restoring the Kazan Khanate and opposing Christianization began after the burning of Moscow by Devlet I Giray. However, isolated disturbances had been recorded a year earlier. From 1572, Kama Bashkirs joined the uprising for the first time. In 1574, the last Tatar raid on Nizhny Novgorod took place. The uprising was defeated.
- ⑱ The Third Cheremis War (1581–1585). An increase in tribute and political pressure from the Russian administration led to another uprising in the Volga region. It was triggered by the Siberian Khanate's invasion of Russian territory. The uprising was distinguished by its scale and ferocity — this time, all the peoples of the Middle Volga participated: Tatars, Meadow Mari, Hill Mari, Chuvash, Udmurts, and Bashkirs. The rebels besieged Kazan, Cheboksary, and Sviyazhsk, and devastated the surroundings of Khlynov. After the suppression of the uprising, the region was rapidly developed, with Russian towns and fortresses constructed. The consequences of defeat included a ban on Mari residing in towns and along the banks of large rivers, as well as engaging in blacksmithing. At this point, the liberation struggle in the Volga region ended, although isolated disturbances by Bashkirs were recorded in 1587, and by Tatars and Mari in 1592.
- ⑲ The Siege of Berezov (1595). An uprising of the local population led by the Lyapin prince against Russian authority, and an unsuccessful six-month siege of the Berezov stockade. Disturbances in the district continued until the summer of the following year.

CHAPTER 19

THE TIME OF TROUBLES AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE
FIRST RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1598-1619

PART I



Foreign policy failures (*the Livonian War, Crimean incursions*) and internal repression (*the Oprichnina*) brought Russia into a deep crisis in the 1580s-1590s, known as the "Ruin." While Ivan the Terrible's son Fyodor remained on the throne, the situation stayed relatively stable, but the death of the last tsar from the ruling dynasty, who left no heir, created the preconditions for the collapse of Russia — the so-called "Time of Troubles."

The Zemsky Sobor of 1598 elected Boris Godunov to the throne — the tsar's brother-in-law and the de facto ruler of Russia over the previous decade and a half. Under his rule, in 1598, the conquest of the Siberian Khanate and the Yugra principalities was completed; in 1600, the Great Nogai Horde was transformed from a nominal into a real vassal; and from 1603, penetration into the Altai began. It marked the peak of the First Russian Empire's territorial expansion.

However, the catastrophic famine of 1601–1603 undermined Godunov's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. At the same time, an unknown man laid claim to the throne, presenting himself as Dmitry, the miraculously saved son of Ivan the Terrible (*in Russian historiography — False Dmitry I*). In 1605, during the war with the pretender, Boris died, and his son Fyodor became his heir. But within a month and a half, he was overthrown and killed, and Moscow was occupied by the claimant, who was anointed tsar as Dmitry I.

In 1606, Dmitry was also overthrown and killed during an uprising, and Vasily Shuisky became the new tsar. He had to wage a difficult but ultimately victorious war against the supporters of Dmitry, rallied by Ivan Bolotnikov. In 1607, a new impostor, False Dmitry II, imposed a blockade of Moscow — and in 1609, a war between Russia and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth began. In 1610, Shuisky was deposed by a temporary aristocratic government — the Seven Boyars — which subsequently admitted a Commonwealth garrison into the city. Later that same year, the second impostor also perished. Russia, as a unified state, ceased to exist *de facto*.

Several western cities, such as Chernihiv (1610) and Smolensk (1611), were occupied by Commonwealth forces. Sweden, which had previously been Shuisky's ally, occupied Ladoga, Novgorod, and adjacent territories in 1610–1611. A puppet Novgorod state emerged, whose ruler, Karl Philip, became another claimant to the Moscow throne.

The remaining northern and eastern cities recognized the authority of False Dmitry III. The southern outskirts were subjected to regular raids by Crimeans and Nogai forces.

Don Cossacks and various insurgents controlled a significant part of the state's territory, while anti-colonial uprisings of subjugated peoples flared up on the peripheries. Polish and Swedish troops fought each other on Russian territory, and within the Commonwealth itself, the father — King Sigismund III — and the son — Prince Władysław — competed for the Moscow throne. These events can already be interpreted not as an elite interne-cine struggle, but as the first civil war in Russia.

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Obdorsk Principality.
- ③ The Lyapin Principality.
- ④ The Koda Principality.
- ⑤ The Bardakov Principality.
- ⑥ The Ryabaya Horde.
- ⑦ The Great Nogai Horde.
- ⑧ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.


- ⑨ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑩ The land of the Yaik Cossacks.
- ⑪ The Endirey Principality.
- ⑫ The uprising of Khlopko Kosolap (1601–1603) was a series of bandit raids by runaway serfs. Suppressed by government troops.
- ⑬ The uprising in the Narym volost in 1602 was an armed attempt by the princes of the Ryabaya Horde to restore their state's independence. After its defeat, the horde was annexed.
- ⑭ The 1605 uprising in Moscow against Fyodor Godunov.
- ⑮ The 1606 uprising in Moscow against Dmitry.
- ⑯ The uprising of Ivan Bolotnikov (1606–1607) — a war of Cossacks, nobles, and peasants under the banners of the self-proclaimed “voivode” of False Dmitry I against the government of Shuisky. The first siege of Moscow by insurgents in history.
- ⑰ The Volga uprising (1606–1610) — a political struggle of the Russian population in towns and a national and social anti-colonial struggle of Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples. The insurgents besieged Nizhny Novgorod three times and Kazan once. Suppressed by government troops.
- ⑱ The Astrakhan uprising (1606–1614) — a Cossack-urban revolt against the central authorities. It ended with a pro-government coup.
- ⑲ The Berezov revolt of 1607 was an attempt by the princes of Obdorsk, Lyapin, Kazym, Pelym, and Bardakov to restore the independence of their states. The uprising was suppressed by the forces of the Koda Principality, whose ruler was the first to “submit” to Moscow. Plans for anti-Russian uprisings in 1609 and 1612 were uncovered in advance.
- ⑳ The 1610 uprising in Moscow against Shuisky.

CHAPTER 20

THE TIME OF TROUBLES AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE
FIRST RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1598-1619

PART II



In the spring of 1611, the forces of the First Militia, led by Ivan Zarutsky and Prokopy Lyapunov, laid siege to Moscow. After Zarutsky murdered Lyapunov, the First Militia effectively ceased to exist, and its remnants joined the Second Militia.

At the end of 1612, Moscow was liberated by the Second Militia led by Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, after which the consolidation of power began. In 1613, Mikhail Romanov was elected as the new tsar. He had to fight both external enemies (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden) and internal ones (*Zarutsky*, *Baloven*, and *Enaliyev*). Hostilities continued until the end of 1618, when the troops of Prince Władysław, together with the Zaporozhian Cossacks of Petro Sahaidachny, unsuccessfully stormed Moscow.

Under the Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617, Russia ceded to Sweden territories in northwestern Russia (over 82,000 km²), including access to the Baltic Sea. Up to half of the local Ingrian population was forcibly resettled to the Novgorod region. Under the Truce of Deulino in 1618/19, western lands that Moscow had seized as early as the beginning of the previous century (80,000 km²) passed to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The remaining occupied cities (*Novgorod, Vyazma, and others*) were returned to Russia by Sweden and the Commonwealth.

The total number of deaths resulting from famine, warfare, and captivity exceeded one million, while the area of cultivated land was reduced by half (*and in some regions by up to fifteen times*). In the central regions of Russia, the number of peasants fell by a factor of four, and pre-crisis birth rates were not restored until the mid-17th century.

Nevertheless, in the east of the country, Cossacks and Russian regular forces continued their expansion into Siberia, reaching the Yenisei during the Time of Troubles. Despite territorial losses in the west, Russia's total area increased to over **5.7 million km²**.

The collapse of authority and foreign invasions triggered a powerful wave of unrest that swept across almost the entire state. Some rebels rose against specific rulers or the central authority; others opposed Russian domination as a whole, and it is often impossible to identify a single motive among the participants.

However, the Time of Troubles became a period of the first and largest spontaneous democratization in Russia, manifested not only in popular uprisings but also at the institutional level:

1. In 1598 and 1613, the Russian tsar was elected by the Zemsky Sobor; in the latter case, this was a genuine choice among several alternative candidates.

2. In 1606, Vasily Shuisky issued a *krestotselovalnaya zapis* ("cross-kissing charter"). This document legally constrained autocracy in the judicial sphere (*somewhat analogous to the Magna Carta, though on a much smaller scale*).

3. From 1610 to 1612, Russia was formally governed by a collegial body — the Seven Boyars (*in practice, power was held by the troops of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth*). In 1610, the boyar envoy Mikhail Saltykov secured an agreement to elect the Polish prince Władysław as tsar. The agreement envisaged the introduction in Russia of a constitutional monarchy modeled on England (*with two representative bodies*) and, moreover, a religiously tolerant one.

4. Nominal leadership of the First and Second Militias in 1611–1613 was exercised by the so-called "*Councils of All the Land*" — in effect, temporary, collegial insurgent governments (*merged into a single body from 1612*).

5. It is possible that, upon ascending the throne in 1613, Mikhail Romanov issued a version of the *krestotselovalnaya zapis* or a document of similar content. It is even possible that the next tsar, Alexei, imposed a similar limitation on himself, although contemporaries already accused him of violating his promise.

6. Even under the rulers of the Time of Troubles, for whom documentary evidence is lacking, the level of freedom, according to foreign observers, was higher than in previous eras. In particular, the process of peasant enserfment, begun by Ivan the Terrible, was slowed for several decades.


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- ② The Koda Principality.
- ③ The Bardakov Principality.
- ④ The Great Nogai Horde.
- ⑤ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ⑥ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑦ The land of the Yaik Cossacks.
- ⑧ The First People's Militia (*main center of formation*), 1611–1612 — technically an uprising against the government of the Seven Boyars; in practice, an alternative government of Russia led by Lyapunov and Zarutsky.
- ⑨ The uprising against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth garrison in 1611 was suppressed before the First Militia arrived.
- ⑩ The Second People's Militia (*main center of formation*), 1611–1613 — technically an uprising against the government of the Seven Boyars; in practice, an alternative government of Russia led by Minin and Pozharsky. Ended in victory and transferred power to the newly elected tsar.
- ⑪ The uprising of Mikhail Baloven, 1614–1615 — a series of bandit raids by Cossacks and revolts of "Cossackized" peasants and serfs against a return to serfdom. Suppressed by government troops.
- ⑫ The uprising of Jan-Ali ("*Enaliyevshchina*"), 1615–1616 — a national and social anti-colonial struggle of Turkic and Finno-Ugric peoples led by Enaley Enmametyev. Suppressed by government troops.
- ⑬ The uprising in the Bardakov volost, 1616–1619 — a struggle by the sons of the former prince against the transformation of the principality into a volost. Suppressed by government troops.

CHAPTER 21


THE CONQUEST OF CENTRAL SIBERIA

1600-1632



Mangazeya was founded on the Taz River in 1600 and completed in 1601, making it the first city beyond the Arctic Circle. The Time of Troubles slowed the pace of expansion: Russia's new eastern frontier ran along the Tom River (*Kuznetsk*, founded in 1618) and the Yenisei above the Angara (*the Yenisei Ostrog*, 1619). The next fort — Krasnoyarsk — was built only in 1628. Soon thereafter, however, Russia's eastern boundary shifted to the Lena River (*the Lensky and Zhigansk Ostrogs*, founded in 1632).

The subjugation of Central Siberia was the first phase of Russian colonization, driven solely by economic motives — without military, demographic, or cultural imperatives. Whereas Novgorod's economy had rested on squirrel pelts, Russia's economy of this period depended on sable and fox. At various points in the 17th century, the fur trade accounted for **10–25%** of Russia's nominal gross income; in practice, however, selling pelts abroad was almost the only way to replenish the treasury with silver and to supply the army with firearms.



Except for the Yenisei Kyrgyz, most of Central Siberia's population did not mount organized resistance to Russian colonization because of their small numbers and the absence of state structures.

While the conquest of Western Siberia (*the khanates and Yugra principalities*) required large-scale, centrally coordinated military campaigns, Central Siberia was subdued largely by local Russian authorities. An even greater role than before was played by government-independent *promyslovye lyudi* ("industrial people" — hunters and trappers), who collected fur using methods unfamiliar to the indigenous peoples.

Typically, Russians read the so-called "*tsar's gracious word*" to the indigenous groups they encountered, declaring the newly discovered "*lands*" to be state property of Moscow and permitting local inhabitants to remain — and even to receive armed protection — in exchange for paying *yasak* (tribute). Initially, a "*non-assessed*" *yasak* was collected — an unequal but voluntary exchange of furs for Russian goods. It was later replaced by an "*assessed*" *yasak* — a standardized annual tribute. To ensure regular collection, Russians widely employed the system of *amanatstvo* — the taking of hostages — and threats.

Although local "*petty princes*" were compelled to conclude sworn agreements with Russian voivodes, many tribes were unfamiliar with permanent taxation, let alone subjection to a distant tsar. For some, a public oath was considered shameful. Nevertheless, out of fear, a desire for access to goods or protection from neighbors, or a desire to strengthen their own authority, most tribal leaders accepted Russian overlordship. Exempted from paying *yasak* themselves, these leaders oversaw its collection

from their tribesmen and were granted judicial functions — thereby strengthening their position and aligning with Russian administrative needs.

If, however, indigenous groups deemed an agreement disadvantageous and refused to pay *yasak*, colonizers resorted to repression: beatings, executions of hostages, destruction of dwellings, and, in some cases, mass killings.

Official state policy emphasized persuading indigenous peoples to pay voluntarily, and abuses against them were formally condemned. In general, until the end of the century, local populations organized into *yasak volosts* experienced no interference in their internal affairs. The authorities explicitly obstructed the Christianization of the natives, since converts ceased paying the *yasak*.

To preserve the tax base, local officials were forbidden to sentence *yasak* payers to death on their own authority, to beat or mutilate them; land transactions with natives were prohibited, as were debt obligations and the settlement of Russian peasants among them (*even Metropolitan Korniliy was forced in 1678 to return seized native lands*).

Indigenous people could not be turned into serfs, removed from Siberia, or sold wine, tobacco, or gold. Private trade was prohibited until the *yasak* was paid. For abuses against *yasak* payers, the law prescribed flogging.

There is also no evidence of systematic racism in the Russian policy of the period. On the contrary, interethnic marriages were common, as was cross-cultural influence (*in 1622, priests complained that Orthodox parishioners neglected fasting due to shared meals with "infidels — Tatars, Ostyaks, and Voguls"*). The best relations developed in remote areas, where Russian settlers relied more on indigenous people than on their own administration.

Nevertheless, abuses by local authorities were frequent — price fraud in the fur trade, unauthorized additional taxes, outright robbery, and looting of burial mounds — prompting flight and uprisings among *yasak* payers and leaving traces in folk epic traditions.

By 1622, the Russian population in Siberia numbered approximately **15,000**, half of whom were servicemen and the rest peasants from state lands (*forcibly relocated until 1621*). By contrast, the indigenous population at the end of the 16th century was estimated at approximately **200,000–220,000**.

Numbered designations indicate:


- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Koda Principality.
- ③ The Great Nogai Horde.
- ④ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ⑤ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑥ The land of the Yaik Cossacks.

CHAPTER 22

THE SMOLENSK WAR AND THE RESUMPTION OF WESTWARD EXPANSION

1632-1634

	Main territory of the Russian Tsardom (including unsettled districts) in 1619
	Vassal lands within Russia
	Lands of the free Cossacks under Russian protectorate
	Territories seized by Russia as a result of the Smolensk War of 1632-1634
	Territories annexed to Russia in the course of border demarcations in the 1640s



During Russia's Time of Troubles, Smolensk was captured by the forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1611). A Russian attempt to retake the city in 1613–1617 failed, and under the Deulino Truce of 1618/19, Smolensk formally passed under the authority of the Commonwealth. The truce was concluded for 14.5 years, and shortly before its expiration, Russia declared war.

In the autumn of 1632, Russian troops seized a number of border towns in Belarusian-Lithuanian and Ukrainian-Polish lands, including Novhorod-Siverskyi, and in December laid siege to Smolensk. Several assaults in the spring and summer of 1633 failed. The strategic situation then turned against Moscow: Polish-Ukrainian forces besieged Putyvl, Zaporizhzhian Cossacks attacked Belgorod, and Crimean Tatars devastated central Russian regions. In August 1633, royal forces arrived to relieve Smolensk.

In the autumn of 1633, Russian troops burned Baturyn, Poltava, and a number of other towns, but the main Russian army at Smolensk was itself encircled and capitulated in February 1634. The Polyanovka Peace was signed in June of that year.

Under the treaty, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth retained Smolensk and the other cities secured by the Deulino Truce; Russia returned all territories it had occupied during the war except for Serpeysk. Moscow paid Warsaw 20,000 rubles in silver, and King Władysław IV formally renounced his claims to the Russian throne.

Between 1635 and 1648, five border demarcations stipulated by the treaty were carried out. As a result, Russia acquired several additional frontier settlements, including Okhtyrka (*the dates in parentheses indicate the year of actual transfer*).

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Koda Principality.
- ③ The Great Nogai Horde.
- ④ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ⑤ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑥ The land of the Yaik Cossacks.
- ⑦ Serpeysk and its surroundings.
- ⑧ Lebedyn and Okhtyrka (1644).
- ⑨ Krupets (1644).
- ⑩ Oleshkovychi and Trubchevsk (1644–1645).
- ⑪ Zhizhitsi (1644).
- ⑫ Krasne township (1645).


CHAPTER 23

THE FORMATION OF THE
KALMYK STATE WITHIN RUSSIA

1630S-1650S



	Main territory of the Russian Tsardom (including unsettled districts) in the 1630s
① ②	Vassal lands within Russia
③ ④	Lands of the free Cossacks under Russian protectorate
⑦ ⑧	State of the Kalmyks associated with Russia
	Territories annexed to Russia in the course of border demarcations in the 1640s



In 1606, Russian frontiers along the Irtysh River reached the pastures of several western Mongol tribes, later known as the Kalmyks. Between 1607 and 1616, local Kalmyk princes (*taishas*) recognized Russian suzerainty in exchange for protection against other nomads. Other Kalmyk groups reached the Volga region in 1613 and, in 1618, attacked the Great Nogai Horde, which was a Russian vassal.

As a result, the Nogais twice crossed the Volga to the western bank, into the lands of the Lesser Nogai Horde, a vassal of the Crimean Khanate.

In the Kalmyk–Nogai war of 1628–1634, the Great Nogai Horde was defeated and effectively ceased to exist. On the one hand, Russian troops periodically assisted the Nogais; on the other, local Russian authorities plundered them, seizing horses and capturing women and children. The last Nogai bey was imprisoned in 1634.

In 1633, the Kalmyks acquired their first common leader — the chief *taisha*. From 1635, the Great Nogais finally left the Volga–Yaik interfluvium and migrated westward, while their former pastures passed into Kalmyk hands. The Kalmyks carried out raids on Russian towns, including Samara (1639), Astrakhan (1643), and the Terek region (1644), and during the 1640s occupied the right bank of the Volga.

At the same time, in 1639, the Lesser Nogai Horde ceased to exist with the death of its bey, and all Nogais came under the direct authority of the Crimean khan. Some remained in the Kuban region, while others migrated to the western Black Sea area.

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Some remained in the Kuban region, while others migrated to the western Black Sea area.

Russia opted for negotiations. In 1655 and 1657, the chief *taisha* Shukur-Daichin twice swore allegiance (*shert'*) to Tsar Alexei. The Kalmyks were confirmed in possession of their lands, were to pay a small *yasak* (*tribute*), and to provide troops at Moscow's request, while retaining full internal sovereignty and even rudimentary international relations. In 1664, Russia officially recognized an associated Kalmyk polity, presenting the chief *taisha* with a mace as a symbol of authority. Relations with the Kalmyks were conducted through the Ambassadorial Chancellery. In 1690, the Kalmyk ruler Ayuka was granted the title of khan by the Dalai Lama, despite not being a descendant of Chinggis Khan.

Dependence on Moscow, participation in wars, and involvement in suppressing anti-Russian uprisings did not prevent some Kalmyks from also taking part in those same rebellions or from raiding Russian territory in the 1660s and 1680s. In the eighteenth century, Kalmyks fought alongside St. Petersburg in the Northern and Persian wars.

In 1715, a Russian resident appeared at the khan's court, and two years later, the Kalmyk steppe formally became part of the Astrakhan Governorate. From 1724, Russian authorities began interfering in the succession of the Kalmyk Khanate, effectively reducing it to vassal status. Christianization and the seizure of pastures by Russian agricultural settlers led to the migration of three-quarters of the Kalmyks to China in early 1771. By the end of that year, the khanate had been annexed, and its territory was incorporated into the Astrakhan Governorate. In 1800–1803, Russia attempted to restore Kalmykia as a viceroyalty but was unsuccessful.


Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Koda Principality.
- ③ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ④ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ⑤ The area of Kalmyk nomadism in the first third of the 17th century.
- ⑥ Kalmyk pastures in the 1630s–1650s; the zone of Kalmyk influence from the last quarter of the 17th century.
- ⑦ The territory of the Kalmyk *taisha*-ruled polity (*principality*) within Russian borders in the 1630s.
- ⑧ Territories subordinated to or conquered by the Kalmyks in the 1640s–1650s.

CHAPTER 24

THE CONQUEST OF EASTERN SIBERIA AND THE REACH TO THE PACIFIC

1633-1649

	Main territory of the Russian Tsardom (including unsettled districts) in the 1630s
	Vassal lands within Russia
	Lands of the free Cossacks under Russian protectorate
	State of the Kalmyks associated with Russia
	Territories seized by Russia in 1633-1649
	New Russian fortresses and stockades in the seized lands
	Territories annexed to Russia in the course of border demarcations in the 1640s

Setting out from the Lena River in 1632, Russian pioneers reached the shores of the Pacific Ocean by 1639. In 1643, they arrived at Lake Baikal, and in 1648, sailed by sea through the Bering Strait. Eastern Siberia proper thus came under Kremlin authority. Beyond Moscow's control remained the so-called Far East: Chukotka, Kamchatka, and the Amur region.

Colonization of these lands was spontaneous and often poorly controlled. The central government had no clear plan for subjugating the region, so the direction of advance was determined primarily by economic considerations. Above all, Russians sought to collect *yasak* (tribute) from local populations; secondarily, they targeted walrus rookeries near the mouths of northern rivers. Intensive hunting led to a sharp decline in regional populations of sable, beaver, and arctic fox.

In Siberia, governmental, Cossack, and "popular" (unofficial) modes of expansion were closely intertwined. In some areas, state-led colonization prevailed for a time; in others, popular initiatives dominated.



The interests of free settlers and state officials did not always align, although both sought the same outcome. As expansion pushed deeper into Northern Asia, Siberian authorities increasingly received instructions to act “*according to circumstances*.” This made local governance more flexible and responsive, but also led to frequent inconsistencies and a lack of coordination among state representatives.

Such disarray often led to armed clashes between colonizing detachments competing for control over the richest regions. As a result, local tribes were sometimes forced to pay *yasak* two or three times a year — to different Cossack atamans or tsarist voevodas. This alarmed the Kremlin, since much of the wealth remained in local hands rather than flowing to the central treasury.

Administration of newly seized territories initially fell to the Ambassadorial Chancellery, then to the Kazan Chancellery; in 1637, a separate Siberian Chancellery was established. In 1638, the Lena District (the Yakut Voivodeship) was created — the largest administrative-territorial unit in Russia by the late 17th century, encompassing nearly all of northeastern Asia.

Local and central authorities supervised the “*exploration*” of new “*lands*,” securing promising, revenue-rich areas through towns and forts (*ostrogs*). Service people were transferred there “*by decree*,” while traders, hunters, and peasant “free wanderers” arrived spontaneously. Systems of taxation and justice were organized, markets opened, and state ploughlands established where suitable.

A royal charter of 1621 granted privileges to Russian peasants and obliged local authorities to identify convenient sites for resettlement. Initially, state and serf peasants could move to Siberia only with their owners’ consent, and runaways were hunted down. Over time, however, the authorities disregarded spontaneous migration. All Russian peasants in Siberia became state peasants; serfdom persisted only on monastic lands.

As in Central Siberia, most indigenous peoples in Eastern Siberia either offered no resistance or were defeated after brief fighting (*as with the Yakuts*). However, the numerous Buryats halted Russian advance for more than forty years, and the distant, warlike peoples of Kamchatka and Chukotka — the Chukchi, Koryaks, and Yukaghirs — retained independence until the early or even mid-18th century.

The central government’s focus on fur revenues (see “*The Conquest of Central Siberia*”) led to the emergence of a category of Russian *yasak*-paying people — migrants from European Russia who secured the right to pay the lighter *yasak* instead of performing heavier *corvée* labor.

By the mid-17th century, Russian attention shifted to Siberia’s southern frontiers, initiating a prolonged border conflict (1649–1689) with Qing China. Russian expansion in the Amur region was halted.

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The Koda Principality.
- ③ The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ④ The land of the Don Cossacks.

CHAPTER 25

THE BELGOROD ABATIS LINE AND THE CONTINUED COLONIZATION OF THE VOLGA REGION FIRST HALF OF THE 17TH CENTURY


In the 17th century, the number of ethnic Russians in the Volga region increased due to both state-directed colonization and spontaneous migration. Resistance by the Bashkirs forced Russian settlers to bypass the southern Urals and move toward the middle and lower Volga.

The state sought not only to secure the loyalty of the local Tatar population but also to consolidate its rule in the region by settling ethnic Russians there. Garrisons were transferred from other parts of Russia to newly built fortresses, while serfs were relocated to lands granted to Russian landlords and monasteries.

The main drivers of popular migration were economic (*shortage of free land in the country's core regions, droughts, and other natural disasters*), social (the tightening of serfdom), political (repression against participants in Cossack and peasant uprisings), and religious (*the church schism*).

Migration was further encouraged by the construction of new fortresses and abatis lines in the region. The Belgorod Abatis Line (1635–1646) protected newly colonized areas from Crimean Tatar incursions; the Simbirsk Line (1648–1654) and the Zakamsk Line (1652–1656) defended against Kalmyk incursions. Somewhat later (1675–1680), the Penza Line was constructed to counter raids by Crimean and Nogai forces.





In the middle Volga region, north of these defensive lines, Russian and numerous non-Russian populations lived in relatively close proximity. Russians formed a majority in Kazan, Sviyazhsk, and Tetyushi, as well as along the banks of the Volga between these towns. In other areas, they lived in a patchwork settlement pattern alongside indigenous populations. Between **50%** and **60%** of Russian villages bore Finno-Ugric names, as they arose on previously inhabited lands; the rest, founded on vacant land, had distinctly Russian names. In isolated cases, Russians settled on the outskirts of Mordvin and Mansi villages.

Government instructions emphasized that *“there is plenty of vacant land and various types of land, and it is possible to establish arable-peasant settlements not on disputed territory.”* The Law Code of 1649 explicitly prohibited Russians from purchasing land from the Bashkirs. At the same time, most Russian towns and fortresses were founded atop earlier non-Russian fortified centers.

In the first half of the 17th century, Russian presence on the middle Volga, south of the abatis lines, was seasonal and associated with hunting and fishing. In the second half of the century, Russians began to settle there permanently.

The lower Volga remained almost entirely unsettled by Russians for the first century after its conquest. By the mid-17th century, there was no village between Tetyushi and Astrakhan. The number of Cossacks and streltsy in towns significantly exceeded that of the civilian population. Until the very end of the 18th century, Russians did not move away from the banks and delta of the Volga, while the surrounding steppes remained under Kalmyk control.

The intensity of interaction between ethnic Russians and the sedentary population of the Volga region was significantly higher than with steppe nomads or forest hunters. At the end of the 16th century, Metropolitan Hermogenes of Kazan complained that many Orthodox Christians *“live among the Tatars and the Cheremis and the Chuvash, drink and eat with them from the same [table], marry among them, and many Russian people have fallen away from the Christian faith and converted to the Tatar faith.”* Tatars of the Middle Urals, together with Russians, took refuge in forts from Kalmyk raids. Assimilation with Finno-Ugric populations was even deeper, despite an official ban on Russians settling on Mansi lands, which were exempt from military recruitment and obligations.

At the same time, disputes between Russian and non-Russian peasants over arable land and resource areas were frequent.

During this same period, another short-lived attempt was made to resume expansion into the Caucasus. In 1651, a fort was built on the Sunzha River to link the free Greben Cossacks with the Terek streltsy, but it was burned by Persian forces as early as 1653.


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
- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ③ The land of the Don Cossacks.

CHAPTER 26

THE KHMELNYTSKY UPRISING AND THE FORMATION OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1648-1656





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ③ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ④ Kalmykia.
- ⑤ The Ukrainian Hetmanate (*"Zaporozhian Host"*) in association with Russia in 1654.
- ⑥ Territories incorporated into Ukraine in 1654–1656.

THE KHMELNYTSKY UPRISING AND THE FORMATION OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1648-1656

The Khmelnytsky Uprising was a Cossack revolution that led to the emergence of an early modern Ukrainian state and transformed the political situation throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Beginning in 1648 under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the uprising quickly escalated into a comprehensive war. This conflict precipitated a sharp weakening of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which, until the mid-seventeenth century, had remained one of the largest states on the continent. The Khmelnytsky Uprising opened a window of opportunity for expansion in Central and Eastern Europe by extra-regional powers: Sweden, the Ottoman Empire, and, most importantly, the Tsardom of Russia.

Despite a series of victories at Zhovti Vody, Korsun, and Pyliavtsi in the spring and summer of 1648, Khmelnytsky actively sought an external ally capable of securing him an advantage over the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. His principal demand in this regard was recognition of his sovereignty over a new state — the Zaporozhian Host (*the Ukrainian Hetmanate*) — with its capital in Chyhyryn. Khmelnytsky's strategy aimed to strengthen statehood by concluding international treaties. The initial partner — the Crimean Khanate — proved unreliable: Crimean Khan Islam III Giray pursued his own interests and therefore, at decisive moments of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, entered into separate agreements with the Polish king John II Casimir (*in 1649 and 1653*). Despite its intentions, the Ottoman Empire ultimately did not provide military support to the Cossacks.

The hetman's choice ultimately settled on Russia. Ukrainian–Russian contacts were initiated by a letter from Khmelnytsky as early as 1648, yet Moscow refused to send its troops to assist the hetman, refraining from direct confrontation with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Nevertheless, a gradual incorporation of Ukrainian lands into the Russian sphere of influence was taking place.

The treaty with Moscow made it possible to present the Cossack state not as a rebellious movement, but as a fully fledged political actor. It also strengthened the legitimacy of Khmelnytsky personally and that of his government. Arguments in favor of an alliance with the Tsardom of Russia included geographical proximity, a shared religion (*though the conflict between Kyiv and Moscow Orthodoxy would emerge later*), and Moscow's historical enmity toward the Polish–Lithuanian state. For the Tsardom of Russia, in turn, the alliance offered a chance to restore its international standing, which had declined after the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the century, and to significantly expand its territory.

The foreign policy position of the Ukrainian Hetmanate deteriorated markedly due to the advance of Polish–Lithuanian forces in the autumn of 1653 and the conclusion of the unpromising Treaty of Zhvantsi.

At the same time, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was weakened by internal conflicts, and Khmelnytsky once again sought the protection of the Ottoman Empire, following Moldova's example.

Under these conditions, in December 1653, the Zemsky Sobor in Moscow adopted a decision to accept the Zaporozhian Host “*under the high hand of Tsar*” Alexei Mikhailovich. On the Ukrainian side, this process was completed at the Pereiaslav Council in January 1654, where the Cossack senior officers swore allegiance to the Russian ruler.

However, the political inequality between the parties became immediately evident: the Cossacks took an oath in accordance with European principles, whereas the tsar assumed no reciprocal obligations, since Muscovite tradition did not envisage an oath by the autocrat to his subjects. Chyhyryn regarded the agreement as a military-political alliance of unequal yet distinct entities. In contrast, Moscow interpreted it as a legally formalized act of allegiance, under which the new territories became the tsar's patrimony. For Ukraine, the treaty was a temporary measure to resolve a complex military situation, whereas Russia viewed it as a perpetual commitment.

As a result of the Pereiaslav Council, a written document — the March Articles — was drafted. They confirmed the preservation of the Cossack system: the election of the hetman, autonomy in internal administration, a **60,000**-strong Cossack register, and the right of the Ukrainian nobility and cities to retain their old privileges. The March Articles also legally affirmed the transfer of the territory of the Zaporozhian Host — which encompassed the Chernihiv-Siversky region, Poltava region, Kyiv region, Eastern Podillia, and the territory of the Zaporizhzhian Sich — under the protection of Russia.

At the same time, key provisions significantly limited Ukraine's autonomy: foreign relations without the tsar's consent were prohibited. Russian voivodes with garrisons were stationed in Kyiv and along the border with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, facilitating direct Russian interference in Ukraine's internal affairs. The Kyiv Metropolis was to be gradually subordinated to the Moscow Patriarch.

Thus, for Ukraine, the 1654 agreement appeared as a partly unequal yet still an alliance of two parties against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In contrast, for Russia, it became an instrument for the gradual incorporation of one party by the other.

Following the conclusion of the treaty in 1654–1656, Russian troops, together with Cossack units, conducted a series of large-scale operations that captured Smolensk, Vilnius, and other cities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. At the same time, Khmelnytsky organized raids into the territories of Galicia and Volhynia, aimed at devastating noble estates and demonstrating the Cossacks' ability to wage war on multiple fronts simultaneously.

The agreement with Moscow gave the Hetmanate the opportunity to significantly expand the scale of military operations, but their consequences were contradictory. On the one hand, the Cossacks received substantial support in the struggle against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

On the other hand, Moscow gradually took over management of the war, using Cossack detachments as auxiliary forces. Moreover, in Khmelnytsky's conflicts with the senior officers and the rank-and-file Cossacks, it was precisely Moscow (*"the tsar's word"*) that appeared as the court of last resort.

Russia sought to consolidate its influence in the Belarusian lands, viewing them as the primary direction of expansion. For Khmelnytsky, the key objective remained the liberation of ethnic Ukrainian territories from Polish domination. This divergence in strategic priorities hindered effective cooperation. Furthermore, a conflict broke out in southeastern Belarus between the Ukrainian Cossack administration and the Russian voivodeship administration.

In 1655, the Swedish king Charles X Gustav launched a war against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, thereby effectively benefiting the Russian–Ukrainian alliance. The Swedish army rapidly occupied a large portion of the country, initiating the occupation known as the *"Deluge."* However, Moscow began to view Sweden as a dangerous rival for spheres of influence. Fearing the excessive strengthening of Stockholm, Moscow concluded the Vilnius Truce with Warsaw in 1656, thereby turning against the Swedes. This shift proved a serious blow to the Cossacks. The truce with Poland was negotiated without taking Ukrainian interests into account (*the Ukrainian delegation was not admitted to the hall*), clearly demonstrating Moscow's attitude toward the Cossacks not as equal allies, but as subordinates.

In the summer of 1656, the Russian army, led by the tsar, marched into Livonia. Muscovite forces captured a number of cities and fortresses, but the main objective of the campaign — Riga — withstood the siege. Under the Valiesar Truce of 1658, Moscow retained the captured Livonian cities for three years. The Treaty of Kardis of 1661 completely deprived the Tsardom of Russia of all its conquests in Livonia, leaving the southern Baltic under Swedish control. Nevertheless, the military campaign of 1656–1658 became a *"general rehearsal"* for Moscow ahead of the Great Northern War.


The 1654–1656 campaign against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth ended in victory for the Tsardom of Russia. On the one hand, Moscow gained significant territorial and political gains in Belarus and Lithuania, thereby substantially enhancing its international prestige. On the other hand, Russia gained legal and political opportunities to further interfere in Ukrainian affairs. The alliance with the Cossacks, which had concluded in 1654, rapidly evolved from a military partnership into a mechanism of external control. For Cossack Ukraine, the end of the war and Khmelnytsky's death in 1657 marked the beginning of a gradual dependence on Moscow's decisions.

At the same time, along the frontier between the Tsardom of Russia and the Ukrainian Hetmanate, a distinctive territorial entity began to take shape under Moscow's auspices — Sloboda Ukraine, or Slobozhanshchyna. It encompassed territories in present-day Ukraine (*almost all of Kharkiv Oblast, the southeastern part of Sumy Oblast, most of Luhansk Oblast, and a small part of Donetsk Oblast*) and in Russia (*the southern parts of Belgorod, Voronezh, and Kursk Oblasts*).

The first settlements appeared here during the Cossack uprisings of the first third of the seventeenth century, when rebels from the Dnipro region fled repression by the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Russian authorities actively supported the settlers, offering tax and obligation exemptions in permanently established slobodas in exchange for border defense.

The Khmelnytsky Uprising significantly undermined the power of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and altered the political balance in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the principal beneficiary of these changes was Russia itself, which consolidated a new role as a state that not only intervenes in the internal conflicts of neighboring countries but also gradually subjugates their territories. The protectorate over Ukraine proclaimed at Pereiaslav became a cornerstone of the Second Russian Empire.


Peter I's adoption of the title of Emperor of All Russia in 1721 would have been impossible without Alexei's earlier adoption of the title of Tsar of Great, Little, and White Russia. It is also from the Pereiaslav Council that the conventional date for the beginning of systematic Russian expansion into Ukraine is derived.




CHAPTER 27

THE RUSSO-POLISH STRUGGLE FOR
UKRAINE

1657-1663





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate.
- ② The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks.
- ③ The land of the Don Cossacks.
- ④ Kalmykia.
- ⑤ The Ukrainian Hetmanate ("Zaporozhian Host / Cossack Hetmanate").
- ⑥ Territories incorporated into Russia under the Vilnius Truce of 1656.
- ⑦ Territories incorporated into Russia under the Vailiesar Truce of 1658.

THE RUSSO-POLISH STRUGGLE FOR UKRAINE 1657-1663

At the council held in April 1657 in Chyhyryn, Bohdan Khmelnytsky secured the transfer of the hetman's mace to his younger son Yuri, seeking to introduce a dynastic principle of succession. By June of the same year, the general scribe Ivan Vyhovsky had become regent for the young hetman. In October, Vyhovsky himself was proclaimed hetman.

In foreign policy, Vyhovsky followed the example of Khmelnytsky the Elder, attempting to maneuver between the Tsardom of Russia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Ottoman Empire. However, unlike his predecessor, Vyhovsky failed to stabilize the state's internal political situation. The sharpening of social contradictions (*Vyhovsky relied on the Cossack elite while ignoring the interests of townspeople and the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks*) led to an uprising by the Poltava Regiment and the Zaporizhzhian Sich (*the self-governing part of the Hetmanate*) against the hetman. Colonel Martyn Pushkar and the kish otaman, Yakiv Barabash, led the revolt.

Vyhovsky's defeat of the rebels near Poltava in May 1658 did not end the civil war — the Cossack opposition appealed to the Tsardom of Russia for military assistance. Tsar Alexei exploited the contradictions within Ukrainian society to strengthen his influence over the Hetmanate, thereby recognizing the Sich as a separate subject of Russian-Ukrainian relations. As early as July 1658, a Russian army advanced to support the rebels.

The threat posed by the Tsardom of Russia prompted Vyhovsky to conclude an alliance treaty with Poland, in addition to the earlier agreement with the Crimean Khanate. The Treaty of Hadiach in September 1657 provided for the recognition by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of a Ukrainian state (*"the Grand Duchy of Rus"*) within the boundaries of the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav voivodeships. This state entity was to become part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a separate federal subject; Ukrainian elites were to receive seats in the senate; an amnesty was guaranteed to all participants in the war; the Cossacks received confirmation of their old privileges, and the register was set at **60,000** men. Two universities were to operate on the territory of the "GDR." In addition, of particular importance to Orthodox elites was the clause abolishing the Uniate (*Greek Catholic*) Church and returning to the Orthodox Church the property and buildings previously seized by the Uniate Church. The Hadiach Treaty substantially limited the internal sovereignty of the Ukrainian Hetmanate, but gave the state a chance to survive in its struggle against Russia.

However, the Sejm of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ratified the agreement in May 1659, not in the version previously agreed upon. The approved text did not include provisions on the abolition of the Uniate Church and the return of church property, and the register was reduced by half, to **30,000**. Rumors of new treaty terms sparked protests in the Hetmanate, but the Hadiach

Agreement provided Warsaw with grounds to enter the war against Moscow. Moscow, for its part, regarded the signing of the treaty as the hetman's betrayal, and Russian troops laid siege to Konotop.

On 29 June 1659, Ukrainian-Crimean forces, supported by a Polish detachment, completely defeated the Muscovite army near Konotop. However, Vyhovsky was unable to capitalize on this brilliant victory — in the Nizhyn, Pereiaslav, and Chernihiv regiments, Cossack uprisings against the Hadiach Agreement broke out. In addition, the Zaporizhzhian campaign against Crimean-Ottoman possessions in July-August forced Khan Islam III to abandon Vyhovsky. As a result, in September, the hetman was compelled to renounce the mace in favor of Yuri Khmelnytsky.

By that time, the Russian army controlled Left-Bank Ukraine, enabling Moscow to dictate its terms to the new hetman. Khmelnytsky submitted to the tsar a draft treaty intended to confirm all the gains of the March Articles. The new agreement between Moscow and Chyhyryn was concluded in Pereiaslav in October 1659. Under its terms, the Zaporozhian Host was legally integrated into the Tsardom of Russia: the hetman was deprived of the right to conduct an independent foreign policy — he could send or receive embassies only with prior consent from Moscow; the election of the hetman was henceforth supervised by the Tsardom of Russia. The agreement required the Cossack elite to swear allegiance to the Russian monarch, upon whom their careers now depended. In addition, the Russian military presence was expanded — besides Kyiv, tsarist voivodes with garrisons were stationed in Pereiaslav, Chernihiv, Nizhyn, Bratslav, and Uman.

Thus, the Pereiaslav Articles of 1659 recorded the loss of the Zaporozhian Host's independence and its acquisition of autonomy within the Tsardom of Russia. Cossack military forces were transformed into auxiliary troops of the Tsardom of Russia.

At the beginning of 1660, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth concluded its war with Sweden, known as the "Deluge." Both sides were exhausted by fighting on two fronts — not only against each other, but also against Russia. In May, with French mediation, a peace treaty was signed in the village of Oliva near Gdańsk. It legally confirmed the transfer of Livonia to Sweden, which had been under Swedish control since the 1620s. John II Casimir renounced his claims to the Swedish throne, and Sweden pledged to support freedom of trade in the Baltic Sea. The following year, the treaty was ratified by the Sejm of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, after which Warsaw could direct all its resources toward confronting Moscow.

During the Chudniv Campaign of August-October 1660, the Crimean Khanate fought on the Polish side, while the Zaporozhian Host supported the Russians. The combined Russian-Ukrainian force numbered more than **15,000** cavalry, **4,000** soldiers and musketeers, **50** cannons, and **15,000** Cossacks. Hetman Khmelnytsky, with Right-Bank regiments (*30,000 Cossacks and 30 cannons*), was to join the main forces near the town of Slobozhysche (*in the Zhytomyr region*).

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, having defeated Russian forces in Belarus in the summer of 1660,

was able to field more than **12,000** cavalry and **10,000** infantry. In addition, around **1,500** of Vyhovsky's Cossacks joined the Polish side.

The battle near Slobodyshche ended in the Russian army's capitulation and marked the greatest defeat of the Tsardom of Russia in the Russo-Polish War of 1654–1667. The Poles did not allow Khmelnytsky's Cossacks to unite with the main forces, while the Crimeans blockaded their camp. Under these conditions, the idea of concluding an agreement with the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth spread among Khmelnytsky's Cossacks. On 17 October, Khmelnytsky the Younger concluded the Slobodyshche Treaty, also known as the Chudniv Agreement, with King John II Casimir of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Upon learning of this, **2,000** Cossacks from the Russian camp defected to Khmelnytsky's side. The Muscovite voivode, in a hopeless situation, capitulated on the terms of evacuating all Muscovite troops from Ukraine (*which never actually occurred*) and promised to hand over to the Crimean Khan **9,000** Cossacks who remained with him as captives. Instead, the Crimean commander ordered the capture of **12,500** Russians as well, including the voivode himself (*who spent 21 years in captivity and died shortly after his release*).

Under these circumstances, Russia signed the Treaty of Kardis with Sweden in 1661. Moscow returned to Stockholm all territories seized by its troops between 1656 and 1658.

The Chudniv Agreement signed by Khmelnytsky was based on Vyhovsky's Hadiach Treaty. However, the article on the Grand Duchy of Rus' was removed from the text, and the hetman was prohibited from conducting an independent foreign policy. Thus, the Chudniv (*Slobodyshche*) Treaty limited the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Hetmanate just as substantially as the Pereiaslav Agreement of the previous year, but this time from Warsaw's side.

The Slobodyshche Treaty caused a split within Cossack society. Its legitimacy was rejected by the Left-Bank elite, led by the acting hetman Yakym Somko, Yurii Khmelnytsky's maternal uncle. Long-simmering contradictions between the Right-Bank Cossack elite, which originated among registered Cossacks and Cossackized nobility, and the Left-Bank elite, in which former members of the Sich and Cossackized townspeople and peasants played the leading role, escalated into open conflict.


During 1661–1662, a series of battles took place in which Khmelnytsky's Right-Bank regiments, supported by Crimean detachments, opposed the Left-Bank regiments, which received assistance from Russian voivodes. Neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory.

Khmelnytsky's already weak authority was further undermined by the many thousands taken into captivity by the Crimean Khanate, allied with the hetman, in Kaniv and its surroundings. Disillusioned, the hetman expressed his desire to relinquish the mace in the autumn of 1662. At the beginning of 1663, a Cossack council was held at which the hetman's powers were transferred to Pavlo Teteria. At his own request, Yurii Khmelnytsky was tonsured as a monk at the St. Onuphrius Monastery under the name Gideon.

Given the complexity of the situation in the Het-

manate, Moscow established a separate Little Russian Chancellery in 1662/1663 under the authority of the Ambassadorial Chancellery.

The settlement of Sloboda Ukraine continued. In 1651, the first Cossack regiments — the Ostrogozhsk and Kharkiv regiments — began to form in Slobozhanshchyna; in 1655, the Okhtyrka regiment, and in 1688, the Izium regiment — were formed. The Zmiiv regiment (1666–1671) and the Balakliia regiment (1670–1677) also existed briefly. The Sloboda Cossacks had no single hetman; all colonels from 1688 were subordinate to the Ambassadorial Chancellery through the Belgorod voivode. A significant influx of population into Slobozhanshchyna occurred in 1678–1679 during the “*great relocation*” of Ivan Samoilovych, when Russian and Left-Bank forces forcibly resettled inhabitants of Right-Bank Dnipro Ukraine from their homes.



CHAPTER 28

THE "RUIN" AND THE PARTITION OF UKRAINE ALONG THE DNIPRO

1663-1668





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Kasimov Khanate (*annexed in 1681*).
- ② The land of the Greben and Terek Cossacks (*lost its independence in 1668*).
- ③ The land of the Don Cossacks (*lost its independence in 1671*).
- ④ Kalmykia.
- ⑤ Left-Bank Hetmanate.
- ⑥ Smolensk and its environs.

THE "RUIN" AND THE PARTITION OF UKRAINE ALONG THE DNIPRO 1663-1668

After the split within the Ukrainian Hetmanate's political elite precipitated by the signing of the Slobodyshe Treaty, the struggle between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tsardom of Russia for control over Ukrainian lands intensified. Seeking to seize the Left Bank, King John II Casimir launched a new military campaign in the autumn of 1663. He was joined by the forces of the newly elected hetman Pavlo Teteria, a former general chancellor in the government of Yurii Khmelnytsky. The latter, who by that time had become archimandrite of the Monastery of St Onuphrius, welcomed the Polish-Cossack troops in Bila Tserkva. Teteria supported the Polish king's campaign in the hope of uniting all the lands of the Hetmanate under his own mace.

Meanwhile, the Tsardom of Russia refused to recognize Yakym Somko as hetman, even though he had been elected by the Left Bank Cossack elite after rising against Khmelnytsky. Several contenders competed for Moscow's favor — the most influential rivals to Somko included Vasyl Zolotarenko, colonel of Nizhyn, and Ivan Briukhovetskyi, the *kosh otaman* of the Zaporozhian Host. Tsar Aleksei placed his bet on Briukhovetskyi, since the political programs of Somko and Zolotarenko were oriented toward the interests of the wealthy Left-Bank Cossack elite, which sought to consolidate its social position by securing the inviolability of its rights and liberties and preserving Cossack autonomy.

In June 1663, at the Black Council in Nizhyn (*attended not only by members of the Cossack elite but also by the "black," that is, ordinary Cossacks*), Briukhovetsky was elected hetman. Somko and Zolotarenko were declared traitors and executed. The outcome of the election was distorted by Moscow's intervention aimed at promoting "its" candidate: tsarist officials bribed part of the Ukrainian elite and later exiled others to Siberia. Briukhovetskyi's hetmancy was not recognized on the Right Bank, and after the Black Council, the split of the Ukrainian Hetmanate into two states — the Left-Bank and the Right-Bank Hetmanates — was effectively completed.

However, Teteria's orientation toward the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and his inconsistent domestic policy also provoked discontent among a part of the Right-Bank population, which did not wish to see a restoration of the previous socio-economic order. The failure of the king's campaign on the Left Bank also played a role: despite partial successes, John II Casimir was unable to hold a single captured town. As a result, an uprising against the Poles and Teteria, whom they supported, broke out in 1664.

The leaders of the movement were Vyhovsky, Colonel Ivan Bohun, the Metropolitan of Kyiv Yosyf Neliubovych-Tukalsky, and Yurii Khmelnytsky, who decided once again to return to power. The social explosion that spread from Zaporizhzhia to the Bratslav and Kyiv regions could be suppressed only with the help of the Crimean

allies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, at the beginning of 1665, the uprising erupted anew with greater force. Realizing his inability to cope with the internal political situation, Teteria fled to Poland.

After executing Vyhovsky and Bohun and imprisoning Khmelnytsky in Malbork, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth hoped to bring the Right Bank firmly under control. Instead, these actions only intensified the struggle for the hetman's mace there. Ultimately, Petro Doroshenko — an associate of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and a participant in the royal campaign against the Left Bank — emerged victorious. He was elected hetman in January 1666. At the same time, however, the Bratslav colonel Vasyl Drozdenko also laid claim to the hetman's mace. Only after suppressing the uprising in Bratslav was Doroshenko able to consolidate his authority as hetman.

Meanwhile, the Left-Bank Hetman Briukhovetsky increasingly clearly demonstrated his own political ambitions. He subordinated the urban population to the Cossack administration, put financial affairs in order, and tried to extend his influence to the Right-Bank Hetmanate as well. Encountering resistance from the opposition, Briukhovetsky, as usual, sought support in Moscow. However, his official visit to the capital of the Tsardom of Russia in the autumn of 1665 ended not with a strengthening of hetman power, as he had hoped, but with its further limitation. The new terms of Russian-Ukrainian relations were set out in the Moscow Articles of the same year.

According to them, direct control over the military-administrative and financial-economic life of Ukraine passed into the hands of the tsar's voivodes. The number of troops in Russian garrisons within the Hetmanate increased, and Ukrainian taxpayers bore the cost of their maintenance. In addition, new Russian garrisons were established in Poltava, Kremenchuk, Novhorod-Siversky, Oster, Kaniv, and Kodak. The collection of taxes from the Ukrainian population (*excluding Cossacks*) was transferred to the tsarist administration, and the taxes were directed to the tsar's treasury. Moreover, the tsar, together with the Moscow patriarch, advanced claims to the Kyiv Metropolis. Upon returning to Ukraine, Briukhovetsky, married to a Russian noblewoman, began implementing the Moscow Articles, but met resistance from the Cossack elite. His authority began to fall rapidly.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, though it had emerged from the war with Sweden, was extremely weakened. Alongside the financing of military operations on several fronts, internal political struggle also intensified. In 1666, an uprising against John II Casimir broke out, known as Lubomirski's *rokosz*. The rebels defeated the royal troops near Matwy. Thus, the king, to address the internal enemy, was compelled to seek a compromise with the external one.

The compromise took the form of the truce signed in the village of Andrusovo (*Smolensk region*) on 30 January 1667. Under its terms, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tsardom of Russia delimited their spheres of control over the Hetmanate. All territory of the Zaporozhian Host on the right bank of the Dnipro was placed under the protectorate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and on the left bank under that of the

Tsardom of Russia. Kyiv, as a right-bank city, was also to be transferred to the king, but the tsar retained control of it for two years. The Zaporozhian Sich came under the joint supremacy of both states. In addition, long-held Belarusian-Lithuanian towns, the principal one being Smolensk, were formally transferred to Russia.

As compensation for the lands lost by the Polish nobility on the Left Bank, the tsarist government undertook to pay Poland **1 million Polish zlotys** (about 200,000 rubles). The truce lasted 13.5 years. The hetmans of the Right Bank and Left Bank were not invited to the negotiations — in essence, the agreement was concluded behind the backs of the Cossacks of both opposing camps by their own allies.

The conclusion of the Polish-Russian agreement, with a complete disregard for Ukrainian interests and for the previous treaties concluded with the Zaporozhian Host, caused great dissatisfaction on both sides of the Dnipro. Hetmans Doroshenko, Briukhovetsky, and the “Zaporizhzhian hetman” Petro Sukhoviiienko strongly opposed the Andrusovo Treaty. Moreover, under the Moscow Points of December 1667, the Tsardom of Russia provided military support to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in its struggle against Doroshenko.

In protest, Left-Bank hetman Briukhovetsky in January 1668 announced a break with Moscow (*which had brought him to power*) and a union with the Right-Bank hetman Doroshenko. The Cossack elite, realizing the de facto betrayal by its allies, intensified negotiations with the third participant in Ukraine’s seventeenth-century “*geopolitical triangle*” — the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate.

The Andrusovo Truce initiated the gradual loss of the Zaporizhzhian Host’s status as a subject of international relations. However, the complete absorption of Ukrainian lands by Russia remained far off.

After the signing of the Andrusovo Truce, Briukhovetsky issued universals to the population calling for mobilization, since the Russians and Poles had “*resolved to devastate Ukraine, our fatherland, to the ground*.” The hetman also appealed to the Cossacks of Slobozhan-shchyna to join the common struggle against Moscow. There, the uprising against the Muscovites was led by the Kharkiv colonel Ivan Sirko.

As of mid-March 1668, Russian troops had been driven out of almost the entire Left Bank — tsarist garrisons remained only in Nizhyn, Chernihiv, Pereiaslav, and Oster. However, from the beginning of May, Russian forces once again entered the Left Bank. Briukhovetsky requested assistance from Doroshenko. At the end of May, the latter crossed into Left-Bank Ukraine with his army.

At that time, the Right-Bank hetman enjoyed unquestioned authority among Cossacks on both banks of the Dnipro. He secured the protection of the Turkish sultan, whose representative, in March 1668, officially warned Warsaw that the Sublime Porte would respond to grievances inflicted upon its Cossack subjects by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Therefore, when Doroshenko’s troops appeared on the Left Bank, local Cossacks refused to recognize Briukhovetsky’s authority.

In June 1668, near Dykanka, during a meeting of Right-Bank and Left-Bank Cossack forces and the holding of a joint general council, Cossacks subordinate to Briukhovetsky killed him and recognized Doroshenko as their hetman. For a time, a single Ukrainian Hetmanate re-emerged.

It proved impossible to maintain the state’s unity for long. Already in mid-July of the same year, Polish troops invaded the Right Bank. Doroshenko therefore withdrew with part of his forces, leaving the acting hetman, Demian Mnohohrishny, on the Left Bank. And although by mid-August the Polish offensive had been successfully repelled, at this time a new claimant to the hetman’s mace appeared — the Zaporizhzhian scribe Petro Sukhoviiienko.

Sukhoviiienko, supported by the Zaporizhzhians and Cossacks of several Left-Bank regiments, acted under the auspices of the Crimean khan Adil-Girey, with whom he signed a treaty. Under its terms, the Crimean Khanate undertook to provide the Sich Cossacks with military assistance in their struggle against Doroshenko. The khan pursued his own interests: in this way, he sought to establish a protectorate over the Right Bank.


The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the second half of September 1668, Russian troops went on the offensive in the Siveria region, burned Nizhyn, and captured Chernihiv. In mid-October, Mnohohrishny swore allegiance to the tsar.



CHAPTER 29

THE RUSSIAN-POLISH-TURKISH STRUGGLE FOR UKRAINE

1669-1687





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Kalmykia.
- ② Left-Bank Hetmanate.
- ③ The Zaporozhian Sich (*formally under joint Muscovite–Warsaw protectorate until 1686, in practice independent*).

THE RUSSIAN-POLISH-TURKISH STRUGGLE FOR UKRAINE 1669-1687

In mid-March 1669, at a general Cossack council in Hlukhiv, the election of Demian Mnohohrshny as hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine was confirmed. At the same time, a treaty between him and the Tsardom of Russia was signed — the Hlukhiv Articles. Russia feared a genuine reunification of the Hetmanate, and therefore made concessions to the Left-Bank Cossacks.

In particular, Moscow abandoned attempts to introduce its own administrative and financial system in the Hetmanate; voivodes were not to interfere in the affairs of Cossacks and townspeople; and Russian garrisons remained in only five towns — Kyiv, Pereiaslav, Nizhyn, Chernihiv, and Oster. However, the hetman still had no right to an independent foreign policy; the re-election of a hetman was permitted only with the tsar's consent, and the Cossack register was limited to men.

While Mnohohrshny's hetmancy was being confirmed in Hlukhiv, an expanded Cossack council convened by Doroshenko was also taking place near Korsun. In addition to the Right-Bank officer class, it was attended by delegates from Left-Bank regiments and Zaporizhzhia, as well as envoys of the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. The main issue before the council was the prospect of the Zaporozhian Host accepting the protection of the Turkish sultan, a step supported by the majority of participants. Doroshenko had sent the corresponding proposal to Mehmed IV in Istanbul as early as the summer of 1668.

Under the agreements, the sultan was to facilitate the reunification of all Ukrainian lands from the Vistula and Przemyśl in the west to Sevs and Putyvl in the east. The Ukrainian hetman was to be elected for life; the Orthodox Church was to receive autonomy under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople; the Ukrainian population was to be exempt from taxes and tribute, and Muslims present on Ukrainian lands were not to have the right to build mosques. Thus, following this treaty, the Hetmanate de facto came under the Ottoman Empire's protectorate.

However, the Zaporozhian Sich categorically rejected Doroshenko's sharp change in foreign policy course: in early May 1669, it proclaimed Petro Sukhoviiienko hetman for the second time. In addition, a significant portion of Right-Bank Cossacks opposed Doroshenko. Yet Sukhoviiienko did not remain hetman for long — by early August of that year, the Zaporozhians had elected Mykhailo Khanenko as hetman.

To counter Doroshenko, Khanenko also secured external backing: he promptly affirmed his loyalty to the Polish king and his favor toward the Russian tsar. In early September 1670, Khanenko concluded an agreement with the Poles in Ostroh. But instead of confirming the rights and liberties of the Cossacks, this agreement ignored them entirely. This alienated Khanenko's supporters.

The next war of the Polish-Lithuanian Common-

wealth against Doroshenko began in the summer of 1671, when the army of Hetman Jan Sobieski launched an offensive into Eastern Podillia. Khanenko's regiments came to his aid, while, at the same time, Kish otaman Ivan Sirko, through his raids, held the Crimeans in the south.

From December 1671, Doroshenko, with Tatar forces, began pushing Polish troops out of the Bratslav region. For his part, Sultan Mehmed IV sent the Polish king an official notification of the start of war in defense of his vassal Doroshenko and the "Cossack people." By early August 1672, the Turks were on the banks of the Dniester, near Khotyn, and soon united under the walls of Kamianets with Doroshenko's forces. Kamianets was taken after a ten-day siege, after which the combined Cossack-Turkish-Tatar army marched toward Lviv. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth requested negotiations.

A peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was concluded in October 1672 in the town of Buchach. Under it, the Hetmanate under Doroshenko's authority and the sultan's protection included the Right-Bank Kyiv region and the Bratslav region.

Western Podillia was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire as the Kamianets Eyalet. The remaining Ukrainian lands stayed within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Thus, the Treaty of Buchach did not accommodate Doroshenko's desire to unite the entire Cossack state under his mace, as its lands were partially divided between Poland and Turkey.

However, the Sejm refused to ratify the Buchach treaty and instead approved preparations for a new war with the Ottoman Empire. To win over the Cossacks, Warsaw initiated negotiations with Doroshenko, who was once again ready to seek rights and privileges for the Hetmanate from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Meanwhile, Sobieski's troops in the autumn of 1673 dealt a devastating blow to the Ottoman army near Khotyn.

On the Left Bank, the Cossack elite, led by the general judge Ivan Samoilovych, carried out a coup in March 1672 near Konotop. Mnohohrshny was arrested and sent to Moscow, where he was tortured. A new treaty between the new Hetman Samoilovych and the Tsardom of Russia was also signed — the Konotop Articles.

The new provisions stipulated an expansion of the rights of the officer class, a ban on territorial expansion of the Hetmanate at the expense of Belarusian lands (Mnohohrshny had tried to include Homel in the Cossack state), and the removal of the clause requiring mandatory participation of a Ukrainian delegation in Russian-Polish negotiations if the matter concerned the Hetmanate. Cossacks were also strictly forbidden to accept runaway peasants from Russia.

Taking advantage of the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth being preoccupied with war, Samoilovych, together with the Russian government, attempted in 1674 to annex the Right Bank. At the beginning of the year, Russian-Cossack forces crossed the Dniro. The Cossacks of the Cherkasy and Kaniv regiments recognized Samoilovych's authority. In early summer 1674, Samoilovych and the Russians laid siege to Chyhyryn, but an Ottoman army moved to relieve it.

The Turkish sultan, learning of events on the Right Bank, directed his forces from Moldova toward Chyhyryn. A number of settlements in Eastern Podillia were destroyed, and their inhabitants taken captive. The Turks acted most brutally in Uman: all civilians were executed, and the town itself burned.

The actions of the Turks and Tatars ultimately destroyed Doroshenko's authority. His former allies defected en masse to Samoilovych's camp. The hetman decided to renounce the mace. Thus, when Russian–Cossack forces once again appeared beneath the walls of Chyhyryn in September 1676, Doroshenko handed over the hetman's regalia to Samoilovych and swore allegiance to the Russian tsar before him.

Meanwhile, the struggle between the Turks and the Poles for the Right Bank ended with the Treaty of Żurawno in 1676, which somewhat reduced Poland's losses but confirmed Podillia's incorporation into the Ottoman Empire. Having made peace with the Poles, the Ottomans turned to war against the Russians. After Doroshenko's capitulation, the Porte placed its bet on Yurii Khmelnytsky, proclaiming him hetman with his capital at Nemyriv. In 1677, Khmelnytsky, together with Ottoman forces, launched a campaign against Chyhyryn. On that occasion, the city held out, but the following year the Turkish–Tatar army captured the capital of the Hetmanate. The city was left in ruins; Chyhyryn lost its status as the center of the Cossack state.

To deprive the Turks and Khmelnytsky of support, Samoilovych conceived a plan to resettle people and destroy settlements on the Right Bank. Thus, in 1678–1679, the Great Zghin took place — all fortifications of the Right-Bank regiments were destroyed, and the population was relocated to the Left Bank and Slobozhanshchyna.

At the beginning of 1681, the Treaty of Bakhchysarai was concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Under it, the Turkish sultan recognized the Russian tsar's supremacy over Left-Bank Ukraine, Kyiv and its environs, and Zaporizhzhia. In return, the Muscovite tsar recognized Podillia and the Southern Kyiv region as subject to the sultan. A strip along the right bank of the Dnipro up to 20 km wide was declared neutral and was to remain uninhabited. Soon after this, Khmelnytsky the Younger died or was executed.

The only hetman remaining was Samoilovych. He consistently strengthened the Hetmanate's state institutions and sought to centralize hetman authority. Samoilovych also restricted the liberties of Zaporizhzhia by forbidding the Sich Cossacks from pursuing an independent foreign policy. Having come to power with Moscow's help, Samoilovych nonetheless resolutely opposed the intentions of the Russian leadership to present the Zaporozhians with tsarist banners, which would have meant subordinating the Sich Cossacks directly to the tsar.

In Moscow, after Alexei's death in 1676, his son Fyodor briefly became tsar. In 1682, de facto power passed to his daughter Sophia, who was appointed regent for the minor heirs, Ivan and Peter. Sophia relied on her favorite, Prince Vasily Golitsyn.

It was Golitsyn who secured the conclusion of the Eternal Peace between the Tsardom of Russia and the

Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1686. The treaty confirmed the articles of the Andrusovo Truce; the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth ceded Kyiv permanently in exchange for **146,000 rubles** in compensation; Russia assumed sole control over Zaporizhzhia; and the Southern Kyiv and Bratslav regions, devastated by warfare, were declared neutral territory. Russia also annulled previous treaties with the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate and joined the Holy League (the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria, the Vatican, and Venice) directed against the Porte.

After the Eternal Peace, the transfer of the Kyiv Metropolis under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate became a matter of time. However, this was facilitated not only by Russian expansionism but also by the stance of some Ukrainian hierarchs, particularly Symeon Polotsky, a graduate of the Mohyla Academy. Having arrived in Moscow as early as 1664, he founded a school whose graduates persuaded the Ukrainian Church to merge with the Russian one.

The beginning of the end of Samoilovych's rule was the failed Crimean campaign of 1687, which was prepared within the framework of the Holy League's ideas, although Russia pursued its own interests. Golitsyn had ambitious plans for the Tsardom of Russia's access to Azov and Black Sea ports. However, the campaign failed, and the search for the guilty party led to the hetman. On the return journey, Samoilovych was deprived of the hetman's mace.

At the council of senior officers, with Golitsyn's support, a new hetman was elected — Ivan Mazepa. Mazepa soon concluded the Kolomak Articles with the tsarist government. They worsened the legal position of the Hetmanate. In particular, the hetman's rights to grant estates and the right of the Zaporizhzhian Host to elect and depose the hetman were restricted. The right and duty of the senior officers to monitor the hetman and report on him to Moscow were confirmed. In addition, the presence of Russian troops was strengthened — under the agreement, a streltsy regiment was stationed in the capital, Baturyn. The agreement also, for the first time in the history of relations with Russia, contained an instruction to the hetman and the Cossack senior officers to make efforts to eliminate the national distinctiveness of Ukrainians (*in particular, through mixed marriages*), and it was also forbidden to state aloud that the “Little Russian land is of the hetman's regiment” (*that is, that it is under the rule of its own hetman*).

CHAPTER 30

THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFLICT WITH CHINA AND
RUSSIA'S ACCESS TO THE BLACK SEA

1689-1700



	Main territory of the Russian Tsardom (including autonomous Cossack lands) at the end of the 1680s
	States associated with Russia
	Territories recognized as Chinese under the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689
	Territories that remained undelimited under the Treaty of Nerchinsk
	Territories seized by Russia by the end of the 1690s, and new stockades built on them
	Territories seized by Russia by 1696 and annexed under the Treaty of Constantinople in 1700



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Kalmykia.
- ② Left-Bank Hetmanate.
- ③ The Zaporozhian Sich (since 1686 under exclusive Russian protectorate).

THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFLICT WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA'S ACCESS TO THE BLACK SEA 1689-1700

The successes of Austria and Venice in the struggle against the Ottoman Empire enabled the tsarist government to prepare for the second Crimean campaign. A **112,000**-strong Russian army under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn, together with Sloboda Cossack regiments, set out on campaign in March 1689. At the end of April, the hetman's forces under Ivan Mazepa joined them. However, this campaign also ended unsuccessfully: the combined forces reached Perekop and besieged the town, but were unable to overcome Crimean resistance and retreated. Unlike his predecessor, Mazepa did not lose his position because of the failed campaign.

In parallel, the Tsardom of Russia pursued active expansion eastward. In the Amur region, a conflict with Qing China over control of fur-rich areas began in 1649. That year, the Russian industrialist Yerofey Khabarov set out with Don Cossacks to the Amur to "*reconnoiter new lands*." He crossed the Stanovoy Range and reached the first towns of the Daur people. Before long, Khabarov and the Cossacks withdrew, returning the following year with more men and munitions. Having defeated the Daur (*who had already recognized China's supremacy*) and seized their supplies, the Russians destroyed the captured settlement of the Daur prince Albazy.

In 1652, the Chinese unsuccessfully attempted for the first time to expel the Russians from the Amur region. In 1653, Russian detachments advanced to the middle Amur and began collecting tribute from the Nivkhs. Ostrogs were built on territories seized by the Russians. Among the first was the Nerchinsk ostrog (*present-day Nerchinsk*). The following year, the fortress received its first voivode — thereafter, the Russian authorities officially intervened in the conflict. For abuses, Khabarov was recalled to Moscow and imprisoned for several years.

Many Russians moved to the Amur in search of food. After the Daur and other peoples fled from the Russian "pioneers" beyond the Amur, the territories between the Amur and Zeya rivers were devastated, depriving the conquerors of grain supplies and yasak. This prompted the Cossacks led by the desiatnik Onufrii Stepanov to move upstream along the Sungari River, seize provisions from the local Ducher people, and then return to winter in the lower Amur. In the summer of 1654, Stepanov's detachment attempted a similar expedition, but encountered an army of Chinese and their Korean allies. The Russians managed to defeat the Qing flotilla, but the assault on the shore fortifications failed, and they retreated from the Sungari.

At the beginning of November 1654, Stepanov's detachment, together with other Russian groups, founded a fortified winter camp on an island of the annual channel of the right tributary of the Amur, the Kumara (*Khumarkhe*) River — Ust-Kumara ostrog — from which they planned

to collect tribute from the local population. However, in March 1655, a **10,000**-strong combined force of Amur-region tribes and Chinese, under the command of the Qing Empire's military minister, who had been specially dispatched from Beijing to the Amur, approached the ostrog. In April, the siege was lifted, but in June, the Russian detachments nevertheless abandoned the ostrog due to a shortage of provisions.

Over the next several years, the Russians continued to explore the Amur and its tributaries, extracting furs. However, in June 1658, the "*Amur frontier explorers*," led by Stepanov, the prikaz official of the Great Amur River and the Daurian Land, were defeated by Chinese forces, and Stepanov himself was killed. The remaining small detachments, having crossed the mountains in the spring of 1659, returned to the Lena basin.

The collection of yasak by the Russians continued, but the Qing authorities were unwilling to openly oppose Russian expansion into the Amur region. The Qing Empire had a weak economic base in Central and Southern Manchuria; therefore, from 1665 to 1683, no open hostilities occurred. Meanwhile, in 1666, the Russians restored Albazin.

A new cause of rising tension between the Tsardom of Russia and the Qing Empire was the transfer in 1667 of a Tungusic prince, together with several clans, into Russian allegiance. The Chinese authorities repeatedly demanded that the prince and his people be handed over to them, but received a refusal.

From 1669 onward, the two states exchanged embassies: a Russian embassy arrived in Beijing, and a Qing embassy in Nerchinsk. The embassies agreed to observe a mutual truce and refrain from incursions into territories controlled by either state. The left tributaries of the upper Amur were recognized as the Russian zone of control. An increasing number of Russians began to resettle in the Albazin area, where they built 20 settlements and a monastery in the vicinity.

At this time, the Mongols increasingly attacked Russian frontier ostrogs, as they regarded the lands of the Baikal region and Transbaikalia as their own. In addition, in 1674, the Chinese established a fortress at Jilin on the Sungari.

To avoid direct conflict with the Qing, Tsar Alexei sent an embassy to Beijing in 1675. It departed from Moscow, passed through Irkutsk and Nerchinsk, and arrived in the Chinese capital the following year, 1676. No agreements were reached in the course of the negotiations.

To strengthen its position in the Amur region, the Albazin voivodeship was established in Albazin. This became a call to action for the Qing Empire. In June 1685, Chinese troops besieged Albazin. Russian auxiliary forces did not arrive in time; after repelling the first assault, and with the resources for defense fully exhausted, the voivode surrendered the fortifications.

The Qing command insisted that the Russians withdraw to Yakutsk, believing that Nerchinsk was also built on Chinese territory. However, the voivode managed to negotiate a retreat upstream along the Amur, which was far easier for the Russians than crossing the mountain range into Yakutia. The Russian troops, together with the

population, left the town without hindrance and moved westward. Qing troops destroyed Albazin and withdrew. However, by August, Russian Cossacks had returned and restored the fortress.

A new Qing imperial campaign against Albazin began in 1686, when the emperor ordered the fortress to be taken, not destroyed, but instead reinforced as a base for a further advance on Nerchinsk. In the summer, Qing forces once again laid siege to Albazin, and the Russians repelled all assaults. However, scurvy spread among the Cossacks, killing most of the defenders of Albazin — by December, only 45 men remained capable of standing guard.

The Qing Empire was unable to capture the principal Russian fortification on the Amur, but continued to attempt to restrain further Russian advance. In January–March 1688, a Mongol force allied with the Qing besieged the Selenginsk ostrog, then commanded by the former Ukrainian hetman Demian Mnohohrishny. Having withstood a 13-week siege and one assault, the Selenginsk garrison, together with reinforcements from nearby ostrogs, fought the Mongols near Goose Lake at the end of March. The battle ended in the Mongols' defeat, and they were forced to retreat.

In Beijing, it was decided to resort to negotiations with the Russians. To exert military pressure, a 5,000-strong Qing force approached Nerchinsk in July. A month later, the envoy of the Tsardom of Russia and governor of Siberia, Fyodor Golovin, arrived there from Moscow. The negotiations lasted two weeks, during which the Russians bribed the Jesuit envoys in Nerchinsk, who served as interpreters for the Chinese, while the Buryats en masse entered into allegiance with the Qing Empire.

Following difficult negotiations, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded on 27 August 1689. Under it, a border between Russia and the Qing Empire was established for the first time — along the Gorbitsa River (*modern Amazar*), a left tributary of the Shilka, and the Stanovoy Range. The Russians ceded to the Manchus a portion of territory on the left bank of the Amur and the right bank of the Argun, including Albazin, which was to be destroyed. The treaty also set terms for diplomatic contacts and trade between the states. Most of the Amur region remained undemarcated.

That same year, 1689, changes took place in Moscow. The struggle for power between Tsarevna Sophia and her brother Peter ended with Sophia's removal — she was forcibly tonsured as a nun. The *de facto* ruler of Russia became Peter I; however, until his death in 1696, his co-ruler was his frail brother Ivan V.

The foreign policy priority of the new tsar in the early years of his reign was to continue the war with the Ottoman Empire and Crimea. In the spring of 1693 and 1694, Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful campaigns along the lower Dnipro. Unlike his predecessor, Peter I decided to focus not on Crimea, but on the Turkish city of Azov at the mouth of the Don. The first Azov campaign took place in 1695 and ended unsuccessfully. Already in autumn, preparations began for the second campaign: in Voronezh, the construction of a rowing flotilla was launched.

At the same time, Mazepa's regiments, with Russian support, captured four Crimean–Turkish fortresses at the mouth of the Dnipro.

In May 1696, a **40,000**-strong Russian army besieged Azov. The fortress surrendered even before the July assault. The Ottoman garrison and the population left Azov without hindrance, after which streltsy and Cossacks were resettled there. The city's mosques were converted into churches.

Thus, Russia gained access to the southern seas for the first time. In addition, following the Azov campaigns, the port of Taganrog was founded, and the Tsardom of Russia gained the capability to attack the Crimean Peninsula by sea.

Attempts by Crimean–Turkish forces to retake what was lost in 1697 and 1698 proved unsuccessful, after which a two-year truce was concluded. In July 1700, Russia and Turkey signed the Treaty of Constantinople, under which Peter I retained the conquered territories, but renounced claims to Kerch.

In parallel, in 1697–1698, Russian forces captured the Kamchatka Peninsula.


Thus, at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, the territory under Moscow's control grew to **14.4 million km²** — including uninhabited, vassal, and autonomous Cossack lands, but not counting associated states: Kalmykia (231,000 km²), Left-Bank Hetmanate (115,000 km²), and the Zaporozhian Sich (98,000 km²). In total, over the course of nearly 100 years, Russia nearly tripled in size.

CHAPTER 31

ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONAL AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA

2ND AND 3RD THIRDS OF THE 17TH CENTURY





Numbered designations indicate:

- | | |
|---|--|
| ① "The Tara Troubles" 1627–1635. | ⑪ The Ukrainian uprising, 1668–1669. |
| ② Bashkir uprising, 1645. | ⑫ "The Solovetsky Sitting" 1668–1676. |
| ③ "The Salt Riot" 1648–1649. | ⑬ The Bashkir uprising, 1681–1684. |
| ④ The Pskov–Novgorod uprising, 1650. | ⑭ "The Khovanshchina" 1682. |
| ⑤ The Buryat uprising, 1658. | ⑮ The uprising of the Vanyads (<i>Vadeev Nganasans</i>), 1683. |
| ⑥ The Western Siberian uprising, 1661–1665. | ⑯ Territory of the Tungus and Yakut resistance |
| ⑦ "The Copper Riot" 1662. | ⑰ Territory of Yukaghir resistance |
| ⑧ The Bashkir uprising, 1662–1664. | ⑱ The Baikal uprising, 1695–1700. |
| ⑨ The uprising of the Avam Nganasans, 1666. | ⑲ The Streltsy uprising, 1698. |
| ⑩ The uprising of Stepan Razin, 1667–1671. | |

ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONAL AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA

2ND AND 3RD THIRDS OF THE 17TH CENTURY

Popular movements in Russia in the second to fourth quarters of the seventeenth century can be conditionally divided into three groups. The first includes local, primarily urban uprisings against local authorities, most of which occurred before the middle of the seventeenth century.

Uprisings of significant scale and some success occurred in Yeniseisk (1626), Mangazeya (1631), Tomsk (1637–1640), Tobolsk (1639), Krasnoyarsk (1641–1642), Yakutsk (1642–1650 and 1690), the Verkholensk ostrog (1655), and Nerchinsk (1682). The main driving force in these cases was the service personnel (*in Mangazeya — promyshlenniki*).

The rebels “voluntarily-compulsorily” or by outright force expelled corrupt voivodes, replacing them with others or creating (*as in Tomsk*) elected self-government bodies, until new officials were sent from Moscow. In Krasnoyarsk and Yakutsk, the old voivodes retained their posts.

From the middle of the century, such actions began to encompass several towns and ostrogs simultaneously: the “Salt Riot,” the Pskov–Novgorod uprising, and the uprising in the Baikal ostrogs. However, in essence, they remained socio-economic riots without a nationwide political program. There was no talk of separation from Russia or of changing the central government. Repression was rarely applied to participants (*except in Moscow*).

The second group consists of anti-colonial movements of peoples conquered by Russia in the Urals and Siberia, as well as the anti-Moscow uprising in Ukraine. Although most of them were caused by economic reasons (*land and tax abuses*), they had a deep anti-Russian character. Unlike the previous actions, these were mostly suppressed by force, and only in Ukraine and Bashkiria did the Russian authorities, after a series of battles, agree to certain arrangements with the rebels. In border territories, external forces became involved in this struggle.

Finally, the third group can include actions of a purely political character, even if other slogans masked them. These include the “people’s war” led by Stepan Razin and both Streltsy uprisings in Moscow, as well as all instances of armed resistance by the Old Believers.

Ultimately, most of these actions failed to achieve their stated goals, resulting in military defeats at the hands of the regular army. Only riots against local authorities, as well as the Bashkir and Ukrainian uprisings, proved partially successful. The only truly victorious uprising was the Streltsy uprising of 1682, which resulted in a change of power in Moscow.

The largest actions during this period were as follows (*numbered on the map*).

1. “The Tara Troubles” 1627–1635. A series of

actions by the local population against the collection of yasak, as well as the struggle of Kuchum’s sons and grandsons to revive the Siberian Khanate. The Kalmyks and Teleuts aided the rebels; detachments of the vassal Koda Principality fought alongside government forces.

2. The Bashkir uprising, 1645. A local action in response to the Russians’ founding of the Menzelinsk ostrog was forcibly suppressed.

3. “The Salt Riot” 1648–1649. An urban uprising against tax pressure and rising salt prices. It culminated in the fall of the government of the time. The “Salt Riot” became the main one in a series of actions that that year engulfed other Russian cities: Olonets, Sol Vychegodskaya, Kargopol, Veliky Ustyug, Totma, Kaigorod, Sol Kamskaya, Romanov, Ruza, Vladimir, Novosil, Yelets, Livny, Voronezh, Dedilov, Kursk, Karpov, Kozlov, Kromy, Narym, Kuznetsk, Tomsk. In most cases, the central authorities were forced to make concessions to the rebels, removing local voivodes from office. The situation was finally brought under control only in 1650.

4. The Pskov–Novgorod uprising, 1650. A series of urban disturbances against rising bread prices in Pskov and Novgorod, as well as in the neighboring Voronichi, Gdov, Izborsk, and Ostrov.

5. The Buryat uprising, 1658. The subjugation of the Buryats took place from the mid-1630s through the early 1650s and was marked by their active resistance. The Buryats regularly besieged Russian ostrogs (1636; two in 1643–1644; 1651). In 1634, they destroyed the first Bratsk ostrog; in 1648, the Osinsk ostrog; in 1654, the Udinsk ostrog; and in 1655, the Irgen ostrog. After the conquest of Buryatia, the local population proved disloyal and in 1658 launched a large-scale uprising against abuses by yasak collectors. Most of the rebels withdrew to Mongolia the following year, and the rest in 1661. The next wave of Buryat resistance dates to 1693–1696 (*in the last year, an unsuccessful attempt to seize Irkutsk*), after which it declined.

6. The Western Siberian uprising, 1661–1665. A collective name for a series of mutinies and actions by the local population against Russian domination. In 1662, the Nenets attacked Pustozersk and raided Mangazeya. In 1662–1663, the population of the middle Ob and lower Irtysh rose; these actions continued until 1665. Pustozersk had also been attacked in 1644, and Obdorsk in 1649 and 1678/79. Nenets attacks on the Khanty allied with Moscow are recorded in 1668 and 1670.

7. “The Copper Riot” 1662. An uprising against the excessive minting of copper coinage and the resulting depreciation. Suppressed by troops, but a year later, the issuance of copper money ceased.

8. The Bashkir uprising, 1662–1664. A full-scale uprising caused by the Russian authorities’ encroachment on traditional Bashkir landholding and tax abuses by officials. After a series of clashes, negotiations ensued, resulting in a de facto victory for the rebels: the Ufa voivode was removed, the seizure of land by Russian settlers was halted, and the increase in the yasak rate was rescinded.

9. The uprising of the Avam Nganasans, 1666. The largest action by these people against the payment of yasak.

10. The uprising of Stepan Razin, 1667–1671. The largest anti-government action in 17th-century Russia. In 1667–1669, Razin brought the lower Volga under his control, seized the Yaik town, and devastated Persia's Caspian coast. In 1670, rebels among the Don Cossacks, dissatisfied with the strengthening of tsarist control, seized Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, and several other Volga cities, and marched on Moscow. Razin's program envisaged the abolition of serfdom, the introduction of Cossack democracy, and the redistribution of boyar wealth among the population; at the same time, the ataman did not speak out against the tsar, but declared himself his defender. Peasants, poor townspeople, Old Believers, and representatives of the non-Russian peoples of the Volga region joined the Cossacks en masse. It is likely that Razin's associate in this region, Alena Arzamasskaya, was of Erzya descent. However, in 1671, the uprising was suppressed by government forces, and the so-called "settled" Cossacks turned against Razin, handing him over to Moscow. After this, the Don Cossacks for the first time swore an oath of loyalty to the tsar.

11. The Ukrainian uprising, 1668–1669. An armed action on the Left Bank and, in part, in Sloboda Ukraine against the division of the Hetmanate under the Andrusovo Truce of 1667 and against Russian rule in general. After a series of battles, the uprising ended with negotiations and the return of the Left Bank under Moscow's protectorate on milder terms than before (*"the Hlukhiv Articles"*).

12. "The Solovetsky Sitting" 1668–1676. The largest action by Russian Old Believers. The siege and capture of the rebellious Solovetsky Monastery by government forces, whose monks refused to accept the church reforms of Patriarch Nikon.

13. The Bashkir uprising, 1681–1684. A full-scale uprising due to an attempt at forced Christianization of the Bashkirs and the arbitrariness of local Russian authorities. The rebels besieged Ufa, but a Kalmyk incursion forced them to reconcile with Russia. As a result, the planned Christianization of Bashkiria was canceled.

14. "The Khovanshchina" 1682. A Streltsy mutiny in May, as a result of which Tsarevna Sophia was proclaimed regent for the underage tsars Ivan and Peter.

15. The uprising of the Vanyads (Vadeev Nganasans), 1683. The largest action by these people against the payment of yasak was accompanied by the destruction of the Yessey winter camp and a mass flight of the population to Yakutia.

16. The Tungusic and Yakut uprisings. The Russian conquest of Yakutia was, on the whole, completed by 1632, but already in 1631 and 1632, the Yakuts rose against Kremlin rule. The first siege of the Yakutsk ostrog by the Yakuts took place in 1634. In 1639–1640, the Tungus took up arms against the payment of yasak. In 1641–1642, a joint Tungusic-Yakut uprising occurred, including an unsuccessful siege of the Yakutsk ostrog; another siege followed in 1646. In 1650–1651, there was yet another siege of the Okhotsk ostrog (*from then until 1678, the rebels were led by Zelemei Kovyryn*). Notable clashes took place in 1654, 1666, 1674 (*the unsuccessful siege of the Bauntovsky ostrog*), 1675–1676 (*under the leadership of Baltuga Timiryev*), and 1677–1678 (*the unsuccessful*

siege of the Okhotsk ostrog). In 1682, the Yakuts under Jennik, together with the Tungus, Old Believers, and part of the Cossacks (*married to Yakut women*), made several attempts to capture Yakutsk. In 1683, the Tungus and Nganasans destroyed the Yessey winter camp. In 1684, the Yakuts under Oryukan Sekuyev rose for the last time against the yasak collectors and local collaborators. In 1686, the Tungus destroyed the Tontor winter camp.

17. Yukaghir uprisings. The Yukaghirs recognized Russian supremacy after a series of battles in 1635–1644, but did not lay down arms. The largest clashes, with temporary rebel successes, occurred in 1645, 1647, 1649, 1650, 1651, 1652, 1656, 1661, 1663 (*the Nizhneyansk winter camp was destroyed*), 1666, 1669, 1672, and 1697. During 1681–1684, Kaniva made the last organized attempt to rid himself of Russian domination by besieging the Anadyr ostrog. After the 1714–1715 uprising, the Yukaghirs finally recognized Moscow's authority.

18. The Baikal uprising, 1695–1700. A series of actions by service people against abuses by local authorities, joined by the surrounding peasants and the lower-ranking yasak-paying population. Unlike in previous actions, this time the rebels from different towns coordinated their activities, and the Transbaikalian Cossacks even formed an alliance. The main centers were Krasnoyarsk and Nerchinsk (*beginning in 1695*); the Barguzin, Bratsk, Ilyinsk, Kabansk, Selenginsk, and Udinsk ostrogs and Il'msk (1696); and Irkutsk (1697). In most cases, the actions ended after 2–3 years in a certain compromise.

19. The Streltsy uprising, 1698. An action by four old regiments against the reforms of Peter I was suppressed by the new regular army.

CHAPTER 32

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE PETRINE ERA

1700-1720S



- Main territory of the Russian Tsardom (including autonomous Cossack lands) in 1700
- ① ② ③ States associated with Russia
- Territories returned to the Ottoman Empire under the treaties of 1711–1713
- Territory of Zaporizhzhia under the Ottoman protectorate from 1711
- ④ ⑤ ⑥ Territories seized by Russia in the first third of the 18th century
- Temporary possessions of the Russian Empire in the 1720s–1730s
- ★ **Saint Petersburg** (the new capital of Russia from 1714)



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Kalmykia.
- ② Left-Bank Hetmanate.
- ③ Zaporizhzhian Sich (*the part controlled by Russia in 1711–1734/1739*).
- ④ A part of Khongorai (*the statehood of the Yenisei Kyrgyz*), seized during 1707–1718 and definitively fixed for Russia by the Kyakhta Treaty with China in 1727.
- ⑤ Territories of southern Siberia and the Altai, seized during 1713–1720.
- ⑥ Territories seized during the Great Northern War and secured for Russia by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE PETRINE ERA 1700-1720S

At the outset of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), Peter I seized Ingria, the territory of which today encompasses Leningrad Oblast, parts of Karelia, and the Baltic countries. In 1710–1714, Russian forces captured Riga, Revel (*Tallinn*), Vyborg, and Helsingfors (*Helsinki*). In 1714, the capital was definitively transferred from Moscow to St. Petersburg. The Peace of Nystad of 30 August 1721 secured Russia's new territorial gains in the north.

After the victory at Poltava in 1709 and the defeat of Charles XII's forces, Peter I was drawn into an unsuccessful war with the Ottoman Empire (1710–1713). Under the terms of the Pruth Peace concluded in 1711, Russia lost the Azov region and the Black Sea littoral and also undertook to withdraw its troops from Moldova.

After the war with the Swedes ended, Peter I launched the Persian (*Caspian*) Campaign of 1722–1723. The Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1723 secured for Russia new provinces: Baku, Derbent, Shirvan, Gilan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad.

Under Peter I, the annexation of Kamchatka continued, and the Kuril (1711) and Lyakhovsky (1712) Islands were discovered. In 1716, Omsk was founded, becoming an important stronghold of Russian colonialism in Siberia. In the same period, Russia seized most of the Altai by force.

The Russian Empire's expansion into the Far East and its southward advance across Eurasia necessitated the establishment of relations with the Qing Empire. In 1727, the parties signed the Kyakhta Treaty. Under its terms, a common border between the two empires was defined, cross-border trade was established, and a permanent ecclesiastical mission of the Russian Empire was opened in Beijing.

Peter I concentrated his efforts on reforming all spheres of Russia's state, political, and social life, thereby transforming the tsardom into a centralized, absolutist empire. To a significant extent, the need for reforms was dictated by constant military campaigns and the expansion of the state's territory.

Military reforms of the Russian Tsardom began even before Peter I's reign, but under him, in 1699–1700, the army formed regular infantry and cavalry regiments of a new model, with unified tables of organization, standardized armament, and standardized training. In 1705, conscription was introduced, and conscripts' service was lifelong.

The acquisition of control first over the Sea of Azov and later over the Baltic gave impetus to the creation of the Russian navy. In 1703, construction of the first frigates of the Baltic Fleet was completed. In 1711, the Admiralty Collegium was established, and in 1712, the first Naval Academy was established. Specialized schools in navigation, artillery, and engineering were also founded to train officers.

In the 1708–1720s, a reform of central and local government bodies was carried out. The model for Russian reforms was the Swedish system, built on the principles of cameralism — a theory of bureaucratic administration that provided for the functional organization of government, the

establishment of collegia as central administrative institutions, and strict specialization and regulation of chancery activity.

At the same time, as early as 1710, the “*Accord Points*” and the acts of capitulation of Livonia and Estonia secured the special status of these lands within Russia: the courts and self-government remained in the hands of the local German and Swedish nobility and municipal institutions, and their privileges were confirmed. Even the Landtags — regional representative bodies — were preserved.

In 1711, the Senate was created — the highest body of executive, judicial, and “*legislative-consultative*” authority, replacing the Boyar Duma. In 1717–1720, the old system of tsarist prikazy was abolished, and 12 collegias were established, each responsible for a distinct sphere of state administration (*military, naval, financial, foreign affairs, and so forth*). The collegia were subordinate to the Senate and had the right to issue their own decrees within clearly defined competence.

In 1708–1709, Russia's territory was divided into 8 guberniyas (*Moscow, Ingermanland, Kyiv, Azov, Smolensk, Arkhangelogorod, Kazan, and Siberia*). In 1719, the guberniyas were divided into 50 provinces, and those into districts (*uyezds*). The guberniyas were headed by governors subordinate to the tsar, the Senate, and the relevant collegia. In the provinces and districts, voivodes with chanceries operated.

In 1718–1724, a population census was conducted, after which household taxation was replaced by the poll tax (*for men*), and the overall tax burden doubled. Military-tax districts (*regimental districts*) were created, in which quar- 5 tered troops controlled tax collection and suppressed unrest.

By decrees of Peter I, a class of state peasants was formed — rural inhabitants outside landlords' estates, thereafter dependent on the government. In 1724, the yasak-paying inhabitants of the Volga region — Tatars, Chuvash, Mordvins, Mari, and Udmurts — were enrolled as state peasants; from 1721, conscription was extended to them, and in 1725, the poll tax was imposed. Neither of these innovations affected Bashkiria nor the indigenous peoples of Siberia.

To establish control over the activities of state structures in the Russian Empire, a system of secret surveillance was introduced in 1711, and prosecutorial oversight was established in 1722. The reform of state administration more than doubled the number of officials: from 924 in 1723 to 1,962.

Peter I's reforms also affected the religious sphere. In the tsar's entourage, a prominent role was played by graduates of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy — philosophers and theologians Stefan Yavorsky and Theophan Prokopovych. Both also had Western European education. After the death of Patriarch Adrian in October 1700, Peter I prohibited the election of a new patriarch and instead appointed a native of Galicia, Yavorsky, as locum tenens. Overall, during 1700–1762, of the 127 bishops who held diocesan sees, 70 were Ukrainians, 47 were Russians, and the remainder were of other nationalities.

As one of the tsar's closest advisers, Prokopovych developed a project of church reform. As a preacher and publicist, he justified the necessity of state reforms and unlimited autocracy, denying the supremacy of spiritual

authority over secular power. He provided the theoretical foundation for caesaropapism by proclaiming Peter I the head of the Church, which became the ideological basis of the synodal system. He drafted the Spiritual Regulation of 1721, under which the patriarchate was officially abolished and replaced by a Synod of twelve bishops operating under the monarch's control.

Nominally, the Synod was headed by Yavorsky, who initially supported Peter I's church reform but later opposed it, advocating the separation of church and state. However, actual power was concentrated in Prokopovych's hands; after Yavorsky's death, he became the first member of the Synod and thus led the Russian Orthodox Church. After Peter I's death, Prokopovych facilitated the transfer of power to his wife, Catherine I. Nevertheless, he sought to preserve the special position of his homeland within the empire by popularizing the doctrine "*Kyiv — the Second Jerusalem*," which identified Kyiv as Russia's spiritual capital.

Whereas in 1702, Peter I declared an unwillingness to impose Orthodoxy by force, already in 1704 an additional tax began to be levied from Muslims and pagans for prayers. By decrees of 1713 and 1715, Muslim landowners were restricted in their right to own Orthodox serfs and were compelled to be baptized within 6 months under threat of losing their estates. From 1720, the newly baptized were exempt from taxes for three years, and from 1722, from conscription. From 1724, baptism was exempted from debt bondage and the death penalty. Only baptized inorodtsy were able to open copper-smelting enterprises. Despite this, in Kazan Guberniya from 1719 to 1725, only **2,000** people were baptized, and by 1730, another **800**.

In 1706 and 1710, Peter I ordered the Siberian archbishop to baptize the Ostyaks and Voguls, employing both incentives and coercion. Most of these people ultimately converted to Orthodoxy. On the other hand, the Russian authorities did not oppose the conversion of most Buryat pagans to Buddhism in the early 18th century.

Peter I's reforms provoked dissatisfaction, which led to several uprisings. In newly annexed territories during this period, uprisings broke out: the Astrakhan uprising (1705–1706), Kondrat Bulavin's uprising (1707–1708), the Bashkir uprising (1717–1718), and actions in the Far East — all of which were suppressed by government forces.

As a result of the suppression of the Bulavin uprising, most of the territory of the Don Cossacks was included in the newly created Azov Guberniya. In 1708, the election of atamans was abolished; the Cossacks were conscripted into the regular army; and along the Don, several Russian fortresses were built, whose commandants were granted the authority to adjudicate disputes among Cossacks, the officer class, and neighboring peoples. Under the decree of 1721, all Cossacks were subordinated to the Military Collegium.

From the end of the 17th century, Peter I consistently pursued a policy of direct intervention in the Hetmanate's political and economic affairs.

In 1709, the emperor issued a manifesto introducing the institution of tsarist residents attached to the hetman. They performed political oversight of the hetman and the Cossack senior officers, gathered intelligence on public sentiment, and assessed the degree of loyalty of the Ukrainian

elite to Russian authority. The residents were to influence appointments, pressing the hetman to approve only those individuals deemed "*loyal to the tsar*." In cases of suspected disloyalty, they were authorized to employ military force.

The tsarist government facilitated the resettlement of Orthodox nobility from the Balkans — predominantly Serbian or Vlach. They were granted estates confiscated from Mazepa's supporters.

The creation of the Little Russian Collegium in May 1722 effectively eliminated the political autonomy of the Hetmanate. Its activity led to the extension of Russian legislative acts to the Ukrainian lands of the Left Bank and Sloboda Ukraine and to the subordination of local administrative structures to the central bodies of imperial power.

The president of the collegium, Stepan Velyaminov, was granted authority to reform the judicial system, finances, and administrative and military structures, aligning them with empire-wide arrangements. His responsibilities included reviewing judicial appeals, overseeing taxation, supervising the activities of the hetman and the General Military Chancellery, and regulating the deployment of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory.

The prosecutor of the Little Russian Collegium exercised police functions, including the arrests of persons suspected of separatist activity among the Cossacks and the inventorying of their property. By a decree of 1723, the institution of regimental overseers was established to oversee taxation and ensure compliance with the collegium's orders.

Following the death of Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky in 1722, the collegium gradually assumed full governing authority. The attempt by the acting Hetman, Pavlo Polubotok, to defend the Hetmanate's autonomous rights ended in his arrest and imprisonment, along with a group of officers, in the Peter and Paul Fortress in November 1723. Peter I's reforms transformed the Hetmanate into a de facto province of the Russian Empire with minimal autonomy.


In a similar manner, between 1716 and 1726, Russia, through a series of measures — stationing troops on foreign territory, influencing royal elections, fomenting conflicts between the king and the aristocracy, creating a pro-Russian party through corruption, diplomatic isolation, and interference in internal affairs under the pretext of protecting Orthodoxy — reduced Poland to the status of a client state. This algorithm was later employed in the annexation of the Crimean Khanate, and some of its elements were applied again in the twenty-first century.

Under Peter II, there was a certain liberalization of domestic policy and a retreat from Peter I's radical reforms. The potential outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire led in 1727 to the abolition of the Little Russian Collegium and the restoration of the hetman's authority — Danylo Apostol. At the same time, Russian nobles were prohibited from purchasing land in Ukraine.

CHAPTER 33

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE ERA OF “PALACE COUPS”

1730S-1760S



	Main territory of the Russian Empire in 1730
 ① ② ③	States associated with Russia
 ④ ⑤	Vassals of the Russian Empire
 ⑥ ⑦	Territories returned to Persia in the 1730s
	Territories ceded to Russia by Turkey under the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739
	Territories of Zaporizhzhia, which in 1739 passed from the Ottoman to the Russian protectorate
	Buffer lands between the Russian and Ottoman empires in 1739–1774
 ⑧ — ⑪	Territories seized by Russia in the 1730s–1750s
 ⑫ ⑬	Temporary possessions of the Russian Empire

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Kalmykia.
- ② Left-Bank Hetmanate.
- ③ Zaporizhzhian Sich (*the part controlled by Russia in 1711–1734/1739*).
- ④ The Junior Kazakh Zhuz (*a Russian vassal from 1731*).
- ⑤ The Middle Kazakh Zhuz (*a Russian vassal, first from 1732, definitively from 1740*).
- ⑥ Territories returned to Persia under the Treaty of Resht in 1732.
- ⑦ Territories returned to Persia under the Treaty of Ganja in 1735.
- ⑧ Territories taken from the Hetmanate and Zaporizhzhia during the construction of the Ukrainian Line in 1731–1735.
- ⑨ Swedish territories, seized during the war and secured for Russia by the Treaty of Abo in 1743.
- ⑩ Territories taken from Zaporizhzhia for the establishment of military settlements for foreign colonists in 1751–1754.
- ⑪ Kazakh pastures, seized de facto as a result of the construction of new fortresses in 1734–1754.
- ⑫ East Prussia, seized in 1758 during the Seven Years' War and incorporated into Russia, returned in 1762.
- ⑬ Holstein-Gottorp, the hereditary possession of Emperor Peter III from 1761, ceded to Denmark in 1773.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE ERA OF “PALACE COUPS” 1730S-1760S

After the death of Peter I, the Russian Empire entered a period of constant struggle for power — the era of so-called “palace coups.”

Peter II was the last male-line representative of the Romanov dynasty on the Russian imperial throne. After his death in early 1730, members of the Supreme Privy Council began a power struggle; particularly active were representatives of the Dolgorukys and the Golitsyns. As a result, the members of the council decided to offer the throne to the younger daughter of Tsar Ivan V — Anna of Courland, who soon became Empress Anna Ioannovna.

The council members, the so-called “*verkhovniki*,” decided that Anna’s authority could be easily controlled. To that end, special clauses — the “Conditions” — were drafted to constrain Russian autocracy. The text set out the ruler’s key obligations: preserving and promoting the Orthodox faith, renouncing marriage and designating an heir, and transferring decisive state powers to the Supreme Privy Council. The document contained a list of prohibitions against waging war independently, making peace, appointing to high offices, imposing taxes, and disposing of estates. A delegation of the “*verkhovniki*” in Mitau (present-day Latvia) presented Anna with the text of the “Conditions.” Before departing for Moscow, Anna signed the document, aware of dissatisfaction with the “*verkhovniki*” among the Russian nobility.

In February 1730, Anna Ioannovna arrived in Moscow, where the empire’s highest military and state ranks swore loyalty to her. Gradually, within the noble milieu outside the circle of the “*verkhovniki*,” two opposing political groups formed: proponents of noble liberties (Prince Aleksei Cherkassky, Vasily Tatishchev, and others) and supporters of the full restoration of the monarch’s autocratic power (Princes Antioch Kantemir, Nikita Trubetskoy, Grigory Yusupov, Theophan Prokopovich, and others).

In the course of debates over limiting autocracy, several projects for a new imperial state order emerged. Dmitry Golitsyn, one of the “*verkhovniki*,” proposed creating a mixed aristocratic model of government on the Swedish 17th-century pattern. It envisaged founding a bicameral “*proto-parliament*”: a Lower Chamber of the nobility (200 nobles) to defend estate rights and a Chamber of city representatives to govern trade and industry. Another project advanced by Tatishchev envisaged abolishing the Supreme Privy Council and establishing an “*Upper Government*” (a Senate) of 21 members, responsible for foreign policy and national affairs. Economic functions would pass to a “*Lower Government*” of 100 persons, which would convene three times a year. Posts within governmental structures, including senior military offices and the presidency of collegia, would become elective.

The debates around the projects led supporters of restoring strong imperial authority to agree on an appeal to Anna Ioannovna demanding the liquidation of the Supreme Privy Council, the rejection of the “Conditions,” and

the restoration of the Senate’s authority. Anna secured the support of the Guard, and nobles led by Kantemir submitted a petition demanding the restoration of full autocracy. In response, Anna publicly tore up the “Conditions” text, definitively shattering the “*verkhovniki*” plans. Soon, the country swore loyalty to Anna Ioannovna a second time as an absolute monarch, and the “*verkhovniki*” faced reprisals.

The empress’s reign was characterized by the growing role of persons of German origin in the highest state structures: the favorite Ernst Johann von Biron, Andrei Osterman, Burkhard Münnich, and others. Their elevated status contributed to the spread in society of the view that power in the country had been usurped by a “German party,” which came to be known as “Bironovshchina.” Yet this view was not groundless — in the 1760s, over 40% of 400 senior Russian officers were of non-Russian origin, and three-quarters of them were Germans.

However, “German” influence was not all-powerful. In several instances, Biron supported Russian figures and sought to avoid openly provoking dissatisfaction among the Russian nobility. After Anna’s death, he briefly served as regent under her will, but was quickly removed, sentenced, and exiled.

In 1733, in connection with Danylo Apostol’s illness, a government of six persons was formed in the Hetmanate, composed equally of Ukrainians and Russians and headed by the Russian Prince Shakhovskoy. After the hetman’s death the following year, power in Ukraine passed to this “*hetman government*.”

In 1734, the Zaporozhians returned under Russian protection, which led to the outbreak of another Russo-Turkish war the following year. In 1736, Russian and Cossack forces took Azov, broke through Perekop, and temporarily occupied several Crimean towns, including Bakhchysarai and Gezlev (Yevpatoria). Further operations in the Black Sea littoral proved inconclusive, forcing Russian garrisons to abandon Ochakiv and Kinburn. Due to Austria’s separate peace with the Ottoman Empire and the threat of war with Sweden, Russia concluded the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739, under which it regained the Black Sea territories lost in 1711–1713.

By contrast, expansion opportunities emerged in Central Asia. In the first half of the 18th century, Kazakh society, organized as three hordes-zhuzes (Junior, Middle, and Senior) with their own territorial, cultural, and political specificity, experienced a period of internecine strife and pressure from neighbors. In these conditions, in 1730, the khan of the Junior Zhuz, Abulkhair, appealed for acceptance into Russian allegiance, which was granted to him the following year.

In the following decades, the Russian Empire consistently strengthened its control over Kazakh lands. In 1740, the Middle Zhuz definitively came under Russian protectorate. By contrast, an attempt in the same year to bring the Senior Zhuz into allegiance ended with the killing of the khan. The incorporation of Kazakh territories into the empire was accompanied by the destruction of the traditional system of authority, the introduction of Russian administrative structures, the transformation of the social order and the economy, and the gradual integration

of the region into the imperial trade and infrastructure networks. Allegiance, initially sought as a form of protection, evolved into a full-scale transformation of Kazakh lands.

Dissatisfaction with Anna Ioannovna's rule and the unchecked power of "*Bironovshchina*" contributed to the formation of expectations among the Russian elite that, with the accession of Elizabeth Petrovna, there would be a return to Peter I's policies and a weakening of the "*German dominance*." Having ascended the throne following a bloodless coup in late 1741, Elizabeth, unlike the Germans, had strong ties to the Ukrainian milieu. Her favorite was a representative of the Cossack officer class, Oleksii Rozumovskiy. During her reign, in 1742, the Kyiv Metropolis was restored; in 1744, she traveled to Ukraine and laid the foundation stone of St. Andrew's Church in Kyiv; at the request of the Cossack officer class, she restored the institution of the Hetmanate. In 1750, Oleksii's brother, Kyrylo Rozumovsky, became the new Hetman.

At the same time, imperial authority continued to integrate the Hetmanate's lands into all-imperial structures. As early as 1753, an imperial decree abolished the elective nature of the Sich's kosh leadership, though the government was unable to implement it. In 1754, customs borders were abolished; Zaporizhzhia was subordinated to the hetman administration; in 1756, the Hetmanate and the New Sich were transferred to the Senate's jurisdiction; and a network of military settlements and colonization projects was established, gradually restricting the autonomy of Ukrainian territories. Rozumovsky spent most of his time in St. Petersburg, delegating the administration of the Hetmanate to his council, all of whose members were Russians.

In the 1730s–1740s, the Russian government continued the gradual transformation of the Cossack estate into dependent peasantry. In 1733–1737, reforms were implemented to equalize the service of the Sloboda and Zaporizhzhian Cossacks with that of regular troops and to transfer Cossack assistants into the category of state peasants.

Although following petitions from Slobozhans, Empress Elizabeth formally abolished these innovations in 1743, the traditional Cossack order had already been substantially undermined. The Cossack officer class increasingly appropriated communal lands, enserfed rank-and-file Cossacks, and formed large private estates.

During this period, the Zaporozhzhians organized their territories into palankas; among these, the Kalmius Palanka was substantial, encompassing the region between the Siversky Donets and the Don. However, disputes over the delimitation of possessions between the Zaporizhzhian Host and the Don Host continued. In 1746, Elizabeth Petrovna, by a special decree, changed the borders of the Zaporizhzhian Host of the Lower Regions, transferring to the Don Cossacks the lands between the Don and the Kalmius.

The Russian Empire's assimilation policy also extended to the Volga Tatars, particularly through systematic Christianization. In the 1730s–1740s, a campaign of forced conversion of the peoples of the Volga region, including Tatars, was launched, accompanied by harsh administrative and economic measures.

In 1731, a Commission for the Baptism of Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod Muslims was created, and nine years later, the Office of Affairs of the Newly Baptized (*for Astrakhan and Voronezh guberniyas in addition to the previous ones*). The decree of 1731 guaranteed the newly baptized cash payments and three-year tax privileges; from 1749, their poll tax was shifted onto those who remained Muslim.

From 1738, cases of mass forced baptism of entire Tatar villages were recorded. Refusal to perform Orthodox rites entailed being put in chains. Particularly intransigent residents were expelled from their native villages. The decree of 1742 prohibited the construction of new mosques; all those built after 1552 were to be demolished (*in practice, 418 of 536 were destroyed*). In 1744, the Senate and the Synod allowed Muslims to build mosques in villages without an Orthodox population at a rate of one mosque per **200–300** persons. Another decree on the destruction of mosques was issued in 1752.

As a result of these measures, in 1750 the Kazan Governorate counted **202,300** newly baptized men (*of whom only 3,500 were Tatars*), alongside **129,100** unbaptized subjects, **108,600** of whom were Tatars. Overall, between 1741 and 1755, **335,000** non-Russian subjects were baptized, the largest number among the Chuvash. The combination of tax pressure and religious restrictions led to a sharp rise in social tension: mass flight of Tatars to less tightly controlled regions, particularly the Cis-Ural area, became widespread. There, centers of armed resistance to imperial policy emerged.


Only in 1755 was the resettlement of unbaptized Tatars to new places halted, and from the following year the construction of new mosques was permitted.

By analogous methods, from 1731, the conversion of the Tungus, Yakuts, Chukchi, and Koryaks to Orthodoxy was carried out.

CHAPTER 34

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE CATHERINE ERA


1760S-1790S



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Kalmykia (*until 1771*).
- ② Left-Bank Hetmanate (*until 1764/1781*).
- ③ Zaporizhzhian Sich (*until 1775*).

 Main territory of the Russian Empire in 1760	 Buffer lands annexed to Russia in 1774
 ① ② ③ Associated states absorbed by Russia during the 1770s–1780s	 Chukotka, annexed to Russia in 1778–1779
 ④ ⑤ ⑥ Vassals of the Russian Empire	 Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom under the Russian protectorate from 1783
 ⑦ Temporary possessions of the Russian Empire	 ⑧ – ⑱ Territories seized by Russia in 1763–1795 (the fortresses of Kerch and Yenikale are marked)
 The beginning of the settlement of Alaska in 1772	

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- ④ The Junior Kazakh Zhuz.
 - ⑤ The Middle Kazakh Zhuz.
 - ⑥ The Tarkov Shamkhalate (*under the vassal treaties of 1784 and 1786, definitively under Russian suzerainty with the preservation of internal self-government from 1793*).
 - ⑦ The Archipelago Grand Duchy (*27 islands seized by Russia in 1770 and returned to Turkey in 1774*).
 - ⑧ Mountain Altai (*accepted into Russian allegiance in 1756, the Russo-Chinese conflict of 1757–1763, the formal conclusion of the territorial dispute with China by the Chuguchak Treaty of 1864; the eastern border is shown together with the Second Chuya Volost — since the mid-18th century under dual Russian-Chinese allegiance, from 1865 under Russian rule*).
 - ⑨ Territories incorporated into Russia as a result of the First Partition of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772.

- ⑩ Territories seized and annexed by Russia after the Russo-Turkish War under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 (*including the fortress on the Kinburn Spit and the Crimean fortresses of Kerch and Yenikale Fortress*). In 1774–1775, part of the Zaporizhzhian Sich.
- ⑪ Kabarda (*a buffer territory between Russia and Turkey from 1739, the first Russian fortress established in 1763, formally annexed together with dependent parts of Ossetia to the empire under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, effectively conquered during the “Seven-Month War” of 1779, and retaining internal autonomy until 1825*).
- ⑫ The Kuril Islands (*irregular collection of yasak tribute from 1713, permanent from 1775, completion of incorporation into Russian allegiance in 1778*).
- ⑬ The Crimean Khanate (*effectively seized in 1782, formally annexed in 1783*).
- ⑭ Northern Yedisán, transferred from the Ottoman Empire to the Crimean Khanate under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, returned to Turkey in 1779,

and seized and annexed by Russia after the Russo-Turkish War under the Treaty of Jassy of 1791/92.

- ⑮ Ingushetia. Nominally incorporated into Russia as a result of oaths sworn by tribal elders of individual communities in 1770 (*twice*), 1771, and 1810. Effectively under Russian control from 1784 (*the founding of Vladikavkaz*).
 - ⑯ Southern Yedisán (*part of the Ochakiv Eyalet*), seized and annexed by Russia under the Treaty of Jassy of 1791/92.
 - ⑰ The Bukhtarma Region, under Russian allegiance from 1791, recognized as Russian under the Chuguchak Treaty of 1864.
 - ⑱ Territories annexed by Russia as a result of the Second Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1793.
 - ⑲ Territories annexed by Russia as a result of the Third Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795.
- Kartli-Kakheti is shown on the map alongside the sultanates dependent on it.*

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE CATHERINE ERA 1760S-1790S

Following the 1762 coup, Catherine II became the new ruler of the Russian Empire. German by origin, she married the future Emperor Peter III in 1745, the grandson of Peter I. His short reign and pro-German foreign policy caused dissatisfaction among the military and the nobility. As a result, Catherine and her supporters organized a plot. She secured the support of the military, in particular the Izmailovsky Regiment, the Orlov brothers — of whom the eldest, Grigory, was her lover — as well as Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovskyi. On 12 July 1762, Peter III abdicated the throne and soon afterward, most likely, was killed.

Catherine II's domestic policy is characterized by the concept of "*enlightened absolutism*," reflecting the empress's aspiration to reconcile the ideals of the European Enlightenment with the consolidation of autocratic power. Drawing on the concepts of the French philosophes, Catherine regarded unlimited monarchy as natural for the vast expanses and harsh climatic conditions of the Russian Empire. Therefore, her reforms aimed to centralize governance, strengthen the bureaucratic apparatus, and unify administrative structures.

The first step was the Senate reform of 1763, which divided it into six departments and subsequently stripped it of legislative functions, thereby transforming it into the highest judicial and supervisory body. The center of law-making shifted to the empress and her cabinet. In 1766–1768, Catherine convened the Legislative Commission to draft a new code of laws, in which some saw the beginnings of future parliamentarism. Representatives of all estates, except serfs, were involved in its work, and its ideological foundation was the empress's "*Instruction*" (*Nakaz*), grounded in the principles of the separation of powers and humanism. However, the Commission's work was halted and did not lead to substantial legislative change, especially of the kind that would limit the monarch's authority.

Instead, the aristocracy secured and consolidated its privileges, which is why Catherine II's reign is often described as the "golden age of the Russian nobility." The Charter to the Nobility of 1785 exempted it from requisitions and the quartering of troops, granted property rights to mineral resources, ensured the creation of estate institutions, guaranteed the inviolability of estates (*with no possibility of confiscation even in cases of criminal offenses*), and secured hereditary transfer of holdings.

The position of the peasantry deteriorated significantly. The decree of 1760 authorized landowners to send disobedient peasants to Siberia or to penal servitude, with the right to determine the length of punishment at their discretion. The 1763 decree imposed on peasants the obligation to maintain troops dispatched to suppress uprisings. The decree of 1767 prohibited peasants from submitting complaints directly to the empress.

In 1762–1764, Catherine II issued two manifestos to attract foreign settlers to the empire. They urged foreigners to immigrate to Russia and outlined a list of benefits

and privileges. The first German settlements appeared in the Volga region. Many foreigners settled along the northern boundaries of the Zaporizhzhian Sich. The Zaporozhians regarded their appearance as a land grab, and by the late 1760s, they began to resist them, including by armed means. This struggle was especially intense in 1772–1774.

In 1773–1775, the empire was shaken by a large-scale Cossack-peasant uprising in the Urals, known as the Pugachev Rebellion, which also engulfed neighboring territories of Bashkiria, Western Siberia, and the Volga region. After it was suppressed, Catherine II ordered the removal of any public mention of the uprising: the Yaik River was renamed the Ural, the Yaik Host became the Ural Host, and Yaik Town became Uralsk; places and symbols associated with Pugachev were destroyed. After the execution of the leaders, the government introduced a series of reforms that strengthened imperial control. The administrative-territorial reform of 1775 established a new system that divided the empire into viceroyalties and districts, based on population size: instead of 23 governorates, 53 viceroyalties were created, and the number of towns increased by converting large villages into urban centers.

In 1784, the government integrated the lower strata of the elites of the Volga region, the Urals, and Bashkiria by admitting them to state service. It opened a path to Russian nobility even without mandatory baptism and restored the right to hold serfs (*but not Orthodox ones*). Later, the Tatar elite was regarded as so loyal that local merchants were granted trade privileges in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, thereby advancing imperial interests there.

There was some curtailment of Baltic autonomy: in 1783, the competence of noble self-government bodies was reduced, and the poll tax was introduced; the charters to towns and to the nobility of 1785 equalized the Baltic provinces with the rest of the empire. However, as early as 1796, Paul abolished all innovations except the tax and introduced conscription.

A similar centralization also affected the Ukrainian territories. In 1764, Catherine II abolished the hetman's authority and established the Second Little Russian Collegium. In her instruction, she criticized the administrative order, fiscal system, and judiciary of the Hetmanate, emphasizing the need for its full integration into imperial structures, in particular the introduction of Russian as the sole official language of administration and education, as well as the encouragement of exclusively Russian-language book printing. In her letter to Prince Alexander Vyazemsky, the empress stated that the Little Russians were hostile to everything Great Russian, and therefore the former hetman territories should be turned as quickly as possible into an ordinary imperial province, "*so that they become Russified and cease looking [at it], like wolves toward the forest.*"

In 1765, all five Sloboda regiments were abolished, and a governorate was formed on their territory.

In 1775, Russian troops returning from the war with the Ottoman Empire occupied the Zaporizhzhian Sich and destroyed its fortifications. In 1781, the Cossack-regimental order was replaced by an empire-wide governorate system. In 1783, serfdom was legally formalized on the Left Bank and in Slobozhanshchyna, and the Cossack

regiments were converted into regular units; in 1785, the officer class was granted rights equal to those of the Russian nobility — through these measures, the central government secured the loyalty of Cossack landowners. Loyalty to the throne meant the possibility of a meteoric career — Oleksandr Bezborodko became Chancellor of the Russian Empire; half of the entire Russian elite in the second half of the century were natives of Ukraine; among physicians, Little Russians were twice as numerous as Great Russians. The abolition of the Second Little Russian Collegium in 1786 meant the cancellation of even the nominal distinctness of Ukraine within Russia.

Under Catherine II, the empire's territory expanded significantly, above all through the three partitions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth among the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian empires. In 1772, Russia acquired a substantial part of Belarusian territory, thereby securing control over the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Dvina basins and pushing the border toward central Polish territories. After the reforms of Stanisław August Poniatowski and the adoption of the Constitution of 3 May 1791, Russia launched a new military intervention. By the Second Partition of 1793, the empire annexed Right-Bank Ukraine (*the Kyiv, Bratslav, and Volhynian voivodeships*) and central Belarusian lands with Minsk. Following the uprising of Tadeusz Kościuszko, the Third Partition of 1795 eliminated the statehood of the Commonwealth: Russia acquired Lithuania, including Vilnius, Courland, and the remaining Belarusian territories.

8 Russia justified the annexation of these lands by appealing to history — it was framed not as the conquest of foreign, but as the return of ancient Rus' lands (*"Otto rzhennaya vozvrati kh"*). Although the Commonwealth's nationwide institutions were dissolved and the territories were divided into ordinary governorates, Polish nobles occupied most local government posts, and legal relations were regulated not by Russian laws, but by Magdeburg law (*until 1831–1834*) and the Third Lithuanian Statute (*until 1832–1840*). Under Paul, noble sejmiks were even revived. Altogether, the Polish nobility at the beginning of the 19th century constituted nearly **70%** of the empire's nobility.

Following the incorporation of Right-Bank Ukraine into the empire in 1793, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was abolished there: Uniate dioceses were dissolved, their property confiscated, and churches transferred to the Orthodox Church. Under strong state pressure in 1794–1795, nearly **1.8 million** Greek Catholics were converted to Orthodoxy. Serfdom and conscription were introduced in the newly annexed lands.

About a million Jews also fell within the empire. To prevent their resettlement into the central governorates and to ensure control over taxation, in 1791, Catherine II introduced the Pale of Settlement — a territory outside which Jews were forbidden to reside. The Pale encompassed regions of traditional Jewish settlement annexed as a result of the Partitions of Poland, as well as steppe regions near the Black Sea and sparsely populated territories east of the Dnieper. From 1794, Jews (*but not Karaites*) were subject to double taxes. Conversion to Orthodoxy removed all restrictions.

Under Catherine II, the development of northern territories continued. The increased activity of English and French expeditions along the shores of Chukotka prompted the government to incorporate these lands into the empire more quickly. In 1776, the empress ordered that the Chukchi's recognition of Russian allegiance be achieved through peaceful means — persuasion and bribery. In 1778, an agreement was concluded regarding the Chukchi's entry into the empire, and in 1779, Catherine II declared them Russian subjects. The Chukchi were granted broad rights: they were exempted from paying *yasak* for ten years, and their autonomy in internal affairs was preserved.

King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti appealed to the empress with a request to accept his state under the protection of the Russian Empire. In 1783, the Treaty of Georgievsk was concluded, under which Erekle II recognized Russian patronage, limited his foreign policy, and undertook to provide troops. Russia guaranteed the inviolability and independence of Kartli-Kakheti and recognized its internal sovereignty. The treaty equalized the rights of the Georgian and Russian nobility, clergy, and merchant classes; its secret articles provided for the stationing of a Russian garrison and for efforts to reclaim Georgian territories seized by the Ottoman Empire. As part of implementing the treaty, several fortresses were founded, including Vladikavkaz. However, as early as the 1780s, Ottoman raids and regional instability undermined the treaty's effectiveness, and in 1787, the withdrawal of Russian troops effectively denounced it.

In this period, Russia proclaimed a policy of religious toleration. From 1764, additional taxes imposed on non-Orthodox peasants for the newly baptized were removed; the corresponding office was abolished, and missionary activity was devolved to the diocesan level. In 1767, Kazan Tatars were permitted to build mosques. In 1773, a law on the toleration of all confessions was issued, forbidding Orthodox clergy from interfering in the affairs of other faiths. In 1788, a manifesto was published establishing the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in Ufa, intended to oversee Muslim clergy in the empire, the construction of mosques, property disputes, and the observance of religious rites. Muslim communities were granted the right to build and restore mosques, thereby facilitating their integration into the empire's state system.

By the time of Catherine II's death, Russia's area had grown to **16.4 million km²** (*excluding Alaska, which was only being developed*); in addition, St. Petersburg controlled the Junior Zhuz (*over 500 thousand km²*), the Middle Zhuz (*over 1 million km²*), and Kartli-Kakheti (*42 thousand km²*).

CHAPTER 35

RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF THE NORTHERN BLACK SEA REGION AND CRIMEA (1771-1792)

The final abolition of the Hetmanate's autonomy and its subsequent territorial and socio-political incorporation into the Russian Empire under Catherine II laid the groundwork for implementing the still-Petrine plans to take control of the Northern Black Sea region and gain access to the Black Sea. In the autumn of 1768, the Ottoman Empire declared war on the Russian Empire. Significant Ottoman military defeats led the Nogais of the Yedisian and Budjak hordes — cut off from the steppe — in the summer–autumn of 1770 to enter a forced alliance with the Russians. The Nogais of the Yedichkul and Jambuluk hordes also withdrew from Istanbul's suzerainty.

In the summer of 1771, a **30,000**-strong Russian army entered Crimea, supported by **60,000** Nogais. Sahib Giray found himself on the khanate's throne, while his brother Şahin took the position of kalga. Under conditions of occupation and as a result of coercion, on 12 November 1772, a treaty was concluded in Karasubazar (present-day Bilohirsk) between the Russian Empire and the Crimean Khanate. The agreement declared the "independence of the Tatar peoples," comprising one region and an "eternal alliance" with Russia. The fortresses of Kerch and Yenikale, as well as Akhtiar Bay (now Sevastopol Bay), were transferred to the Russians "for perpetual possession." In effect, Russia gained opportunities to develop its foreign trade, and possession of the bay made it possible to build a base here for the future Black Sea Fleet.

The war's favorable course for Russia, along with the Ottoman Empire's internal and external problems, forced it first into an armistice (concluded in May 1772) and then into a peace settlement. On 21 July 1774, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was signed. The Crimean Khanate — including the mainland part of its possessions populated by five Nogai hordes — was proclaimed an independent state; only in religious terms did the khanate's population remain subject to the sultan as the caliph of all Muslims. The Ottoman possessions on the southern coast of Crimea, as well as in the Northern Black Sea region between the Southern Bug and the Dniester (except the fortress of Ochakov and its district), were to pass to the khanate. The Russian Empire undertook to withdraw its troops from the territory of the khanate and the Ottoman Empire. To Russia passed Ottoman holdings in the east of the Kerch Peninsula (the district of the fortress of Kerch) and the west of the Taman Peninsula; the area between the lower reaches of the Dnipro and the Southern Bug, together with the fortress of Kinburn; and Russia's possession of Azov and its district was confirmed.

The Küçük Kaynarca treaty became the starting point on the road to Russia's full conquest of Crimea. Contrary to the agreement, Russian troops remained on the peninsula, which enabled St. Petersburg to intervene in

the khanate's internal affairs. In 1777, the Russian army re-entered Crimea and placed Şahin Giray on the throne. To weaken the khanate and remove a demographic resource, in 1778 — under the command of Alexander Suvorov — Crimean Christians (*more than 30,000 Greeks and Armenians*) were deported to the Azov Governorate.

Şahin Giray's pro-Russian orientation, his unpopular reforms (*tax, military, administrative*), and a gradual loss — among his subjects — of the image of a legitimate ruler (*moving the residence from Bakhchisarai to Kaffa, shaving his beard, and so on*) contributed to growing discontent within Crimean society. His receiving the rank of captain in the Guards' Preobrazhensky Regiment was perceived by the opposition as a betrayal of the khanate and Islam. In 1781 and 1782, anti-khan uprisings broke out in Kuban. During the suppression of the 1782 revolt, negotiations were held with Şahin Giray: he would renounce power in favor of Russia in exchange for a promise of rule in one of the Persian provinces; the pro-Russian Crimean elite expressed a desire to pass under the authority of the Russian Empire.

In December 1782, Catherine II decided to annex the Crimean Peninsula to the empire. Implementation of the annexation was ensured by the army corps (*which remained on the peninsula after suppressing the uprising*) and by the fleet, which was ordered to enter Akhtiar Harbor. Under the pretext that Turkey had violated provisions of the Küçük Kaynarca treaty (*the entry of a Turkish garrison onto Taman and the declaration of its inhabitants as subjects of the Turkish sultan*), on 19 April 1783, Catherine II signed the manifesto "On the Acceptance of the Crimean Peninsula, the Island of Taman, and the Entire Kuban Side under the Russian State." The formalities of "accession" were completed by bringing the Tatar nobility and clergy to an oath of loyalty to the imperial house in July, and by issuing in August 1783 Catherine II's decree "On Accepting the Crimean Inhabitants and Other Tatar Peoples into Russian Allegiance."

After the 1774 peace, the Nogais were gradually moved by the Russian government to the right bank of the Kuban. After the annexation of this territory in 1783, the Nogais were the first to recognize Russian allegiance. In the summer of 1783, amid tense relations and preparations for another war with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian government demanded that the Nogais resettle from the Kuban to the steppe near the Urals. This sparked unrest and an anti-Russian uprising among the Nogai. After a series of armed clashes, in October 1783, Suvorov's Kuban Corps, together with Don Cossacks, attacked the main camp of the insurgents on the Laba River. In the decisive battle, the Nogais suffered a crushing defeat and mass killing, which many contemporary researchers equate with an act of genocide.

Immediately after the annexation, Crimea formally retained its previous administrative-territorial structure, including the former division into six kaymakamates (provinces): Bakhchisarai, Aqmescit, Karasubazar, Gezlev, Kefé, and Perekop, which, in turn, were divided into several (*ranging from five to nine*) kadiliks (districts). In practice, most kaymakams — whose competence included all judicial and local (zemstvo) authority in their provinces —

as well as the kadis (*judges*), were left in their posts. Real power, however, was concentrated in the hands of Governor-General Grigory Potemkin, through the commanders of Russian troops in Crimea, who directed the “Crimean government” of Mehmedî-bey Şirinski; the latter, in essence, performed only representative functions. After Mehmedî, Crimean Tatars did not hold leading positions in Crimea (*above the level of city mayor*) until 1917.

By Catherine II's decree of 13 February 1784, the Taurida Oblast was created. It included the Crimean Peninsula proper with the territory lying between Perekop and the borders of the Yekaterinoslav Viceroyalty, as well as the Taman Peninsula. The Taurida Oblast was subordinated directly to the administration of Potemkin as Governor-General of Yekaterinoslav and Taurida. On 19 February that year, Catherine II signed a decree dividing the Taurida Oblast into uyezds (*counties*): Simferopol, Levkopol, Yevpatoria, and Perekop (*all in Crimea*), and Dnipro, Melitopol, and Phanagoria (*on the Taman Peninsula*).

In December 1796, by decree of Paul I, the Taurida, Voznesensk, and Yekaterinoslav governorates were abolished and merged into a single Novorossiysk Governorate (*the territory of the former Taurida Governorate was divided into Aqmescit and Perekop counties, which were attached to Novorossiysk*). In October 1802, the Taurida Governorate was restored, comprising seven counties: three on the mainland (*Tmutarakan, Dnipro, and Melitopol*) and four in Crimea proper (*Perekop, Yevpatoria, Simferopol, and Feodosia, with the Kerch-Yenikale gradonachalstvo*).

The next Russo-Turkish war (1787–1791), triggered by Sultan Abdülhamid I's demand that the Russian Empire return the Crimean Khanate and Georgia under Ottoman protection, ended with the Treaty of Jassy, signed on 9 January 1792 (27 December 1791). The treaty confirmed the terms of the 1774 peace and also the inclusion of the Crimean Khanate and the Kuban in Russian possessions. The Russian Empire obtained the lands between the Southern Bug and the Dniester (*the Ochakiv region*), strengthening its position in the Northern Black Sea region.

St. Petersburg viewed the annexation of the Crimean Khanate as the first step toward conquering Istanbul-Constantinople and expelling the Turks from Europe. This aim shaped St. Petersburg's policy toward the local population. Formally, the 1783 manifesto promised the Crimean Tatars “to keep them on an equal footing with our natural subjects, to guard and protect their persons, property, temples, and native faith, the free exercise of which, with all lawful rites, shall remain inviolable...”. In practice, however, the empire's colonization policy sought to reduce the share of Crimean Tatars and to settle Crimea with Orthodox Albanians and Greeks.

After annexation, formerly free Crimean peasants became state peasants; although the standard imperial poll tax did not apply to them, they were subjected to a mandatory tithe on property. During land surveys dividing seized estates from free peasants' plots, boundaries were drawn extremely carelessly, which led to the effective dispossession of Crimean Tatars from their land.

Landowners sought to convert peasants into serfs; peasants refused to recognize landlords' property rights, cultivated the land, and failed to pay dues. Abuses in land matters became so widespread that, from 1796, special courts operated on the peninsula to review them.


One consequence of this policy was the mass emigration of Crimean Tatars after 1783 — often encouraged by the Russian administration (*especially from the southern coastal areas*) or carried out under coercive conditions — alongside the large-scale granting of Crimean lands to Russian nobles and officials.

Between the 1770s and 1802, as a result of wars and uprisings, a plague epidemic, and migration, the number of Crimean Tatar inhabitants of the peninsula was reduced by half. Monuments of Crimea's historical heritage — from cemeteries to the khan's palace in Bakhchisarai — suffered damage from both deliberate destruction and negligent management.

The religious policy of the new administration was aimed at neutralizing the political and ideological influence of Islam on the Tatar population (*deportations to interior Russian provinces or exile abroad of Crimean mullahs deemed “especially dangerous” by the Russian authorities, restrictions on Crimean Tatars' travel to Mecca for the hajj, the reduction in the number of mosques and their conversion into Orthodox churches, and similar measures*). The final stage of this policy was the establishment, in January 1794, of the Taurida Muslim Spiritual Administration, a special state institution entrusted with the functions of control and supervision over the Muslim clergy. A subsequent decree of 1796 regulating religious affairs in the Taurida Region further deepened the trend toward the “state domestication” of Crimean Islam in the interests of imperial policy.

CHAPTER 36

FORTIFIED LINES AND THE CONTINUED COLONIZATION OF THE VOLGA REGION, SIBERIA, AND THE BLACK SEA STEPPE 18TH CENTURY



Numbered designations indicate:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| ① Ukrainian Line (1731–1735) | ⑨ Samara Line (1736–1742) |
| ② Dnipro / New Ukrainian Line (1770) | ⑩ Yekaterinburg Line (1736) |
| ③ Tsaritsyn Line (1718–1723) | ⑪ Orenburg Line (1739) |
| ④ Mozdok Line (1763) | ⑫ Sakmara Distance (1739–1742) |
| ⑤ Azov–Mozdok Line (1777–1780) | ⑬ Upper and Lower Uí Lines (1739) |
| ⑥ Black Sea / Border Line (1792) | ⑭ Old Ishim Line (1737) |
| ⑦ Kuban Line (1794) | ⑮ Irtysh Line (1745–1750) |
| ⑧ New Zakamsk Line (1731–1736) | ⑯ Tobol–Ishim Line (1752–1754) |
| | ⑰ Kolyvan–Kuznetsk Line (1747–1768) |

FORTIFIED LINES AND THE CONTINUED COLONIZATION OF THE VOLGA REGION, SIBERIA, AND THE BLACK SEA STEPPE (18TH CENTURY)

The crushing of Stepan Razin's uprising gave an additional impulse to the colonization of the southern Volga region. The drivers of this process were minor servicemen — petty nobles and "boyar's sons" — who received estates in newly pacified territories: *"beyond the rampart on the Crimean side — empty land, wild steppe, which has been given to no one as a service estate or for rent."* Colonizers moved their own serfs there from Russia's inner regions and also massively accepted runaway local peasants, to the point that the government had to send agents to investigate such cases.

To protect the population, new towns were built — for example, Syzran — and later fortified abatis lines (*zasichnye belts*). Their defense was assigned to "plow soldiers" (*arable soldiers*): servicemen resettled there "for lifelong living" with their families, who received not grain or cash pay but arable plots to farm on their own. Simbirsk Cossacks were sent to support them.

Even so, the right bank of the Volga remained open to Crimean and Nogai incursions until the 1720s. Nomads not only seized livestock but also took peasants captive: *"near the towns of Tsaritsyn and Saratov they dared not sow anything in fields and steppe, for fear of sudden raids by the Kuban Horde."* To prevent attacks, in 1718–1723, a defensive abatis line was built along the Don and in the Volga–Don interfluvium — an actual frontier of Russia in the region until the 1780s.

A specific obligation imposed on the non-Russian peoples of the Volga region was the lashman duty: the requirement to cut and transport timber for the needs of the navy. From 1718, 40,000 "mirzas and Tatars" attached to the Admiralty lost the possibility of obtaining Russian nobility through military service.

The left bank of the Volga below Samara was settled by Russians much more slowly; this process was not fully completed until the 1850s. Among the region's colonizers in the second half of the 17th century, Russians recruited nobles and soldiers from Polotsk and Sviyazhsk (*captives and defectors*), but by the beginning of the 18th century, the influx of new settlers had ceased. The main obstacle was the nomadic peoples of the Kalmyks and Bashkirs. Despite their formal subjection to Russia, Kalmyks and Bashkirs carried out regular raids on sedentary peasants as far as Kazan. Even purely formal land demarcation was often not carried out. One complaint from 1710 stated that peasants *"do not possess that land; and besides Tatar nomad camps, on that meadow side there is no Russian settlement at all."*

Nevertheless, the population of the former "Wild Field" grew from 2.1 million in 1719 to 4.2 million in 1744 and 6 million in 1762 — matching the population of the

Muscovite core.

Regular settlement in Kalmykia began only after the 1764 manifesto, which invited foreigners and Old Believers to take up land and granted them privileges and exemptions. Kalmykia was brought under full control not only externally, through fortified lines, but also internally, as a Russian official was appointed to each ulus. While this secured the safety of imperial colonists, it also became the final catalyst for the mass eastward migration of the Kalmyks out of Russian territory in 1771. Only about 13,000 Kalmyk families remained on the right bank of the Volga.

Until the mid-18th century, colonization of Bashkiria — due to constant armed resistance — was carried out almost exclusively by military means: building forts and stationing Cossack forces. And while in the late 17th and first half of the 18th century the Bashkir elite managed to place non-Russian settlers (*"bobylys" and "teptyars"* — 11,000 in 1734 and 52,000 in 1797) in dependency, in the second half of the century the situation changed: a *"popular"* (mass peasant) colonization of the region began.

A fortified line built in 1735–1740 cut Bashkiria off from the Kazakh steppe, and Bashkir uprisings were brutally suppressed. In 1736, Russians were permitted to purchase Bashkir lands; Bashkirs were prohibited from maintaining forges in the steppe and from bringing in weapons; construction of new mosques and schools was restricted. Tatars, bobylys, and teptyars were removed from the Bashkir elite's authority. From 1739, tribal elders began to be appointed in Orenburg.

From then on, only in central Ufa province did Bashkirs remain a majority, while on the outskirts other peoples began to predominate. Russians primarily colonized the northern and eastern provinces, while the south and west — since the 17th century — had been settled by Tatars, Udmurts, Chuvash, and Mari. Active construction of state mining and metallurgical plants led to the massive seizure of Bashkirs' forest lands.

At the same time, the Bashkir population continued to grow (from 35–40,000 to 100,000 between 1710 and 1730), and they remained outside the general imperial structures, continuing to pay the yasak. In 1798, all Bashkirs (about 500,000 in the mid-19th century), together with local Tatars — Mishars (100,000) and teptyars (260,000) — were transferred into a military-service estate similar to that of the Cossacks — the Bashkir–Meshcheryak Host (existing until 1863–1865).

In the first half of the 18th century, four abatis (*fortified belts*) were built around Kazakhstan and southern Siberia to defend against not only external enemies — above all the Dzungar Khanate — but also vassal Kazakhs. Kazakh raids on border villages provoked punitive expeditions deep into the steppe, although soldiers were forbidden to use weapons first. The confrontation reached a particular intensity during the Pugachev uprising, when the toll of killed and captured ran into the thousands.

Both the technology of building these lines and the service regulations differed little from earlier systems in the "Wild Field": a chain of forts with redoubts between them, beacon posts at intervals of 2–5 versts, and small guard posts of 3–5 Cossacks. To prevent clashes between

nomadic and sedentary subjects, the command of the Irtysh Line forbade Kazakhs from approaching fortifications within 5–10 versts and Russians from settling closer than 40 versts. These measures strengthened peasant colonization of southern Siberia — families who had fled from nomads in the second half of the 17th century returned.

Pugachevshchina again delayed colonization; only in 1787 did construction of new forts begin to control the space between the Volga and the Urals. By 1808, from towns, Cossacks, peasants, and some Kazakhs, a line Cossack host was formed, comprising ten cavalry regiments. These measures increased the flow of migrants from Russia and Ukraine to northern Kazakhstan and the Altai, with the peak occurring somewhat later, in 1816–1834.

Changes also occurred in Siberian colonization. In the Petrine era, exile was used not only as punishment for high-ranking elites (*such as Ukrainian hetmans*) but also for rebellious Cossacks and streltsy, beginning with Razin's associates. For most participants in Bulavin's uprising, hanging was replaced by exile. Swedish prisoners were also sent there. However, the main share of settlers were peasants, whose duty was to supply fortress garrisons with grain.

In the 1730s, administrative exile to Siberia began to be applied to runaways and vagrants, fraudulent jewelers, and "recruiting" alcohol-addicted craftsmen and compulsive gamblers; criminal exile for repeat theft, robbery, and involuntary manslaughter. Under Anna Ioannovna, mid-level corrupt officials were exiled. From 1760, land-lords could send their serfs to Siberia for misconduct, counting them as recruits (*comparable to how Britain transported convicts to Australia*). In the 18th and early 19th centuries, exile became the primary instrument of the state's colonization of the region. Exiles, however, were reclassified as state peasants, and private land ownership in Siberia did not become widespread. From 1730, convicts were also used in mines and factories.

By the beginning of the 18th century, the number of European settlers and Russian old-timers was roughly equal to that of Siberian indigenous people (*approximately 200–220,000 each*). This led to active mixing (*metisat*ion) of the former and to assimilation (*baptism and transition to agriculture*) of the latter. Only Old Believers (*about 100,000 during the 1660s–1760s*) refrained from marrying Siberian peoples.

At the same time, the number of Russian men far exceeded the number of Russian women. The practice — common among earlier Cossack pioneers — of abducting indigenous girls gave way to buying them from families. Warfare, hostage-taking, destruction of traditional livelihoods, and — most importantly — epidemics of diseases brought by Russians (*smallpox, syphilis*) inflicted enormous damage on Siberia's indigenous population. From the late 16th to the early 18th century, its numbers even declined slightly, indicating losses that exceeded a century of natural population growth. Only during the 18th century did the situation change: the indigenous population grew from approximately **200,000** to **360,000**. Yet over the same time, the number of Russians rose to **550–575,000**. The "Russification" of the region led in 1763 to

the abolition of the separate Siberian Prikaz.

That same year, the institution of yasak collectors was abolished: from then on, natives had to deliver fur to collection points themselves; allocation of yasak by clans was replaced with individual assessment. The tax norm was reduced, but new obligations were introduced — guard duty, construction duty, and road duty. For the first time, parts of the local Tatar, Khanty, Buryat, and Yakut aristocracies were equated with the Russian nobility.

Under Anna Ioannovna, the strategy of fortified lines was extended to the Hetmanate. While the earlier Belgorod Line ran through Russia proper, the Ukrainian Line of 1731–1735 was built between the Oril and Vorskla rivers. It consisted of 14 fortresses and hundreds of redoubts. The need arose after Zaporizhzhia went under Ottoman protection in 1711. Defense of the line was assigned to nine land militia regiments — **20,000** state peasants whose duty to serve was replaced by guard service. At the same time, lands of the Hetmanate and Zaporizhzhia adjacent to the Ukrainian Line were removed from the authority of the Hetman and the Kish Otaman and transferred to Russian officials. In 1770, the Dnipro Line was built along the Kinski Vody on the border of the Crimean Khanate.

In the mid-18th century, lands of the Zaporizhzhian Sich on the right bank of the Dnipro were seized for a colony of foreigners — New Serbia (*populated mainly by Serbs, as well as Moldovans, Romanians, and Bulgarians*). Alongside Balkan settlers, Russian peasants and Old Believers moved south. After the Sich was liquidated, its lands were confiscated and transferred to the state treasury, and they were subsequently granted to loyal nobles with a 10-year exemption from all obligations.

After the pacification of the Bashkirs, the departure of the Kalmyks, the annexation of Crimea, and the resettlement of the Nogais to the Kuban, the Eurasian steppe opened to European colonists. Between 1762 and 1775, the first **30,000** Germans arrived in the Lower Volga region. Settlers were promised exemption from all taxes and levies for 30 years, exemption from military service indefinitely, and guarantees of religious freedom and internal self-government.

From the 1780s and into the mid-19th century, tens of thousands of Germans, Bulgarians, and Romanians moved to Northern Tavia; thousands of Armenians also arrived, along with smaller numbers of Swiss and Italians. Coastal zones were allocated for centrally organized resettlement from the Balkans of Arnauts (*Orthodox Albanians*) and Greeks, resulting in frequent conflicts with the Crimean Tatars in Crimea.

Over ten years, **100,000** peasants were resettled into the Novorossiysk and Azov governorates onto lands taken from Cossacks and Nogais — at least **20,000** of them Russians. To compensate for the gender imbalance, Novorossiya's governors paid 5 rubles for each recruited female settler from central Russia; recruiting 80 girls could earn officers a promotion. If, at the beginning of the conquest of "Novorossiya" in 1768, the region's population did not exceed **100,000**, then by the early 19th century, it had reached **1 million**, and in 1823–1825, **1.5 million** (*due not only to resettlement but also to a surge in the birth rate*).

In response to the large number of people seeking to move, restrictions on immigration were introduced in 1804: the preferential tax period was reduced to 10 years, and permission to resettle was granted only to experienced farmers, herders, and craftsmen. In 1819, official invitations to colonists were discontinued.

The most important role in the development of the Black Sea region, however, was played by Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks — ultimately, they formed the majority of the population (65% by the late 18th century and 75% in the early 19th century). However, the bulk of them lived in rural areas, while the region's main cities, Katerynoslav and Odesa, were, to a significant extent, Russified (*although ethnic Russians did not constitute a majority there*). Even Kyiv acquired the features of a typical Russian city — not so much through Russian immigration as through Russification of its Ukrainian, Jewish, and Polish population.

A component of Black Sea colonization was the settlement of the Kuban. After the defeat of 1775 and the destruction of the Zaporizhzhian Sich, many Cossacks remained on Russia's Black Sea coast, and in 1792, they were resettled to the Kuban and the western North Caucasus. By the end of the century, **14,500** former Zaporizhzhians had moved there. But the small size of the Cossack host forced the government to allow replenishment from other estates; thus, in 1808–1811, **41,600** Ukrainian peasants moved to the Kuban.






CHAPTER 37

ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONAL AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT
UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA

18TH CENTURY



- Main territory of the Russian Empire in 1796
- Vassals of the Russian Empire
- Kartli-Kakheti associated with Russia
- Areas of anti-government uprisings of Cossacks, townspeople, and peasants
- Areas of national anti-colonial uprisings



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Territory of Koryak and Itelmen resistance in the 1st half of the 18th century.
- ② Bashkir uprising of 1704–1711.
- ③ Astrakhan uprising of 1705–1706.
- ④ Bulavin uprising of 1707–1708.
- ⑤ Yaik uprisings of 1721 and 1772.
- ⑥ Tara's revolt of 1722.
- ⑦ Bashkir uprisings of 1735–1740.
- ⑧ Teryushev uprising of 1743–1745.
- ⑨ Osinsk-Siberian revolt of 1747.
- ⑩ Bashkir uprising of 1755–1756.
- ⑪ Aleut uprising of 1763–1765.
- ⑫ Plague riot of 1771.
- ⑬ South Kuril revolt of 1771–1772.
- ⑭ *"Pugachevshchina" (People's War)* of 1773–1775.
- ⑮ Koktemir uprising of 1775–1776.
- ⑯ Nogai uprising of 1783.
- ⑰ Uprising of Syrym Datov of 1783–1797.
- ⑱ Turbai uprising of 1789–1793.
- ⑲ Esaul revolt of 1792–1794.
- ⑳ Kościuszko Uprising of 1794.

ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONAL AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA 18TH CENTURY

The largest uprisings in this period were as follows (the numbers are indicated on the map in the previous spread).

1. Koryak and Itelmen resistance. The liberation struggle of Kamchatka's indigenous population began almost immediately after the Russians seized the peninsula. In 1699, 1700, 1705, and 1708, the Koryaks and Itelmens destroyed Russian detachments; in 1706, they burned the Bolsherechensky ostrog. Between 1700 and 1716, 31 armed clashes were recorded. In 15 cases, the victory went to the Russians, in 10 to the Koryaks, and in 6 cases, the match ended in a draw. The capture in 1714 of the largest Koryak fortress, "*Velykyi Posad*," after a six-month siege marked a turning point in the struggle. By 1720, all unconquered Koryak units had been defeated and their fortresses taken. A second wave of fighting occurred in 1731–1733, when the Russians were forced to abandon several of their ostrogs for a time. A brief Itelmen uprising occurred in 1741. The uprising of 1745–1757 under the leadership of Evonty Kosynsky, with the participation of the Chukchi and Yukaghirs, liberated the entire northern coast of the Sea of Okhotsk from Russian rule. Only after the suppression of this uprising did Kamchatka finally become part of Russia.

2. The Bashkir uprising of 1704–1711 under the leadership of Aldar Isyekeiev. In the first stage (1704–1706), the uprising was triggered by the introduction of new taxes, religious oppression, and conscription. In 1708, the rebels announced the establishment of a Bashkir Horde under a khan. Bashkir forces controlled territory from Kazan to the Trans-Urals and inflicted a series of defeats on the Russians. The Karakalpaks supported the rebels, whereas the Kalmyks fought alongside government troops. For a time, the Bashkirs achieved de facto independence, but after defeats and negotiations with the government, the prewar status quo was legally restored in 1722.

3. The Astrakhan uprising of 1705–1706. An armed uprising of Cossacks, streltsy, and townspeople against tax increases, corruption, and the resulting rise in bread prices. Having begun under socioeconomic slogans, the uprising immediately assumed a political form: the city's new government became a Cossack circle. Guryev (*Yaik Town*) and Terek, controlled by the Cossacks, joined Astrakhan. Government troops suppressed it with the support of Kalmyk detachments.

4. The Bulavin uprising of 1707–1708. A war led by Kondraty Bulavin against the government, caused by Peter I's attempts to restrict Cossack self-government, seize their saltworks, and forcibly return runaway peasants from the Don. However, the uprising did not develop into an openly anti-tsarist movement. The revolt split not only the Don Cossack community but also the Zapor-

izhzhian and Sloboda ones — representatives of each fought on both sides. It was suppressed by government forces, after which the assault on Cossack liberties intensified.

5. The Yaik uprisings of 1721 and 1772. Spontaneous actions by the Yaik Cossack Host against subordination to the Military Collegium (1721) and against the restriction of liberties and violence by central officials (1772). The second revolt led to a split among the Cossacks into the "*officers' side*," which supported the government's curtailment of traditional liberties, and the "*host side*," which sought to restore the old order. Government troops suppressed both; the second flowed into Pugachevshchina.

6. The Tara revolt of 1722. An armed uprising of Old Believers and Cossacks of the town of Tara against swearing allegiance to Peter I's successor. Suppressed by government forces.

7. The Bashkir uprisings of 1735–1740. A series of armed actions against the construction of Russian fortresses (*Orsk*, *Chelyabinsk*), encroachment on traditional landholding, and the population census (1739). In the final year, the rebels elected a khan again. It was suppressed by government troops, after which the territory of Bashkortostan was gradually encircled with lines of Russian fortresses.

8. The Teryushev uprising of 1743–1745. Armed resistance by the Erzya to a policy of forced Christianization. Suppressed by government forces.

9. The Osinsk-Siberian revolt of 1747. An armed uprising by the indigenous population of the Osinsk and Siberian Darugas (*administrative-territorial units*) of Orenburg province against the replacement of the yasak with taxation. Suppressed by government forces.

10. The Bashkir uprising of 1755–1756. An armed uprising led by Batyrsha against the proposed replacement of the yasak with a salt tax and the ban on firearms. Suppressed by government troops, which triggered mass Bashkir emigration to Kazakhstan; however, the harshest innovations were repealed.

11. The Aleut uprising of 1763–1765. An uprising by the population of several Aleutian Islands against brutal yasak collection. The suppression of the uprising by promyshlenniki opened the way for Russian settlement of Alaska.

12. The Plague riot of 1771. Unrest among the urban lower classes in Moscow as a result of the authorities' quarantine measures. Suppressed by government forces.

13. The South Kuril revolt of 1771–1772. An Ainu uprising on a number of the southern Kuril islands against brutal yasak collection. It ended with the rebels' victory — starting in 1779, the imposition of yasak on the Ainu was banned.


14. "Pugachevshchina" (People's War) of 1773–1775. The largest and last major Cossack-peasant-religious-national uprising in the history of imperial Russia. Initially, a revolt of dissatisfied Yaik Cossacks, following Emelian Pugachev's proclamation as Emperor Peter III and the abolition of serfdom, became, in effect, a civil war in the country. Volga Finnic peoples joined Pugachev (*against Christianization*), the Tatars (*against taxation and*


A map of East Asia, including parts of China, Korea, and Japan. The Japanese archipelago is highlighted with a dashed orange oval. A black arrow points from a circled number 13 to the Japanese archipelago.

CHAPTER 38

RUSSIAN EXPANSION
IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY

1790S-1825






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	Main territory of the Russian Empire in 1796
	States associated with Russia
	Kartli-Kakheti, annexed by Russia
	Vassals of the Russian Empire
	Vassal states annexed by Russia
	Territories seized by Russia
	Lands under temporary Russian control
	The semi-autonomous Bukey Horde in 1801–1845

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Territory ceded by Sweden under the Treaty of Fredrikshamn (*Hamina*) of 1809, on which the Grand Duchy of Finland was established.
- ② The territory of "Old Finland", incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1812.
- ③ The Kingdom of Poland — a part of the Duchy/Principality of Warsaw, effectively occupied in 1813 and assigned to Russia by the decision of the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
- ④ The Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, annexed in 1801 (*including the dependent Shuragel sultanate in the southwest, finally subordinated in 1806*).
- ⑤ The Tarki Shamkhalate, in definitive vassal dependence on Russia from 1793, annexed in 1867.
- ⑥ The Avar Khanate, a Russian vassal from 1803 (*with interruptions*), annexed in 1864.
- ⑦ The Principality of Mingrelia, a Russian vassal from 1803, annexed in 1867.
- ⑧ The Principality of Abkhazia, a Russian vassal from 1810, annexed in 1864.
- ⑨ The Principality of Guria, a Russian vassal from 1810–1811, annexed in 1829.
- ⑩ The Ilisu Sultanate, a Russian vassal from 1803, annexed in 1844.
- ⑪ The Kyurin Khanate, a Russian vassal from 1812, annexed in 1865.
- ⑫ Dagestani polities subordinated to Russia under the Gulistan Peace with Persia in 1813: the Tabasaran Maysumate (*a vassal from 1806, annexed in 1813*), the Kaitag Utsmiat (*a vassal from 1812, annexed in 1820*), the free communities of Akusha-Dargo (*formal allegiance in 1812, seized in 1819, uprising in 1843, annexed in 1854*), the Gazikumukh Khanate (*a vassal from 1813, uprising in 1819, seized in 1820, annexed in 1859*), the Mekhtuli Khanate (*seized in 1818, annexed in 1867*), and others.
- ⑬ The Talysh Khanate, a Russian vassal from 1809 (*northern part*) and 1813 (*southern part*); the khan's authority abolished in 1826; final annexation in 1840. The southern border is shown as of 1829.
- ⑭ The Ganja Khanate, seized and annexed in 1804.
- ⑮ The Kingdom of Imereti, a Russian vassal from 1804, annexed in 1810.
- ⑯ The Shaki Khanate, a Russian vassal from 1805, annexed in 1819.
- ⑰ The Shirvan Khanate (*including the vassal Javad Khanate*), a Russian vassal from 1805, annexed in 1820.
- ⑱ The Karabakh Khanate, a Russian vassal from 1805, annexed in 1822.
- ⑲ The Derbent Khanate, seized and annexed in 1806.
- ⑳ The Quba Khanate, a Russian vassal from 1806, annexed in 1810.
- ㉑ The Baku Khanate, seized and annexed in 1806.
- ㉒ The Middle Kazakh Zhuz, annexed by Russia in 1822 (*liberated following a series of uprisings in the 1830s–1840s; seized in 1846–1847*).
- ㉓ The Junior Kazakh Zhuz, annexed by Russia in 1824 (*liberated following a series of uprisings in the 1830s–1840s; seized in 1846–1847*).
- ㉔ The territory of continental Alaska, taken by Russia from 1791 to 1824/1825 (*not shown is Fort Ross in California, which existed from 1812 to 1841*).
- ㉕ The Bialystok District, obtained by Russia under the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807.
- ㉖ Bessarabia, seized during the war and secured for Russia under the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest.
- ㉗ The interfluvium of the Terek and Sunzha (*lowland Chechnya*), formally under allegiance from 1781, effectively seized in 1817.
- ㉘ The "Republic of the Seven Islands", under Russian protectorate from 1800 to 1807.
- ㉙ The Ternopil District, transferred to Russia under the Treaty of Schönbrunn of 1809 and returned to Austria in 1815.
- ㉚ The Free City of Kraków under the Austro-Prussian-Russian protectorate in 1815–1846.



RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY 1790S-1825

During the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Empire adopted a clearly counter-revolutionary position. Catherine II, despite becoming one of the initiators of the anti-French coalition and renouncing all existing treaties with France, viewing the revolutionary events as a threat to the monarchical order in Europe, did not join the military actions. Her successor, Paul I, joined the Second anti-French coalition in 1798, alongside Great Britain, Austria, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Naples. Under the command of Alexander Suvorov, Russian forces conducted a successful campaign in Italy and Switzerland, including the 1799 crossing of the Alps; however, due to disputes with Austria, Russia withdrew from further participation in the war. In 1800, following Napoleon's rise to power, a temporary rapprochement between the states culminated in the establishment of direct diplomatic relations.

At the beginning of Alexander I's reign, in 1802, the government was reformed: the collegia were replaced by eight ministries, in which decisions were made either by a single minister or by the Committee of Ministers. This led to even greater centralization of power in the empire.

In 1805–1807, Russia participated in the Third and Fourth anti-French coalitions, suffering defeats at Austerlitz and Friedland. After the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, the Russian Empire effectively became Napoleon's ally, joined the Continental Blockade of Britain, and began coordinating parts of its foreign policy with Paris. Economic losses and disputes over Poland's future led to the rupture of the alliance and to the invasion of Russia by Napoleon's Grand Army.

The War of 1812 ended with the expulsion of French forces from Russian territories and the catastrophe of Napoleon's army in Europe. In 1813–1814, Russia played a leading role in forming the Sixth anti-French coalition, took part in military operations in Europe, and led the allied forces that entered Paris in April 1814. Alexander I's participation in the Congress of Vienna of 1814–1815 secured the Russian Empire's status as one of the principal arbiters of the new European order.

In pursuing Napoleon's retreating forces in early 1813, the Russian army occupied almost the entire territory of the Duchy and the Principality of Warsaw that Napoleon had created. The duchy came under Russian Empire control, although its final status was to be determined by the Congress of Vienna. Russia sought to annex the entire territory of the duchy, provoking resistance from Austria, England, and France, which, on 3 January 1815, concluded a secret alliance against the Russian–Prussian rapprochement. Alexander I compromised, agreeing to transfer Toruń and Poznań to Prussia. The main part of the Duchy of Warsaw was incorporated into the Russian Empire.

During Napoleon's invasion of Russia, the tsarist authorities decided to mobilize the Ukrainian population, in-

cluding former Cossacks, promising to restore their rights and liberties. In the summer of 1812, 15 Cossack regiments, with a total strength of about 18,000 men, were formed on the Left Bank; representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia participated in their organization, including Ivan Kotliarevsky, who helped create the 5th Poltava Regiment. On the Right Bank, four additional Cossack regiments and numerous peasant militia detachments were also formed.

However, Ukrainian hopes were not realized, and the imperial authorities continued to incorporate the Ukrainian population into state structures. The only substantive step was the encouragement of Cossack resettlement in southern and border regions, above all to the Kuban, where tens of thousands of migrants from the Hetmanate settled since the beginning of the 19th century. Although the Cossacks temporarily retained certain privileges, after the war with Napoleon, they were again burdened with taxes and conscription obligations. As a result of social reforms, the Cossacks gradually lost their distinct status and became a special category of state peasants, while the Ukrainian szlachta was largely integrated into the Russian nobility.

In 1812, Bessarabia became part of Russia, which, in 1818–1829, had some sort of socio-legal autonomy similar to that of the Baltic provinces, with local power remaining in the hands of the boyar class. At the same time, Bessarabian peasants had never known serfdom or conscription.

In the early 19th century, Russia also consolidated its authority in Georgia. The death of the Georgian king George XII gave the empire grounds to abolish the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti. Paul I's manifesto of 1801, confirmed by Alexander I, proclaimed Georgia's inclusion in the Russian Empire. Subsequent military campaigns against Persia and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the suppression of local anti-colonial protests, ensured the gradual incorporation of Imereti, Abkhazia, and other lands. Later, following the Russo-Persian and Russo-Turkish wars, the empire annexed Batumi, Poti, Akhaltsikhe, Artvin, and other territories. In 1811, the Georgian Orthodox Church was forcibly incorporated into the Russian Church.

In addition to Georgian territories, Russia incorporated several Transcaucasian khanates. Between them lay territories of de facto independent Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus — Chechnya, Dagestan, Circassia, and others. A complex system of tribal autonomy and the economic dependence of some mountain communities on raiding made it impossible to maintain stable relations with the imperial administration. In these circumstances, St. Petersburg sought to secure a territorial connection with Transcaucasia and to stop highlanders' attacks on lands under its control.

Therefore, in 1816, full-scale military operations began here. Commander of the Separate Caucasus Corps, General Aleksey Yermolov, developed a strategy of gradual advance that envisaged building a system of fortresses, laying roads, creating lines of fortification, and displacing recalcitrant communities from key areas. The war encompassed two main theaters: the North-East Caucasus, where the population of Chechnya and Dagestan resisted

(later united in the Imamate), and the North-West Caucasus, inhabited by the Adyghe (*Circassians*). Systematic advance, military expeditions, and the destruction of traditional ties in mountain societies defined the prolonged and exhausting character of the Caucasian War, which drew the empire into armed conflict in the region for an extended period.

Over the first half of the 19th century, the traditional political structure of the Kazakh zhuzes was gradually dismantled. In 1799, the Orenburg Border Commission was established to administer the Junior Zhuz, and the khans' real power became nominal. In 1818, the title of khan was abolished in the Middle Zhuz, and in 1824 in the Junior. In 1822, the lands of the Middle Zhuz were incorporated into Western Siberia under the name "*Kyrgyz Steppe*." The reforms developed by Governor-General Mikhail Speransky envisaged integrating Kazakhstan into the imperial system. A new administrative structure (*territorial rather than clan-based*), taxes (*monetary rather than the in-kind yasak*), and restrictions on pastures were intended to facilitate the transition of Kazakhs to sedentary life. At the same time, they retained local self-government (*councils of elders*) and exemption from conscription.

Pressure on the non-Russian population of the "*internal*" provinces also increased. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the poll tax on state peasants tripled. It was precisely to this category that most non-Orthodox subjects in European Russia belonged — former yasak payers. In 1812, the Russian Bible Society was established in Kazan and published Orthodox literature in the languages of non-Russian peoples. Printing in the Russian Empire in the early 19th century was conducted not only in Russian but also in other languages. However, the periodical press was published only in the state language, and attempts to create national periodicals were met with official bans.

Russia also continued its advance in the Far East by conquering new territories. Colonization spread to the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and part of Northern California. Russian authorities consolidated their possessions by establishing the Russian-American Company in 1799, which administered Russian territories in North America. Initially, these lands were part of the Siberian Governor-Generalship, and after its division in 1822, of the Eastern Siberian Governor-Generalship. The final boundaries of Alaska were determined by agreements with Russia (1824) and Britain (1825).


The Napoleonic Wars spread the ideas and ideals of the French Revolution across Europe. The Russian Empire was no exception. Under the influence of European Enlightenment ideas and the experience of a significant part of the Russian nobility and officer corps being in Europe, an increasing share of the Russian elite sought to limit the monarchy and abolish serfdom. Alexander I's domestic policy is often characterized as liberal. The emperor sought to avoid lagging behind new European trends, especially after the experience of the Napoleonic wars, granting broad autonomy to the Grand Duchy of Finland and, in 1815, providing a constitution to the Kingdom of Poland (*both associated states received their own representative bodies*). In 1818, he instructed the preparation of

a State Charter for Russia, which, following the model of the Polish constitution, envisaged the separation of powers, a bicameral parliament, freedom of the press, and personal inviolability.

Secret organizations that emerged in the early 1810s proposed several projects for the future order of the state. The constitution of the Northern Society envisaged the creation of a federation of 14 "*states*" and two regions, a constitutional monarchy with broad parliamentary powers, and the abolition of serfdom with minimal land allotments for peasants. Pavel Pestel's document "*Russkaya Pravda*," by contrast, proposed a unitary republic with strong centralized authority and the transfer of peasant land to the commune. Sergey Trubetskoy's "*Manifesto to the Russian People*" demanded the immediate abolition of serfdom, the introduction of civil liberties, the abolition of the poll tax, the creation of local self-government and jury courts, and the transfer of supreme power to a temporary "*government*" of 4–5 persons, which was to prepare elections to a representative body with constituent functions.

Gradually, Alexander I moved away from liberalism and adopted a more conservative position, strengthening autocracy. The revolutionary events in Europe in 1820–1821 had a particular impact on his decisions. Therefore, the project to prepare the State Charter was postponed, and the liberal transformations developed by Speransky were curtailed.

This led to the disillusionment of the progressive segment of the Russian nobility and officer corps and contributed to the radicalization of their demands. Following the death of Alexander I in November 1825 and the ensuing power vacuum, members of secret societies staged an uprising on Senate Square in December, known as the Decembrist Revolt. It coincided with the oath of allegiance to the new emperor, Nicholas I, but failed. The uprising of the Chernihiv Regiment in support of the Decembrists in January 1826 was suppressed by force.







CHAPTER 39

RUSSIAN EXPANSION

IN THE MID-19TH CENTURY

1825-1864





 	Main territory of the Russian Empire in 1825
1 2 3	States associated with Russia
4 – 7	Vassals of the Russian Empire
8	The semi-autonomous Bukey Horde in 1801–1845
8	Vassal states annexed by Russia (apart from those shown on the previous map)
9 – 27	Territories seized by Russia
 	Sakhalin, in joint Russo-Japanese possession from 1855 to 1875
28 – 30	Territories lost by Russia

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Grand Duchy of Finland.
- ② Territories incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1833.
- ③ The Kingdom of Poland (*a kingdom in personal union with Russia until 1832; thereafter a viceroyalty*).
- ④ The Principality of Mingrelia (*until 1867*).
- ⑤ The Tarki Shamkhalate (*until 1867*).
- ⑥ The Kyurin Khanate (*until 1865*).
- ⑦ The Mekhtuli Khanate (*until 1867*).
- ⑧ Svaneti: the independent Principality of Svaneti in the west, the Imeretian vassal principality in the south, and free communities in the north; the princely parts under Russian suzerainty from 1833, the communities from 1840, the entire territory annexed in 1859.
- ⑨ Balkaria and part of Digoria, under Russian allegiance from 1827.
- ⑩ Karachay, seized in 1828.
- ⑪ The Erivan Khanate (*in the north*) and the Nakhchivan Khanate (*in the south*), seized in the war with Persia and secured for Russia by the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, with the simultaneous annexation (*shown as of 1893, after clarification of the border with Iran*).
- ⑫ The Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, secured for Russia after the Russo-Turkish War by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829.
- ⑬ The Akhaltsikhe province, secured for Russia by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829.
- ⑭ The Danube estuary and islands, secured for Russia by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 and lost in favor of the Principality of Moldova under the Paris Treaty of 1856.
- ⑮ The Jar-Belokan free communities, seized in 1803, retained internal autonomy during the 1804–1806 uprising and were finally seized and annexed in 1830.
- ⑯ South Ossetia, finally seized in 1830.
- ⑰ The free communities of the Samur Valley, under Russian allegiance from 1809–1811, liberated as a result of the 1837 uprising and finally seized by Russia in 1839, with simultaneous annexation.
- ⑱ Part of Trans-Kuban, seized by 1841.
- ⑲ Kazakh territories and part of Semirechye (under Chinese protectorate since the mid-18th century), gradual Russian allegiance of separate clans from 1818, liberated as a result of a series of uprisings in the 1830s–1840s, seized in 1846–1847. Finally recognized as Russian under the Chuguchak Treaty with China in 1864.
- ⑳ The Zailiysky Region (territory of the Kokand Khanate), seized in 1850–1851, abandoned, and taken under control again with the construction of the fortress Vernaya (now Almaty) in 1854.
- ㉑ Ak-Mechet and the southern bank of the Syr Darya estuary (territory of the Kokand Khanate), conquered in 1852–1853.
- ㉒ The shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, under Russian allegiance from 1855, finally recognized as Russian under the Chuguchak Treaty with China in 1864.
- ㉓ Chechnya and part of Dagestan, finally seized after the defeat of Imam Shamil's Imamate in 1859.
- ㉔ The Amur Region (*territory of China*), ceded to Russia under the Treaty of Aigun in 1858. The Nikolayevsky Post fortress, built in 1850 on Chinese lands, is marked. Sixty-four Manchu villages on the Russian bank of the Amur (hatched) retained internal self-government until 1900.
- ㉕ Primorye (*territory of China*) under joint Russo-Chinese administration from 1858, ceded to Russia under the Treaty of Beijing in 1860. The De-Kastri fortress, built in 1853 on Chinese lands, is marked. Borders are shown according to the 1881 demarcation.
- ㉖ Yany-Kurgan (*territory of the Kokand Khanate*), conquered in 1861.
- ㉗ Circassia, Abazinia, and Ubykhia (*independent lands*), finally conquered in 1860–1864.
- ㉘ Joint, disputed, and properly Russian territories of the Nyavdem and Pazretsky pogosts, finally ceded to Norway under the St. Petersburg Convention of 1826.
- ㉙ Iturup Island (*a zone of competitive Russo-Japanese colonization in the 18th century, armed conflict of 1806–1807, renunciation of claims in 1821*), ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimoda in 1855 in exchange for a trade agreement and joint possession of Sakhalin.
- ㉚ Southwestern Bessarabia (*including the Danube estuary*), transferred to Moldova under the Paris Treaty of 1856.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE MID-19TH CENTURY

1825-1864

During Alexander I's reign, a new war with Persia began. Backed by Great Britain, the Persian leadership sought to exploit the Russian Empire's internal weakness following the Decembrist uprising and to restore the status quo in the South Caucasus. In 1826, Persian forces entered the southern Caucasus. Their advance was accompanied by mass uprisings against Russian rule in the former khanates. After initial successes, the strategic initiative shifted to the Russian army. The confrontation ended with the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, which confirmed Russia's possession of the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates, as well as part of the Caspian Sea coastline. The agreement also stipulated that Persia pay an indemnity.

Under Nicholas I, policy toward the Ottoman Empire changed. Since the time of Catherine II, Russian rulers had entertained plans to partition Ottoman territories and to restore the Byzantine Empire under Russian control. Nicholas I replaced these plans with a strategy of expanding Russia's direct influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the eastern Black Sea coast. The Ottoman Empire, weakened by the Greek War of Independence, sought to counter by closing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, declaring the previous arrangements with Russia void, and expelling Russian officials from its territory. In April 1828, Russia declared war, beginning an offensive on the Danube and Caucasus fronts.

The Russian army in the Balkans occupied the Danubian Principalities, captured Varna and Adrianople, and, in the Caucasus, seized key fortresses, including Kars, Akhaltsikhe, and Erzurum. In September 1829, the Treaty of Adrianople was concluded, under which Russia obtained part of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and the Danube delta, while Greece gained independence, and Serbia, Moldova, and Wallachia received broad autonomy.

The wars with Persia and Turkey also enabled Russia to continue consolidating its position in the Caucasus. In 1826, under the command of Aleksey Yermolov, the Russian army forcibly subdued local auls. The following year, Nicholas I recalled the commander, ostensibly because of his ties to the Decembrists, appointing Ivan Paskevich in his place. In 1827 and 1828, Balkaria and Karachay became part of the empire. The emperor set Paskevich the task: *"to pacify the mountain peoples forever, or destroy the recalcitrant."*

Imperial expansion generated dissatisfaction both in the controlled regions and along the frontier. In 1830–1831, the Kingdom of Poland was swept by the November Uprising, during which Nicholas I lost the title of *"King of Poland."* In response, the emperor stripped Poland of the main attributes of statehood — its own Sejm and army — and embarked on a course of Russification.

In the mountain regions of Dagestan and Chechnya, the religious-political movement of muridism intensified, led first by Ghazi Mullah and later by Gamzat-bek.

Subsequently, the murid movement spread across large territories, was accompanied by attacks on Russian fortifications (*Tarki, Kizlyar*), and culminated in the creation of the Imamate. In response, the Russian administration deployed a system of fortified lines and conducted a series of punitive expeditions. The deaths of Ghazi Mullah in 1832 and Gamzat-bek in 1834 did not end resistance in the region. The struggle was led by Imam Shamil, under whom the North Caucasian Imamate became a full-fledged state, which was finally conquered in 1859.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian Empire sought to integrate Kazakhstan into its imperial governance system. In 1844, the Kazakhs of the former Junior Zhuz were placed under the authority of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Orenburg military commandant. The territory of the Zhuz was divided into Western, Central, and Eastern regions. The reforms envisioned a gradual transition of the nomadic population to a sedentary way of life. Kazakh nomads were granted land allotments (*15 desiatinas*) free of charge, along with seeds and agricultural implements. Clan elites received larger plots, intended to consolidate the new social and administrative hierarchy. In 1841, a code of steppe laws was codified, combining the norms of adat with provisions of Russian judicial practice. The innovations provoked widespread discontent. In 1841, an uprising broke out under the leadership of Kenesary Qasymov. After its suppression, significant territories of northern and central Kazakhstan came under the empire's direct control.

A notable feature of the Russian Empire's foreign policy was its active participation in suppressing revolutionary movements, which solidified Russia's reputation as the *"gendarme of Europe."* At the request of the Austrian Empire, Russian troops defeated the Hungarian Revolution in 1849, thereby preserving Habsburg rule. In the western provinces of the empire, including the Kingdom of Poland, revolutionary organizations of the Springtime of Nations were dismantled, and their participants were subjected to repression.

Nicholas I sought to entrench his influence in the Balkans by cultivating an image of Russia as the protector of Orthodox Christians in the region. The pretext for the Crimean War was a dispute between Orthodox and Catholic clergy over control of holy sites in Palestine. Russia broke diplomatic relations with Turkey and occupied the Danubian Principalities. In November 1853, the Russian fleet under Admiral Pavel Nakhimov defeated a Turkish squadron in Sinop Bay. The successes provoked a sharp reaction from Great Britain and France, which feared Russia's growing strength. The main fighting unfolded in Crimea, where in September 1854, the allies began the siege of Sevastopol. Despite the city's fierce defense, which lasted almost a year, the Russian Empire's technical and economic backwardness, the absence of modern communications, and the enemy's superiority in armaments led to defeat. Nicholas I's death in February and the fall of Sevastopol in August 1855 effectively decided the outcome of the war. Under the terms of the Paris Treaty of 1856, Russia lost the Danube delta and adjacent lands, as well as the right to maintain a military fleet and fortifications in the Black Sea.

During the Crimean War in 1854, the transport of Russian troops down the Amur River was organized to strengthen the defense of Kamchatka. The authorities encouraged the resettlement of peasants and Cossacks from the Transbaikalian Cossack Host to the lower Amur in order to secure Russia's presence in the Amur region. The formal international legalization of the annexation took place through Russo-Chinese negotiations. Weakened by internal unrest, the Qing Empire signed the Treaty of Aigun in 1858 and the Convention of Beijing in 1860, under which it lost the Amur River basin.

Following the subjugation of the Eastern Caucasus in 1859, the Russian army's main forces were concentrated against the Circassians. The campaign's mechanism was a policy of forced resettlement, codified in the Caucasus Committee's 1862 decision *"On the resettlement of mountaineers."* In May 1864, a mass deportation of Circassians, as well as Abazins, Abkhazians, and Ubykhs, began to the Ottoman Empire or to inhospitable internal regions of the empire. The total number of those who perished as a result of the war and deportation is estimated at **1–1.5 million** people, with roughly the same number emigrating to Turkey. Up to **95–97%** of the Circassian population was removed from its historic lands, after which these territories were settled by colonists loyal to the empire. The same fate befell tens of thousands of Chechens, Ingush, and Ossetians.

In domestic policy, Nicholas I tightened control over all spheres of public life. To integrate the empire's population, Minister of National Education Sergey Uvarov articulated in 1833 the ideological formula of Russian state policy, intended to unite Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. In Uvarov's conception, Orthodoxy was regarded as the spiritual and moral foundation of society, autocracy as the only legitimate form of state power, and nationality as fidelity to Russian traditions and the rejection of Western European ideas of individualism and political freedom.

From 1828 onward, the Synod ordered the revival of missionary activity, arguing that "unity in faith also promotes unity of spirit and thought" within the state. In 1839, **130,000** Greek Catholics were subjected to voluntary-compulsory conversion to Orthodoxy; between 1845 and 1847, **100,000** Latvian and Estonian peasants were converted (*several thousand of whom returned to Protestantism within a decade*). In the 1860s, **60,000** Catholics — primarily Belarusian peasants — were likewise converted to Orthodoxy. However, no large-scale conversion of the indigenous peoples of the Far North and Siberia occurred.

Administrative and police measures reinforced orthodox missionary activity in the Volga region in the 1830s. In response, apostasy — the renunciation of Orthodoxy by newly baptized Muslims (*2,000 people*) — spread across hundreds of Tatar villages. The state resorted to repression: movement leaders were imprisoned in monasteries, "refuseniks" were sent into exile, denied passports, and their marriages were not registered; children could be forcibly placed with Christian families. Self-government in Kazan (*"the Tatar town hall"*) and the teaching of the Tatar language in the city gymnasium were abolished.

However, these actions had the opposite effect — conversions to Islam increased among the Chuvash, Ud-

murts, and Mari. Only in 1860 did the state stop persecuting former Christians who had become Muslims. As a result, the number of those who fell away from Orthodoxy rose to **12,000**. Meanwhile, pressure on the Greek Catholic Church increased, culminating in the final liquidation of the Union (1832) and the transfer of its faithful to Orthodoxy.


In 1833, the State Council resolved that Transcaucasia should be *"bound to Russia by civic and political ties into a single body, and the inhabitants there compelled to speak, think, and feel in Russian."* In 1843, a harsh forced eviction of Jews from border areas took place, and a year later the kahals — organs of Jewish self-government — were abolished in the empire (*except Courland*).

In the summer of 1826, the Third Section of the Imperial Chancellery was created as a special body for political surveillance and state security. It was headed by Count Alexander Benckendorff. The Third Section's remit included political investigation and inquiry, monitoring public sentiments, police supervision, censorship, combating "heresies," sectarianism, and Old Belief, overseeing political prisons, and monitoring foreigners. The agency annually prepared analytical reviews of the country's socio-political condition for the emperor.

The Third Section exposed and halted the activities of the secret Ukrainian society, the *"Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius."* It existed in Kyiv from 1845 and united members of the intellectual elite associated with Kyiv and Kharkiv Universities. Leading roles were played by Mykola Kostomarov, Taras Shevchenko, Panteleimon Kulish, Mykola Hulak, Vasyl Bilozersky, and Heorhii Andruzky. The society's ideology evolved from the idea of Slavic unity toward a clear emphasis on Ukraine's national revival and the creation of a democratic federation of equal Slavic peoples, with the abolition of serfdom, the affirmation of civil liberties, and autonomy for each people. In March 1847, its members were arrested and repressed. The authorities regarded the Brotherhood's activity as a threat to the autocratic order.

Nicholas I attempted in part to reduce pressure on peasants, but he did not succeed in abolishing serfdom. Only in 1861 was a peasant reform carried out in the Russian Empire. On 19 February 1861, Alexander II promulgated a Manifesto and a package of corresponding legislative acts. The reform abolished peasants' personal dependence and granted them civil rights, but retained landowners' ownership of the land, which peasants received only for use, with subsequent redemption.


Redemption payments, inflated relative to market prices, and the reduction in land allotments led to land shortages and social tensions. Despite its modernizing character, the reform failed to resolve the agrarian question, as large landed estates remained intact. At the same time, the reform proved discriminatory along ethnic lines: Russian peasants received larger allotments than non-Russian groups. Thus, in Kazan Province, Russians received on average **6.4** desyatinas per person, Mari people **5.7**, and Tatars **4.7** desyatinas of land. Given higher birth rates among non-Russian populations, these populations experienced greater acuteness of land scarcity.



CHAPTER 40

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

1864-1905



 	Main territory of the Russian Empire in the summer of 1864	17 – 19	Vassals of the Russian Empire
1 2	States associated with Russia	20	Vassal states annexed by Russia (apart from those shown on the previous map)
3 – 16	Territories seized by Russia	21 – 23	Territories acquired by Russia under treaties



24 – 27	Temporary Russian Possessions
28 – 30	Concession Territories
31 32	Lost Territories

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Grand Duchy of Finland.
- ② The Kingdom of Poland (*a viceroyalty until 1874; thereafter a governor-generalship*).
- ③ The shoreline of Lake Zaysan, seized in 1864 and recognized as Russian under the Chuguchak Treaty with China of the same year.
- ④ Tashkent and other territories of the Kokand Khanate, conquered in 1864–1866.
- ⑤ Samarkand and other territories of the Emirate of Bukhara, conquered in 1866–1868.
- ⑥ Territory of Turkmen tribes, seized in 1869.
- ⑦ The bekdoms of the Zeravshan River valley, conquered in 1870.
- ⑧ Part of the territory of the Ili region (*Kulja*), seized in 1871 and retained within Russia under the St. Petersburg Treaty with China in 1881.
- ⑨ Territories of the Khiva Khanate, conquered in 1873.
- ⑩ Territory of Turkmen tribes, seized in 1873.
- ⑪ The Kars Oblast, seized as a result of the Russo-Turkish War and secured for Russia by the Treaty of San Stefano and the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.
- ⑫ Ashgabat and other territories of the Turkmen tribes, seized in 1881.
- ⑬ The Pamir territory, seized by 1883.
- ⑭ Merv and other territories of the Turkmen tribes, seized in 1884.
- ⑮ Territory of Turkmen tribes, seized in 1885 (*border delimitation with Iran in 1887, minor changes with mutual exchanges of territory in 1893, 1954–1957, and 1970*).
- ⑯ Part of Badakhshan, seized and incorporated into Russia under an agreement with Britain and Bukhara in 1895 (*officially from 1905*).
- ⑰ The Emirate of Bukhara, a Russian vassal from 1868 to 1917.
- ⑱ Territories annexed to Bukhara in 1870–1895.
- ⑲ The Khiva Khanate, a Russian vassal from 1873 to 1917.
- ⑳ The Kokand Khanate, under Russian suzerainty from 1868, was liberated as a result of the 1875 uprising, then conquered and annexed in 1876.
- ㉑ Sakhalin Island, under dual Russian-Japanese control since 1855, was transferred by Japan under the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875 in exchange for the Kuril Islands.
- ㉒ Southern Bessarabia, transferred by Romania under the Treaty of San Stefano in exchange for Dobruja and secured by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.
- ㉓ The mouth of the Black Irtys River, transferred by China under the treaty of 1881 in exchange for most of the Ili region.
- ㉔ The Ili region, seized in 1871 following an anti-Chinese uprising (*the formation of the Ili Sultanate*) and returned to China in 1881.
- ㉕ Bayazet and other Turkish territories, annexed under the Treaty of San Stefano, but returned to the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.
- ㉖ Northern Dobruja (*Ottoman territory*), seized and annexed under the Treaty of San Stefano, and in the same year, 1878, transferred to Romania in exchange for Southern Bessarabia.
- ㉗ The Kwantung Leased Territory (*Chinese territory*), leased (*in practice, possessed*) from 1898, transferred to Japan after defeat in the war under the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905.
- ㉘ The settlement at Hankou, a concession from 1896 to 1920.
- ㉙ The Chinese Eastern Railway zone of alienation, under concession from 1896. The dotted line marks the segment of the South Manchurian Railway transferred to Japan in 1905.
- ㉚ The settlement at Tianjin, a concession from 1900 to 1920.
- ㉛ Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, sold to the United States in 1867.
- ㉜ The Kuril Islands, transferred to Japan in 1875 in exchange for Sakhalin.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN THE LATE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

1864-1905

As of 1864, when the subjugation of the Caucasus and the incorporation of the Kazakh steppes had been completed, but expansion into Central Asia had not yet begun, the total area of Russia (*including Finland, Poland, and Sakhalin*) amounted to **23.7 million km²**. This was the peak of its territorial development.

In the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Russian Empire consolidated its status as an influential geopolitical actor and continued to consolidate autocracy within the empire. At the same time, this period was marked by the emergence of opposition forces, assassination attempts on emperors, and the spread of revolutionary ideas.

Alexander II began his reign by undertaking reforms of the empire. The changes were aimed at modernizing the state after defeat in the Crimean War. The central elements of the reform program were the 1861 peasant reform and the zemstvo, education, municipal, judicial, and military reforms. The Zemstvo Reform of 1864 introduced elected bodies of local self-government in districts and provinces, endowing them with powers in economic management, taxation, public health, and primary education. The Municipal Reform of 1870 created city dumas elected on the basis of property qualifications. The Judicial Reform of 1864 established the principles of equality of all before the law, open court proceedings, and judicial independence.

③ The military reforms of 1856–1874 were implemented in stages. In 1857, military settlements were abolished, and in 1859, the term of compulsory service was reduced to fifteen years. The core of the reform was the introduction of a system of military districts, which redistributed functions of supply, training, and administration between central and local authorities. The technical modernization of the army included rearming the infantry and transitioning field artillery to rifled guns. The Manifesto of 1870 proclaimed the army's shift to universal military service, which was finally established by the 1874 law, which replaced the recruitment system with universal conscription across all social estates. Service terms were also reduced to ten years.

Educational reforms contributed to the unification of the system and reinforced Russification and the consolidation of centralized power, particularly after the suppression of the Polish January Uprising of 1863–1864. The processes of urbanization and industrialization reinforced the dominant position of Russians — they constituted the majority of residents of large cities and workers at major enterprises even in non-Russian regions (*e.g., Ukraine and the Volga region*).

In the 1860s–1870s, the viceroyalty in Poland was abolished, and full unification with the imperial system was introduced, effectively depriving the Kingdom of Po-

land of its autonomous status. In parallel, legal and cultural unification was carried out: Russian legislation was extended to Polish lands, and judicial proceedings and office work were conducted in Russian. Mandatory study of Russian in state institutions was also introduced, and the activities of the Catholic and Greek Catholic churches were restricted.

In 1899, the constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland was effectively abolished. In 1900, a manifesto on the Russian language was introduced, making it mandatory in Finland's clerical work and administration.

In Ukrainian lands, the policy of forced Russification was established by separate regulatory legal acts. In July 1863, the empire's Minister of Internal Affairs, Pyotr Valuev, issued a circular banning the printing in Ukrainian of scholarly, educational, and religious works in Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language was regarded as an artificial formation that had arisen under the influence of Polish.

The circular was supplemented by the Ems Ukaz of 1876 — a secret order by Alexander II banning the publication and importation into the empire of books in Ukrainian, including translated works and musical notation. As a result of these acts, the hromadas' activities were terminated. At the same time, the tsar granted a subsidy of 1,000 rubles to the Lviv Russophile newspaper "*Slovo*" — the first act of clandestine information warfare in Russian history. In 1881, a decree was issued banning the use of Ukrainian names in baptism.

Additionally, within the context of Russification in the 1860s, the Cyrillic alphabet was developed for the empire's Muslim peoples. The first non-Russian periodical in Russia was published in Baku in 1875–1877, and only in 1883 did Ismail Gasprinsky's bilingual newspaper "*Ter-cüman-Perevodchik*" begin to appear regularly in Crimea — in Russian and in "*Common Turkic*" Arabic script. The lifting of restrictions on the use of national languages and printing occurred only in 1905.

The Russian Empire sold its North American possessions to the United States for **\$7.2 million** in gold. The Russian government viewed the sale as a means of avoiding possible losses of these territories in the event of war with Great Britain. The treaty transferring Russian possessions in North America was signed in Washington in March 1867, ratified by Emperor Alexander II in May, and entered into force in the autumn of the same year.

In Central Asia, following the defeat of the Kokand Khanate in 1867–1868, the Russian administration introduced new administrative forms of governance in the Kazakh steppes and, later, the Steppe Governor-Generalship. The capture of Tashkent in 1865 and the formation of the Turkestan Oblast strengthened Russia's position in the region and led to a clash with the Emirate of Bukhara, which sought to preserve its political independence. Military campaigns of 1866–1876 culminated in Bukhara's defeat, the establishment of vassalage to Russia, and the liquidation of Kokand as an independent state. The "Provisional Statute" of 1868 unified the system of governance across all Central Asian territories — from Kazakhstan to Turkestan.

In 1873, Russia subordinated the Khiva Khanate, retaining the khan's internal administration but taking con-

trol of foreign relations and trade. In parallel, between 1880 and 1885, the military subjugation of Turkmenistan occurred. The final stage was the settlement of border issues with China regarding the Ili region under the St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881.

Russia's advance in the region alarmed Great Britain, and the rivalry between them became known as the "Great Game." The most acute episodes fell in the 1870s–1890s. The Afghan crisis of 1885, when Russian troops seized the Merv oasis and advanced to Panjdeh, was resolved diplomatically and culminated in the mid-1890s in the delimitation of the border. Rivalry over the Pamirs continued in parallel, resulting in the region being divided among Russia, Afghanistan, and the Russian-controlled Emirate of Bukhara. As a result, the "Great Game" led to the establishment of spheres of influence: Afghanistan was recognized as a British sphere of influence, northern Persia as a Russian one, and Tibet as neutral.

Russia entered a war with the Turks after the escalation of the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia and Montenegro. Despite a temporary truce achieved following a Russian ultimatum in April 1877, Alexander II officially declared war on the Ottoman Empire. In the course of hostilities, the Russian army crossed the Danube, seized the strategically important Shipka Pass, and, after a prolonged siege, forced the capitulation of the Turkish army at Plevna. A successful winter crossing of the Balkan Mountains opened the road to Constantinople and compelled the Ottoman Empire to conclude the Treaty of San Stefano, the results of which were, however, later revised at the Congress of Berlin.

Under the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Russia regained the southern part of Bessarabia and annexed Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi. Bulgarian statehood was restored; the territories of Serbia, Montenegro, Wallachia, and Moldova were expanded; and Bosnia and Herzegovina came under the authority of Austria-Hungary.

The Russian Empire's dominance in the Far East in the second half of the nineteenth century was shaped by a combination of territorial compromises and strategic military decisions. The St. Petersburg Treaty of 1875, concluded by Alexander II with Japan, provided for the transfer of the Kuril Islands to Japan in exchange for Russian control over Sakhalin. Like Alaska, the Kurils were regarded by the Russian government as remote and economically unprofitable possessions. Against the backdrop of the annexation of the Amur region and Primorye, these concessions enabled Russia to concentrate on developing its continental Far Eastern territories, secure convenient ice-free naval bases, and, for a time, ensure the neutrality of the United States and the Japanese Empire toward Russian policy in the region.

In 1891, Russia began construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway — a rail line linking the European part of the empire with Vladivostok — of key economic and military-strategic importance, facilitating the integration of Siberia and the Far East into the all-imperial space. In 1900, during the suppression of the Boxer Uprising in China, Russian troops stormed Beijing. For the next five years, Russia became the de facto proprietor of Manchuria and, together with other European countries, exercised

semi-colonial governance over China.

During the gradual integration of the Far Eastern region, Russia encountered Japan's rise. In the early 20th century, Nicholas II sought to implement the so-called "Great Asian Program," aimed at strengthening political, economic, and military influence in East Asia and ensuring access to ice-free seas. Japan viewed the Russian presence in Manchuria and Korea as a direct threat to its interests. The deterioration of relations in 1903, diplomatic disputes, and mutual distrust ultimately led to the severance of diplomatic relations and the outbreak of war. In January 1904, Japan attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.

During the hostilities, Japan seized the strategic initiative, securing troop landings in Korea, the blockade and capture of Port Arthur, and victories over the Russian army in Manchuria and the fleet at the Battle of Tsushima. The remoteness of the theater of war, limited transport communications, incomplete military preparedness, and technological backwardness led to Russia's defeats. The conflict ended with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905, under which Russia ceded the southern part of Sakhalin to Japan and transferred the lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway.

The war had serious domestic political consequences for the Russian Empire, contributing to the outbreak of the 1905 revolutionary events. The unrest began with a strike by workers at the Putilov Plant in Saint Petersburg, which escalated into a mass peaceful demonstration on 9 (22) January 1905. Its suppression by government troops, known as "Bloody Sunday," triggered a sharp surge in protest sentiment and the spread of the revolutionary movement throughout the empire.

During 1905–1907, the strike movement assumed an all-imperial character; peasant disturbances and mutinies in the army and navy occurred; and councils of workers' deputies were formed. At the same time, the most intense clashes occurred in the western national borderlands — the Kingdom of Poland, the Baltic provinces, Transcaucasia, and the Black Sea region — while the east of the empire remained generally calm. Under pressure from mass protests, the government was forced to make limited political concessions, in particular by proclaiming the October Manifesto of 17 October 1905, which guaranteed civil liberties and granted the State Duma legislative powers.

Even before that, restrictions on the use of non-Russian languages were abolished, and the national periodical press began to appear (*however, some peoples, including Ukrainians, still did not obtain schooling in their native language*). In parallel, Orthodox believers were officially permitted to convert to other religions; as a result, 200,000 Ukrainians and Belarusians, and several tens of thousands of Tatars, returned to their ancestral faith. At the same time, discrimination against Jews persisted — the Pale of Settlement, quotas in educational institutions, restrictions on land purchases, and choice of profession (*it was precisely in 1881–1905 that Jewish pogroms in Russia occurred*). Russification measures in the Kingdom of Poland were not abolished.


Following the defeat of the revolution (*the so-called "Third of June coup" of 1907*), a regime of political reaction was established that restricted electoral and national rights.




CHAPTER 41

FORTIFIED LINES AND THE OUTCOMES OF RUSSIAN COLONIZATION

19TH CENTURY





Numbered designations indicate:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| ① Novoietsk Line (1810–1822) | ⑦ Black Sea (Coastal) Line (1837–1839) |
| ② Sunzha Line (1817–1821) | ⑧ Laba Line (1840) |
| ③ Emba Line (1826) | ⑨ New Siberian Line (1847–1854) |
| ④ Lezgin Line (1830) | ⑩ Urup Line (1850) |
| ⑤ New Line (1835–1837) | ⑪ Syr Darya Line (1853–1864) |
| ⑥ Akmolinsk-Kokshetau Line (1837) | ⑫ Belorechensk Line (1860) |
| | ⑬ Kokand Line (1864) |

FORTIFIED LINES AND THE OUTCOMES OF RUSSIAN COLONIZATION 19TH CENTURY

Andreas Kappeler proposed the following classification of the non-Russian subjects of the Muscovite state in the 16th century, on the eve of large-scale imperial expansion:

1. **“Internal” Finno-Ugric tribes** and peoples (*Karelians, Vepsians, Komi, Permians*), engaged in agriculture, formally Christianized, whose elite had disappeared and whose territory had been colonized by Russian peasants. Nevertheless, these ethnic groups managed to preserve their identity, at least in part, and not dissolve into the Russian population.

2. **Hunters, gatherers, and herders of the Far North** (*Nenets, Sami, Khanty, Mansi*), whose dependence was expressed exclusively through the payment of *yasak* in furs. Muscovy had no influence whatsoever on the internal order or culture of these peoples, and Russians did not live on their lands.

3. **Borderland Finno-Ugric and Turkic peoples** (*Mordvins, Mari, Udmurts*) engaged in agriculture. They were already performing regular obligations to Moscow and were partially governed from the capital, but they retained their own elites, lands, and cultural distinctiveness.

4. **The Tatars of the Qasim Khanate** and the European inhabitants of Moscow cannot be assigned to any of the previous groups.

Here is how the same scholar classifies the Russian peripheral regions of the late 19th century depending on their administrative status and demographic conditions.

1. **The Grand Duchy of Finland and the Baltic provinces** — with legally enshrined autonomy (of varying scope) and almost no Russians except officials and fortress garrisons. At the same time, the elites of these regions (*Swedes and Germans, respectively*) were ethnically distinct from the bulk of their populations. Socio-cultural tensions forced the local aristocracy to seek close cooperation with the imperial government and ensured their high level of loyalty to the center. From 1812, Bessarabia briefly belonged to this group.

2. **The Kingdom of Poland** also had autonomy (and even its own constitution during the first third of the century), but Poles made up more than **75%** of the region's population and dominated in the cities. This created the basis for the outbreak of national liberation uprisings in 1830–1831 and 1863–1864.

3. **The volosts of the inorodtsy of Siberia**, to which Russians did not migrate deliberately — the regions of the Far North, Yakutia, Buryatia, and so on. Although the local population (360,000 in 1795) had no administrative autonomy, it entirely preserved its traditional internal order and loyalty to the empire.

4. **Historically non-Russian regions** that underwent large-scale popular colonization by Russians: the so-called “Russian North” (the Novgorod region and the

Northern Urals) and southern Siberia (where 820,000 Russians lived at the beginning of the century). If the indigenous peoples here preserved their cultural distinctiveness at all, it was only partially, under pressure from miscegenation, Russification, and Christianization. In administrative terms, however, they were fully equated with Russian peasants. There was also no mass national resistance to imperial rule here.

5. **The Northern and Central Volga region**, where local elites preserved certain positions because Islam connected them with the majority of the rural population. However, the dominant position, both among the aristocracy as a whole and especially in the cities, was occupied by Russian nobles and burghers (urbanization among the Tatars was only 6%). In the 19th century, there were no notable national movements there.

6. **Bashkiria**. Here, the majority of the elites were ethnic Bashkirs, which enabled the region to retain a unique status akin to that of the Cossacks — the Bashkir-Meshcheryak Host. This made it easier for the Bashkirs to resist St. Petersburg's centralizing policy. However, among the population as a whole, the largest group became Russian peasants, so this struggle did not reach the scale of previous centuries.

7. **The steppes of the Lower Volga region and the Azov area**, from which the Kalmyks and Nogais were displaced, were settled by Russian and Ukrainian peasants. The remaining nomads partially preserved internal self-government and full cultural distinctiveness, whereas the status of settled peasants was no different from that in Central Russia.

It would be appropriate to distinguish two more types of peripheral region. The eighth consists of the lands of the Cossack hosts (the Don, the Kuban, and certain Siberian rivers). Although there was no question of political autonomy, the Cossacks felt distinct from the Great Russians, preserved internal self-government, and enjoyed significant privileges that shaped their loyalty.

The ninth consists of the Ukrainian provinces, which had no separate administrative status and were left with almost no national elite, yet in which Russians constituted an insignificant minority (9%). Such territories could become a base for large-scale social struggle, but the national movement proper there remained in an embryonic state.

This comparison shows how complex Russia's ethnopolitical and socio-economic structure had become over the course of 400 years. Nevertheless, the peak of its complexity and diversity came in the mid-18th century. From that point, the capital's centralizing and unifying aspirations gradually gained the upper hand over regional peculiarities.

In the first quarter of the 19th century, the processes begun in the previous era still continued. During this period, the Cossack colonization of the North Caucasus continued. Since few were willing to move there because of the constant military threat, the government resorted to using lots. Right up to the end of the Caucasian War, settlers concentrated in fortified stanitsas, hardly founding any khutors.

At the same time, the Kuban acquired a distinctly

Ukrainian character. During the first quarter of the century, nearly **100,000** peasants from the Poltava and Chernihiv provinces joined **25,000** Cossacks. In the middle of the century, another **15,000** joined, including those from the Kharkiv region. Due to natural increase and the uninterrupted flow of fugitives and re-emigrants (*Danubian Cossacks*), by the late 1850s, **185,000** people lived in the Kuban in **3** towns and **3,000** khutors.

From 1813, Bessarabia was governed by the Regional Supreme Council, which was removed from the jurisdiction of the government and the Senate and subordinated to the State Council and to the emperor personally. The RSC consisted of appointed and elected members, with the latter — predominantly Moldovian landowners — forming the majority. The Council operated exclusively under local public and private law and used Romanian for clerical work (*only in criminal proceedings and administrative matters was Russian additionally used*).

As for the center, loyalty to the throne still outweighed ethnic origin. Foreigners made up about **8%** of the highest officials, and they were required neither to convert to Orthodoxy nor even to know Russian. Under Nicholas I, the ministers of foreign affairs and finance were of German origin. Lutherans (*primarily Baltic Germans*) in the middle of the century held 12 of 113 Senate seats and occupied 9 of 48 gubernatorial posts; 9 of 19 ambassadors were also Lutherans.

In all 8 Russian universities in 1830, non-Russians outnumbered Russians both among faculty and among students, and in half of them instruction was not conducted in Russian at all (*in two — in Polish, in one each — in German and Swedish*).

However, neither Muslims nor, even more so, Jews could aspire to the highest official posts. The Pale of Settlement for Jews was not abolished until 1917.

In the second decade of the 19th century, another stage of centralization and unification of the imperial space began.

In 1822, the *“Statute on the Administration of Inorodtsy”* came into force. The non-Russian population of the Asian part of the empire was divided into three groups: “wandering” (hunters, gatherers, and fishermen of the North), “nomadic,” and “settled.” Separate statutes were granted to the Chukchi and the *“Kirghiz-Kaisaks”* (*Kazakhs*). Outside the scope of the new rules remained the inhabitants of Southern Altai (*dual tributaries to China until 1865*), Alaska, and the islands.

The document secured self-government for the inorodtsy based on tradition. The “wandering” received only *“clan administrations,”* the nomads in addition received “inorodtsy councils,” and the Yakuts and Buryats — also *“steppe dumas.”* Clan elders headed them, and their functions did not change either — judicial proceedings and the collection of yasak. The inorodtsy (*except the Buryats*) were not conscripted into the army, and their long-standing economic and cultural rights and freedoms were preserved. Overall, the burden on commoners from indigenous peoples was significantly lighter than that on Russian peasants.

The author of the Statute, Mikhail Speransky, intended to protect the inorodtsy from the arbitrariness of the

Russian administration, but his initiative also had a darker side. First, the inorodtsy were once again recognized as unequal subjects of the empire, which could not help but affect Russians’ attitude toward them. Second, because of the uneven tax burden, settled peoples began to demand classification as nomadic, and nomads as “wandering,” with minimal obligations. Some communities refused to pay yasak in money (*the Chukchi and part of the Yukaghirs did not pay it at all*). Similar reforms in 1822 and 1824 in the Kazakh steppes abolished khan power and traditional administration, and, in fact, led to the annexation of these lands by the empire.

In addition, although local elites were granted the status of “honorary inorodtsy,” with the exception of isolated cases, they were not incorporated into Russia’s nobility.

In 1828, Bessarabia’s autonomy was abolished — a Regional Council of appointed officials replaced its Supreme Council. In 1830, the customs barrier between the region and the rest of Russia disappeared. However, ancient estate rights were preserved here, and there was no serfdom at all. Because of this, the popular colonization of Bessarabia proceeded at the fastest pace in the empire. If in 1812 it was inhabited by **240,000** people, then in 1856 it was inhabited by nearly a million. This changed the ethnic makeup of the region: in 1863, Moldovians made up approximately three-quarters of Bessarabia’s population, and in 1897, only **48%**. Nevertheless, the upper ranks of the nobility and the clergy remained Moldovian.

The Polish uprising of 1830–1831 marked a transition not simply to even harsher centralization, but also to the state Russification of the empire. The triad *“Orthodoxy — autocracy — nationality”* determined the turn in Russia’s domestic policy for the following decades.

In the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, for another three decades, the majority of officials remained Poles, Polish law and language continued to be used in judicial proceedings, and the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic churches were not persecuted. However, in 1841, the Russian ruble was introduced in Poland; in 1848, the standards of measure and weight were established; and in 1850, the internal customs border between it and the rest of the empire was abolished.

The regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth directly incorporated into Russia underwent deeper Russification. The Lithuanian Statute and Magdeburg law were abolished, Russian replaced Polish in clerical work and education (*Vilnius University and the Kremenets Lyceum were closed, while a university was opened in Kyiv*), and many Catholic monasteries were transferred to the Orthodox Church (*including the Pochaiv Lavra in 1831*).

Even harsher was Russian policy in territories that the authorities did not regard as “civilized.” For example, of the **300,000** Kabardians who lived in the Caucasus before Russia captured their homeland, only **35,000** remained by the second quarter of the 19th century. The rest died or were forced into emigration.

The Russian-American Company divided the population of Alaska and the adjacent islands into three categories: *“truly dependent”* Aleuts, *“semi-dependent”* Athabaskans and Eskimos, and *“entirely independent”* Tlingit. The latter received this designation because of their vic-

tory in the Russian-Tlingit war of 1802–1805 (*individual clashes continued until 1818*). Although the Indians failed to throw the Russians into the sea, they defended their own freedom. The “semi-dependent” tribes suffered only from unequal trade with the colonists, whereas the Aleuts were effectively enserfed.

Although an imperial decree of 1799 prohibited the imposition of a *yasak* on the indigenous peoples of America, the Company's leadership secured, in 1821, the right to involve the Aleuts in hunting and construction. The Russians selected elders (“*toyons*”) for the Indians on a state salary and also introduced the post of chief *toyon*, who, from 1842, was confirmed by the emperor. Under the supervision of the aristocracy, ordinary Aleuts were forcibly moved into large settlements, caught fish for the Russians, and built fortresses. The Indians were forbidden to barter the seafood they caught independently or to leave the settlements. This practice ended only with the sale of Alaska in 1867.

During this period, the Germans of the Baltic provinces (*their local rights were codified in 1845*), the elites of Finland, and the Armenian communities preserved their loyalty to the authorities and thus their privileges.

In the first half of the century, the colonization of Siberia continued — by both administrative and popular methods.

In 1806, state peasants who lacked land at home were allowed to move to Siberia to unoccupied plots of land. Settlers received a treasury loan and a five-year exemption from obligations, except military recruitment. In 1812, this provision was suspended, but in 1822 it was restored by Speransky on the condition that the peasants had no debts. However, over the entire period, only several thousand families were able to take advantage of the opportunity due to the cost and inconvenience of the journey.

A turning point came in 1837 with the creation of the Ministry of State Property. It provided settlers free money, livestock, and equipment; extended the preferential period to 8 years, including a three-year deferment from military recruitment; and wrote off debts. Groups of peasants were assigned guides, way stations, and food; they were first moved to the internal provinces and only then to Siberian ones. There was a mass demarcation of allotments of 15 *desyatinas* each. However, this program covered only those provinces without free state lands, and by the end of the 1850s, the flow of organized state-supported settlers had been exhausted (*only spontaneous relocations continued*). In total, up to **400,000** people moved to new places during this period.

On the other hand, the Complete Collection of Laws recognized the right of townspeople's and peasants' communes to send troublemakers and vagrants into exile, and in the 1830s–1840s, by popular verdicts, **6,000** men together with their families were sent to Siberia. At the landowners' decision, **8,000** people were exiled by mid-century. Court sentences and officials' orders increased the number of forced settlers by another **350,000**.

The third route to Siberia ran through conversion to Cossack status. In 1808, Siberian Cossacks numbered **6,000**, which was insufficient to cover the long border, es-

pecially during the period of large-scale Kazakh uprisings. Therefore, during the 1830s–1840s, more than **12,000** peasants from Great Russian provinces were transferred into the Cossack estate, and in 1849, **4,000** from Poltava.

Mass resettlements led to an even greater distortion of the demographic situation in Siberia, a distortion that no birth rate could correct. In 1858, there were already **2.3 million** colonists and their descendants there, whereas the indigenous inhabitants numbered only **650,000**.

The 1860s were marked by two epochal events: first, the beginning of modernization (*the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the Great Reforms*); and second, the revolutionary wave (“*Land and Liberty*” in 1861, *the beginning of populism*, and *the January Uprising in Poland in 1863–1864*).

But if the reaction of the authorities “from above” and “in the center” implied a certain liberalization of the regime (*for example, jury trials*), then on the peripheries and “below,” centralization and unification, on the contrary, only intensified. For the first time, the Russian Empire unequivocally defined itself precisely as a state of ethnic Russians.

The earliest and best-known prohibitions on national grounds were the restrictions on the Ukrainian language: the Valuev Circular of 1863 and the Ems Ukaz of 1876. These acts effectively deprived Ukrainians of their own literature — the printing and import of books in the Ukrainian alphabet were banned (*only literary works in all-Russian orthography were permitted*), as were performances and concerts, and instruction in primary schools.

In Bessarabia in the 1860s, the Romanian language was removed first from school education and then from church services.

In the 1870s, Polish was replaced at all levels of education by Russian, and from 1879, speaking Polish during breaks was punished. The University of Warsaw, founded in 1869, was a Russian-language institution. It was forbidden to print and import texts in Belarusian and in Lithuanian written in Latin script (*Lithuanian in Cyrillic script was permitted*).

From 1867, Russian became compulsory for officials in the Baltic provinces, and the new Municipal Statute ten years later destroyed traditional German burgher self-government. In 1881, Emperor Alexander III, for the first time, did not confirm the Baltic privileges granted under Peter I, and later, the acts of municipal self-government were translated into Russian. From 1888–1889, police and judicial proceedings were conducted in Russian, and later so was all education, except for the first two grades. Pressure intensified on Latvians and Estonians who had converted to Orthodoxy but later returned to Lutheranism.

In 1871, the self-governing bodies of foreign colonists in southern Russia and Ukraine were abolished, clerical work was transferred to the Russian language, and they were included in the peasant estate. Three years later, universal military service was extended to them.

In the 1860s, the Armenian, Georgian, and Muslim aristocracies of the South Caucasus were incorporated into Russia's nobility. But by 1872, the Georgian language had already been replaced by Russian in the theological seminary in Tiflis — the Russification of the region's Christian peoples had begun. In 1882, the use of the very

name "Georgia" was prohibited. In the 1880s, Armenian school education was russified, and after 1895, non-state schools, public associations, and libraries were closed. In 1903, the Armenian Church's property was confiscated.

As for the Muslims of the South Caucasus, they preserved the traditional system of education and clergy training, although judicial proceedings there, too, were transferred into Russian. However, judicial reform in the region proved limited — no jury trials were established there.

The Russification of educational institutions in the empire's national outskirts was carried out systematically in accordance with the government's plan. As the line minister Dmitry Tolstoy stated in 1870, *"the ultimate goal of educating all inorodtsy... must be their Russification and fusion with the Russian people."*

A certain exception was the Grand Duchy of Finland. In 1850, the printing of books in Finnish was permitted, and from 1858, Finnish lyceums began operating. In 1863, the Finnish language was granted equal status to Swedish in government institutions and courts. From 1865, Finland had its own currency; in 1869, the Diet received legislative powers; and in 1878, a separate Finnish army appeared (*it did not participate in the First World War*).

However, at the end of the century, Russia began gradually restricting Finland's autonomy: in 1899, the emperor established his right to issue laws without the Diet, and in 1900, the Russian language was introduced into clerical work. In 1903, the Russian governor-general effectively turned into Finland's dictator, restricting freedom of assembly, closing 72 publications, and replacing many local officials and judges with Russians (the following year, he was shot).

Artificial barriers to the development of national cultures were abolished only in 1905, and their effects were felt for a long time afterward. Thus, in 1911, **25,500** titles of printed material were published in Russian, **1,600** in Polish, **965** in Yiddish and Hebrew, and only **242** in Ukrainian (*in Finnish — 232, despite a tenfold difference in population compared with Ukraine*). In 1913, **800** students studied at Kazan University, of whom only **26** were Tatars.

Administrative measures of Russification were combined with another large-scale wave of colonization. The abolition of serfdom in many provinces led to a reduction in peasant allotments. On the other hand, in the second half of the century, there was an explosive population increase. Both phenomena intensified the land shortage and forced Russian peasants to move en masse to the imperial outskirts.

By the 1890s, **50–100,000** people were leaving annually for Siberia. In 1893, a body for the centralized migration of peasants was created — the Siberian Railway Committee — and the number of settlers increased to **150–300,000** people per year.

The government placed particular emphasis on populating the Amur region. Settlers were permanently exempted from the poll tax and, for 10 years, from all payments and obligations, including military obligations; they received allotments of 100 desyatinas, with the option to purchase at a preferential price. In 1901–1912, **230,000**

people moved there, 2.5 times as many as in the previous 40 years.

Overall, more than **3.5 million** people moved to new places in the region before the outbreak of the First World War, and Siberia's total population in 1911 grew to **9.36 million**.

A separate question concerns the consequences of Russian colonization in Siberia. Except for a period of stagnation or even partial decline at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 18th centuries, the indigenous population of the region continued to grow. In 1911, it exceeded **970,000** people, an increase of almost 4.5 times over a little more than three centuries. Since the number of Indians in South and North America declined significantly in the colonial era, many emphasize the particular mildness of Russian imperialism, at least in Siberia.

In reality, the situation is more complex. Some people, already numerous before, managed to improve their demographic indicators. The number of Buryats grew 10.5 times, Yakuts — 7.9, Altai-Sayan peoples — 6.5, Siberian Tatars — 3.1, Khanty — 1.5 times. Other tribes, however, became victims of Russian colonization, both of accompanying factors such as disease and of direct genocide. The number of insular Aleuts decreased tenfold to **2,500**; Itelmens — from **20,000** to **1,951** people; Mansi and Koryaks — by **50%**; and Yukaghirs — by **44%**. Some small ethnic groups disappeared entirely.

In the end, the number of colonists and their descendants in Siberia exceeded that of the indigenous peoples tenfold, and the reforms of 1898–1901 almost abolished the inorodtsy's self-government, bringing their communities closer to the status of Russian rural communes.

Victory in the Caucasian War (1864) opened the way for Russian settlement of the North Caucasus. The mountains themselves were not suitable for peasant colonization, but in the Caucasian foothills alone, the area of arable land doubled during the 1860s–1880s. Likewise, in the second half of the century, Russians began to settle the cities of the South Caucasus, though they did not form a majority there.

Not only mountaineers but also Cossacks suffered under Russian colonization. For example, in the Kuban in 1897, there were **1.9 million** inhabitants, of whom **785,000** (41%) were Kubanians, **95,000** were indigenous peoples, and more than a million were Russian settlers. In 1917, **3.5 million** people lived in the Don, of whom only **42%** were Cossacks.

Social pressure after the defeat in the Crimean War, and especially tax innovations (*the replacement of rent in kind with monetary rent*), led to the largest emigration of Crimean Tatars and Nogais to Turkey. In the 1850s–1860s, nearly **200,000** people left the peninsula and adjacent lands, opening the way for settlers from the north.

If, at the end of the 18th century, Crimean Tatars made up **95%** of the population of Crimea, then by the beginning of the 20th century, they were already a minority (28.7%), surrounded by Russians (41.2%). This led to the destruction of the region's traditional Muslim culture — the number of mosques declined by more than half, and the number of clergy fivefold. Of **300,000** desyatinas of waqf lands (*lands bequeathed to mosques*), **83,000**

survived; the rest were confiscated.

The “*plow*” colonization of the Kazakh steppes in the 1840s–1860s proceeded extremely slowly. To stimulate this process, a special resettlement commission was created, and in 1879, the first Russian villages appeared in the region’s north. Their inhabitants were given the right to choose their allotments themselves; were exempted from taxes and duties, except military ones, for 10 years; and were paid money and given tree saplings. However, many settlers returned home or simply scattered. Although the pace of colonization increased tenfold over the decade, in absolute terms its annual scale remained insignificant: from **1,800** peasants in 1879 to 12,000 in 1890.

There were several reasons for this: poor soil, water shortages, a harsh climate, and locust invasions. The government’s half-hearted policy played an equally important role: on the one hand, calling colonists to new lands, and on the other, trying to preserve the traditional economy of the nomads. Instructions to land surveyors of resettlement parties emphasized the inviolability of the Kazakhs’ winter pastures and the settled natives’ irrigated plots. Finally, the indigenous inhabitants drove out the colonists by force and devastated their households.

Traditional Kazakh landholding was restricted by the Steppe Statute of 1891, after which the flow of Russian settlers to the region increased sharply. Although out of a total population of more than **3 million**, the number of colonists did not exceed **300,000**, they changed the demographic face of the northern Kazakh steppes.

The Russians received land where the Kazakhs grazed their herds in summer, leading to the end of traditional seasonal nomadism. Part of the local population adopted a sedentary lifestyle, while others were forced to relocate to the less fertile southern steppes. All this laid the groundwork for mass violence against colonists during the Central Asian uprising of 1916.

Central Asia, conquered in the 1860s–1870s, was one of the few regions that both the authorities and society almost unanimously regarded as a colony of the Russian Empire. Unlike the Volga region and Crimea, imperial officials only limited, rather than abolished, Muslim self-government. The local aristocracy, although it retained its offices, was not incorporated into the Russian nobility. Military service did not apply to the “*natives*”; only separate cavalry detachments were accepted into service, and their leaders received officer ranks.

Sharia and adat (*customary law*) were partially adjusted (for example, slavery was prohibited), but education in mektebs and madrasas remained untouched. Waqfs were also preserved. Orthodox missionary activity was prohibited, and the Tashkent diocese never appeared. However, even in nominally sovereign Bukhara, the Russians, in addition to a garrison in the capital, controlled the railway and the customs service, reducing the emir’s independence to nothing.

The popular colonization of the region was not large-scale. The Regulation on the Administration of Turkestan of 1891 prohibited peasant seizure of settled agricultural areas, so Russians concentrated in the cities. Some of them, particularly Tashkent, were effectively divided in half — into “*Russian*” and “*native*” parts. The only ex-

ception was the fertile foothills of Kyrgyzstan, which Russian and Ukrainian peasants gradually settled.

The entire population of Russian Central Asia (*excluding the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara*) at the beginning of the 20th century exceeded 6 million people. Of these, settlers numbered approximately **400,000**, and they were almost nowhere a majority. No assimilation of the local and incoming populations was observed — they continued to live as two separate worlds.

Economic changes were far more significant than political or demographic ones. The empire turned the region into a raw-material base for its own industry. In 1885, only **14%** of arable land in the Fergana Valley was devoted to cotton cultivation, but by the outbreak of the First World War, it had already risen to **40%**.

Another region where Russian colonialism did not extend beyond political boundaries was the Baltic region. There, Russians concentrated only in the cities, where they did not form a majority: **14–15%** each in Reval (Tallinn) and Riga. By comparison, **15%** Tatars and more than **80%** Russians lived in Kazan.

In total, Russia contained approximately **2.5 million km²** of conquered but largely uncolonized lands, accounting for more than **12%** of the state’s territory. And according to Vadim Pokshishevsky’s calculations, from the 16th century to the beginning of the 20th century, the total volume of interregional migration in Russia amounted to **30 million** people, most of whom were Russian and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian peasants.

Although racism in the Western sense was not characteristic of the Russian Empire during the 19th century (*discrimination was rather based on religious grounds*), among most Russians, a sense of cultural superiority developed toward the peoples of Siberia, the Volga region, the Steppe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The processes of modernization in Russia also gave rise to mass antisemitism and Jewish pogroms from 1881 to 1907. The emergence of Black Hundred organizations with government support marked the final consolidation of Russia as a state of ethnic Russians and Orthodox Christians.

Kappeler compiled the following scale of Russifying integration of the empire’s population:

1. The greatest pressure was experienced by **Ukrainians and Belarusians**, who were generally considered branches of a single Russian people and whose elites had become almost totally Russified.
2. The next step was occupied by **non-Russian peoples “Russified”** through their Orthodoxy: **Romanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Georgians**, as well as newly baptized Muslims and pagans.
3. Next came **Poles, Lithuanians, and Armenians**, who were not regarded as “*Russians*” even in the broadest sense, but to whom forced Russification was applied.
4. The next category included **Germans, Finns, Estonians, Latvians**, and the **Muslims of the Volga region and the Caucasus** — the pressure on them was significantly weaker. The inorodtsy of Siberia and the steppe nomads enjoyed even greater cultural freedom.
5. Finally, the **Muslims of Turkestan** knew almost no interference in their lives.

Outside these categories stood the Jews — at


once the most discriminated against and an extraordinarily Russified people.

In sum, over the late 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century, Russia became not only a centralized and unified modern state but also a distinctly Russian ethnic state. Unlike the maritime colonial empires, Russia placed few obstacles to the social evolution of its peripheral inhabitants. However, the price for this was the acceptance of Russian as the language and Russian Orthodoxy, that is, the complete abandonment of previous identity.

The denationalization of the old peripheral elites in the 19th century meant that the peasant masses — preservers of their ancient traditions — remained nominally loyal to the empire. The identification of the Russian language with the “*lords’ language*” meant that, for tens of millions of subjects, Russia was not their state.

On the other hand, the measures by which the empire asserted its Russianness — mass education, the press, universal military service — in a number of cases contributed to the emergence of new modern national elites in the 20th century. Thus, almost entirely Russian-speaking, but not Russian. And as soon as the central government wavered, the state fell apart into national fragments.


As for the ethnic Russians, in whose name the state acted, empire-building did not improve their condition. In average life expectancy, right up to the 1920s, they lagged behind Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, and Bashkirs.




CHAPTER 42

ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONAL AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT
UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA


LATE 18TH CENTURY-1900





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Uprisings in Kabardia in 1794–1798, 1804–1805, 1810–1811, 1825.
- ② Imeretian uprising of 1810.
- ③ Uprising of the Bug Cossack Host in 1817–1818.
- ④ Imeretian-Gurian uprising of 1819–1820.
- ⑤ Dagestani uprising of 1818–1819.
- ⑥ Chuhuiv uprising of 1819 and riots of military settlers in 1817–1820.
- ⑦ Uprising of Beibulat Taimiev in 1821–1822 and 1825–1826.
- ⑧ First uprising of Zholaman Tlenshiuly in 1822–1825.
- ⑨ Shamkhal uprisings of 1823, 1831, 1843.
- ⑩ Uprising of the Chernihiv Regiment in 1825/26.
- ⑪ Uprising of Sarzhan Kasymov in 1825–1836.
- ⑫ Imamate in 1828–1859.
- ⑬ Shebelynske uprising of 1829.
- ⑭ “Cholera riots” of 1830–1831.
- ⑮ Polish (“November”) uprising of 1830–1831.
- ⑯ Kaitag-Tabasaran uprising of 1831.
- ⑰ Bashkir uprising of 1834–1835.
- ⑱ Uprising of Isatai Taimanov in 1836–1838.
- ⑲ Second uprising of Zholaman Tlenshiuly in 1836–1838.
- ⑳ Quba uprising of 1837–1839.
- ㉑ Uprising of Kenesary Kasymov in 1837–1847.
- ㉒ Revolt of Vauli Piettomien in 1839–1841.
- ㉓ Akramov uprising of 1842.
- ㉔ Uprising of Eset Kotibarov in 1853–1858.
- ㉕ Uprising of Zakonzhi Nurmukhamedov in 1856–1857.
- ㉖ Uprising in Akusha-Dargo in 1843.
- ㉗ “Kyiv Cossackdom” in 1855.
- ㉘ Nazran uprising of 1858.
- ㉙ Peasant uprisings of 1861.
- ㉚ Polish (“January”) uprising of 1863–1864.
- ㉛ Uprising in Abkhazia in 1866.
- ㉜ Kaitag-Tabasaran uprising of 1866.
- ㉝ Circum-Baikal uprising of 1866.
- ㉞ Ural-Turgai uprising of 1868–1869.
- ㉟ Adai uprising of 1870–1871.
- ㊱ Uprising in Svaneti in 1875–1876.
- ㊲ Chechen-Dagestani uprising of 1877.
- ㊳ “Cholera riots” of 1892.
- ㊴ Andijan uprising of 1898.



ANTI-COLONIAL NATIONAL AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT UPRISINGS IN RUSSIA

LATE 18TH CENTURY-1900

The largest uprisings during this period were as follows (marked on the map in the previous spread under these numbers).

1. Uprisings in Kabardia in 1794–1798, 1804–1805, 1810–1811, 1825. The introduction of new arrangements in Kabardia (*clan courts instead of sharia courts and the construction of Russian fortresses*) led to armed uprisings by the local aristocracy against St. Petersburg's rule. A distinctive feature of this struggle was the limited participation of the dependent population, who gained personal freedom at the hands of the Russians when the estates of the rebellious princes were confiscated. The destruction of dozens and hundreds of auls accompanied the suppression of the uprisings. In 1818–1822, the territory of Kabardia was fully occupied by government troops, its borders were narrowed, the nominal post of grand prince was abolished, and administration passed into the hands of the imperial authorities. Tens of thousands of fugitives founded "*Khazret*" ("*Fugitive*") Kabardia beyond the Kuban or joined the murids of Chechnya and Dagestan. As a result of military action, emigration, and a plague epidemic (1805–1811), the number of Kabardians during 1763–1825 declined from 300,000 to 30,000 people.

2. Imeretian uprising of 1810. An armed movement against the Russian annexation and liquidation of the Kingdom of Imereti in 1810, led by King Solomon II, who escaped from arrest. Suppressed by government troops.

3. Uprising of the Bug Cossack Host in 1817–1818. An armed uprising of the Cossacks against the liquidation of the Host and their transformation into military settlers. Suppressed by government troops.

4. Imeretian-Gurian uprising of 1819–1820. A series of armed uprisings in Imereti and a full-scale uprising in Guria against the reform of the Georgian Orthodox Church and the transfer of its peasants and lands into state property. Suppressed by government troops.

5. Dagestani uprising of 1818–1819. Armed uprisings of local elites against the actions of Aleksei Yermolov's Russian army. Suppressed by government troops with the elimination of the core of resistance — the Kaitag utsmiate (1820). Separate riots broke out in 1822.

6. Chuhuiv uprising of 1819. An armed uprising of the military settlers of the Chuhuiv Regiment against the harsh conditions of service. The following year, unrest in 200 settlements of southern Ukraine. Suppressed by government troops.

7. Uprising of Beibulat Taimiev in 1821–1822 and 1825–1826. A local Chechen uprising against deportation (*the first*) and a general uprising against Russian domination in Chechnya and northern Dagestan (*the second*). Suppressed by government troops.

8. First uprising of Zholaman Tlenshiuly in

1822–1825. Armed uprisings on the banks of the Ilek River against the deportation of Kazakhs for the construction of the Novoiletsk fortified line. Continued in the uprising of Sarzhan Kasymov.

9. Shamkhal uprisings of 1823, 1831, 1843.

Armed uprisings of the population of the Shamkhalate and the Mekhtuli Khanate against Russian domination, their own pro-Russian leaders, and later in support of the Imamate. In all cases, they were suppressed by government troops.

10. Uprising of the Chernihiv Regiment in 1825/26.

An armed uprising of military personnel in support of the Decembrist movement. Suppressed by government troops.

11. Uprising of Sarzhan Kasymov in 1825–1834.

Armed struggle of the Kazakhs of the Middle Jüz under the leadership of the khan's son against Russian expansion — the abolition of khan authority, the construction of fortresses in the steppe, the deportation of nomads, and interference in their economy. With varying success, the insurgents attacked both Russian garrisons and pro-Russian auls. Regular battles were largely over by 1832, replaced by Kazakh partisan raids. In 1834, the Kokand Khanate unsuccessfully entered the fighting on the side of the insurgents, after which hostilities ended (*two years later, Sarzhan was killed*).

12. Imamate in 1828–1859. In the first stage (*until 1839*), the uprising led by Ghazi Muhammad, Gamzat-bek, and Shamil against Russian domination and the pro-Russian elites of the Caucasus was suppressed by government troops. In 1840, the uprising resumed, leading to the creation of a full-fledged state — the Imamate. The war with the Russian Empire continued with alternating success until 1859, culminating in the conquest of the Imamate and the capture of Shamil. Mass deportations of the mountaineers provoked an uprising in southern Chechnya in 1860–1861, suppressed by government troops.

13. Shebelynske uprising of 1829. An armed uprising of state peasants against their transformation into military settlers. Suppressed by government troops.

14. "Cholera riots" of 1830–1831. Urban uprisings and rural unrest amid real and imagined cases of a cholera (*or "plague"*) epidemic. The main cause was dissatisfaction with government quarantine measures and with official abuses. In June 1830, armed sailors and townspeople held Sevastopol for 5 days. In November 1830, the inhabitants of Tambov rioted. In July 1831, unrest engulfed Staraya Russa and its neighboring settlements, and a minor uprising broke out in St. Petersburg. Suppressed by government troops.

15. Polish ("November") uprising of 1830–1831.

In effect, a Russian-Polish war was caused by St. Petersburg's violation of the Polish constitution. At the first stage, Poland's independence was restored, but after the defeat of the insurgents, Polish autonomy within Russia was significantly restricted.

16. Kaitag-Tabasaran uprising of 1831. An armed uprising in support of the uprising of Ghazi Muhammad (the Imamate). Suppressed by government troops.

17. Bashkir uprising of 1834–1835. A series of uprisings against government plans to transfer local state

peasants into the apanage category, as well as against rumors of transferring the Bashkirs "into apanage" and of their Christianization. Not only Bashkirs, Mishars, and Teptyars joined the uprising, but also Russian peasants and part of the Orenburg Cossacks. Suppressed by government troops, including Bashkir regiments, the plan to change the status of the local peasantry was abolished.

18. Uprising of Isatai Taimanov in 1836–1838. Armed struggle of the dependent population in the Buk-ei Horde against khan authority and auxiliary Russian detachments for economic reasons (*land dispossession, high taxes*). Suppressed by government troops, but the tax increase was suspended.

19. Second uprising of Zholaman Tlenshiuly in 1836–1838. Armed uprisings in the upper reaches of the Yaik River against the deportation of Kazakhs for the construction of the New fortified line. Continued in the uprising of Kenesary Kasymov.

20. Quba uprising of 1837–1839. Large-scale armed struggle under the leadership of Hadji-Muhammad Khulukhsky against Russian colonization and in support of Shamil. The insurgents included inhabitants of the former Quba and Kyurin Khanates, as well as the free communities of the Samur Valley. Suppressed by government troops with the liquidation of the free communities.

21. Uprising of Kenesary Kasymov in 1837–1847. Armed resistance of the Kazakhs of all three jüzes to Russian expansion. After a series of successful battles, in 1841 Kenesary (*brother of the previous insurgent leader Sarzhan*) was elected khan of all the Kazakhs, and Kazakhstan effectively slipped out of St. Petersburg's control. Only after the construction of six forts in the steppes in 1845–1847 did the Russians restore control over the country. In 1846, the sultans of the Senior Jüz recognized full submission to St. Petersburg. Forced into Kyrgyz lands, Kasymov was defeated, captured, and executed.

22. Revolt of Vauli Piettomen in 1839–1841. A bandit movement of the Nenets, whose leader declared himself elder over all the inorodtsy and removed Obdorsk Prince Ivan Taishin from power. The rebels demanded that the yasak be reduced by half and be captured by Cossacks.

23. Akramov uprising of 1842. An uprising of Chuvash, Mari, and Tatar state peasants against collective plowing and higher taxes. Suppressed by government troops. It became the culmination of a series of so-called "potato riots" that swept through the Volga region in 1841–1842.

24. Uprising of Eset Kotibarov in 1853–1858. A series of attacks by insurgents in the Junior Jüz against Russian and pro-Russian Kazakh detachments with demands for the abolition of taxes, an end to repression, and permission for free nomadism. After defeat by government forces in 1857, Kotibarov concluded an agreement with the Russian authorities.

25. Uprising of Zakonzhi Nurmukhamedov in 1856–1857. Armed resistance to the construction of the Syr Darya line, land seizures, and construction and road duties. After the defeat, the insurgents retreated to the Khivan Khanate.

26. Uprising in Akusha-Dargo in 1843. An uprising

in the free community of Akusha-Dargo led by Muhammad-qadi, as a result of which this territory joined Shamil's Imamate.

27. "Kyiv Cossackdom" in 1855. A mass peasant movement of Ukrainians for obtaining the status of "free Cossacks." Suppressed by government troops.

28. Nazran uprising of 1858. An armed uprising of the Ingush against the ban on edged weapons and the merging of small settlements. Suppressed by government troops.

29. Peasant uprisings of 1861. Armed uprisings of peasants against the terms of emancipation from serfdom. The largest: the Kandiev uprising in Penza province and the Bezdna uprising in Kazan province. Suppressed by government troops.

30. Polish ("January") uprising of 1863–1864. Large-scale armed struggle of the Poles for the restoration of the independence of their state. Suppressed by government troops, followed by further restrictions on Polish autonomy.

31. Uprising in Abkhazia in 1866. A local armed uprising against the Russian annexation and liquidation of the Principality of Abkhazia in 1864. Suppressed by government troops.

32. Kaitag-Tabasaran uprising of 1866. An armed uprising of the population against tax and administrative reforms. Suppressed by government troops.

33. Circum-Baikal uprising of 1866. An armed uprising of Polish insurgents exiled to Siberia. Suppressed by government troops, but the condition of the Poles improved.

34. Ural-Turgai uprising of 1868–1869. Armed struggle of the Kazakhs against the "Temporary Regulation on the Administration of the Steppe Region," which put an end to the internal autonomy of the nomads. Suppressed by government troops.

35. Adai uprising of 1870–1871. A large-scale armed uprising of Kazakhs and Turkmens against Russian administrative and tax reforms. Suppressed by government troops, but the reforms were softened.

36. Uprising in Svaneti in 1875–1876. A series of armed disturbances in the villages of Free Svaneti against the registration of plowed land. Suppressed by government troops.

37. Chechen-Dagestani uprising of 1877. A large-scale armed uprising led by Alibek-Hadji Aldamov to restore the Imamate. Suppressed by government troops.

38. "Cholera riots" of 1892. Mass unrest among the townspeople of Tashkent and Yuzivka (*Donetsk*) because of government quarantine measures.

39. Andijan uprising of 1898. An armed religious uprising led by Muhammad Ali aimed to restore the Kokand Khanate and liberate Turkestan from St. Petersburg's rule. It ended in defeat in the very first battle with the Russian garrison of Andijan.



THE FIRST REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

1905-1907




	Main Territory of the Russian Empire in 1905
	Russian Associated States
	Vassals of the Russian Empire
	Armed Uprisings and Military Mutinies (1905–1907)




CHAPTER 43

RUSSIAN EXPANSION ON THE EVE OF AND DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

1905-1916



①	Main territory of the Russian Empire	⑧ – ⑩	Concession territories
② ③	States associated with Russia	⑪ – ⑬	Territories lost under the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905
④ – ⑥	Vassals of the Russian Empire	⑭	Temporary possession of Russia
⑦	Territory seized by Russia		Territories engulfed by the Central Asian uprising of 1916



	Boundaries of the Russian Empire's spheres of influence
	Front line at the end of 1914
	Front line at the end of 1916

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Kholm Governorate, removed from the Kingdom of Poland in 1912.
- ② The Grand Duchy of Finland.
- ③ The Kingdom of Poland.
- ④ The Khivan Khanate.
- ⑤ The Emirate of Bukhara.
- ⑥ Uriankhai Krai (*formally — a protectorate of the empire, in fact — part of Yenisei Governorate*).
- ⑦ The territory of Uriankhai Krai, incorporated directly into Russia in 1914.
- ⑧ Settlement in Hankou.
- ⑨ Right-of-way zone of the Manchurian Railway.
- ⑩ Settlement in Tianjin.
- ⑪ Kwantung Oblast.
- ⑫ Right-of-way zone of the South Manchurian Railway.
- ⑬ Southern Sakhalin.
- ⑭ Galician General-Governorship (1914–1915).
- Ⓐ Sphere of influence in Persia, formalized by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.
- Ⓑ Sphere of influence in China (*Outer Mongolia, the western part of Inner Mongolia, and Northern Manchuria*), formalized by the Russo-Japanese agreements of 1907, 1910, and 1912.



RUSSIAN EXPANSION ON THE EVE OF AND DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 1905-1916

The revolutionary events of 1905–1907 affected another problem that had remained unresolved since the mid-19th century — peasant land tenure.

In the Russian Empire, peasants' private land ownership was limited. As of 1905–1906, about **80%** of peasant allotments were held under communal tenure, while the rest were held under household tenure. Communal land use was widespread in Central Russia, whereas household tenure prevailed in the Baltic and western provinces, except in Mogilev.

Between 1861 and 1913, the empire's population doubled, and the number of landless peasants increased accordingly. The government viewed the existing land tenure system as a major cause of peasant unrest. According to the concept of Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, the destruction of the peasant commune and the formation of a stratum of small private landowners were supposed to contribute to social stabilization, reduce uprisings, and create a population loyal to the state.

An important component of Stolypin's agrarian reform was the resettlement policy. In 1906–1916, migrants from the central provinces of the European part of Russia moved beyond the Urals into Siberia, to Northern Kazakhstan, and to the Far East. The resettlement policy continued the empire's colonial course, since it envisaged the development not only of free lands, but also of territories used by the local nomadic population.

Over this decade, more than **2.5 million** peasants moved to Siberia, contributing to the economic development of about 30 million desyatinas of virgin land, while another **600,000** settled in Central Asia. At the same time, about **530,000** settlers returned due to harsh natural conditions and socio-economic hardship. The largest share of these so-called "returnees" fell in 1910–1911, when about **238,500** people returned to their previous places of residence.

Russian and Ukrainian peasants moved en masse to Northern Kazakhstan. Settlers were placed mainly in strategically important locations on long-developed lands; Russians were often supplied with firearms, which contributed to the demographic and political consolidation of imperial power on the peripheries. Only **6%** of Russian settlers owned more than **40%** of the region's agricultural land.

To justify the government's resettlement policy, data were needed on the so-called "**surplus**" lands in the Kazakh steppe. For this purpose, statistical and land-survey expeditions were conducted in 1904–1912. Relying on their materials, the government launched a large-scale seizure of land from the indigenous population in 1907–1912. At the same time, large landownership was growing.

The local administration warned of the risks of impoverishing the Kazakhs. It proposed addressing their situ-

ation first, but in 1907, the Ministry of Internal Affairs replied that the best lands could not be given to the nomads, since this would be "*offensive to the Russian peasant*." As a result, a significant part of the nomadic Kazakhs was pushed into the semi-desert and desert areas of Central and Southern Kazakhstan. At the same time, some were forced to migrate beyond their ethnic territory.

From 1898, the steppe dumas and inorodtsy administrations that had survived until then were abolished, and the indigenous inhabitants were forcibly grouped into volosts, no longer headed by tribal nobility but by peasant chiefs. From 1909, by Stolypin's order, the inorodtsy began to be mass-registered in the settled category, with corresponding taxes imposed on them. Only the Siberian Tatars and Bukharans managed to preserve their traditional way of life.

Stolypin's reform failed to finally resolve the problem of land scarcity in the European part of the empire.

On the eve of the First World War, the Russian Empire entered the system of European military-political alliances. In August 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet was signed, completing the formation of the Entente. Northern Iran came under the control of St. Petersburg. The convention with Japan that year delineated spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia.

At that time, Russia had mutual military obligations with France under the 1891 agreement and the 1892 military convention. As a result, relations with Germany deteriorated. Russian diplomacy failed to ensure stability in the Balkans during the wars of 1912–1913, leading to worsening relations with Austria-Hungary and to the effective transfer of the Ottoman army under German command at the end of 1913.

At the same time, the Russian Empire strengthened its control over Central Asian territories. In 1911, its military presence in Persia was increased, and in 1912, Mongolia effectively came under a Russian protectorate. In 1912–1913, the Tuvan nobility repeatedly appealed to the Russian Empire's government, requesting the establishment of a protectorate. In April 1914, Russia officially proclaimed a protectorate over the five khoshuns of Uriankhai Krai, incorporating it into the Yenisei Governorate. Actual administration was exercised by a Russian commissioner and a resettlement administration headquartered in Belotarsk, founded in 1914.

The reduction of the state's territory through the loss of Alaska and Northern Sakhalin was partly compensated by the conquest of Central Asia and other acquisitions. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, the total area of the Russian Empire reached **22.4 million km²**, of which Russia proper accounted for **21.5 million** (including the uninhabited northern islands). In comparison, the remainder consisted of Finland (367,000 km²), Poland (125), Khiva (62), Bukhara (206), and Uriankhai (163). This was the second and last peak of its territorial expansion.

After the Russian Empire entered the First World War in 1914, the main military operations unfolded on the Eastern Front. In the autumn of 1914, the Russian army suffered defeat in the East Prussian operation. Still, it achieved success in the Battle of Galicia, occupying

most of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, where the Galician General-Governorship was established. The Ottoman Empire's entry into the war after the shelling of Black Sea ports in the autumn of 1914 led to the opening of the Caucasus Front, where in 1914–1915, Russian troops defeated the Turkish army.

After the German and Austro-Hungarian breakthrough at Gorlice in 1915, the Russian army was forced to retreat from Poland and Galicia. As a result of the Russian offensive of 1916, known as the Brusilov breakthrough, the Austro-Hungarian troops were now defeated. On the Caucasus Front, by the summer of 1916, Russian troops had occupied a significant part of Western Armenia.

Despite individual military successes, the protracted war increasingly exhausted the empire's resources and deepened the internal crisis. A significant patriotic upsurge and mass loyalty to the monarchy accompanied the outbreak of the First World War. Still, even during the summer 1914 mobilization, protests were recorded in several provinces and brutally suppressed by the authorities. Subsequently, military defeats and enormous human losses undermined the initial consensus, leading to the radicalization of public sentiment.

In the summer of 1915, Nicholas II was forced to dismiss several key ministers, and the State Duma demanded the creation of a government responsible to parliament. The emperor's decision to assume command of the army as Supreme Commander-in-Chief led to his effective removal from civilian administration and to the growing influence of Empress Alexandra Fyodorovna and her favorite Grigory Rasputin. In 1916, administrative instability took the form of a *"ministerial leapfrog,"* which finally undermined the authority of the autocracy.

In 1914–1915, a surge of state-sponsored and everyday chauvinism was observed in major cities and on the front lines. The empire was home to more than **2 million** people of German origin, concentrated primarily in the Baltic, Volga, Southern Ukraine, and Western Siberia regions. Persons with German citizenship were automatically declared prisoners of war and were subject to arrest and exile under police supervision. German schools were closed. In 1914–1915, a wave of anti-German pogroms swept through, particularly in Moscow, accompanied by the destruction of property and businesses. Legislative acts of 1915 restricted landownership by subjects of enemy states, and in the summer of that year, the forced deportation of tens of thousands of German colonists from the southwestern provinces to the interior regions of the empire began. Crimean Turks suffered similar persecutions. On suspicion of disloyalty, hundreds of thousands of Jews were expelled from border regions.

Such tendencies also spread to the occupied territories of Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, where a general-governorship was established under Georgii Bobrinsky. The official course became the liquidation of Ukrainian national life, and the governor-general declared that he would *"introduce the Russian language, law, and order."* Censorship was introduced in the region. Books in Ukrainian and Russian published abroad were forbidden from being sold or issued in libraries, especially to Ukrain-

ian soldiers of the tsarist army.


In September 1914, the Prosvita society was closed, the publication of Ukrainian periodicals halted, and the bookstore of the Shevchenko Scientific Society liquidated. At the same time, the activities of the Ukrainian sports-patriotic organizations *"Sich"* were banned. In November 1914, free movement around the region was restricted. Ukrainian schools and publishing houses were also closed, the Ukrainian language was banned in the public sphere and even in private correspondence. The Greek Catholic clergy was subjected to repression, **30,000** Uniates were forcibly converted to Orthodoxy, and Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky was exiled to central Russia and imprisoned in an Orthodox monastery.

At the beginning of 1915, in Galicia, the Russian authorities opened 5 rural public schools and 33 church schools, as well as Russian-language courses for urban officials. Over the next 5 years, it was planned to create a network of about **9,000** schools, open **10** teacher seminaries and **2** teacher institutes, and build **25** male and **25** female gymnasiums each. At the same time, higher educational institutions were to be closed until the end of the war. The possibility of transferring Lviv University to Warsaw and Warsaw University to Lviv was considered, with the aim of facilitating the administrative and cultural integration of Eastern Galicia into the Russian Empire. Chernivtsi University was to be reorganized into a Russian-language institution of higher education. By contrast, Polish schools, which had been closed at the beginning of the occupation, soon resumed their activities.

At the same time, repressions against the Ukrainian intelligentsia were carried out: in 1914–1915, in Lviv and other cities, about two thousand public figures, priests, scholars, and teachers were arrested and deported to the interior provinces of Russia. Even his move to Kyiv did not save Mykhailo Hrushevsky from exile. The occupation authorities carried out an *"inventory"* of banks, museums, and cultural institutions that, in practice, amounted to systematic looting.

Another manifestation of the deep internal crisis was the Central Asian uprising in the summer of 1916. Its immediate cause was the decree mobilizing the Muslim population for rear labor. The uprising covered much of Turkestan and the Steppe Region. The combination of mobilization, land alienation in favor of settlers, and interethnic tensions caused it. The fighting was accompanied by mass violence against the civilian population — both Russian and non-Russian. By October, the uprising had been suppressed by regular troops using artillery and field courts-martial, which led to numerous casualties — more than **3,000** Russians were killed, and from **150** to **270,000** Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were killed in battle or died in the mountains while fleeing to China. The armed struggle of separate detachments continued until February 1917.


Taken together, the events of 1914–1916 testified to the profound decline of the imperial system of governance and to the autocracy's inability to adapt to the conditions of total war.



CHAPTER 44

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF THE THIRD RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1917-1922



① – ⑪

Territories of the former Russian Empire that entered the newly formed states in 1917–1921




Boundary of the territories under Soviet control in the autumn of 1918



Boundary of the territories under Soviet control in spring–summer (in the east and north) and autumn (in the south and west) of 1919



Territory of the former Russian Empire that entered the USSR in 1922–1923



Moscow — Capital of Soviet Russia (since 1918) and of the USSR



12 **13** RSFSR Territories under Foreign Occupation at the Formation of the USSR




Major Anti-Soviet Uprisings in the 1920s

Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Finland — independent since 6 December 1917, recognized by Russia within the borders of the Grand Duchy of Finland on 31 December 1917.
- ② Estonia — independent since 24 February 1918, border with Russia established by the Treaty of Tartu on 2 February 1920.
- ③ Latvia — independent since 18 November 1918, border with Russia established by the Treaty of Riga on 11 August 1920.
- ④ Lithuania — independent since 16 February 1918 — undefined borders with Russia under the Moscow Peace Treaty of 12 July 1920.
- ⑤ The Petsamo/Pechenga area, annexed to Finland under the Treaty of Tartu on 14 October 1920.
- ⑥ Poland — independent since 11 November 1918, border with Russia established by the Treaty of Riga on 18 March 1921.
- ⑦ Bessarabia — annexed by Romania on 26 November 1918 — was recognized by the Soviet government as part of Romania.
- ⑧ The Khorezm People's Soviet Republic — proclaimed on 26 April 1920, recognized by Russia within its existing borders on 13 September 1920 (*in fact, a Russian military-political protectorate*), from 30 October 1923 — the Khorezm Socialist Soviet Republic, liquidated on 27 October 1924.
- ⑨ The Bukharan (*People's*) Soviet Republic — proclaimed on 6 October 1920, recognized by Russia within its existing borders on 4 March 1921 (*in fact — a Russian military-political protectorate*), from 19 September 1924 — the Bukharan Socialist Soviet Republic, liquidated on 27 October 1924.
- ⑩ Kars Oblast — annexed to Turkey under the Moscow (16 March 1921) and Kars (13 October 1921) treaties.
- ⑪ Tannu-Tuva — independent since 14 August 1921, recognized by Russia within its existing borders on 22 July 1925.
- ⑫ Wrangel Island (*occupied until 20 August 1924*).
- ⑬ Northern Sakhalin (*occupied until 15 May 1925*).
- ⑭ Antonovshchina (*Tambov Rebellion*) (*Summer 1920 – Summer 1921*)
- ⑮ Makhnovshchina (*Makhnovist Movement*) (*Autumn 1920 – Summer 1921*)
- ⑯ Basmachi Movement (*Autumn 1920 – Autumn 1926*)

⑰ West Siberian Uprising (*Winter 1921 – Autumn 1922*)

⑱ Tungus Uprising (*Spring 1924 – Summer 1925*)



THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF THE THIRD RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1917-1922

At the beginning of 1917, the Russian Empire entered a period of systemic destabilization, driven by war, financial difficulties, and a broader governance crisis. Military expenditures caused prices to rise, with prices at the beginning of 1917 almost four times those in 1913. The mobilization of more than **14.9 million** people undermined agriculture, while supply disruptions caused a bread crisis in major cities, above all in the capital, Petrograd.

On 27 February (12 March) 1917, the Provisional Committee of the State Duma emerged, including the parliamentary factions of the so-called Progressive Bloc (*mostly liberal in orientation*), as well as the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, created on the initiative of socialist and social-democratic parties as a representative body not only of the capital, but of the entire Russian Empire. In the following months, a power struggle unfolded among these structures and the supporters of monarchist forces.

On 1 March 1917, the Petrograd Soviet issued "Order No. 1," which initiated the democratization of the army and undermined the traditional system of military command. On 2 March 1917, Emperor Nicholas II abdicated the throne. The next day, Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich refused to accept supreme power until the Constituent Assembly was convened. Georgy Lvov headed the Provisional Government, and after the July Crisis on 7 (20) July 1917, it was replaced by Alexander Kerensky. In August 1917, he was forced to rely on the support of the Petrograd Soviet to suppress the anti-government uprising of Supreme Commander-in-Chief Lavr Kornilov.

In April 1917, Vladimir Ulyanov (*Lenin*), leader of the left-wing Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks), returned to Russia from Switzerland. At the station itself, he proclaimed the slogan "All power to the soviets!" and began preparations for the armed seizure of power in the state.

At the same time, a process of national-political state-building was underway in the country's non-Russian regions. Thus, on 4 (17) March in Kyiv, the Ukrainian Central Rada (*UCR*) was established — first as a coordinating center, and later as a revolutionary proto-parliament. By the First Universal of the UCR on 10 (23) June, the de facto autonomy of Ukraine within Russia was proclaimed. Mykhailo Hrushevsky became head of the UCR, and Volodymyr Vynnychenko was appointed first head of the General Secretariat (*government*).

In March, the Temporary Crimean Muslim Executive Committee (*Musvykonkom*) arose in Simferopol — a national representative body of the Crimean Tatar people. In April, the Kuban Military Council was created in the Kuban. In May, the All-Russian Muslim Council (*Shuro-i-Islam*) was established in Moscow, proclaiming the territorial autonomy of Idel-Ural, inhabited by Tatars, Bashkirs,

Volga Germans, Chuvash, and other peoples. In July, the Great Belarusian Council and the Temporary Zemstvo Council of Estonia (*Maapäev*) emerged. In September, the Congress of the (*Subjugated*) Peoples of Russia took place in Kyiv, where representatives of 15 peoples agreed on a program for transforming the state into a democratic federation.

In the autumn of 1917, the Bolsheviks gained control of the key soviets of major industrial centers, the Baltic Fleet, and several military units. On 20 September (3 October) 1917, Leon Trotsky became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. On 25 October (7 November) 1917, detachments of Red Guards seized the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government was located. On 27 October (8 November) 1917, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK/Sovnarkom) headed by Lenin was formed. The new government emerged with the support of the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs), whom the Bolsheviks could not temporarily ignore because of their popularity.

The elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, held on 12 (25) November 1917, brought victory to the SRs. Still, the Bolsheviks received approximately a quarter of all votes (*and almost half of the military vote*). Representatives of national parties also won mandates, including the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party, the Kazakh Alash-Orda, the Azerbaijani Musavat, and the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun. The work of the Constituent Assembly under the chairmanship of SR Viktor Chernov lasted only one day. On 6 (19) January 1918, the assembly was dissolved by decision of the Bolsheviks (*"the guard is tired"*).

After seizing power in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks tried to establish control in the same way in the localities. In Moscow, the transfer of power to the Bolsheviks took place after fighting in October — November 1917. By the end of the year, the Bolsheviks had established themselves in the western provinces, the Volga region, the southern Urals, east of the Aral Sea, and west of Lake Baikal.

In the Urals and steppe regions, the ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks, Alexander Dutov, declared in October 1917 that he would not recognize Soviet power. After the capture of Orenburg by Red Guard detachments in January 1918, Dutov continued the struggle on the periphery and in April 1918 withdrew into the Turgai steppes (*northern Kazakhstan*).

After the Bolshevik coup, the Finnish parliament assumed full power in the country and on 6 December 1917 proclaimed the independent Kingdom of Finland, which the Bolsheviks were forced to recognize. The following year, Finland became a republic.

On 9 (20) November 1917, the UCR refused to recognize the SNK's authority and, by its Third Universal, proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic (*UPR*). On 4 (17) December 1917, Lenin issued an ultimatum to the UCR, which the Ukrainian authorities rejected. The Congress of Soviets of Peasants', Soldiers', and Workers' Deputies in Kyiv expressed support for the UCR. At the same time, the Bolshevik delegates, who were in the minority, moved to Kharkiv, where on 11–12 (24–25) December 1917 they proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets (*UPRS*).

On 20 November (3 December) 1917, Sovnarkom concluded an armistice with the Central Powers, and on 9 (22) December negotiations began in Brest, in which the UPR delegation also participated.

On 6 (19) December 1917, the Bolsheviks began military action against the UPR. In December 1917 – January 1918, Soviet troops captured Kharkiv, Luhansk, Katerynoslav, and Odesa. On 26 January (8 February) 1918, troops under the command of Mikhail Muravyov captured Kyiv and carried out repressions against the local population. By mid-February, the UPR retained control only over a narrow strip of Polissia west of Zhytomyr.

In Kazakhstan, the local Alash party proclaimed the formation of Alash autonomy at the Second All-Kazakh Congress in Orenburg in December 1917. Neither the Bolsheviks nor representatives of the White Guard movement supported the idea of creating a new state.

In Turkestan, local Muslim political forces proclaimed autonomy within a federative Russia in November 1917. The Bolsheviks issued an ultimatum to the new government, and after it refused to comply, they sent in troops. Turkestan autonomy lasted until February 1918.

In November 1917, a coalition government of the South Caucasus was created — the Transcaucasian Commissariat, which included representatives of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani political forces elected to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. At the beginning of 1918, they convened the Transcaucasian Sejm.

In December 1917, the Crimean Tatar Kurultai (*national parliament*) declared its intention to establish the Crimean People's Republic and formed a national government — the Directorate, headed by Noman Çelebicihan. Sovnarkom did not recognize this formation. By the end of January 1918, Bolshevik sailors of the Black Sea Fleet had seized the peninsula and launched mass repressions against the Crimean Tatar population.

On the Don, General Aleksei Kaledin refused to recognize the SNK's authority and dispersed the local soviets. In December 1917, the Volunteer Army was formed in Novocherkassk and, after some time, was led by Kornilov. The territory of the Don Host became the center for the formation of anti-Bolshevik forces of the White movement. At the beginning of January 1918, the Cossacks stopped the Bolshevik advance, but soon lost the initiative and control over the region. In February, due to a lack of support, the Volunteer Army was forced to leave Rostov.

On 16 February 1918, the independent Kuban People's Republic was proclaimed, which was to join the UPR on a federal basis. The Bolsheviks occupied Yekaterinodar in March. Soon, the forces of the Volunteer Army and the troops of the Kuban Krai united. In April, they attempted to storm Yekaterinodar, during which General Kornilov was killed; afterward, the Volunteer Army retreated to the Don. In the summer of 1918, the army under Anton Denikin recaptured Yekaterinodar.

To avoid the overt imperialism of the previous regime, the Bolsheviks adopted the tactic of creating quasi-state formations in occupied territories. Thus, until April 1918, the UPRS existed as an alternative to the UPR. This allowed the Bolsheviks to interpret Muravyov's advance on Kyiv as an internal Ukrainian conflict. At the same time,

Moscow supported the creation of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Republic (DKR), proclaimed on 30 January (12 February) 1918 in Kharkiv, formally independent of both the UPR and Soviet Russia. The republic lasted until March 1918, and it claimed the industrial regions of Donbas and Kryvorizhzhia.

In southern Ukraine, on 7 (20) February 1918, the Odesa Soviet Republic (OSR) was proclaimed and existed until March 1918, controlling Odesa and the adjacent territories of the Kherson and Bessarabian provinces. The leadership of the republic sought to join it to the RSFSR, but by February, Muravyov had already limited their power. On 19–21 March, the Taurida Soviet Socialist Republic (TSSR), covering the territory of Crimea, was proclaimed.

In March 1918, the DKR, OSR, and TSSR were recognized as constituent parts of the formally independent Ukrainian Federative Soviet Republic — a buffer country on the borders of Soviet Russia. Also in March, the Volga-Ural Republic (*Idel-Ural Republic*) was established within the Soviet Union.

On 9 (22) January 1918, by the Fourth Universal, Ukraine proclaimed its independence. On 27 January (9 February) 1918, the Treaty of Brest was signed, allowing the UPR to leave the First World War. In mid-February, an alliance was formed among Kyiv, Berlin, and Vienna.

With the help of German and Austrian allies, the UPR regained control over its own territory, while Germany occupied a number of other lands. On 3 March 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, by which Russia recognized the loss of about 1 million km² of its former western and southern provinces, undertook to demobilize its army and navy, and agreed to pay an indemnity. On territories occupied by Germany, new states emerged: Lithuania and Estonia.

In the South Caucasus, the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic emerged in April 1918 and on 8 June 1918 broke up into Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In the region, the Bolsheviks used the tactic that had been tested in Ukraine. In April 1918, they created the so-called Baku Commune. In its activities, like the UPRS, it relied on military support from the RSFSR in confrontation with the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, Turkish troops, and British forces. After troops of the Ottoman Empire and Azerbaijani national forces entered Baku in September 1918, Soviet power there was liquidated.

The Bolsheviks carried out similar political experiments in other regions of the former Russian Empire in attempts to consolidate their power. In particular, from January — May 1918 there existed the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic; from March — May 1918 — the Don Soviet Republic; from April — September 1918 — the Amur Socialist Soviet Republic; from May — July 1918 — the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic; from July — December 1918 — the North Caucasian Soviet Republic; from November 1918 — January 1919 — the Estland Labour Commune; from April — June 1919 — the Crimean Soviet Republic, and others. They served as instruments for legitimizing communist power and masking military expansion under the guise of internal socio-political processes and the “self-determination of peoples.”

On 29 April 1918, a coup took place in Kyiv with Ger-

man support, after which Hetman of the Ukrainian State Pavlo Skoropadskyi came to power. In December, an uprising led by Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura destroyed the Hetmanate regime and restored the UPR.

From 1 November 1918 until the summer of 1919, a war continued between the newly created Western Ukrainian People's Republic (WUPR) and Polish forces, in which the Poles won, completely subordinating Galicia and Volhynia. On 22 January 1919, the UPR and WUPR united to form a single state, but by the end of the year, the union had fallen apart.

In the summer of 1918, the key catalyst of the anti-Bolshevik front was the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps, which liquidated Soviet bodies in the Volga region, the Urals, and Siberia. On 8 June, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly (*Komuch*) was created in Samara. On 4 July, the Declaration on the State Independence of Siberia was proclaimed in Omsk. On 23 September, the Provisional Siberian Government, together with Komuch, formed the Ufa Directory. On 18 November, following a coup in Omsk, Admiral Alexander Kolchak came to power and was proclaimed the Supreme Ruler of Russia.

On 28 November 1918, in Kursk, the Bolsheviks established the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraine, under whose auspices they launched an offensive against the UPR. On 3 January 1919, the Red Army occupied Kharkiv, where on 6 January 1919, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) was created. Formally, the USSR was proclaimed an independent state at the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Kharkiv, where the republic's first Constitution was adopted and finally approved on 14 March 1919. In 1919–1920, a series of military, political, and economic agreements was concluded between the USSR and Soviet Russia, providing for joint command of the armed forces and the centralization of the economy and financial system.

In 1919, Bolshevik troops launched a large-scale offensive, occupying a significant part of the Don, while simultaneously establishing control over southern and eastern Ukraine. Part of the Ukrainian forces sided with the Red Army, but in May — June, the Hryhoriiv uprising broke out in the Bolshevik rear, contributing to the White advance from the Don.

On 8 January 1919, the Volunteer Army united with other anti-Bolshevik forces to form the Armed Forces of South Russia under the command of General Denikin. The advance of the Red Army and the disintegration of the Don Army led to the establishment of Soviet power on the Don. In March, the anti-Bolshevik Upper Don uprising broke out, and on 8 June, units of the Don Army broke through to the insurgents. In the summer, Denikin's armies were at the peak of their strength, having captured Donbas and Odesa and reached the Volga.

On 30 August 1919, the combined forces of the UPR and WUPR liberated Kyiv from the Bolsheviks, but the next day, they were forced to surrender it to Denikin's forces. The Ukrainian-White Guard war exhausted both sides — at the end of the year, the UPR army was forced to switch to partisan warfare (*"The First Winter Campaign"*), while Denikin's advance on Moscow failed.

At the same time, in 1919, French troops temporarily

occupied Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Kherson, while British forces controlled the Caucasus, the Don, and the Kuban, supporting the White armies. However, at the end of that same year, the Entente states refused to provide further support for the White movement, focusing instead on creating a *"sanitary cordon"* around Bolshevik Russia.

On 25 April 1920, the Polish army, with the support of Ukrainian allies, opened full-scale military operations against the Bolsheviks and on 6 May captured Kyiv. On 14 May, the Soviet counteroffensive began. Polish-Ukrainian troops were forced to retreat, but managed to stop the Bolsheviks near Lviv and Warsaw. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Riga on 18 March 1921, according to which Ukrainian and Belarusian ethnic lands were divided between Poland and Soviet Russia.

The remnants of the White troops under the command of Pyotr Wrangel concentrated in Crimea in January 1920. In November, the Bolsheviks and their Makhnovist allies broke through the peninsula's defenses. Over the course of three days, about **150,000** White Guards were evacuated from the ports of Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia, and Kerch.

In the Caucasus, the Azerbaijan SSR was proclaimed in April 1920, the Armenian SSR in November 1920, and in 1921, Soviet power was established in Georgia in 1921. In all cases, Soviet Russia invaded the territories of independent republics, ignoring prior agreements with them. In February 1921, the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship was concluded, and in March, a treaty between the RSFSR and Turkey was concluded, securing international recognition of the Soviet republics.

In April 1920, in Central Asia, the troops of the Turkestan Front defeated the White Guards in Semirechye, and in September, Soviet power was established in Bukhara.

On the Pacific coast, the Bolsheviks created the buffer state of the Far Eastern Republic in 1920. Japanese troops maintained a presence in the region until October 1922. The last regions of Russia liberated from foreign occupation were Wrangel Island (20 August 1924) and Northern Sakhalin (15 May 1925).

After the end of the main military operations, resistance to Bolshevik rule continued in the form of peasant, national, and regional uprisings, including the Tambov uprising (1920–1921), the anti-Soviet Basmachi movement in Central Asia (until the mid-1930s), and a number of uprisings in the Caucasus and Siberia.

The Bolsheviks failed to retain control over all the territories of the former Romanov Empire. Finland, Poland, and the Baltic provinces formed their own national states. At the same time, the Bolsheviks established control over Ukraine, Belarus, Crimea, the Caucasus, the Kuban, and several other regions by force. The total area of the USSR at the moment of its emergence was **21.4 million km²**.

The outcomes of national liberation efforts in each region were influenced by many factors, including traditions of statehood, experience of autonomous administration under the tsars, the presence of a political elite, the share of the ethnic Russian population, urbanization, education, and, ultimately, geopolitical position.

For example, before 1917, Finland had the status of a grand duchy with autonomy and its own parliament

(the *Eduskunta* since 1907). Administration was carried out through the governor-general and the Senate. In the Baltic provinces (*Estland, Livland, Courland*), elements of autonomy remained, including landtags and traditional urban rights. At the same time, the territories of modern Lithuania (*Kaunas, Vilna, and Suwałki provinces*) had no autonomous status. In 1840, the Lithuanian Statutes were abolished, and an empire-wide law was introduced. The Polish lands within the empire had the status of the Kingdom of Poland — an autonomous constitutional monarchy within the Russian Empire.

The Ukrainian territories within the Russian Empire were integrated into nine Little Russian and Novorossiyan governorates, grouped into three governor-generalships without autonomous rights. In the Volga region, the governorates likewise had no autonomy. Crimea, as part of the Taurida Governorate, also had no autonomous status. Still, it was distinguished by specific administrative centers — the Sevastopol city governorate (from 16 June 1873) and the Kerch-Yenikale city governorate (from 1821), which were directly subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In Transcaucasia, imperial authority operated through a special administrative system — the Caucasian Viceroyalty, which encompassed six governorates, five oblasts, and two separate districts.

In Finland, the political infrastructure included the Social Democratic Party of Finland, the Old Finn Party, the Young Finn Party, the Agrarian Union, and the Swedish People's Party (*which represented about 6% of the Swedish minority*). The legal system retained its autonomy and was grounded in traditional norms of Swedish law. In the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish Socialist Party and the National Democratic camp were active. In the Baltic governorates, the political spectrum was primarily represented by social-democratic parties, whereas national parties, in some cases, did not enjoy broad support.

In the governorates of Ukraine, party life after 1908 was largely forced underground. In the elections to the First and Second State Dumas, representatives of Ukrainian parties accounted for no more than **40%** of the deputies from the nine governorates. In the Caucasus, political structures included the RSDLP (*Mensheviks*) and national parties, such as Dashnaktsutyun and the Azerbaijani party Musavat.

The share of the Great Russian population across the Russian Empire's regions at the end of the 19th century was uneven. It was lowest in the Grand Duchy of Finland (*about 0.3%*), the Kingdom of Poland (*2.8%*), and the Baltic governorates (*4.5%*), where local ethnic communities predominated. In Central Asia, the share of Russians was approximately **5.3%**, reflecting the empire's administrative and military presence. In Ukraine, their share reached about **12%**; in the Caucasus, **17.5%**; while in Crimea, it rose to **33.1%** as a result of the active colonization policy following the annexation of the peninsula. The highest share of Great Russians was in the Volga region — about **63.6%**, where they constituted the principal ethnic component of the population.

According to the 1897 census of the Russian Empire, most of its regions at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century retained a distinctly agrarian character.


Overall, **16.5 million** people lived in cities, amounting to about **13%** of the empire's population, whereas the overwhelming majority of inhabitants lived in the countryside. Against this background, Crimea (*21% urban population*) and Ukraine (*20%*) stood out for their relatively higher level of urbanization. In the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Kingdom of Poland, the share of urban residents was **16%** in each case (*with Warsaw being among the three largest cities of the empire*), in the Baltic governorates — **15%**, and in the Caucasus — **16.5%**. The lowest urbanization rates were observed in the Volga region, where only **7.8%** of the population lived in cities.

Characteristically, the majority of the empire's urban population consisted precisely of Russians, with three exceptions. In Finland, Swedes predominated in the cities; in the Baltics, Germans; in Poland, Poles.

The literacy level of the population in the regions of the Russian Empire remained generally low and varied significantly across territories. On average, **78.9%** of the population of the European part of the empire remained illiterate. The highest literacy rates were observed in the Grand Duchy of Finland (*about 75%*) and the Baltic governorates (*about 70%*), both of which were attributable to the influence of Protestant educational traditions. In the Kingdom of Poland, the literacy rate was about **40%**; in the Volga region, **25%**; in Ukraine, about **20%**; in the Caucasus, **17%**; and in Crimea, **16.3%**. It should be added that in most cases, literacy meant proficiency in Russian, and only in Finland and the Baltic governorates was the Russification of schooling still far from complete.

In the final analysis, those regions of the former Russian Empire that preserved their independence were those with a long tradition of state-building and self-government, higher rates of urbanization and literacy, and a lower share of the Great Russian population, especially in the cities. As a result, they developed in sufficient numbers a national bourgeoisie, a national intelligentsia, and a national bureaucracy — the pillars of the new states. At the same time, the region's borderland location and the presence of external allies played equally important roles.

Yet even the disappearance of some national states from the map did not mean the complete defeat of the corresponding national-revolutionary movements. Thus, the fierce resistance of the Ukrainians forced the Bolsheviks to create a number of formally independent quasi-state formations for them. The strongest movements secured for their nations the status of republican subjects within the Soviet "*federation*," while smaller peoples had to content themselves with autonomous status.




CHAPTER 45

THE USSR IN THE ERA OF KORENIZATSIYA

1921-1929





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The main territory of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.
- ② The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic at the beginning of 1920.
- ③ Territories of the former Don Host Oblast (*Western Donbas and Stanytsia Luhanska*), annexed to the Ukrainian SSR respectively in March — April and August 1920 (*minor border changes in 1923–1924 are not shown*).
- ④ Territory of the former Don Host Oblast (Eastern Donbas), annexed to the Ukrainian SSR in March — April 1920 and transferred to the RSFSR in October 1924 (*final delimitation — October 1925*).
- ⑤ Territories annexed to the Ukrainian SSR in exchange for Eastern Donbas in October 1925.
- ⑥ The Belarusian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1920–1923.
- ⑦ Territories annexed to the BSSR in 1924.
- ⑧ Territories annexed to the BSSR in 1926.*
- ⑨ The Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in 1922–1936.
- ⑩ The Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic from 1921.
- ⑪ The Armenian SSR from 1920.
- ⑫ The Azerbaijani SSR from 1920.
- ⑬ The Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1924–1940) within the Ukrainian SSR.
- ⑭ The Socialist Soviet Republic of Abkhazia (1921–1931), in a federal union with the Georgian SSR.
- ⑮ The Adjarian ASSR (1921–1990) within the Georgian SSR.
- ⑯ The Nakhichevan Socialist Soviet Republic (1920–1923), the Nakhichevan ASSR (1923/24 – 1990) within the Azerbaijani SSR
- ⑰ Territory of the Turkestan ASSR within the RSFSR (1918–1924), which became part of the Turkmen SSR.
- ⑱ The Turkmen SSR in 1924–1936, formally part of the USSR from 1925.
- ⑲ The Uzbek SSR in 1924–1929, formally part of the USSR from 1925.
- ⑳ The Tajik ASSR (1924–1929) within the Uzbek SSR.
- ㉑ The Kirghiz (1920–1925) / Kazakh (1925–1936) ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉒ Territory of the Turkestan ASSR, annexed to the Kirghiz/Kazakh ASSR in 1924.
- ㉓ Parts of the territory of the Turkestan ASSR and Khorezm, annexed to the Kirghiz/Kazakh ASSR in 1925 and transferred directly to the RSFSR in 1930.
- ㉔ The Kirghiz ASSR (1926–1936) within the RSFSR.
- ㉕ The Karelian ASSR (1923–1940) within the RSFSR.
- ㉖ The Crimean ASSR (1921–1945) within the RSFSR.
- ㉗ The Mountain ASSR (1921–1926) within the RSFSR.
- ㉘ The Dagestani ASSR (1921–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉙ The Autonomous SSR of the Volga Germans (1923–1941) within the RSFSR.
- ㉚ The Chuvash ASSR (1925–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉛ The Tatar ASSR (1920–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉜ The Autonomous Bashkir Soviet Republic (1919–1922), the Bashkir ASSR (1922–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉝ Bashkir territories, transferred to the RSFSR and the Kirghiz/Kazakh ASSR in 1922–1924, as well as certain districts of Kazakhstan annexed by Bashkiria in 1924.
- ㉞ Territories of the Kirghiz/Kazakh ASSR (*“the Orenburg corridor”*), transferred to the RSFSR in 1925 (*additional territorial transfers took place in 1927 and 1934*).
- ㉟ The Buryat-Mongol (1923–1958) / Buryat ASSR (1958–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㊱ The Yakut ASSR (1922–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㊲ The Tuvan People's Republic (1921–1944), a satellite of the USSR (*the southern border, disputed with Mongolia, is shown as of 1936*).
- ㊳ The Mongolian People's Republic (1925–1992), a satellite of the USSR until 1990.

THE USSR IN THE ERA OF KORENIZATSIYA 1921-1929

The 1920s in the USSR were a period of transition from the policy of “war communism” to the New Economic Policy (NEP), of active debates over how to resolve the national question, of the introduction of the policy of korenizatsiya, and of a short-lived cultural flourishing in the Soviet republics.

The policy of so-called “war communism,” launched in 1917, was an attempt to implement utopian communist ideals in the economy and social life. Still, for the Bolsheviks, it turned into a socio-economic catastrophe. As early as 1919, the Bolsheviks encountered discontent among their own supporters: peasants were dissatisfied with prodrazvyorstka and resisted the party’s agrarian policy. In March 1921, the revolution’s stronghold — the sailors of Kronstadt — rose in rebellion.

This state of affairs led to calls among members of the RCP(b) to abandon the policy of war communism. On 21 March 1921, prodrazvyorstka was replaced by a food tax, half its size, and the New Economic Policy was proclaimed. The NEP provided for the limited legalization of the private sector, the development of state and cooperative trade, the partial denationalization of small enterprises, and the introduction of elements of market pricing between town and countryside. The state, while preserving its monopoly over heavy industry and foreign trade, controlled the bulk of commodity circulation. The NEP was a temporary forced measure imposed by the Bolshevik authorities to restore the economy, reduce social tensions, and create a resource base for further expansion.

At the same time, the Bolsheviks sought to regulate relations with the Soviet republics. In 1919–1921, the Ukrainian SSR, the Transcaucasian SFSR, and the Belarusian SSR were formally independent but, in fact, satellites of Russia. Their relations with Moscow were regulated by bilateral agreements on military and economic union between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR (28 December 1920), the BSSR (16 January 1921), the Azerbaijani SSR (30 September 1920), and the Georgian SSR (21 May 1921), which provided for the military and economic unification of the Soviet republics. According to these agreements, the government of the RSFSR de jure concentrated in its hands the leadership of the armed forces, foreign trade, transport, and communications — that is, those spheres which the Kremlin had in fact controlled from the moment Soviet rule was established.

In March 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), the People’s Commissar for Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, presented the project of the “autonomization” of the Soviet republics, which envisaged transforming Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan into autonomous parts of the RSFSR. Stalin’s proposal met with sharp rejection among the republics, especially Ukraine and Georgia, which saw in it a threat of the restoration of Russian imperialism. At the congress, Stalin’s main opponent was

Volodymyr Zatonsky, who urged that the Soviet federation should not be identified with Russian state-building projects.

In 1922, Stalin, as a member of the Orgburo, which considered the question of relations among the Soviet republics, proposed a draft decision of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) “*On the Relations of the RSFSR with the Independent Republics*.” It proposed incorporating the republics into Russia as autonomies and liquidating their statehood. The Orgburo members supported the document.

However, Vladimir Lenin, who did not take part in the discussion of Stalin’s project, opposed its approval. In a note to the members of the Politburo of the RCP(b), he proposed an alternative concept — the creation of a federal superstructure over the Soviet republics without ethnic domination. They were to unite in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) based on equality and voluntariness. Lenin’s model envisaged preserving the limited national statehood of the republics without singling out Russia for a special role. On 6 October 1922, the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) supported Lenin’s concept, which became the basis for the formation of the USSR. On 30 December 1922, it was secured by the draft Treaty on the Creation of the USSR, which entered into force on 6 July 1923. Representatives of the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the BSSR, and the TSFSR signed it.

Under the 1924 Constitution, the USSR was a rigidly centralized federation. The formation of the Union secured the RSFSR’s dominant status. Its governmental and party institutions merged with all-Union structures, making the RSFSR a new form of the Russian Empire, a Soviet federation. Russia retained dominance within the system of Union organs, as the USSR’s central institutions and the party apparatus were predominantly Russian and located on its territory.

The 1924 Constitution enshrined the principles of equality among nations and the republics’ right to leave the Union, but these principles were declaratory in nature. Lenin viewed them as a formal concession on the national question, intended to calm the non-Russian peoples. Stalin agreed with this as well and did not resume promoting his project even after concentrating power in his own hands.

In the process of national-territorial delimitation in the 1920s, the Soviet leadership officially proclaimed the creation of union and autonomous republics on an ethnic principle. Still, the actual formation of borders had a distinctly political character. Moscow sought centralized control, leading to numerous cases of artificial boundary redrawing. Ukrainian ethnic territories were transferred to the RSFSR. Following the creation of the Kazakh ASSR (1925), the so-called “Orenburg corridor” was formed around its capital, Orenburg, separating Kazakhstan from the Russian steppe. In Transcaucasia, the Kremlin, guided by political considerations, left Nagorno-Karabakh, populated by Armenians, within Azerbaijan, and declared Nakhichevan an autonomous territory.

In Central Asia and the Volga region, delimitation was accompanied by numerous conflicts. The Uzbek SSR controlled the historic Tajik centers — Samarkand

and Bukhara — while the Tajik Autonomous Oblast initially formed part of it and was not transformed into a union republic until 1929. A number of national regions, such as Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Chechnya, and Karakalpakstan, were denied the status of union republics — they remained within the RSFSR as autonomous republics. In the North Caucasus and Siberia, units of the RSFSR with artificially mixed ethnic compositions were created — in particular, the Karachay-Cherkess, Chechen-Ingush, and Buryat-Mongol units.

The expansion of the USSR through the annexation of Khorezm, Bukhara, and islands in the Northern Ocean increased its territory to **21.6 million km²**.

In April 1923, the Twelfth Congress of the RCP(b) approved the policy of korenizatsiya as the official party line on the national question (*certain elements of Ukrainization were recorded as early as 1919*). It envisaged the inclusion of representatives of titular nations in the organs of power, education, the party and state apparatus, as well as the establishment of local languages in administration, schools, and the press. The declared aim was the development of cultures that were “*national in form, socialist in content*.” For 72 languages, Latin-based writing systems were introduced, and for 48 of them, writing systems were created for the first time. In 1927, **90%** of Belarusian, **94%** of Kirghiz, and **96%** of Tatar schoolchildren studied in their native language. In 1933, **37%** of all newspapers in the USSR were published in non-Russian languages.

Korenizatsiya contributed to the growth of the proportion of representatives of indigenous peoples in party structures: in particular, in Ukraine, the share of Ukrainians in the composition of the CP(b)U rose from **23%** in 1922 to **52%** in 1927, while in the republics of Central Asia, the share of local cadres in the state apparatus doubled.

Ukrainization proved the most successful among the other korenizatsiya campaigns — administration and education were almost completely switched to Ukrainian, and Ukrainian-speaking urban strata and industrial proletarian groups were formed. Whereas in 1923 only **19%** of schools and higher educational institutions of the Ukrainian SSR provided instruction in Ukrainian, by 1929 this figure had risen to **69%**. In 1933, **80%** of primary schools were Ukrainian-language (*98% of ethnic Ukrainians studied in their native language*). The publication of books in Ukrainian in 1925–1927 alone grew from **40%** to **54%**, and the publication of newspapers — from **40%** to **60%**. The changes also affected higher education — the share of Ukrainian-language lectures rose from **33%** in 1927 to **58%** in 1929. The successes of Belarusization were much more modest (*in 1927, in the BSSR, 4 newspapers were published in Russian and 3 in Belarusian, with one each in Polish and Yiddish*), and the results among smaller ethnic groups were even worse.


The temporary retreat of the Bolsheviks from rigid ideological directives during the years of the NEP encouraged the emergence in the 1920s of a short-lived period of cultural “*pluralism*.” At that time, various artistic trends and creative associations coexisted, although, from 1922, artists’ activities were already under the control of Glavlit, the censorship body overseeing print. In 1925, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers was founded, be-


coming the leading ideological center in Soviet literature. In Ukraine, analogous processes were manifested in the activities of the literary groupings “*Pluh*,” “*Hart*,” VAPLITE, and others, which combined creative experimentation with attempts to preserve national cultural identity within the Soviet system. In the art of this period, the principle of socialist realism became established. At the same time, the activity of independent groups — such as Proletkult or the Associations of Revolutionary Art — was subordinated to the idea of the “*total transformation of society*.”

In the Ukrainian SSR, the NEP period coincided with a cultural flourishing. One of the new centers of cultural life became Kharkiv, the then-capital, where writers, artists, and theater figures gathered (*at the “Slovo” House*). At that time, expressionism and neo-romanticism developed particularly dynamically in literature, as evidenced in the works of Mykola Khvylovy, Yurii Yanovsky, Mykola Kulish, Les Kurbas, and other representatives of Ukrainian modernism. Despite the unprecedented rise of Ukrainian culture, artistic life remained under close authorities’ supervision, and by the end of the 1920s, most associations had been dissolved. In the 1930s, some participants of the Ukrainian SSR’s “*Red Renaissance*” were repressed.

The American historian Terry Martin, analyzing the policy of korenizatsiya, defined the Soviet Union as “*the world’s first empire of affirmative action*.” He interpreted the policy of korenizatsiya of the 1920s as a Soviet variant of “*positive discrimination*,” aimed at granting representatives of national, ethnic, and linguistic minorities privileges in comparison with the titular Russian majority.

But in practice, korenizatsiya in the USSR was accompanied by mass purges in the party-state apparatus and in scholarly and cultural institutions, during which thousands of figures in national cultural movements were accused of “*counterrevolutionary activity*” or “*nationalist deviations*.” And from the beginning of the 1930s, national policy increasingly took on the character of undisguised Russification, accompanied by the strengthening of the dominant role of the Russian language and culture as the unifying foundation of Soviet society.







CHAPTER 46

SOVIET COLONIALISM

FROM COLLECTIVIZATION TO THE GREAT TERROR


1929-1939





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The main territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
- ② The Belarusian SSR.
- ③ The Ukrainian SSR.
- ④ The Moldovan ASSR within the Ukrainian SSR.
- ⑤ The Georgian SSR.
- ⑥ The Abkhaz ASSR within the Georgian SSR.
- ⑦ The Adjarian ASSR within the Georgian SSR.
- ⑧ The Armenian SSR.
- ⑨ The Azerbaijani SSR.
- ⑩ The Nakhichevan ASSR within the Azerbaijani SSR.
- ⑪ The Kazakh SSR (from 1936).
- ⑫ Territories disputed between the Kirghiz/Kazakh ASSR and the RSFSR since 1920, mostly annexed to Russia in 1929–1930, final delimitation in 1934.
- ⑬ The Uzbek SSR.
- ⑭ The Kara-Kalpak ASSR (1932–1936) within the RSFSR, the Karakalpak ASSR (1936–1990) within the Uzbek SSR.
- ⑮ The Turkmen SSR.
- ⑯ The Tajik SSR (from 1929).
- ⑰ The Kirghiz SSR (from 1936).
- ⑱ The Karelian ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ⑲ The Komi ASSR (1936–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ⑳ The Mari ASSR (1936–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉑ The Chuvash ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉒ The Mordovian ASSR (1934–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉓ The Udmurt ASSR (1934–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉔ The Tatar ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉕ The Bashkir ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉖ The Autonomous SSR of the Volga Germans within the RSFSR.
- ㉗ The Kalmyk ASSR (1935–1943) within the RSFSR.
- ㉘ The Crimean ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉙ The Kabardino-Balkar ASSR (1936–1944) within the RSFSR.
- ㉚ The North Ossetian ASSR (1936–1990) within the RSFSR.
- ㉛ The Chechen-Ingush ASSR (1936–1944/1946) within the RSFSR.
- ㉜ The Dagestani ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉝ The Yakut ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉞ The Buryat-Mongol / Buryat ASSR within the RSFSR.
- ㉟ The Tuvan People's Republic.
- ㊱ The Mongolian People's Republic.
- ㊲ Xinjiang — formally a Chinese province, in fact a semi-independent region; in 1934–1942 — a Soviet satellite.



SOVIET COLONIALISM FROM COLLECTIVIZATION TO THE GREAT TERROR 1929-1939

Characteristic features of the USSR's domestic policy during this period were violent collectivization, the dekulakization of the peasantry, artificial famines, the Holodomor, and mass repressions, combined with policies of forced resettlement and Russification.

The decision to begin collectivization in the USSR was adopted at the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*) in December 1927. Later, plans for accelerated collectivization were approved, envisaging the incorporation of up to **20%** of agricultural land into collective farms by 1933. From October 1929 to January 1930, the share of forcibly collectivized peasant households grew from **4%** to **21%**. In March 1930, more than half of the USSR's peasantry had been incorporated into collective farms. In March 1930, the Ukrainian SSR had **23,594** collective farms, covering **64.4%** of peasant households and **70.9%** of sown areas. By the beginning of January 1932, these figures had risen to **80%** and **86.6%** respectively.

Another dimension of the collectivization policy was the struggle against prosperous peasants — the so-called "*kulaks*." Officially, it was formalized by the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*) of 30 January 1930, "*On measures for the liquidation of kulak farms in areas of complete collectivization*." Overall, between 1928 and 1931, the number of peasant households declined by **352,000**. As of 1 January 1933, **1.1 million** people (*including women and children*) were being held in special settlements designated for "*kulak elements*."

Repressive measures on a smaller scale were applied in Transcaucasia, where in 1930–1931 only **870** kulak families were deported, whereas in the North Caucasus this figure reached **38,000** families.

Collectivization measures caused significantly greater damage to the national borderlands than to the Russian center of the USSR, where the tradition of communal landholding was strong. The authorities' actions provoked a reaction — mass emigration among Central Asian nomads and armed struggle in sedentary regions.

In 1930, **13,453** mass peasant disturbances were recorded in the USSR, of which **176** were organized uprisings, and **55** escalated into open armed clashes. The total number of participants in these events was about 2.5 million. In the Ukrainian SSR, **4,098** such disturbances were recorded; in the Volga region — **1,780**; in the North Caucasus — **1,467**; in the Central Black Earth Region — **1,373**; in Moscow Oblast — **676**; and in Siberia — **565**.

The largest armed uprising of Ukrainian peasants against the policy of collectivization was the Pavlohrad uprising, which took place on 5–6 April 1930 and covered the Pavlohrad, Petropavlivka, and Blyzniuky districts of Dnipropetrovsk region. The uprising was quickly sup-

pressed by the forces of the GPU and the militia with the help of hostage-taking. Twenty-seven insurgents were sentenced to death, and hundreds were imprisoned.

Economic losses and rising social tensions forced the Soviet leadership to temporarily slow the collectivization campaign. On 2 March 1930, Joseph Stalin published the article "*Dizzy with Success*," in which he shifted responsibility for the "*excesses*" of collectivization onto local authorities. After that, peasants began leaving collective farms en masse: whereas in March 1930 about **58%** of peasant households had been drawn into them, in June their share had fallen to approximately **24%**. In the autumn of 1930, the policy of collectivization was resumed with somewhat less intensity, while repression remained in place.

The intensification of grain procurement plans began in the autumn of 1932. To carry them out, emergency commissions were created on 22 October, and their activity covered the main grain-producing regions of the Union: in Ukraine, it was headed by Vyacheslav Molotov, in the North Caucasus by Lazar Kaganovich, and in the Volga region by Pavel Postyshev (in January 1933, appointed second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*) of Ukraine). Grain procurement policy was accompanied by mass repression, especially in the Ukrainian SSR. A form of collective punishment was the placement of villages and districts on "*blacklists*" for failure to fulfill plans, which led to a military blockade and the complete cessation of food supplies.

Such measures led to a catastrophic reduction in food reserves. The share of grain confiscated from peasants rose sharply: from **34%** in 1930 to **54%** in 1932, causing bread consumption to fall below the threshold of physical survival. On 7 August 1932, the so-called "*law of five ears of grain*" was adopted, criminalizing the gathering of harvest remnants; a system of fines in kind, mass searches, and confiscation of all food reserves from peasants was introduced. In the spring of 1933, mortality reached its peak — in June alone, about **28,000** people were dying each day. Despite the mass death of the population, the Soviet authorities denied the fact of famine, refusing to accept international aid. During the Holodomor, according to the most balanced estimate, about **4 million** Ukrainians died.

As a consequence of the forced collectivization policy, the inhabitants of Belarus, the Kuban, the Volga region, and Kazakhstan also suffered from famine at that time. However, the scale of the tragedy proved significantly greater in Ukraine than in the RSFSR. In Russia, acute food shortages were observed only in certain regions — the Volga German Republic, Krasnodar Krai (*including the Kuban*), and the right-bank part of Saratov Oblast. In Siberia, the Volga region, and the North Caucasus, famine-related mortality amounted to approximately **500,000** people in each region. Overall, at least **3 million** people were victims of famine in the RSFSR.

At that time, the Kazakh ASSR was part of the RSFSR. The first secretary of the Kazakh regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*), Filipp Goloshchyokin, in 1925–1927, initiated a campaign of forced sedentarization of nomadic households, forced collectiv-

ization, and property confiscation. As a result of the seizure of livestock — the main means of subsistence for the Kazakhs — the livestock sector was effectively destroyed: of **40 million** head of livestock, only about **10%** remained by 1933. Famine, intensified by repressive grain procurement and administrative-punitive measures, caused the deaths of at least **1.5 million** people, amounting to about a quarter of the Kazakh ethnic group. At the same time, mass deportations and confiscations took place: about **700** prosperous households were dekulakized and exiled, and thousands of families lost their property. In 1929–1931, **372** peasant and nomadic uprisings were recorded, and more than **1.1 million** people fled the republic to China, Iran, Afghanistan, and other countries.

Forced collectivization led to intensive internal migration, significantly altering the ethno-demographic composition of certain regions. In 1934, **5.2 million** people arrived in the cities of the RSFSR, **1.5 million** in the Ukrainian SSR, and **41,000** in Uzbekistan, predominantly Russians or Russian-speaking people.¹⁸ These processes were especially noticeable in Kazakhstan, where the natural increase of the urban population in 1926–1937 amounted to **759,000** people, while the total migration balance of Kazakhstan and the republics of Central Asia in 1926–1937 stood at **+1.095 million** people due to the influx of Russian-speaking population from the European part of the USSR and the outflow of indigenous peoples, in particular Kazakhs.

Significant demographic shifts were also observed in Ukraine. In 1933, natives of the RSFSR accounted for **26%** of all arrivals in cities in the Ukrainian SSR with populations of more than **100,000**, thereby accelerating the Russification of the urban environment.

If the famine of the first half of the 1930s particularly affected the rural population, then the Great Terror of 1937–1938 was directed mainly against urban dwellers (*the creative intelligentsia, officials, clergy*). In total, over two years, more than **1.7 million** people were arrested on political charges, of whom at least **750,000** were shot under the sentences of NKVD “*troikas*” and “*dvoikas*” without judicial review. Terror against the old Bolshevik elite reached a particular scale — of **62** corps commanders of the Red Army, only five survived the purges; of **102** members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*) of Ukraine, only three survived.

A separate type of repression was directed against representatives of national minorities, whom the Soviet authorities declared “*potentially disloyal*” or “*hostile elements*” connected with “*foreign intelligence services*.” The victims of the NKVD national operations of 1937–1938 amounted to **335,513** people, of whom **73.66%** were shot. In particular, during the so-called “*Polish operation*,” at least **143,810** people were arrested, of whom **111,091** were executed. During the “*German operation*,” about **65–68,000** people were arrested, a significant part of whom were later sentenced. The “*Greek operation*” spread to Ukraine’s Donetsk, Odesa regions, Crimea, and the Krasnodar Krai, as well as to Azerbaijan. About **8,000** people of Greek origin were arrested in these territories. Within the framework of the “*Latvian operation*,” **21,300** people


were convicted, of whom **16,575** were executed. Along the “*Finnish line*,” the share of repressed Finns reached more than **40%** of the total number of terror victims in Karelia.


The total number of those shot alone during the period from 1920 to 1942 reached **1.1 million** people.

According to the Soviet censuses of 1926 and 1939, the total number of Ukrainians in the USSR declined from **31.1 million** to **28.1 million** people, Kazakhs — from **3.9 million** to **3.1 million** people, Poles — from **782,300** to **630,000** people, Estonians — from **154,600** to **143,500**, Latvians — from **151,400** to **114,400**, Lithuanians — from **41,400** to **32,600**. The share of non-Russian peoples in the Union’s state apparatus declined again.

At the same time, the policy intensified in the 1930s. Linguists loyal to the regime developed the concept of creating a common lexical fund for all the languages of the peoples of the USSR, which envisaged widespread borrowing of terminology from Russian. In many languages, **70–80%** of terms were of Russian origin or had been assimilated through Russian mediation. The process was accompanied by ideological rhetoric that entrenched in mass consciousness the myth of the “*greatness*” of the Russian language as the leading and “*most developed*” one in the “*family of brotherly peoples*.”

From 1938, the Russian language became compulsory in all schools in the republics of the Union. In 1939–1940, the Latinized alphabets of non-Russian languages were replaced with Cyrillic alphabets, thereby definitively securing the dominance of the Russian linguistic model throughout the USSR. Nevertheless, the level of education, the average income, and the life expectancy of Russians proper were lower than those of some other peoples.







CHAPTER 47

SOVIET EXPANSION
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1939-1945




	Main territory of the USSR in 1939		Borders of the union republics
	Territories seized and annexed by the USSR in 1939-1941		Front line at the end of 1941
	Temporary possessions of the USSR		Changes on the front line by the autumn of 1942
	Satellite states of the USSR		Boundary of the USSR's zone of influence in Iran in 1941-1946



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
- ② The Karelo-Finnish SSR (1940–1956).
- ③ The western parts of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas, ceded by Finland to the USSR under the 1940 Moscow Treaty and incorporated into the RSFSR.
- ④ The Salla-Kuusamo area, obtained under the Moscow Treaty and incorporated into the Karelo-Finnish SSR in 1940.
- ⑤ Part of Southern Karelia (*Sortavala*), obtained under the Moscow Treaty and incorporated into the Karelo-Finnish SSR in 1940.
- ⑥ Part of Southern Karelia (*Vyborg*), obtained under the Moscow Treaty, incorporated into the Karelo-Finnish SSR in 1940, and transferred to the RSFSR in November 1944.
- ⑦ The Hanko Peninsula, leased to the USSR in 1940–1944.
- ⑧ The Petsamo/Pechenga area, transferred to the USSR under the Moscow Armistice of 1944 and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, and incorporated into the RSFSR.
- ⑨ The Porkkala area, leased to the USSR in 1944–1955.
- ⑩ The Jäniskoski-Niskakoski sector, purchased by the USSR in 1947.

- 
- The map shows the Soviet Union with various territories highlighted in red and numbered circles corresponding to the list. The numbers 1 through 48 are placed on the map to indicate the locations of the territories mentioned in the list. The map also shows the borders of the Soviet Union and its constituent republics.
- ⑪ The Ukrainian SSR.
 - ⑫ The Byelorussian SSR.
 - ⑬ The territory of Western Ukraine, seized from Poland in September and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in November 1939.
 - ⑭ The territory of Western Belarus, likewise incorporated into the Byelorussian SSR in November 1939.
 - ⑮ Bialystok Oblast as part of the Byelorussian SSR in 1939–1944.
 - ⑯ Part of Zakerzonnia as part of the Ukrainian SSR in 1939–1945.
 - ⑰ The Vilnius area, seized from Poland and transferred to Lithuania in October 1939.
 - ⑱ Northern and Central Bessarabia, detached from Romania in June 1940, on the territory of which the Moldovan SSR was created in August.
 - ⑲ Northern Bukovyna, incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in 1940.
 - ⑳ Southern Bessarabia, incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in 1940.
 - ㉑ Lithuania, forcibly annexed to the USSR as a union republic in August 1940.
 - ㉒ Latvia, forcibly annexed to the USSR in August 1940.
 - ㉓ Estonia, forcibly annexed to the USSR in August 1940.
 - ㉔ The Ivangorod area, transferred from the Estonian SSR to the RSFSR in November 1944.
 - ㉕ The Pechory area, transferred from the Estonian SSR to the RSFSR in August 1944.
 - ㉖ The Abrene (*Pytalovo*) area, transferred from the Latvian SSR to the RSFSR in August 1944.
 - ㉗ Transcarpathia, transferred by Czechoslovakia in June 1945 and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR.
 - ㉘ Part of East Prussia, transferred to the USSR in July–August 1945 and incorporated into the RSFSR.
 - ㉙ Snake Island, transferred by Romania in May 1948 and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR.
 - ㉚ Part of Poland, annexed to the Ukrainian SSR as part of the territorial exchange in February 1951.
 - ㉛ Part of the Ukrainian SSR, annexed to Poland in the course of the territorial exchange in February 1951.
 - ㉜ The Georgian SSR.
 - ㉝ Territories of the abolished autonomous republics of the RSFSR, included in the Georgian SSR in 1943/1944–1957.
 - ㉞ The Armenian SSR.
 - ㉟ The Azerbaijani SSR.
 - ㊱ The Kazakh SSR.
 - ㊲ The Uzbek SSR.
 - ㊳ The Turkmen SSR.
 - ㊴ The Kirghiz SSR.
 - ㊵ The Tajik SSR.
 - ㊶ The territory of the Tuvan People's Republic, incorporated into the USSR as an autonomous oblast of the RSFSR in October 1944.
 - ㊷ The Kwantung Peninsula (*Port Arthur*), leased to the USSR in 1945–1955.
 - ㊸ Southern Sakhalin, seized in September 1945 and annexed to the USSR (*RSFSR*) in January 1946.
 - ㊹ The Kuril Islands, seized in September 1945 and annexed to the USSR (*RSFSR*) in January 1946. Japan does not recognize Russian sovereignty over the 4 southern islands.
 - ㊺ The Mongolian People's Republic.
 - ㊻ The Second East Turkestan Republic (1944–1946), a satellite of the USSR.
 - ㊼ The Azerbaijan People's Government / Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (1945–1946), a Soviet puppet state.
 - ㊽ The Republic of Mahabad (1946), a Soviet puppet state.

SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-1945

Soviet imperialism and Russian colonialism in 1939–1945 were interrelated phenomena that combined the USSR's geopolitical expansion with a policy of internal subjugation and assimilation of the population of the annexed territories.

On the eve of the Second World War, favorable conditions emerged for the advancement of Moscow's geopolitical interests. The signing in Moscow on 23 August 1939 of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocol envisaged the division of Eastern Europe into spheres of influence between Berlin and Moscow. The Soviet leadership sought to use its agreements with Nazi Germany to implement its own expansionist plans for restoring control over the territories of the former Russian Empire.

On 1 September 1939, Germany attacked Poland, and on 17 September, the USSR entered the war on the side of the Nazis. The territorial partition of Poland was legally formalized on 28 September 1939 with the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and the Border, which drew the boundary between the two countries along the so-called “Curzon Line,” running along the Narw, Western Bug, and San rivers. The eastern territories of Poland were incorporated into the USSR, comprising more than **51%** of the state's prewar territory and a population of about **13 million**. The remaining lands, with a population of more than **22 million**, went to Germany.

On 30 November 1939, Soviet troops launched an invasion of Finland. To conceal its role in the invasion, the Finnish People's Government, headed by Otto Kuusinen, a member of the Communist International, was created on the initiative of the USSR. On 2 December 1939, a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was concluded with this government. The war lasted 105 days and ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Moscow on 13 March. Despite the active resistance of its own forces and the enemy's enormous personnel losses, Finland ceded to the USSR about one tenth of its prewar territory and approximately **11%** of its economic potential.

In the summer of 1940, the “*creeping*” occupation of the Baltic states began. The formal beginning of Soviet expansion in the region was the Soviet-Baltic “mutual assistance pacts,” signed in September — October 1939 under pressure from the Kremlin. The agreements allowed the USSR to station military bases and contingents in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. After establishing a military presence, Moscow resorted to political pressure and blackmail. On 12 June 1940, the USSR's Baltic Fleet blockaded Estonia, and on 14 June an ultimatum was issued to Lithuania. Over the next several days, overwhelmingly superior Soviet military forces occupied the Baltic countries.

Thereafter, Moscow-controlled governments were formed in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Under conditions of occupation, snap parliamentary elections were held in July 1940. The new parliaments — the People's Seimas

of Lithuania and Latvia and the State Duma of Estonia — adopted declarations on their countries' accession to the Soviet Union. In early August 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved this decision.

On 26 June 1940, the Kremlin issued an ultimatum to Romania concerning the “*return*” of the territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. On 28 June — 3 July 1940, Soviet troops occupied these territories. Northern Bukovina and Southern Bessarabia were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR, while the rest of the region became the Moldovan SSR on 2 August 1940.

In these territories, a policy of Sovietization was carried out, accompanied by a deliberate assault on national culture and religious institutions. Russification was an integral part of the Sovietization policy. The Soviet punitive apparatus was predominantly composed of Russians. In 1939, about **400** NKVD employees, mostly Russians, were sent from the regions of the RSFSR to the newly annexed territories of the Ukrainian SSR.

After the annexation of the Baltic states, Soviet authorities forcibly deported approximately **17,500** people from Lithuania, slightly more than **10,000** from Estonia, and, according to various estimates, from 15.4 to **16,500** from Latvia. In the prisons of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, **18,632** detainees were held, including **10,685** Poles, among them former officers, representatives of the police and gendarmerie, “*spies and saboteurs*,” former landowners and factory owners, and members of “*counterrevolutionary organizations*.” In 1940–1941, several show trials were held against leaders of the OUN: in October 1940, **11** leaders were sentenced (*10 to death*), in January 1941, the “*Trial of the 59*” was conducted, most of whose participants were executed, and during the spring of 1941, more than **1,800** OUN members were arrested. Altogether, in 1939–1941, Soviet repressive bodies arrested **23,000** Ukrainians, **21,000** Poles, and **13,000** Jews.

Since the prisons were overcrowded, Soviet punitive bodies also resorted to deportations, forced removals, and the shooting of local inhabitants. The largest-scale executions of prisoners in Soviet prisons in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR were carried out in June 1941, when about **22,000** people were killed.

In 1940–1941, on the territory of Northern Bukovina and the Khotyn region, about **11,000** people were repressed for political reasons by Soviet NKVD bodies, of whom more than **1,400** were shot or died in prisons, camps, and special settlements. On the territory of Southern Bessarabia, more than **1,500** people were arrested, and during 1940–1941, hundreds of the region's inhabitants were subjected to imprisonment, deportation, and execution.

The Nazi-Soviet alliance was destroyed as a result of Hitler's invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941. In the first weeks, German troops captured the Baltic republics, most of Belarus, and Right-Bank Ukraine, encircling substantial Red Army forces near Minsk, Smolensk, and Kyiv. In the autumn of 1941, the Germans approached Leningrad, beginning its blockade, and also reached the approaches to Moscow, where their advance was halted. In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht's main efforts shifted southward: the Donbas, part of the Kuban, and

the Lower Volga region were captured; German troops reached the Volga and the North Caucasus; and the Battle of Stalingrad began. It ended in February 1943 with the defeat of the German forces, marking a turning point in the Second World War.

This course of events was made possible by the active support of Great Britain and the United States, which provided the USSR with military and economic assistance. On 12 July 1941, the leadership of the USSR concluded an agreement with Great Britain on joint action against Nazi Germany, thereby bringing the USSR into the anti-Hitler coalition.

On 28 November — 1 December 1943, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin met in Tehran. The main objective of the conference was to coordinate the Allies' strategic actions against Nazi Germany and its allies. Stalin, who arrived in Iran after the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad and the successful crossing of the Dnipro, secured confirmation of his territorial gains of 1939–1940. At the Tehran Conference, he openly declared to the allies for the first time his intention to preserve the USSR's eastern borders of 1941, including the territories of Poland and the Baltic states occupied based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Under pressure from Roosevelt, Stalin formally agreed to hold "referendums" on the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR, but insisted that they be held under the Soviet constitution and without international oversight.

In October 1944, an agreement was reached between Stalin and Churchill on the division of spheres of political influence in Southeastern Europe. During the Yalta Conference of 4–11 February 1945, the main issue was determining the future status of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which the Soviet leadership planned to include within its sphere of influence. Roosevelt and Churchill effectively agreed that the governments of the "liberated" countries should be "friendly toward the USSR," which opened the way for the establishment of regimes controlled by Moscow there.

The sharpest dispute at the Yalta Conference was provoked by the Polish question, which was considered at the Potsdam Conference, which lasted from 17 July to 2 August 1945. Stalin secured recognition of the shifting of Poland's eastern border to the "Curzon Line," with simultaneous "compensation" at the expense of German territories in the west and north, including part of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia. This decision caused mass deportations of the German population from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which caused concern among the Western allies, but was not blocked by them. The conference's decisions effectively consolidated the Soviet Union's dominance in Eastern Europe and legitimized its control over the countries that would later form the socialist bloc.


As a result of the Treaty between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed on 29 June 1945, Transcarpathian Ukraine was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR and transformed into Zakarpattia Oblast. The annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus to the Soviet Union was approved by the Treaty between the USSR and the Polish People's Republic on 16 August 1945 (ter-


ritorial and population exchanges continued until 1951).

After the wartime annexations and the completion of territorial exchanges, the USSR's total area increased to **22.4 million km²**.

Because of a personnel deficit and the fact that two-thirds of local teachers were regarded as "ideologically unreliable," by 1951, the Soviet authorities had sent more than **35,000** teachers from the eastern regions of Ukraine and other republics of the USSR to the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, a network of Komсомол organizations was being developed to promote the formation of a Soviet worldview among youth. The situation in the education system of the Byelorussian SSR was similar. Because of the Soviet authorities' distrust of local teaching staff who had lived through German occupation, teachers from the RSFSR were mass-assigned to Belarus after the war. Since most of them did not know Belarusian, instruction was conducted in Russian. In Brest Oblast, of the 14 Belarusian-language schools operating in the 1945/1946 school year, only one remained.

All of the repressive measures used by the Soviet authorities were aimed not only at consolidating their hold over these territories but also at combating underground movements, especially in the Ukrainian and Lithuanian territories, where armed anti-Soviet resistance continued to operate after the war.





CHAPTER 48

MASS SOVIET DEPORTATIONS

1930S-1950S




Main territory of the USSR in 1939

Territories seized and annexed by the USSR in 1939–1951

Borders of the union republics

Boundaries of the resettlement zones of the deported peoples



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Ingrian Finns (1935).
- ② Poles and Germans (1935, 1936).
- ③ Koreans and Chinese (1937).
- ④ Polish settlers and refugees (1940).
- ⑤ Administratively exiled Poles (1940).
- ⑥ Foreigners from Murmansk Oblast (1940).
- ⑦ Ukrainians and Poles from Western Ukraine (1941).
- ⑧ Residents of the Moldovan SSR and of Izmail and Chernivtsi oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR (1941).
- ⑨ Estonians (1941).
- ⑩ Latvians (1941).
- ⑪ Lithuanians (1941).
- ⑫ Belarusians and Poles from Western Belarus (1941).
- ⑬ Germans (1941) and Italians (1941, 1942 from Crimea).
- ⑭ Finns and Germans (1941, 1942).
- ⑮ Karachays (1943).
- ⑯ Kalmyks (1943, 1944).
- ⑰ Chechens and Ingush (1944).
- ⑱ Balkars (1944).
- ⑲ Crimean Tatars (1944).
- ⑳ Crimean Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, foreigners, and "undesirable elements" (1944).
- ㉑ Meskhetian Turks and Kurds (1944).

- ②② OUN members and their family members (1947–1948).
- ②③ “Forest Brothers” and their family members (1948).
- ②④ Greeks and Armenians from the Caucasian coast (1942, 1948–1949).
- ②⑤ Insurgents and their family members from the Baltic republics (1949).
- ②⑥ Insurgents and their family members from Moldova (1949).
- ②⑦ “Kulaks” (in fact, disloyal population) from the Baltic republics, the western oblasts of the BSSR and Ukrainian SSR, and Moldova (1951).
- ②⑧ Germans from East Prussia to the Soviet occupation zone in Germany (1947–1949).

MASS SOVIET DEPORTATIONS 1930S–1950S

Примусові переміщення населення в СРСР були сисForced population transfers in the USSR were a systemic instrument of state policy across various spheres: economic (*dekulakization and the provision of labor for the northern and eastern territories*), security-related (cleansing of border zones), and political-ideological (*neutralization of “enemies of the people” and national movements*). They became a constituent part of the consolidation of Soviet power in newly acquired territories.

Deportations and forced population transfers assumed significant proportions during the formation of the totalitarian system in the 1930s. However, individual examples of the Bolsheviks’ use of forced resettlement had occurred earlier as well. In particular, on 24 January 1919, the Central Committee of the RCP(b) adopted a directive on decossackization to combat participants in the White movement. In 1920, about **9,000 families (45,000 people)** of Terek Cossacks were deported from the regions of the North Caucasus. Individual resettlement actions took place in Dagestan and Azerbaijan in the 1920s.

In 1922, a Special Commission was created under the NKVD of the USSR for exile to forced labor camps, where political opponents were placed, including among the “unreliable,” who became a source of cheap labor. At the beginning of 1932, **268,700 people** were held in these camps.

In 1925–1928, during the revision of the administrative-territorial boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR, the BSSR, and the RSFSR, the Ukrainian ethnic territories of Starodubshchyna, Belgorodshchyna, Oryolshchyna, and the Don region were transferred to the RSFSR. In the course of this process, local Ukrainians were forcibly resettled to the Far East, the Kuban, and Southwestern Siberia.

In 1924, the All-Union Resettlement Committee was created, which developed voluntary resettlement projects

to regions with labor shortages. By the beginning of the 1930s, this policy had failed, and the Bolsheviks resorted to coercive measures, combining them with collectivization.

The campaign of “*dekulakization*” began in February 1930, and by the beginning of 1932, the total number of special settlers had reached **1.4 million**. Forced deportations reached their greatest scale on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, from which **63,700** peasant families were deported during 1930–1931. Significant deportation scales were also recorded in Western Siberia (*52,100 families*) and neighboring regions, where deportations were predominantly internal. In the North Caucasus, **38,400** families were forcibly deported. The main destination of movement was the Urals, to which more than **26,000** families were sent. Deportations also assumed significant proportions in the Lower Volga (*30,900 families*), the Ural (*28,400 families*), the Central Black Earth (*26,000 families*), and the Middle Volga (*23,000 families*) regions.

The deportations from the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s may be grouped into three categories:

1. Cleansings of border districts of potentially disloyal populations on the eve of the Second World War.
2. Punitive actions in territories liberated from Nazi occupation — both to strengthen the regime’s position and to secure the rear before the continuation of military operations.
3. Postwar relocations aimed at consolidating annexations and territorial exchanges.

In some cases (for example, the *Crimean Tatars*), the deportations had several causes.

In 1934, repressions began in the USSR that also included the forced exile of “*unreliable elements*.” At that time, representatives of the privileged pre-revolutionary social groups — former entrepreneurs, civil servants, clergy, army and navy officers, gendarmes, policemen, and so forth — were expelled from Leningrad.

At the same time, the Soviet authorities sought to resolve the security issue of border territories. On 4 March 1935, the Bureau of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*) adopted a resolution on the removal of the Finnish population from the borderlands. Within the framework of this action, **30,000** Finnish families were deported.

In accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*) of Ukraine of 20 December 1934, “On the resettlement of German and Polish populations from border districts,” in January 1935, **9,470** households (*40,000 people*) were deported from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to Siberia. Subsequently, according to the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR of 28 April 1936, Poles and Germans from the republic’s border districts, categorized by the Soviet authorities as “unreliable elements,” were expelled. Altogether, **23,519** people were forcibly resettled as part of this campaign.

On 21 August 1937, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR adopted the resolution “*On the eviction of the Korean population from the border districts of the Far Eastern Krai*.”

The formal reason was that they could potentially spy on behalf of Japan. By the end of October 1937, the operation was effectively completed: **36,442** Korean households (*171,700 people*) were deported in 124 train echelons. Along with them, about **7,000** Chinese were also forcibly expelled.

After the beginning of the Second World War and the partition of Poland, the USSR occupied the present-day western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. On 22 May 1941, the Soviet authorities launched a large-scale operation to deport so-called “*counterrevolutionaries and nationalists*” from Galicia and Volhynia. Over the following weeks, the action spread to other regions: on the night of 12–13 June, deportations took place in the Moldovan SSR and in the Chernivtsi and Izmail oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR; on 14 June — in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; and on the night of 19–20 June — in Western Belarus. About **11,000** people were deported from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, and about 21,000 people were deported from the western regions of the BSSR. More than **30,000** people were resettled from the Moldovan SSR and the Chernivtsi and Izmail oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, and directed to the Kazakh and Komi ASSRs, as well as to Krasnoyarsk Krai and Omsk and Novosibirsk oblasts. The number of deported Estonians exceeded **10,000** people, Latvians — **15,500**, Lithuanians — **17,500**.

During February 1940 — June 1941, the Soviet authorities carried out several waves of deportations of the Polish population in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. According to various estimates, the total number of deported Poles ranged from 309 to **380,000** people, among whom the predominant groups were the so-called “*settlers*” — former Polish military colonists — as well as refugees from the central regions of Poland. The largest groups of deportees were placed in Arkhangelsk Oblast (*approximately 51,000 people*), Sverdlovsk Oblast (*27,000*), Novosibirsk Oblast, the Komi ASSR, Krasnoyarsk Krai, as well as Vologda, Ivanovo, and Molotov Oblasts (*10–20,000 people in each*).

In July 1940, 2,540 families (*6,973 people*) of Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian populations were deported from Murmansk and Murmansk Oblast to the Karelo-Finnish SSR, while another **675** families (*1,743 people*) of other nationalities were sent to Altai Krai.

During the Second World War, the Soviet authorities also carried out “preventive” and “retaliatory” deportations. After the beginning of the German-Soviet War, the Soviet leadership decided to deport the Germans living on the territory of the USSR. In total, about **1.2 million** people out of approximately **1.5 million** Soviet Germans were subjected to forced resettlement. The liquidation of the Autonomous SSR of the Volga Germans accompanied the deportation of 1941.

Punitive deportations were carried out against the Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, and Crimean Tatars. On 2 November 1943, the forced deportation of the Kalmyk population was carried out — **69,267** people in total. The majority of deportees were sent to Kazakhstan (*12,342 families, or 45,501 people*). Another **22,900** people were sent to the Kirghiz SSR, and smaller groups to Tajikistan, Irkutsk Oblast, and the Far East.

Altogether, the first wave of deportations affected **91,919** people, among whom elderly people and children made up a significant share.

In February — March 1944, the NKVD carried out the large-scale deportation of Chechens and Ingush — more than **490,000** people in total. The majority (*239,768 Chechens and 78,470 Ingush*) were sent to Kazakhstan; another **70,097** Chechens and **2,278** Ingush were sent to Kyrgyzstan.

In May 1944, the deportation campaign also affected the Balkars — about **37,000** people were sent to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. According to official reports, **33,000** people remained in the settlements. At the same time, the rest died during transportation or were returned because they had been mistakenly included in the lists together with the Kabardians.

The deportation of the Crimean Tatar people took place on 18–20 May 1944 by order of the State Defense Committee of the USSR. Over the course of three days, about **200,000** people — almost the entire Crimean Tatar population — were forcibly expelled from the territory of the Crimean Peninsula to special settlements and sent to the GULAG. The official pretext for the deportation was the accusation of the Crimean Tatars of mass treason, collaborationism, and cooperation with the German occupation authorities. The real geopolitical motives were the aspiration of the Soviet leadership to remove the Muslim population from a border region of strategic importance in relations with Turkey. In the summer, more than **43,000** Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, foreign nationals, and “antisocial elements” were deported from Crimea.

With the return of Soviet power to the western Ukrainian territories, the struggle against the underground anti-Soviet movement continued. According to official data, in 1944–1946, **14,729** families (*36,609 people*) were deported from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, and by the beginning of 1948, their number exceeded **77,000**. The largest operation against the Ukrainian underground was Operation “West” (“*Zapad*”), carried out on 21–26 October 1947. In the course of several days, more than **25,000** families (*approximately 77,000 people*) were deported from the western Ukrainian oblasts. They were directed mainly to Kemerovo, Omsk, Karaganda, Chelyabinsk, and Krasnoyarsk oblasts, as well as to Siberia and the Urals.

On 25 March 1949, Operation “*Priboi*” (“*Surf*”) was carried out in the Baltic republics. In just three days — by the evening of 28 March — **29,687** families (*89,874 people*) were arrested, and over the course of the month, **30,630** families, or **94,779** people, were deported in total. **42,149** people were exiled from Latvia, **31,917** from Lithuania, and **20,173** from Estonia. The deportees were sent mainly to Siberia — to Irkutsk, Omsk, and Tomsk oblasts, Krasnoyarsk and Novosibirsk krais, and to Amur Oblast.


Overall, about **6 million** inhabitants of the USSR were subjected to mass internal forced resettlement (*from one district to another republic*).

The scale and geography of the deportations demonstrate that this mechanism became an integral component of totalitarian governance, a means of suppressing resistance and unifying the multinational space of the USSR.


CHAPTER 49

SOVIET EXTERNAL EXPANSION
DURING THE COLD WAR

1945-1985




 The Soviet Union in 1951–1991	 27 – 56 Other allied states and partners of the USSR
 1 – 10 Satellite states and partial satellites of the USSR	 Finland (neutrality dependent on the USSR)
 11 – 22 Communist (socialist) allied states and partners of the USSR	 Part of Austria occupied by the USSR in 1945–1955
 23 – 26 Communist (socialist) states in ambivalent relations with the USSR	



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① The Polish People's Republic.
- ② The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
- ③ The Hungarian People's Republic.
- ④ The People's Republic of Bulgaria.
- ⑤ The German Democratic Republic (*the triangle indicates West Berlin under international administration*).

- ⑥ The Mongolian People's Republic.
- ⑦ The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a satellite state (1978–1979, 1989–1991), occupied (1979–1989).
- ⑧ The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Soviet administration (1945–1948), satellite state (1948–1956), thereafter an ally.
- ⑨ The People's Republic of Albania, satellite state (1945–1961), adversary (1961–1990), thereafter a partner.

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- (10) The Socialist Republic of Romania, satellite state (1945–1964), thereafter an ally.
- (11) The Republic of Cuba (*from 1959*).
- (12) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (*North Vietnam*) / the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (*from 1961*).
- (13) The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (*from 1967*).
- (14) The People's Republic of the Congo (*from 1969*).
- (15) Socialist Ethiopia / the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (*from 1974*).
- (16) The Lao People's Democratic Republic (*from 1975*).
- (17) The People's Republic of Angola (*from 1975*).
- (18) The People's Republic of Benin (*from 1975*).
- (19) The Democratic Republic of Madagascar (*from 1975*).
- (20) The People's Republic of Mozambique (*from 1975*).
- (21) The People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada (1979–1983).
- (22) Burkina Faso (1983–1987).
- (23) The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, an ally (1945–1948), adversary (1948–1955), partner (1955–1964), thereafter a partial ally.
- (24) The People's Republic of China, an ally (1949–1961), an enemy (1961–1989), and thereafter a partner.
- (25) Democratic Kampuchea (*"the Khmer Rouge"*), adversary (1975–1979) / the People's Republic of Kampuchea, an ally (1979–1989).
- (26) The Democratic Republic of Somalia, partner (1969–1977), adversary (*from 1977*).
- (27) Israel (1948–1953).
- (28) Egypt (1954–1974).
- (29) Syria (1958–1961, 1963–1991).
- (30) Iraq (1958–1963, 1968–1979).
- (31) Indonesia (1959–1965).
- (32) Mali (1960–1991).
- (33) Guinea (1960–1984).
- (34) Mauritania (1961–1984).
- (35) Algeria (1962–1991).
- (36) Burma (1962–1988).
- (37) The Yemen Arab Republic (1964–1972).
- (38) Zambia (1964–1991).
- (39) Tanzania (1964–1985).
- (40) Ghana (1964–1966).
- (41) Guyana (1966–1991).
- (42) Equatorial Guinea (1968–1979).
- (43) Peru (1968–1975).
- (44) Libya (1969–1991).
- (45) Sudan (1969–1971).
- (46) Uganda (1969–1971).
- (47) Chile (1970–1973).
- (48) India (1971–1991).
- (49) Bangladesh (1972–1975).
- (50) Guinea-Bissau (1973–1991).
- (51) São Tomé and Príncipe (1975–1991).
- (52) Cape Verde (1975–1990).
- (53) The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (1976–1991).
- (54) Seychelles (1977–1991).
- (55) Nicaragua (1979–1990).
- (56) Zimbabwe (1980–1991).

SOVIET EXTERNAL EXPANSION DURING THE COLD WAR 1945-1985

The end of the Second World War and the intensification of contradictions among the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition created favorable conditions for the USSR to consolidate its influence in Central and Eastern Europe and extend it to other parts of the world.

During the Fourth Moscow Conference on 9–19 October 1944, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin agreed on the division of spheres of influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Agreements were reached on the “percentage division” of influence in the governments of Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Hungary.

At the Yalta Conference of 4–11 February 1945, Stalin, Churchill, and Franklin Roosevelt considered the question of Poland’s territorial future, which was resolved largely in favor of the USSR. The former eastern territories of Poland were annexed to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSRs. The leaders reached a compromise on the formation of the future government: representatives of the Polish government in exile were brought into the Moscow-controlled “Lublin” government, forming the Provisional Government of National Unity. The USSR undertook to ensure free elections in Poland, but did not do so.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe, adopted at the Yalta Conference, envisaged democratic elections under Allied supervision in countries liberated from the Nazis. This enabled the Soviet military presence in Central and Eastern Europe to be legitimized and governments controlled by Moscow to be created. In Poland, the 1947 elections ensured the establishment of the pro-Soviet government of Bolesław Bierut.

Events unfolded similarly in Czechoslovakia. In the coalition government formed after the war, representatives of the local Communist Party controlled the key ministries. In February 1948, as a result of a government crisis caused by the refusal of the minister of the interior, who was controlled by the communists, to report on the replacement of police officers with party loyalists, twelve of the twenty-six ministers resigned. They hoped that President Edvard Beneš would not accept their resignations and would force the communists into a compromise. However, the communist leader and head of government, Klement Gottwald, managed to retain his position and secured the replacement of the resigned ministers.

At the same time, on the initiative of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, mass protest actions began in the country, the largest of which took place in Prague on 21 February 1948. As a result, Beneš was forced to accept the ministers’ resignations, and the communists formed a one-party government. In May 1948, a new constitution was adopted; President Beneš refused to sign it and resigned. Gottwald became the new president.

In 1945–1948, communist governments were established in Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In September 1947, to strengthen the coordination of their activities, the Cominform

(*Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties*) was created. The meeting of representatives of communist parties took place in the Polish city of Szklarska Poręba. In Andrei Zhdanov’s speech as secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (*Bolsheviks*), the world is divided into two camps: the imperialist camp led by the United States and the democratic camp led by the USSR.

The headquarters of the Cominform was initially located in Belgrade. Still, because of the conflict between Stalin and Josip Broz Tito, who sought independence, Yugoslavia was expelled from the organization, and its headquarters was moved to Bucharest.

In January 1949, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was established in Moscow to coordinate the economic efforts of communist countries. Its founding members were Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. In 1950, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) joined the organization; in 1962, the Mongolian People’s Republic; in 1971, the Republic of Cuba; and in 1978, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

In 1949, at the initiative of the USSR, the World Peace Council emerged, propagating ideas of peace and disarmament while advancing the USSR’s ideological and geopolitical influence.

On 14 May 1955, to consolidate the USSR’s geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact was signed — an agreement on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance among Albania, Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. In effect, it was a military-political alliance intended to serve as a counterweight to NATO and to ensure Moscow’s control over the allied countries.

On 1 August 1975, representatives of 35 states, including the USSR, the United States, and most European countries, signed the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The document secured the postwar borders in Europe, recognizing them as inviolable. Still, it also contained provisions on human rights, freedom of information, and freedom of movement, which became a challenge to the Soviet system.

In other parts of the world, the USSR sought to secure the image of an anti-imperialist force supporting decolonization in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

After the victory over Japan in the Second World War, the Korean Peninsula was divided between the USSR and the United States along the 38th parallel. The United Nations General Assembly resolution of 1947 recommended the creation of a working group to prepare elections on the peninsula. The Soviet administration did not allow representatives of the group into the territories of North Korea under its control. As a result, elections were held in 1948 only in the southern part of the peninsula. On 15 August 1948, the Republic of Korea was established, and on 9 September 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established, headed by Kim Il Sung, who had lived in the USSR during the war years.

After the withdrawal of American troops in 1949, Kim Il Sung planned to unite both Korean states by force of arms. For this, he secured the support of Stalin and Mao

Zedong. Without directly intervening in the military conflict that began on 25 June 1950, the USSR approved the plan for the invasion by North Korean troops. It provided advisers, instructors, medicines, fuel, and lubricants, and other resources. The military actions ended in the summer of 1953 with an armistice agreement, and the DPRK continued thereafter to remain under strong Soviet influence.

The USSR also maintained friendly relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). After the victory and establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power, during Mao's visit to Moscow on 14 February 1950, a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance was signed between the USSR and the PRC. Under it, the USSR provided China with economic, military, and technical support and assisted in industrialization and the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. However, after Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, and especially after the "*denunciation of Stalin's cult of personality*" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, relations deteriorated and in the 1960s developed into a deep ideological confrontation and border conflicts.

Vietnam became another important direction of Soviet policy in Asia. After France's defeat in the war to preserve its influence in Indochina, the Geneva Accords of 1954 temporarily divided the country along the 17th parallel. North Vietnam was led by the communist government of Ho Chi Minh, while the South was aligned with the United States. From the 1960s onward, the USSR became Hanoi's principal ally, supplying weapons, equipment, advisers, and resources. After the country's unification and the end of the war, Vietnam entered the Soviet sphere of influence.

Soviet cooperation in various fields also took place with countries of the "non-aligned movement" — Egypt, India, Indonesia, and others. To spread its influence, Moscow actively engaged in scientific and technical, educational, and cultural cooperation, creating and supporting initiatives in these areas.

In Latin America, Cuba came under Soviet influence, and insurgents led by Fidel Castro came to power. The USSR provided political and economic support to the new government, and in October 1962, Nikita Khrushchev decided to place missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. This caused the "*Caribbean Crisis*" — the American blockade of the island, accompanied by the threat of a direct clash with the USSR. In the following decades of the Cold War, Cuba under Castro's leadership became a Soviet bridgehead in Latin America.


The USSR supported the Algerian National Liberation Front in the war for independence from France, supplying weapons through third countries and support in the UN. In 1962, Algeria proclaimed independence, and Moscow helped in building the army, industry, and energy sector. The USSR also had close ties with other former French colonies in Africa — Guinea and the Congo.


In 1974, the monarchy in Ethiopia was overthrown, and the military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power, proclaiming a socialist course. The USSR actively supported the new government — providing modern

weapons, advisers, and economic aid, especially during the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977–1978, when Soviet support became decisive.

The USSR also supported anti-colonial movements in the former Portuguese colonies — Angola and Mozambique. In the 1970s, Moscow provided military and economic assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, led by Agostinho Neto. After Mozambique gained independence on 25 June 1975, the USSR supported the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front, and its leader, Samora Machel, in the military, economic, and educational spheres.

In December 1979, Soviet troops were introduced into Afghanistan in support of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. President Hafizullah Amin, who had requested Soviet assistance, was killed during the storming of his palace; in his place, a puppet government of Babrak Karmal was installed. Despite the limited contingent, the USSR was drawn into a protracted war that became a symbol of the Soviet empire's crisis, revealing its economic, political, and moral exhaustion. The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 signified the USSR's defeat in this conflict and accelerated the decline of its influence not only in the region but throughout the world.





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CHAPTER 50

RUSSIAN COLONIALISM

IN THE USSR

1941-1985



Numbered designations indicate dissolved national entities:

- ① The territory of the Karelo-Finnish SSR, transferred to the RSFSR in 1955.
- ② The Karelian-Finnish SSR (downgraded to the Karelian ASSR in July 1956).
- ③ The Crimean ASSR (transformed into an oblast in June 1945, transferred to the Ukrainian SSR in April — May 1954, restored there as an ASSR in February 1991).
- ④ The Volga German ASSR (dissolved in August 1941).
- ⑤ The Kalmyk ASSR (dissolved in December 1943 and divided among its neighbors, restored as an autonomous oblast (AO) in January 1957, elevated to an ASSR in July 1958).
- ⑥ The Kizlyar Okrug of the Dagestan ASSR, incorporated directly into the RSFSR in 1938, with most of it returned in 1957.
- ⑦ The Karachay AO (dissolved in October 1943 and divided among its neighbors, restored as the Karachay-Cherkess AO in February 1957).
- ⑧ The Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR (transformed into the Kabardian ASSR in April 1944 with partial territorial losses, restored in January 1957).
- ⑨ The Chechen-Ingush ASSR (dissolved in February 1944 and divided among its neighbors, restored in January 1957).

USSIAN COLONIALISM IN THE USSR 1941-1985

In 1941–1985, the USSR's imperial policy continued the traditions of Russian colonialism toward the Soviet republics and the autonomous administrative units of the RSFSR. This was manifested in the demographic sphere, national policy, the economy, education, and culture.

Beginning with Joseph Stalin's toast to the "*Russian people*" (24.05.1945), Russification, after a pause during the Second World War, once again became the mainstream of internal national policy in the USSR.

The period 1946–1951, known after the chief Soviet ideologue as the "*Zhdanovshchina*," was characterized not only by the struggle against "servility before the West" in Russian literature. At that time, Ukrainian and Belarusian culture came under significantly greater pressure, as campaigns were launched against "nationalist deviations," and even the artists and scholars most loyal to the regime were banned. In 1946, the Greek Catholic Church was once again officially liquidated. The denunciation of the "cult of personality" in 1956 did not include condemnation of mass repressions on national grounds; some of the "punished peoples," in particular the Crimean Tatars, were not allowed to return to their homeland.

During 1958–1961, the party leaderships of the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, Azerbaijani, Latvian, and Moldovan SSRs were accused of indulging in local nationalist tendencies and were dismissed. In 1972, in the Ukrainian SSR, Petro Shelest was replaced by Volodymyr Shcherbytsky because of similar accusations.

During 1959–1979, the number of Russians in the USSR increased from **97.9** to **113.5 million** people. Despite a decrease in their share of the Union's total population from **85.8%** to **82.6%**, the number of Russians increased in the national republics (*except the Central Asian ones*). This process was accompanied by a policy aimed at forming a "*single Soviet people*" and the gradual leveling of national differences.

Such demographic processes were most noticeable in the Ukrainian, Belarusian, Moldovan, and Baltic SSRs. In Ukraine, the share of Russians rose from **16.9%** in 1959 to **21.1%** in 1979 and **22%** in 1989, a consequence of the mass resettlement of workers and specialists from the RSFSR during the industrialization of the Donbas, Crimea, and the south and east of the republic. In Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova, the share of Russians exceeded 25% of the population, leading to significant changes in the linguistic and cultural environments of these countries.

In 1959–1979, Russians overwhelmingly predominated in the RSFSR's demographic structure. Their share amounted to more than **82%** of the republic's population. At the same time, within the autonomous republics and oblasts, noticeable differences were observed, reflecting both the consequences of Soviet migration policy and the development trends of local peoples.

In particular, in most northern and central autonomies (*the Komi, Karelian, Udmurt, Mordovian, and Tatar*

ASSRs), the share of Russians was maintained or even increased. In the Komi ASSR, this figure rose from **48.4%** to **56.7%**; in Karelia, from **63.4%** to **71.3%**; and in Yakutia, from **44.2%** to **50.4%**. This dynamic was caused by the settlement in the region of released GULAG prisoners, the development of the timber, mining, and energy sectors, as well as the organized transfer of labor from the European part of the RSFSR within the framework of the development of the "Far North."

By contrast, in the southern and Caucasian regions (*the Dagestani, Kabardino-Balkarian, Chechen-Ingush, and Tuvan ASSRs*), the proportion of ethnic Russians declined gradually. This process was influenced by two factors: the return from exile of deported peoples and the higher birth rates of the indigenous population.

In the economic sphere, numerous resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Gosplan directives subordinated the republics' economies to all-Union needs. For example, the 1954 resolution "*On the development of virgin lands*" envisaged the mass resettlement of Russians and Ukrainians to Kazakhstan, which not only changed the ethnic balance but also strengthened Moscow's administrative control over the republic. The Kazakh SSR occupied a special place in the Union's demographic structure — Russians made up more than **40%** of its population, and in the northern oblasts, more than **50%**.

A policy of linguistic Russification complemented demographic assimilation in the USSR. On 24 December 1958, the USSR Law "*On strengthening the connection of school with life and on the further development of the system of public education in the USSR*" was adopted. One of its key provisions was granting parents the right to choose the language of instruction for their children, which, in practice, legitimized the reduction of education in national languages. The law was duplicated in all union republics during 1959. Formally, these acts affirmed the principle of voluntariness. In reality, they promoted the expansion of the spheres of use of the Russian language, which was regarded as the "*language of interethnic communication*" and an indispensable instrument for professional advancement. The CPSU Program of 1961 approved a course toward further rapprochement and the achievement of "complete unity" among nations.

The percentage of Ukrainian-speaking schoolchildren fell from **81%** to **65%** between 1951 and 1956. As a result of the 1958–1964 education reform, the position of the Russian language in schools of the Ukrainian SSR was significantly strengthened. The number of instructional hours devoted to its study and to the course in Russian literature was increased, while the volume of instruction in the Ukrainian language was reduced. The subject "Ukrainian language and literature" was removed from the curricula of schools where Polish, Moldovan, and Hungarian are the languages of instruction. In contrast, the disciplines "*Russian language and literature*" and "*native language and literature*" were retained. Overall, in the republic, **31%** of schools provided instruction in Russian. The situation in higher education was much more problematic — in 1959, in Kyiv, only **23%** of students attended lectures in Ukrainian.

In 1961, Nikita Khrushchev announced the creation

of a “new historical community” — the Soviet people — in the USSR, with Russian as the language of interethnic communication.

The next wave of Russification policy in education came in the 1970s–1980s. From 1970 onward, all dissertations had to be written in Russian. Article 50 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR designated Russian as the principal means of “interethnic communication,” thereby contributing to its official dominance in education, administration, science, and the army.

The resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR of 1978 “On measures for the further improvement of the study and teaching of the Russian language in the Ukrainian SSR” envisaged the systematic expansion of the teaching of Russian in general education schools. On this basis, the collegium of the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the directive “On improving the study of the Russian language in the republic’s general education schools,” which required an increase in training for specialists in the Russian language.

In 1983, a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On improving the study of the Russian language in the schools of the republics” was adopted, introducing a 15% salary supplement for teachers of Russian in non-Russian-language educational institutions.

In the RSFSR, these measures had little effect. The share of schools with Russian as the language of instruction rose from 97% in the 1980/1981 academic year to 98.1% in 1986/1987. In the other union republics, the pace of Russification varied, but the tendency toward an increasing share of instruction in Russian was common. The most noticeable increase occurred in the Byelorussian SSR — from 65% to 77% during the indicated period.

Whereas in 1980/1981, 54.6% of schoolchildren in the Ukrainian SSR studied in Ukrainian, in 1988/1989 the figure was 47.5%. In Donetsk, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, and Simferopol, not a single school with Ukrainian as the language of instruction remained. In 1985, the number of pupils in Russian-language classes exceeded that of schoolchildren in Ukrainian-language classes for the first time.

During 1965–1978, a substantial strengthening of the Russian language’s position in publishing was observed in the USSR. The number of book and brochure titles in Russian grew from 57,500 to 66,300, accounting for more than 80% of the total print run.

At the same time, in most union republics, publishing in national languages declined or stagnated. Similar dynamics were observed in publications in Belarusian, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Turkmen, and Lithuanian. By contrast, slight growth or stability in the printing of books and brochures in national languages was recorded only in some republics — in particular, in the Kirghiz and Georgian SSRs.

During 1959–1980, the share of Ukrainian-language book titles in the Ukrainian SSR fell from 60% to 24%. In 1961, the number of Russian- and Ukrainian-language books reached a peak (approximately 4,000 each; before that, it had grown roughly evenly). After that, a great divergence began, and in 1990, 6,500 book titles in Russian and only 1,700 in Ukrainian were published in the republic.

This situation persisted until 1994.

The total print run of books in Ukrainian in the Ukrainian SSR (including textbooks) exceeded that in Russian until 1975 (100 million versus 60 million, respectively). In 1985, they reached 80 million, after which Russian-language print runs predominated until 2018.

In the 1970s, 11 scholarly journals were published in Russian in the Ukrainian SSR, 2 in two languages, and 1 in Ukrainian. The share of Ukrainian journals fell from 46% to 19% during 1969–1980.

From 1978 to 1988, 57 films were shot in Russian and only 3 in Ukrainian at the Odesa Film Studio. At the beginning of the 1980s, there were only 2 Ukrainian-language theater studios compared with 48 Russian-language ones.

The situation deteriorated even more rapidly in the BSSR — the share of book titles in Belarusian fell from 85% to 31% during 1950–1965.

All this led to the Russian language gradually replacing the native language among non-Russians. The number of Ukrainians who named Russian as their native language rose from 6% to 16% during 1959–1989; of Belarusians, from 7% to 20%.

During 1965–1978, within the RSFSR itself, there was also a steady decline in the volume of publishing in the languages of indigenous peoples, which testified to the gradual marginalization of these languages in the republic’s cultural space. Whereas in 1965 the number of publications in non-Russian languages amounted to dozens, and even hundreds, of titles, by the end of the 1970s, the situation had changed fundamentally. The most noticeable declines occurred in print runs in Chuvash (from 132 to 87), Tatar (from 230 to 199), Yakut (from 100 to 65), Mordovian (from 62 to 41), and Mari (from 67 to 46). Among the peoples of Siberia, the Volga region, and the North Caucasus, the situation was similar. There was a decline in the number of publications in Buryat, Tuvan, Komi, and Ossetian.

CHAPTER 51

ANTI-SOVIET RESISTANCE

IN THE USSR AND THE WORLD

1945-1985




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Numbered designations indicate the largest anti-Soviet uprisings:

- ① The area of activity of the UPA in 1944–1947.
- ② The area of activity of the “Forest Brothers” until 1947.
- ③ The area of activity of “Freedom and Independence” and other Polish “cursed soldiers” in 1947.
- ④ GORLAG camp — Norilsk (May — August 1953).
- ⑤ Plzeň (June 1953).
- ⑥ Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, Magdeburg (June 1953).
- ⑦ RECHLAG camp — Vorkuta (July — August 1953).
- ⑧ STEPLAG camp — Kengir (May — June 1954).
- ⑨ Klimovsk (May 1955).
- ⑩ Novorossiysk (January 1956).
- ⑪ Tbilisi (March 1956).
- ⑫ Poznań (June 1956).
- ⑬ Orenburg (July 1956).
- ⑭ Budapest (October — November 1956).
- ⑮ Bydgoszcz (November 1956).
- ⑯ Szczecin (December 1956).
- ⑰ Podolsk (June 1957).
- ⑱ Grozny (August 1958).
- ⑲ Temirtau (August 1959).
- ⑳ Krasnodar (January 1961).
- ㉑ Biysk (June 1961).
- ㉒ Murom (June 1961).

- ②③ Aleksandrov (July 1961).
- ②④ Beslan (September 1961).
- ②⑤ Novocherkassk (June 1962).
- ②⑥ Kryvyi Rih (June 1963).
- ②⑦ Sumgait (November 1963).
- ②⑧ Bronnitsy (April 1964).
- ②⑨ Stavropol (April 1964).
- ③⑩ Frunze / Bishkek (May 1967).
- ③⑪ Chimkent / Shymkent (June 1967).
- ③⑫ Stepanakert (July 1967).
- ③⑬ Slutsk (October 1967).
- ③⑭ Nalchik (July 1968).
- ③⑮ Prague (August 1968).
- ③⑯ Camp — Zarafshan (July — August 1969).
- ③⑰ Prague, Brno (August 1969).
- ③⑱ Gdańsk, Szczecin (December 1970 — January 1971).
- ③⑲ Kaunas (May 1972).
- ④⑰ Dniprodzerzhynsk / Kamianske (June 1972).
- ④⑱ Rubtsovsk (May 1974).
- ④⑲ Camp — Smolensk (1978).
- ④⑳ Ordzhonikidze / Vladikavkaz (October 1981).
- ④㉑ Wujek Mine — Katowice, Gdańsk (December 1981).
- ④㉒ Leninogorsk (August 1984).
- ④㉓ Kardzhali and Sliven regions (December 1984 — January 1985).

The list has been compiled according to the following criteria: a duration of more than one day, more than 1,000 participants in the unrest, the seizure of administrative buildings during the protests, or deaths resulting from the use of weapons in suppression. Clashes between football fans or gangs, as well as peaceful rallies regardless of scale, were not taken into account.



ANTI-SOVIET RESISTANCE IN THE USSR AND THE WORLD 1945-1985

Anti-Soviet resistance in 1945–1985 can be conventionally divided into two groups:

- a) resistance directly on the territories of the USSR,
- b) resistance in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Resistance within the USSR in the first years after the Second World War was manifested in the activities of armed detachments in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR and the Baltic countries. In the Ukrainian lands, it was carried out by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought for the restoration of Ukraine's independence and opposed collectivization, Sovietization, and the mass deportations of the local population. In the Baltic republics — Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia — a similar struggle was waged by the "Forest Brothers." They created partisan detachments, organized attacks on Soviet garrisons and punitive organs, and spread anti-communist information.

The active phase of the struggle lasted until the early 1950s, although individual centers of resistance persisted into the following decade. The Soviet special services — NKVD, MGB, KGB — conducted large-scale military operations to liquidate partisan detachments, used agent-combat groups made up of disguised Chekists and turned UPA fighters, deportations of "hostile elements," mass arrests, and propaganda campaigns to discredit the resistance movement. This led to a reduction in the size of the UPA and, in 1949, to a transition, on the initiative of Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych, to an underground struggle focused on anti-Soviet agitation.

In 1950, after Shukhevych's death, the UPA was headed by Vasyl Kuk, who became its last chief commander. He was arrested in May 1954, after which the UPA's activities ceased. The last battle of a UPA detachment took place in 1960, the last battle of a lone fighter in 1967, and the last underground member legalized himself in 1991.

In 1948, Lithuanian anti-communist partisans created the "Union of Lithuanian Freedom Fighters," headed by Jonas Žemaitis-Vytautas. The Soviet authorities, using amnesty, deportations, and repressions, managed to suppress the movement. The last commander of the "Union" was Adolfas Ramanauskas. He was arrested in 1956 and executed the following year.

In other national republics of the USSR, separate manifestations of unorganized resistance were observed — from acts of sabotage in production to the secret observance of religious rites. In some cases, popular riots occurred, driven by socio-economic difficulties, repression, and dissatisfaction with government policy.

Thus, on 2 May 1955, a protest action involving about 2,000 people took place in Klimovsk, Moscow Oblast, and in 1956 similar demonstrations were held in Novorossiysk, Tbilisi, and Orenburg. In June 1957, more than 3,000 workers protested in Podolsk near Moscow, and on 1–3 August 1959, unrest in Temirtau (Kazakh SSR), involving

5,000 people, escalated into an armed confrontation with security forces.

The Soviet authorities suppressed any forms of popular discontent. Particularly bloody was the Novocherkassk massacre of 1962 in Rostov Oblast, when troops opened fire on workers protesting against price increases and low wages. In total, **24** people were killed, and another **39** were wounded.

After the death of Joseph Stalin on 5 March 1953, mass uprisings of GULAG camp prisoners broke out. Particular dissatisfaction stemmed from the fact that the amnesty announced at that time did not apply to political prisoners.

In 1953, uprisings took place in Norilsk (*Gorlag*) and Vorkuta (*Rechlag*). In Norilsk, from 26 May to 4 August 1953, about **17,000** prisoners of more than 80 nationalities revolted, demanding a review of their cases. The overwhelming majority of the insurgents were Ukrainians, former participants in the armed underground. The uprising lasted for more than two months and became the first large-scale protest after Stalin's death. Up to **150** people were killed, and nearly **3,000** activists were imprisoned under harsher detention conditions.

On 19 July 1953, slightly more than three hundred prisoners of the Vorkuta camp refused to go to work. On 22 July, their number rose to **1,500**, and the very next day to **3,000**. The participants in the acts of disobedience (*12,000 people in total*) submitted demands to the camp administration to abolish penal hard labor and reduce prison terms. They requested a meeting with a representative of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The camp administration made some concessions, but the protesters' demands grew. They demanded the release of all prisoners and the full implementation of their previous demands. On 29 July, a commission headed by the USSR's deputy minister of internal affairs arrived in Vorkuta. It tried to persuade the protesters to return to work, but they refused. As a result of the suppression of the uprising, **53** people were killed, and **138** were wounded.

On 16 May 1954, one of the largest anti-Soviet uprisings began — the Kengir uprising in the Kazakh SSR. About **20,000** prisoners, among whom were many former participants of the anti-Soviet underground from Ukraine, the Baltics, and the Caucasus, held the camp for 40 days, creating their own self-government. The immediate cause of the uprising was the shooting by a guard of a column of prisoners — **13** people were killed, **5** later died from wounds, and **33** were wounded. The uprising was brutally suppressed with the use of tanks, which, according to official data, led to hundreds of deaths. Participants in those events testified that the number of killed and wounded may have been much higher.

Among the deported peoples of the USSR, in particular the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Meskhetians, and others, a petition movement actively developed — a form of nonviolent resistance to Soviet national policy. The Crimean Tatar movement grew in scale. From 1956 onward, its leaders systematically sent delegations to Moscow bearing petitions with tens of thousands of signatures. They later organized peaceful marches and rallies in the capital and in major cities

of Central Asia. In the 1960s–1970s, activists including the well-known human rights defenders Petro Hryhorenko, Mustafa Dzhemilev, and Ayşe Seyitmuratova became symbols of nonviolent resistance to the system.

Another form of resistance to the totalitarian regime in the USSR was the activity of the dissidents. They advocated observance of human rights in the USSR, acting within the framework of the Soviet legal system. During the period of détente in international relations, the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR (1969) arose, headed by Petro Yakir and Viktor Krasin, the Moscow Helsinki Group (1976), headed by Yuri Orlov, and the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (1976), headed by Mykola Rudenko. In 1977–1978, the trials of Andrei Sakharov, Mustafa Dzhemilev, Levko Lukianenko, Ivan Dziuba, Vasyl Stus, and Viacheslav Chornovil attracted particular attention.

To defend their rights, political prisoners often resorted to hunger strikes. In response, the Soviet regime widely used punitive psychiatry — imprisoning and mutilating tens of thousands of people in special hospitals. Common practices also remained the conviction of opponents of the regime for “parasitism” while simultaneously dismissing them from work, as well as for fabricated criminal offenses.

With the onset of Perestroika, the dissident movement in the USSR received new impetus through mass, peaceful actions, petitions, rallies, and “letters to the authorities.”

In Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet regime also faced significant resistance. In March 1953, the government of the GDR adopted a decision to increase work norms by 10% without raising wages. Together with shortages of goods and a low standard of living, this caused mass unrest. On 16 June 1953, a workers’ strike began in Berlin, which turned into large-scale demonstrations demanding the cancellation of government decisions, the expansion of political freedoms, and the holding of free elections. Soviet troops brutally suppressed the protests; more than 50 people were killed, hundreds were wounded, and about 15,000 were arrested.

In October 1956, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the exposure of Stalin’s cult of personality, mass protests began in Poland and Hungary demanding a weakening of Soviet control. On 28 June 1956, a workers’ uprising broke out in Poznań, which was suppressed by the army and security services.


On 23 October 1956, protests engulfed Budapest. During a demonstration on 25 October near the parliament building, troops opened fire on the crowd, killing about a hundred protesters. The uprising quickly spread across the country under the slogan: “Russians, go home.” Prime Minister Imre Nagy promised democratic reforms and the country’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On the night of 3–4 November 1956, more than 60,000 Soviet soldiers entered Hungary, and on 11 November, Budapest was captured. In the end, more than 20,000 people died or became victims of repression, including Nagy, and about 200,000 people emigrated.

At the beginning of 1968, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-

slovakia, Alexander Dubček, attempted to liberalize the political regime by introducing the concept of “socialism with a human face.” In response, on 21 August 1968, Soviet troops, together with the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, invaded Czechoslovakia. As a result of the operation, about one hundred civilians were killed, and more than five hundred were wounded. Dubček was removed, and in his place, Moscow loyalist Gustáv Husák was appointed.

At the beginning of 1980, amid growing dissatisfaction with Poland’s socio-economic situation, the trade union movement “Solidarity” emerged under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. The organization, which advocated workers’ rights, democratic transformation, and the limitation of the communist government’s influence, quickly gained the support of 9 million people nationwide. “Solidarity” became the first independent civic movement in the communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. To suppress it, a state of emergency was in force in Poland from December 1981 until 1983.

On 5 November 1968, an act of self-immolation by former political prisoner Vasyl Makukh took place in Kyiv, by which he publicly protested against the Soviet occupation of Ukraine and aggression in Czechoslovakia. His cry, “Out with the occupiers from Ukraine!” became one of the strongest gestures of resistance. Discontent with Soviet oppression was expressed similarly by Ryszard Siwiec in Warsaw on 8 September 1968, Jan Palach in Prague on 16 January 1969, Romas Kalanta in Kaunas on 14 May 1972, Oleksa Hirnyk in Kaniv on 21 January 1978, and Musa Mamut in the village of Donske near Simferopol on 23 June 1978.







CHAPTER 52

PERESTROIKA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE
THIRD RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1985-1991






Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Damansky Island, the site of Soviet-Chinese battles in 1969, transferred to the PRC in May 1991.
- ② The Polish People's Republic (*June — December 1989*).
- ③ The Hungarian People's Republic (*August — October 1989*).
- ④ The German Democratic Republic (*October — November 1989; ceased to exist in October 1990*).
- ⑤ The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (*November — December 1989; ceased to exist in January 1993*).
- ⑥ The People's Republic of Bulgaria (*November 1989 — June 1990*).
- ⑦ The Mongolian People's Republic (*December 1989 — March 1990*).
- ⑧ The Socialist Republic of Romania (*December 1989*).
- ⑨ The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*November 1990 — June 1991; ceased to exist in June — October 1991*).
- ⑩ The People's Socialist Republic of Albania (*February — April 1991*).
- ⑪ Estonia (*declaration of sovereignty: 16.11.1988; declaration of independence: 8.05.1990; referendum in support of independence: 3.03.1991*).
- ⑫ Lithuania (*26.05.89; 11.03.90; 9.02.91*).
- ⑬ Latvia (*28.07.89; 4.05.90; 3.03.91*).
- ⑭ Armenia (*—; 23.08.90; 21.09.91*).
- ⑮ Azerbaijan (*23.09.89; 30.08.91; 29.12.91*).
- ⑯ Georgia (*26.05.90; 9.04.91; 31.03.91*).

- ①⑦ Russia (12.06.90; 12.12.91; –).
- ①⑧ Uzbekistan (20.06.90; 31.08.91; 29.12.91).
- ①⑨ Moldova (23.06.90; 27.08.91; –).
- ②⑩ Ukraine (16.07.90; 24.08.91; 1.12.91).
- ②⑪ Belarus (27.07.90; 10.12.91; –).
- ②⑫ Turkmenistan (22.08.90; 27.10.91; 26.10.91).
- ②⑬ Tajikistan (24.08.90; 9.09.91; –).
- ②⑭ Kazakhstan (25.10.90; 16.12.91; –).
- ②⑮ Kyrgyzstan (15.12.90; 31.08.91; –).
- ②⑯ Dushanbe (January 1985).
- ②⑰ Yakutsk (March 1986).
- ②⑱ Alma-Ata (December 1986).
- ②⑲ Leningrad (March 1987).
- ③⑩ Sumgait (February 1988).
- ③⑪ Stepanakert (September 1988).
- ③⑫ Baku (December 1988).
- ③⑬ Tbilisi (April 1989).
- ③⑭ Fergana Region (May — June 1989).
- ③⑮ Batken — Isfara (June — July 1989).
- ③⑯ Novy Uzen / Zhanaozen (June 1989).
- ③⑰ Sukhumi (July 1989).
- ③⑱ Baku (August 1989).
- ③⑲ Chişinău (August-September, November 1989).
- ④⑩ Tskhinvali (November 1989).
- ④⑪ Baku (January 1990).
- ④⑫ Dushanbe (February 1990).
- ④⑬ Andijan (May 1990).
- ④⑭ Osh (May — June 1990).
- ④⑮ 7 settlements of Tuva (May — June 1990).
- ④⑯ Yerevan (May 1990).
- ④⑰ Dubossary (November 1990).

- ④⑱ Riga (January 1991).
- ④⑲ Vilnius (January 1991).
- ⑤⑩ Prigorodny District (April, November 1991).
- ⑤⑪ Grozny (September — October 1991).
- ⑤⑫ Dubossary (September, December 1991).



PERESTROIKA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1985-1991

By the mid-1980s, the USSR was in decline: production was shrinking, and there was a persistent shortage of everyday consumer goods and food. The consumer revolution and ideological fatigue had reached their peak. The aspiration for a Western way of life — jeans, Coca-Cola, freedom of choice — became a symbol of rejection of Soviet identity.

In March 1985, the relatively young Mikhail Gorbachev became the new General Secretary and embarked on Perestroika, a set of economic reforms, glasnost, democratization, and international détente.

In the economy, the key reforms were the introduction of *khozraschyot* — a system of enterprise self-financing — and the permission, from 1988, to create cooperatives. In international politics, an important step was the signing in December 1987 of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) with U.S. President Ronald Reagan. These changes took place under the slogan of “*New Political Thinking*.”

Glasnost gave impetus to the expansion of freedom of speech. This contributed to the awakening of civic activism and paved the way for a new wave of national revival in the republics. Popular Fronts emerged in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. They advocated cultural autonomy and later full independence. In the Ukrainian SSR, the People's Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika appeared. Similar processes took place in Georgia and Armenia.

In other unions and some autonomous republics, national revival was accompanied by violent confrontation with the authorities.

The events in Kazakhstan in 1986 became emblematic when, after the dismissal of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR, Dinmukhamed Kunaev (*a Kazakh*), and the appointment of Gennady Kolbin (*a Russian*) in his place, student protests broke out in Alma-Ata. They were suppressed, but this was the first open mass “no” to Moscow from a union republic.

In 1987, a demonstration took place in Riga on the anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, whose participants protested against the Soviet occupation.

In other cases, interethnic conflicts surfaced. In 1986, clashes broke out in Yakutsk between Yakut and Russian students, caused by a sense of discrimination against the local population and social inequality. During the actions, the slogan “Yakutia for the Yakuts” was heard.

In Armenia, demands began for the detachment of Nagorno-Karabakh, populated predominantly by Armenians, from the Azerbaijani SSR. In February 1988, an anti-Armenian pogrom took place in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait, in which more than 30 people were killed — the most resonant event of that time, preceding the open war over Karabakh.

In clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in

Sukhumi in July 1989, 16 people were killed. At the beginning of the 1990s, war likewise broke out in Abkhazia.

In South Ossetia that same year, the first attempt to secede from the Georgian SSR occurred, culminating in Georgian security forces blocking the region.

In Uzbekistan, a conflict arose between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks.

On 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi, Soviet troops brutally dispersed a peaceful demonstration against separatism in Abkhazia and for the independence of Georgia. At least 19 people were killed, and hundreds were wounded. The dispersal of the demonstration and the use of force against peaceful people caused significant resonance in the USSR and further undermined trust in the authorities.

In February 1989, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed, bringing to an end the nearly decade-long war. It had a protracted character, exhausted the Soviet economy, and dealt a blow to the USSR's prestige.

As a result, the USSR's ideological framework was shaken. The system, which was held together by repression and censorship, could not withstand the first manifestations of freedom.

The rapid processes of change that began at the end of the 1980s in the countries of the so-called socialist camp confirmed that the events of 1956 in Hungary (the anti-Soviet uprising, brutally suppressed by Soviet troops) and of 1968 in Czechoslovakia (*the reforms of the “Prague Spring,” halted by the invasion of the Warsaw Pact countries*) were no accident.

The Eastern European countries asserted their subjectivity, and the entire zone of Soviet imperial influence proved fragile.

In Poland, the “*Round Table*” talks (February — April 1989) between the authorities and the opposition, led by the Solidarity trade union, culminated in the opposition's victory in the June elections. In August, Tadeusz Mazowiecki became the first non-communist prime minister, beginning the country's transition to democracy.

In May 1989, Hungary opened its border with Austria, weakening the “*Iron Curtain*.” In June, a ceremony for the reburial of Imre Nagy, the leader of the 1956 uprising, took place. In October, the Communist Party dissolved itself, and the country proclaimed democracy. The first free elections took place in 1990.

The “*Velvet Revolution*” in Czechoslovakia began on 17 November 1989 with a student demonstration in Prague. Mass protests led by Václav Havel forced the communists to leave power. Havel became president on 29 December, beginning democratic reforms.

In November 1989, protests in Sofia overthrew Todor Zhivkov. The Communist Party agreed to multiparty elections, and in 1990, Bulgaria transitioned to democracy.

Mass protests in Leipzig in the autumn of 1989 and the flight of citizens through Hungary forced the authorities of the German Democratic Republic on 9 November 1989 to open the crossings through the Berlin Wall. This became a symbol of the collapse of the communist regime. In 1990, the first free elections were held, and on 3 October of that same year, the GDR effectively ceased to exist — its regions joined the FRG.

Romania became the only country in which the overthrow of the communist regime was accompanied by mass bloodshed. In December 1989, protests in Timișoara against the deportation of Pastor László Tőkés developed into a nationwide uprising. Nicolae Ceaușescu's regime brutally suppressed the demonstrations, but on 22 December the army went over to the side of the protesters. Ceaușescu and his wife Elena were executed on 25 December 1989. Power passed to the National Salvation Front.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked not only the physical but also the symbolic end of Soviet control over Eastern Europe. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact countries began in 1989 and continued gradually until 1994.

At the same time, within the USSR itself, the so-called "Parade of Sovereignties" began. The republics started to emerge from union jurisdiction and to declare the supremacy of their own laws over union laws.

The Baltic republics were the first to declare sovereignty. Estonia (16 November 1988), Lithuania (11 March 1990), and Latvia (4 May 1990) proclaimed the restoration of independence (formally recognized on 6 September 1991). In Russia, Boris Yeltsin initiated the adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty on 12 June 1990, which became a symbol of the gradual disintegration of Soviet power at the center. Ukraine adopted an analogous document on 16 July 1990.

The Kremlin tried to keep the republics through negotiations, economic pressure, and forceful methods. In particular, Moscow imposed an economic and energy blockade on the Baltic republics. On 13 January 1991, Soviet troops stormed the television tower in Vilnius during protests for Lithuanian independence. Fourteen civilians were killed. On 20 January of that same year, Soviet special police detachments (OMON) in Riga attacked participants in actions for Latvian independence, as a result of which 5 people were killed.

Interethnic conflicts also remained a marker of the crisis of the Soviet imperial system.

In February 1990, anti-Armenian pogroms took place in Dushanbe, provoked by rumors about the resettlement to the city of a large number of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and the provision of housing to them.

In 1990, the elites of Ingushetia laid claim to territories that had been part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR before 1944, in particular the Prigorodny district of the North Ossetian ASSR. Tensions between Ingush and Ossetians subsequently led to armed conflict in the autumn of 1992.

In October 1990, a confrontation occurred between Moldovans, Gagauz, and Russians in Comrat, the Moldovan SSR. In September and December of that same year, clashes occurred in Dubossary, in the unrecognized Transnistrian Republic. In March 1992, open fighting began in the city between Moldovan government forces and Transnistrian separatists.

The Kremlin's forceful actions, instead of intimidating people, provoked outrage and radicalized national movements. Youth, especially in Ukraine, the Baltics, and other republics, became the driving force of national and democratic movements.

The key question that arose in 1991 was whether the Union could be preserved or would finally collapse.

In Moscow, an alternative center of power emerged to the Kremlin. Yeltsin, elected president of the RSFSR on 12 June 1991, used the rhetoric of decentralization and weakening union power to confront Gorbachev, who was trying to preserve a reformed Union.


The all-Union referendum of 17 March 1991 showed that 76.4% of the population supported the preservation of a renewed Union. Still, the Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova boycotted the vote, while in the Ukrainian SSR, 70% voted for the Union on condition that republican sovereignty be preserved. Georgia declared its independence on 9 April.


At Gorbachev's residence in Novo-Ogaryovo near Moscow, from April to July, a treaty on a Union of Sovereign States (11 republics) was being drafted, with signing planned for 20 August 1991.

Not waiting for this, conservative forces in the CPSU declared a state of emergency and isolated Gorbachev in Crimea, effectively carrying out a coup on 19–21 August. The plans of the GKChP (*State Committee on the State of Emergency*) failed due to a lack of regional support, Yeltsin's resistance, and mass protests in Moscow. The defeat of the putschists prompted the remaining Soviet republics to declare independence.

Ukraine adopted the Act of Independence on 24 August, and it was confirmed in a referendum on 1 December (90.3% "for," including Crimea, where 54% supported independence).

On 8 December 1991, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed the Belavezha Agreement, which led to the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On 21 December, at a conference in Almaty, 8 more republics joined the CIS. On 25 December, Gorbachev resigned as president, and on 26 December, the Council of Republics — the upper chamber of the Soviet parliament — ratified the Belavezha Agreement. The USSR officially ceased to exist.





CHAPTER 53

THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1991-2013



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Islands on the Amur, transferred by Russia to China in 2005.
- ② Belarus.
- ③ Armenia.
- ④ Kazakhstan.
- ⑤ Kyrgyzstan.
- ⑥ Tajikistan.
- ⑦ Uzbekistan (*until 2012*).
- ⑧ Moldova.
- ⑨ Transnistria.
- ⑩ Georgia.
- ⑪ South Ossetia.
- ⑫ Abkhazia.
- ⑬ Ukraine.
- ⑭ The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, to which the Russian Federation laid claim in 1992–1993.
- ⑮ Tuzla Island, which the Russian Federation claimed in 2008.
- ⑯ Vietnam (*until 2002*).
- ⑰ Bosnia and Herzegovina (*1992–2003*).
- ⑱ Kosovo (*1999–2003*).
- ⑲ Azerbaijan (*until 2012*).

THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH RUSSIAN EMPIRE

1991-2013

The collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a series of armed conflicts, in which Russia was able to preserve its influence in Eurasia.

On the territory of Moldova, separatists created the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR), which declared its independence on 25 August 1991. Given the mixed national composition of the population, in which Moldovans make up about one-third, the Russia-backed leaders of Transnistria expressed disagreement with Moldova's course toward national revival and rapprochement with Romania.

In the fighting, which peaked in the spring — summer of 1992, Russian “volunteers” coordinated by the Russian Federation took an active part. But the key role was played by the 14th Army, which assisted the separatists with workforce and weapons. Subsequently, its direct intervention in the war, under the pretext of peacekeeping, led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement on 21 July 1992 and the “freezing” of the conflict.

As a result, Moldova's territory remains divided. Russia finances the PMR and maintains a military base on its territory, but does not recognize its independence. This gives it the status of mediator in negotiations between Chişinău and Transnistria and levers of influence over Moldova's foreign and domestic policy. The war directed from Moscow slowed this country's European integration for decades.

Russia acted on the same principle in Georgia, supporting separatists and introducing “peacekeepers” during the wars in Abkhazia (1992–1993) and South Ossetia (1991–1992). The active phase of the conflicts ended with the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces, which cemented the detachment of these regions from Georgia: formally, as independent entities; in fact, as Kremlin vassals.

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1989–1994) between Armenia and Azerbaijan took place under significant Russian influence. Russia acted as the arbiter of the conflict, but at the same time supported Armenia with weapons. Through its peacekeeping mission and military base in Gyumri, Moscow secured a permanent presence in the region. The “freezing” of the conflict, which at that time ended with the de facto detachment of part of Azerbaijan and the creation of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, placed both countries in dependence on Russia for almost three decades. Karabakh was returned to Baku's control only in 2023.

Russia used the civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997) to preserve its influence in Central Asia. By providing multifaceted support to government troops and forming pro-government detachments that included Russian military personnel, Moscow directly influenced the outcome of the confrontation. The peace agreement between

Tajikistan's authorities and the opposition was signed in Moscow. Since then, Russia has maintained a significant military presence in the region — primarily through the 201st Military Base, its largest outside its borders.

Thus, from the beginning of the 1990s, Russia systematically used and artificially intensified internal contradictions in post-Soviet countries. This undermined political stability and hindered the socio-economic development of the newly formed states, while also providing the Kremlin with mechanisms to control and retain these countries within its sphere of influence.

In 2003, mass protests in Georgia led to the rise of reformist political forces and the adoption of a distinctly pro-Western course for the country's development. Against this background, Russia launched an economic and information war against Georgia. Anti-Georgian hysteria was also observed within the Russian Federation.

The next step was direct armed aggression against this country in August 2008, which the Kremlin justified by the need to “protect peacekeepers” from Georgian troops. As a result of the war (*the active phase of hostilities lasted from 8 to 12 August 2008*), Russia fully occupied part of Georgian territory — South Ossetia and Abkhazia — and later recognized them as “independent states.” This created a precedent for further aggressive actions by the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space.

Ukraine became the main target of Russia's neo-imperial policy. During 1992–1994, the “Crimean crisis,” or the “Cold War for Crimea” (*an unofficial name*), took place as a consequence of Russia's hybrid operations. In 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation initiated the repeal of the 1954 act that had transferred Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR. In 1993, the Russian parliament proclaimed Sevastopol a city of federal significance. During the division of the Black Sea Fleet, hand-to-hand clashes occurred between Russian and Ukrainian sailors.

The crisis reached its apogee with the actions of Crimean President Yurii Meshkov. He invited Russians into the Crimean government, introduced Moscow time on the peninsula, and planned a referendum on Crimea's independence and its subsequent accession to Russia. The crisis was resolved after units of the National Guard of Ukraine were introduced onto the peninsula (1994), Meshkov was removed from office (1995), and the Great Russian-Ukrainian Treaty was signed (1997).

Throughout all the following years, Russian politicians artificially fueled the separatist movement in Crimea to preserve the base of the Black Sea Fleet on the peninsula and maintain their influence in the region.

In September 2003, the Russians began building a dam toward Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait, bringing Ukraine and Russia to the brink of armed conflict. The artificial embankment was to connect Tuzla with the territory of Krasnodar Krai of the Russian Federation, since Russia had cast doubt on the island's territorial affiliation. The conflict was settled diplomatically in October, when the Russians were 100 meters away from the Ukrainian border post.

Economic pressure on Ukraine was likewise deliberate and intended to influence its foreign and domestic policy. Russia systematically introduced various trade

restrictions: on the export of Ukrainian pipes (2005 and later), dairy products (2006), cheeses and confectionery (2012–2013). In 2013, Russian customs blocked Ukrainian transit.

However, the main lever of political pressure on Ukraine became gas. The first suspension of gas supplies occurred in 1995. But such actions by Russia took on the character of an “energy weapon” after the Orange Revolution.

In the 2004 presidential elections, the Russian Federation supported Viktor Yanukovich, who faced Viktor Yushchenko in the second round. The two candidates embodied two different directions for Ukraine’s movement — rapprochement with Russia or with Europe. The choice was so important for Putin that he personally came to Ukraine during the campaign to support Yanukovich and hurried to congratulate him on his election victory.

But because of the falsification of the voting results, mass protests began in Ukraine. The second round of the presidential election was rerun, and Yushchenko won. This became a painful defeat for the Russian Federation and a personal defeat for Putin.

The Russian Federation waged the first “gas war” against Ukraine in 2005–2006. Its mechanism consisted of a sharp increase in fuel prices and the cessation of supplies after Ukraine refused to pay at the new prices. At the same time, Putin publicly accused Ukraine of stealing gas. This statement was directed at a Western audience to discredit Ukraine and reduce support for it.

The problem was eventually resolved, but the situation repeated itself in 2008–2009. Russia stopped gas supplies on New Year’s Eve, thereby blackmailing both the Ukrainian authorities, business, and population, and European consumers, to whom gas was delivered through Ukraine’s gas transmission system.

On the part of the Russian Federation, this was arm-twisting of the Ukrainian economy and discrediting Ukraine’s European integration course. In effect, the implication was that only by electing politicians who had friendly relations with the Russian Federation would Ukrainians avoid gas problems.

A vivid illustration of the Kremlin’s neo-imperial policy was Putin’s own rhetoric. In addition to the fake claim about gas theft, he also stated that **17 million** Russians lived in Ukraine (at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008). In reality, Russians in Ukraine made up **17%** of the more than 40 million citizens living there at the time.

Overall, the information-ideological attack on Ukraine had a systemic, multilayered, and continuous character. In Russia, the Institute of CIS Countries (1996) and “Rosotrudnichestvo” (2008) were created — an organization affiliated with the state and a directly state-run structure, whose purpose was to promote ideological frameworks useful to the Kremlin and to identify agents of influence. In particular, they disseminated theses about the “historical unity” of Ukrainians and Russians, the need for federalizing Ukraine, and the protection of the rights of Russian-speakers. In 2007, the state foundation “Russkiy Mir” was created. By 2013, Russian ideology under the guise of culture was being promoted by 90 centers in 41 countries worldwide.

An ideological rather than spiritual mission was also assigned to the Russian Orthodox Church and its branches in Ukraine (where 60% of all ROC parishes were located). In the 2000s, Patriarch Kirill of the ROC repeatedly visited Ukraine, during which he in effect campaigned for historical-political unity with Russia.

In July 2013, celebrations of the 1025th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’ were held in Kyiv. The marking of this date was turned into a political event with Putin’s participation. It was then that, in his rhetoric, the Russian president for the first time moved from the concept of the “brotherly peoples” of Russia and Ukraine to the thesis of “one people.”

Throughout the period in question, Russia sought to establish integration associations with the countries of the former USSR, intended as the first step toward recreating, in one form or another, a single state.

Thus, on 8 December 1999, the “Union State of Russia and Belarus” was created. The date was deliberately chosen — it was precisely on 8 December 1991 that the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia signed the agreement to create the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, no one else joined the newly created “Union.” Relations between Belarus and Russia also had a specific character. The former emphasized economic integration more, while the Russian Federation sought full “reunification.”

In 2002, the Collective Security Treaty Organization was established, uniting Russia with Belarus, Armenia (membership suspended in 2024), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (which left the CSTO in 2012). Ukraine declined participation in the Organization in 2010.

From 2001 to 2010, the Eurasian Economic Community existed, which was replaced by the Eurasian Economic Union (which includes the Customs Union and the common market). Today, the EAEU includes Belarus, Armenia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.


However, neither the first nor the second association became an analog of NATO or the EU for one reason: their participants pursued different goals. For Moscow, the idea of restoring “Russian greatness,” its sphere of influence, and geopolitical rivalry with the United States always came first. Russia never regarded the newly independent states as equal partners.

CHAPTER 54


CONTEMPORARY EXTERNAL
EXPANSION

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

2014-2025




	The Russian Federation		Territories de facto occupied by the Russian Federation
	Allies of Russia (members of the CSTO)		Countries in which Russian private military companies were actively engaged
	States that suffered armed aggression from the Russian Federation		Countries in which the activity of Russian private military companies was short-term (or whose presence was not proven)



Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Belarus.
- ② Armenia (*until 2024*).
- ③ Kazakhstan.
- ④ Kyrgyzstan.
- ⑤ Tajikistan.
- ⑥ Moldova.
- ⑦ Transnistria.
- ⑧ Georgia.
- ⑨ South Ossetia.
- ⑩ Abkhazia.
- ⑪ Ukraine.
- ⑫ Crimea (*occupied in 2014*).
- ⑬ Donbas (*partially occupied in 2014–2015*).

- ①④ Southern and eastern Ukraine (*partially occupied in 2022*).
- ①⑤ Syria.
- ①⑥ Serbia.
- ①⑦ Venezuela.
- ①⑧ Sri Lanka.
- ①⑨ Algeria.
- ②⑩ Libya.
- ②⑪ Mali.
- ②⑫ Niger.
- ②⑬ Sudan.
- ②⑭ Guinea-Bissau.
- ②⑮ Guinea.
- ②⑯ Burkina Faso.
- ②⑰ Cameroon.
- ②⑱ The Central African Republic.
- ②⑲ The Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- ③⑩ Angola.
- ③⑪ Zimbabwe.
- ③⑫ Madagascar.
- ③⑬ Iraq.
- ③⑭ Afghanistan.
- ③⑮ Yemen.
- ③⑯ Ghana.
- ③⑰ Chad.
- ③⑱ Nigeria.
- ④⑩ South Sudan.
- ④⑪ Congo.
- ④⑫ Mozambique.



CONTEMPORARY EXTERNAL EXPANSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

2014-2025

At the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014, the Revolution of Dignity took place in Ukraine — mass protests against the curtailment of Ukraine's European integration and President Viktor Yanukovich's attempt to establish an authoritarian regime. It proved impossible to suppress the protests by force — on the contrary, this brought even more people into the streets.

By portraying the protest in its media as Nazi and anti-Russian, the Kremlin was preparing the ground for its intervention. Russian television broadcast freely in Ukraine, which made it possible to conduct a targeted disinformation campaign and, in particular, to claim that a state coup had taken place in Ukraine.

In Crimea, the reaction to the events in Kyiv was artificially inflamed by the Russian Federation, which was the sharpest. In addition to pro-Russian rallies, from 23 February 2014 onward, “self-defense” units were formed there under the slogans of protecting the peninsula from nationalists, often with the participation of citizens of the Russian Federation. There were no grounds for this whatsoever, but in this way, the necessary picture of information was created. Accordingly, the annexation of Crimea was presented as the “rescue” of ethnic Russians from the “Banderites” and the restoration of “historical justice.”

On 23 February, after a mass pro-Russian rally in Sevastopol, the city was effectively headed by the first “people’s mayor” — a Russian citizen. On 26 February, the Supreme Council of Crimea in Simferopol was to consider the question of the peninsula’s withdrawal from Ukraine. A large rally of Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians, and other supporters of European integration disrupted these plans, forcing Russia to resort to open armed aggression.

On 27 February, the buildings of the Crimean parliament and government were seized by armed men without insignia. Under their control, the deputies nevertheless decided to hold a referendum on the peninsula on accession to the Russian Federation. At the same time, the blockade of Ukrainian Armed Forces units by Russian servicemen began, who came to be known as the “little green men.” These were both units of the Black Sea Fleet of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and newly arrived units of the Russian army in Crimea.

On 1 March, the Russian Duma and Federation Council voted to authorize Putin to use troops abroad. On 16 March, an illegal “referendum” took place in Crimea, unrecognized by the world. It was conducted without any oversight or international observers, at gunpoint, and was a purely formal exercise, without any real expression of the people’s will.

On 18 March 2014, Russia announced the incorporation of Crimea and Sevastopol into its composition. In numerous interviews later, Putin confirmed the deliberate nature of the Russian Federation’s actions aimed at an-

nexing the sovereign territory of Ukraine. On 27 March 2014, at the 68th session of the UN General Assembly, Resolution No. 68/262 “On the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine” was adopted, condemning the occupation of the peninsula.

By its actions, Russia violated not only international law as such, but also the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, which recognized Ukraine’s borders.

Three-quarters of the Ukrainian service members and police officers in Crimea did not obey the order to leave the peninsula and went over to serve the Russian occupiers.

The annexation of Crimea became not merely another, but a qualitatively new stage of Russian neo-imperialism — an attempt to restore control over the post-Soviet space under the slogans of “protecting compatriots” and “historical unity.” For the first time since 1945, Moscow demonstrated its readiness to redraw European borders by force.

The successes in Crimea propelled the Kremlin’s aggression in the Donbas. In April 2014, Russian sabotage groups seized administrative buildings in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Public communication was carried out in the name of the puppet “people’s mayor” of Sloviansk. Still, in fact, all processes in these cities and the military operations were directed by a Russian citizen, former FSB officer Igor Girkin (*Strelkov*).

In Donetsk and Luhansk, with the direct participation of Russian special services, state institutions were likewise seized and “people’s republics” were proclaimed. There was no mass support for these actions; they were carried out by pro-Russian activists, marginal population groups, and imported Russians. Attempts by the Russian Federation to spread this practice to other cities of eastern and southern Ukraine met resistance and failed — on 8 April in Kharkiv and on 2 May in Odesa.

Although Moscow officially denied involvement, numerous memoirs by Russian participants in those events have been published. The supply of weapons, the financing of disturbances, and Russia’s organization of them have been confirmed. The first leaders of the pseudo-republics in Donetsk and Luhansk were citizens of Russia.

Ukraine responded with the Anti-Terrorist Operation in the Donbas. Russia, for its part, launched a full-scale war, directly intervening at moments critical for the separatists with regular army forces, as happened during the battles for Ilovaisk and Debaltseve in the second half of 2014 and the beginning of 2015.

A key element of the hybrid war was disinformation. Russian media systematically constructed the image of the Donbas as “rebelling against the Kyiv junta,” and of Russia as a “peacekeeper” that was merely “helping a brotherly people.” Any actions by the Ukrainian army to restore control over the region were presented as the “destruction of peaceful residents.” In this way, the myth of a “civil war” was created, intended to conceal the actual invasion.

At the same time, the international community, above all Europe and the United States, stood on Ukraine’s side,

and sanctions pressure on Russia intensified.

Despite numerous attempts at a diplomatic settlement, including the Minsk agreements, the Kremlin used the conflict as a lever of political pressure on Ukraine. The pseudo-republics became an instrument for keeping the country in a state of permanent instability and for demonstrating an *“alternative legitimacy.”* Throughout all the years of the war, Russia continued to finance, arm, and direct the occupation structures, preparing the ground for the next stage — full-scale aggression.

Several months before the full-scale invasion, in the summer of 2021, Putin published a programmatic article entitled *“On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.”* In it, he set out the ideological foundation of contemporary imperial policy toward Ukraine and the justification for war. Putin, in particular, asserts that Ukraine is an artificial state, created by Lenin as a result of the *“robbery”* of Russian territories. Ukrainian nationalism was allegedly created from abroad, and after 2014, Ukraine turned into *“Anti-Russia.”*

Before attacking Ukraine, the Russian Federation issued an ultimatum to the West. In it, Moscow outlined the sphere of influence it claimed — the countries of the former USSR and Eastern Europe (*“NATO within its 1997 borders”*).

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion under the fabricated slogans of the *“demilitarization”* and *“denazification”* of Ukraine. Russian troops attacked from the north, east, and south, attempting to seize Kyiv and key cities. The invasion was accompanied by massive shelling of civilian infrastructure and war crimes, including in Bucha and Mariupol.

In 2022, the aggressor seized parts of the southern and eastern oblasts and advanced directly on Kyiv. Four partially occupied Ukrainian oblasts — Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia — were incorporated into Russia based on fake referendums. Russian administration was introduced in the occupied territories, and education is conducted according to the Russian curricula. The population is subjected to torture, deportations, and forced mobilization.

However, that same year, Ukraine liberated Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, launched a successful offensive, and liberated Kharkiv oblast. In November 2022, the Defense Forces retook Kherson, delivering a serious blow to the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions.

Russia sought to conduct a short-term *“Special Military Operation,”* but the resilience of the Ukrainian army and society, along with international support, thwarted its plans. The Russian Federation did not achieve its strategic goals. In 2024–2025, the Armed Forces of Ukraine took control of parts of the Kursk Oblast of the Russian Federation, dealing an additional blow to the Kremlin’s image.

The UN General Assembly repeatedly condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, in particular by Resolution No. ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022, which recognized the invasion as a violation of international law, and by subsequent resolutions demanding the cessation of hostilities and the protection of civilians. The West imposed multilayered sanctions against the Russian Fed-

eration, including restrictions on energy exports, financial operations, and access to technology, which weakened Russia’s economy.

The invasion demonstrated the Kremlin’s intent to destroy Ukrainian statehood. Instead, it led to a protracted war, with close to a million killed and wounded for the Russian Federation, and to its isolation.

Apart from Ukraine, several other states also experienced Russian interference in their internal affairs. Eurasia became a laboratory of neo-imperialist practices: from influence on elections to the introduction of occupation troops under the guise of peacekeepers.

In 2015, Russia intervened in the civil war in Syria, saving the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Russian Federation deployed air bases at Khmeimim and a naval base at Tartus, establishing its largest military presence in the region since Soviet times.

Russia actively used social media and the capabilities of artificial intelligence to interfere in elections in Romania and Moldova. Traces of its special services are present in the attempted coup in Montenegro in 2016.


At the same time, Moscow began building its network of influence in Africa. The main instrument became the private military company *“Wagner,”* which had previously operated in both Ukraine and Syria. From 2017 onward, Wagner mercenaries appeared in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Niger, and even Madagascar. Formally — to *“protect”* ruling regimes and fight terrorists, in practice — to influence political processes and control deposits of gold and diamonds.

After Wagner’s founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, staged a mutiny in Russia, the company was dissolved following his death. In its place came the *“African Corps,”* which operates under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Its task remains the expansion of Moscow’s geopolitical influence.

In 2020, Russia provided political and informational support to Alexander Lukashenko during the mass protests in Belarus and was prepared to provide force support. In January 2022, during protests in Kazakhstan, a CSTO contingent consisting mainly of Russian troops was introduced there.

From 2014 onward, Russia radically transformed its foreign policy, moving from covert hybrid tactics to open aggression, combining direct military force, information operations, and cyber interference. The Kremlin systematically supports loyal regimes and puppet parties around the world and conducts massive disinformation campaigns.


By destroying the principles of sovereignty, democracy, and international law, Russia seeks not only to restore imperial status but also to create an alternative world order.




CHAPTER 55

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN COLONIALISM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION


1991-2025





Numbered designations indicate:

- ① Mari El (*Russians* — 47.7%; *Mari* — 36.4%).
- ② Bashkortostan (*Russians* — 36.9%; *Bashkirs* — 31%).
- ③ Ingushetia (*Ingush* — 93%; *Russians* — 0.6%).
- ④ Chechnya (*Chechens* — 96.4%; *Russians* — 1.2%).
- ⑤ Dagestan (*Avars* — 30.5%; *Russians* — 3.3%).
- ⑥ Tuva (*Tuvans* — 88.7%; *Russians* — 10.1%).
- ⑦ North Ossetia (*Ossetians* — 65.6%; *Russians* — 16.3%).
- ⑧ Kabardino-Balkaria (*Kabardians and Balkars* — 71.9%; *Russians* — 19.3%).
- ⑨ Kalmykia (*Kalmyks* — 59.5%; *Russians* — 24.5%).
- ⑩ Karachay-Cherkessia (*Karachays and Circassians* — 56.3%; *Russians* — 27.2%).
- ⑪ Yakutia (*Yakuts* — 55.3%; *Russians* — 32.3%).
- ⑫ Chuvashia (*Chuvash* — 63.7%; *Russians* — 30.7%).
- ⑬ Tatarstan (*Tatars* — 53.6%; *Russians* — 40.3%).
- ⑭ The Ural Republic.
- ⑮ Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug.
- ⑯ Taymyr (*Dolgano-Nenets*) Autonomous Okrug.
- ⑰ Evenki Autonomous Okrug.
- ⑱ Koryak Autonomous Okrug.
- ⑲ Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug.
- ⑳ Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug.
- ㉑ The Ossetian-Ingush conflict.
- ㉒ The civil conflict in Moscow.
- ㉓ The Russo-Chechen wars.



CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN COLONIALISM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

1991-2025

In 1987, there were 20 autonomous republics in the USSR, 16 of which were within the RSFSR. In April 1990, the law *"On the delimitation of powers between the Union of SSRs and the subjects of the federation"* was adopted. It provided for the possibility of granting autonomous republics the status of union republics. On 8 October, the Supreme Soviet of the Buryat ASSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty. On 11 October, the Bashkir SSR adopted a similar declaration. However, not a single autonomous republic was ever transformed into a union republic.

The emergence of the Russian Federation in place of the RSFSR did not bring Russian colonialism. On 31 March 1992, Boris Yeltsin proposed signing a federal treaty intended to regulate relations between the autonomous republics. The process was accompanied by interethnic conflicts over administrative borders between the federation's subjects, as in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in the autumn of 1992. Most subjects agreed to sign it, except for the Chechen Republic and Tatarstan.

As early as 30 August 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar SSR adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Tatarstan, which proclaimed that the republic was not a subject of either the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation. On 18 October 1991, the Act on the State Independence of Tatarstan was adopted. On 21 March 1992, a referendum was held in the republic, in which the majority of the population supported the status of a sovereign state. On 6 November 1992, the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan was adopted. On 15 February 1994, the Treaty on the Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers was signed by the Russian Federation and Tatarstan, thereby granting the republic the status of a subject of a confederation.

In 1994 and 1995, Moscow concluded similar agreements on rights and the delimitation of powers with the Republic of Bashkortostan and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). The documents secured broad regional powers in the spheres of the economy, language, and education.

Subjects with an ethnic Russian majority also declared aspirations for expanded autonomous rights. In the spring of 1993, a referendum was held in Sverdlovsk Oblast, in which more than 83% of participants supported creating an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation. On 1 July 1993, the Sverdlovsk Oblast Council proclaimed the creation of the "Ural Republic". It began preparing a draft constitution for it, as well as introducing its own symbols and even a regional currency — the "Ural francs." In response, on 9 November 1993, Yeltsin dissolved the oblast council, and on 10 November, removed Eduard Rossel from the post of head of the oblast.

In the autumn of 1993, a constitutional crisis began in Moscow, sparked by a conflict between the president and the Russian Federation's parliament. On 3–4 October

1993, fierce fighting took place near the building of the Supreme Soviet ("the White House"), which was shelled by tanks; according to official data, about 150 people were killed, according to unofficial data, more than 500, after which the supporters of parliament were suppressed and its leaders arrested.

The Kremlin was forced to use political and military levers of influence in order to ensure that the national republics remained within the Russian Federation.

The Chechen Republic's proclamation of independence on 1 November 1991 and Dzhokhar Dudayev's refusal to sign the federal treaty in 1992 marked the beginning of the First Chechen War (1994–1996). On 21 April 1996, Dudayev was killed on Yeltsin's orders. The war ended on 31 August of the same year with the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords. The document provided for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and postponed the question of its state status until 2001, which temporarily ensured peace. On 12 May 1997, Yeltsin and Aslan Maskhadov, Dudayev's successor, signed the *"Treaty on Peace and the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria."*

The war in the Caucasus provoked the development of armed resistance under Islamist (Salafi) slogans. On 7 August 1999, Chechen detachments of Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded Dagestan with the aim of proclaiming the "Islamic State of the Caucasus." In September 1999, apartment buildings were blown up in Moscow and other cities, an operation organized by the FSB in order to create a pretext for war. During 1999–2000, Moscow conducted the so-called *"counterterrorist operation,"* or the Second Chechen War. The independent Republic of Ichkeria was liquidated, and in its place emerged an *"electoral sultanate"* headed by the pro-Russian Kadyrov clan. From 2000, Chechnya was headed by Akhmat, and from 2007 by his son Ramzan.

After Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, an offensive against the national republics' autonomy began. According to the decree of the president of the Russian Federation of 13 May 2000, *"On the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in a federal district,"* seven federal districts headed by presidential envoys were created.

In March 2002, as a result of constitutional reform, a new version of the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan was adopted, which de facto abolished the provisions on state sovereignty and legally secured the republic's integration into the Russian Federation's federal system.

In 2003–2008, a number of autonomous okrugs were abolished as independent subjects of the federation — the Komi-Permyak, Taymyr, Evenk, Koryak, Ust-Orda Buryat, and Agin-Buryat okrugs disappeared.

In 2001–2004, regional constitutional provisions that contradicted federal laws were abolished. After the terrorist attack in Beslan in 2004, Putin began appointing governors unilaterally. The phenomenon of *"parachute governors,"* having no ties to local elites, became widespread. In 2025, more than 50 out of 89 subjects of the Russian Federation were headed by graduates of the so-called *"school of governors,"* organized by the Russian presidential administration in 2017.

In 2015, a law entered into force establishing that the highest officials of the subjects of the Russian Federation could not be called “presidents.” The exception remained Tatarstan, which was granted a transition period until 2017, after which the agreement on the republic’s special status was not prolonged.

According to the population censuses of 1989, 2002, and 2020, in most autonomous republics of the former RSFSR and the contemporary Russian Federation, the share of Russians in the overall population declined. In 1989, Russians made up on average **50–70%** of the population of the autonomous republics of the RSFSR. In 2002, the share of Russians fell to **40–60%**. The total number of Russians in 2021, compared with 2010, declined by **4.9%**. The sharpest decline occurred in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Tuva, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, and also in Yakutia.

In the demographic context of the Russian Federation, a gradual transformation is underway, marked by declining Russian numbers, rising birth rates in the national republics, and the growing role of Muslim and Turkic peoples. In particular, according to the 2010 and 2021 censuses, growth was shown by Circassians (+56.72%), Chechens (+17.2%), Ingush (+16.27%), Kumyks (+12.48%), Tuvans (+11.92%), Avars (+10.96%), and others. By contrast, during this period, the number of Komi (-37.12%), Mordvins (-34.91%), Udmurts (-30.03%), Chuvash (-25.68%), Mari (-22.61%), Tatars (-11.24%), Adyghe (-10.71%), and other peoples of the Russian Federation declined significantly.

The number of citizens of the Russian Federation who profess Islam was about **14.5 million** in 2020, accounting for approximately **10%** of the country’s population. The majority of the population in Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Adyghe, and Astrakhan Oblast were Muslims. Their number continues to grow, especially in large cities, above all in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where inter-Muslim solidarity is taking shape.

The forced or economically conditioned resettlement of citizens from the national republics to the central regions of Russia contributes to the erosion of ethnic identity and the strengthening of Russification processes.

Moscow is implementing a policy of assimilation of national minorities, the main instruments of which are the dismantling of the system of education in national languages, total Russification, and the imposition of the renunciation of one’s own identity for the sake of social mobility. In some cases, this policy is described as “*linguicide*.”

In 2002, a law was adopted requiring all official languages of the subjects of the Russian Federation to use only the Cyrillic alphabet. In 2007–2008, the “*national-regional*” component of the educational standard was abolished. From 2008/2009, the Unified State Exam was conducted exclusively in Russian. In 2018, the state languages of the national republics were reduced to optional school subjects — even for native speakers, language study was permitted only upon parents’ request. Within half a year after the law’s adoption, the number of pupils studying in the Nogai language was cut in half. The constitutional “*amendments*” of 2020 secured for Russian the status of the “*language of the state-forming people*.” In

2025, the number of hours for studying native languages in schools was cut in half.

As a result, despite growth in the numbers of some ethnic groups, the number of speakers of the corresponding peoples’ languages declined almost everywhere over 20 years. Among more than **1.07 million** Chuvash, only about **700,000** command their native language. Of more than **386,000** Udmurts, **255,000** speak Udmurt, and of approximately **424,000** Mari, **259,000** use their native language. The number of Ossetian speakers declined by **43,000**, Kumyk by **63,000**, and Avar by **80,000**.

The Russifying policy provoked resistance from regional activists. In 2005–2006, Circassian associations organized rallies attended by many thousands, and in the spring of 2007, Buryat activists joined the protest movement. At the beginning of the 2010s, the civic movement for the national revival of the Mari people — Inzor Marii — emerged, whose representatives repeatedly faced administrative pressure, persecution, and censorship by the Russian authorities. In 2017, actions in defense of the Bashkir language took place, and in 2018, protests against the destruction of forests in Buryatia. The public act of self-immolation by the Udmurt scholar Albert Razin in 2019 became a symbol of resistance to the policy of Russification. Mass protests in 2020 were caused by the arrest of the governor of Khabarovsk Krai, Sergei Furgal, who was later sentenced to 22 years in prison.


Russia has also built a hyper-centralized budget system — approximately **55%** of all taxes collected in a region (except Moscow and St. Petersburg) are transferred to the federal budget, from which they are redistributed as grants, subsidies, subventions, and other payments. All subjects of the federation, without exception, receive state assistance, including Moscow. On the one hand, this reduces regional inequality between rich (*donors*) and poor (*recipients*). On the other hand, it makes economic independence impossible even in the most developed region, leaving its leadership dependent on the center’s will.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 provoked the emergence of protests, mainly among women. On 20 March 2022, women in Karachay-Cherkessia protested against the war. Similar demonstrations took place in Buryatia, Yakutia, and Tyva.

On 21 September 2022, Putin announced partial mobilization. On 21–26 September, actions against mobilization took place in Grozny and the districts of Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Makhachkala. The security forces brutally suppressed the protest actions. Because of unwillingness to take part in the war, up to 1 million Russian citizens left the country.

At the same time, the Kremlin positions itself as a fighter against global neocolonialism and uses corresponding rhetoric to justify its aggression against Ukraine.

A distinctive feature of the contemporary state of the Russian Federation is the steady decline in the number of ethnic Russians and of Orthodox Christians, which forces the Kremlin to resort to even harsher measures of Russification and to transfer children from the occupied territories of Ukraine into the interior of the country. Present-day Russia is an expansive colonial empire, crudely disguised as a federation.



CONCLUSIONS



The origins of Russian imperialism and colonialism predate Russian statehood itself. The roots of these phenomena lie in the era of Slavic / Rus' expansion into the Finno-Ugric, Baltic, and Turkic lands of northeastern Europe. Historically non-Slavic, but Slavicized in the 6th–12th centuries, the land between the Oka and Volga (*"Zalissia"*) became the core of the future Russian state.

At that time, the territory of Zalissia was a remote periphery of Rus' — perhaps even a colony in the early medieval sense of the word. At the very least, we can confidently speak of Rus' cities in a foreign ethnic environment as colonies. Yet over the course of just the 12th century, the principal polity of Zalissia — the Vladimir-Suzdal Principality — transformed from a peripheral entity into an alternative center of all Rus'.

Accordingly, 1) the Russian state grew out of a former colony. But Russian power derives not from colonized peoples but from colonizers, and this explains its treatment of its own citizens as colonized.

Mongol rule deprived the Grand Principality of Vladimir and its neighbors of independence, but not of statehood. During this period, the center of Zalissia shifted to Moscow, which became the region's new focal point. In its early rise, Muscovy was aided by the active collaborationism of its princes with the Horde (*the Kremlin ensured the collection of tribute for the khans*) and by the support of the church.

But by the end of the period, it was Moscow itself that led the movement for liberation from Horde overlordship. The models of governance established in that period (*hyper-centralization of finances and land grants in return for military service*) remained relevant for centuries and continue to influence Russian society to this day.

Muscovy underwent significant transformations: part of the Rus' legacy, such as the balance of power in the triangle of prince — boyars — veche, disappeared, whereas the model of the church-state symphony, long received from Byzantium, was preserved. On the other hand, Moscow borrowed from the Horde only certain elements of governance and the fiscal system (the treasury, yam coachmen), but not the model of power as a whole. Contrary to a widespread myth, it was not the Horde that taught the Muscovites despotism, since despotism was the exception rather than the rule among nomads. Russian autocracy did not come from outside — it was formed under cross-pressure from both foreign and internal state forces.

Later, to the Slavic component (*which had itself once undergone Scandinavian and Byzantine influence*) and the nomadic Turkic-Mongol one, there would be added the Ottoman (16th century), Polish-Ukrainian (17th century), and Western European: Swedish, Dutch, German, French, and their combinations (18th–19th centuries).

Thus, 2) the Russian empires are an "onion," not a "peach": many different layers of influence from the East, South, and West, superimposed upon one another, rather than one unchanging core enduring for a thousand years and a mutable periphery.

Moscow's subjugation of the neighboring principalities

of Zalissia by the mid-15th century was not yet imperialism, but the overcoming of appanage fragmentation. This process was characteristic of all late medieval and early modern societies of Europe and Asia. In some places it proceeded more slowly and gently; in others, the opposite; but the general vector was the same. Ivan Kalita's know-how consisted of taking, as collateral for debt, the mortgaged possessions of neighboring princes.

By contrast, the conquest of Novgorod in 1451–1478 was the first indisputable act of imperialism. The Novgorodians differed from the Muscovites in language, economic and political culture, and they also had an independent church (*moreover, religiously diverse Novgorod had always been a source of heresies*). The Novgorod Republic was oligarchic and colonial (*like Venice or Genoa*), but far freer than the Grand Principality of Moscow. Its destruction at the hands of an aggressive continental neighbor was only a matter of time (*no European merchant city-republic survived the age of nation-states*).

Hence, 3) the first empire arose 250 years before such a name appeared and 100 years before the conquest of Kazan, from which many date the history of Russian imperialism. It was precisely the seizure of Novgorod that transformed medieval Muscovy into something greater. Therefore, it makes sense to speak of the emergence of the First Russian Empire in the 1480s.

(The use of the anachronistic adjective "Russian" is necessary to distinguish this new state entity from medieval Muscovy proper.)

At the same time, the beginning of imperial expansion somewhat preceded the formation of centralized structures in the state's core. If Spain and Portugal, or France and Britain, first established themselves as centralized kingdoms and only then began overseas expansion (*leaving aside the Reconquista as a variant of overcoming fragmentation*), with Muscovy, the opposite was true. It carried out its first imperialist act before it had even fully freed itself from Horde rule, and increased severalfold without finally ending appanage fragmentation. This makes it akin to other continental empires, from Assyria to the Ottoman Empire, where the "core" was not clearly separated from the "periphery." Or, as Geoffrey Hosking put it, *"Britain simply possessed an empire, whereas Russia itself was an empire."*

Consequently, 4) in the First Russian Empire, a boundary separating the metropolis from its colonies simply did not have time to form. A natural frontier, such as the ocean in Western empires, was, in principle, absent. The impossibility of clearly determining where "internal" Russia proper ended and the "external" began led Russians to treat the entire territory of the country as "unified" and as "their own." It is precisely from here that there arises the Russian attitude toward the area of the state, so incomprehensible in the West, when any territorial concessions on the distant periphery are perceived as painful as the loss of the capital, and the "gathering of lands" is seen as

the ruler's foremost duty. This attitude was consistently reproduced in subsequent Russian empires.

The fall of Constantinople under Ottoman blows, the capture of Novgorod, the liberation of Moscow from Horde supremacy, and the marriage of the grand prince to a representative of the Byzantine imperial house all took place within less than half a century. This near simultaneity of key events led many Muscovite thinkers to the idea that their country was literally God-chosen at first — to preserve the true faith from destruction by the godless and the heretics (*strictly forbidding Russians contact with those of other faiths*), and, after 1648, to carry it to other peoples. “Moscow — the Third Rome” and “Orthodoxy — autocracy — nationality” are the best-known, but by no means the only, formulations of this doctrine.

At the same time, secular and ecclesiastical power in Muscovy-Russia was fused much more closely than in Byzantium. In the 18th century, the church lost its subjectivity altogether, becoming a state institution. With rare exceptions, church hierarchs consistently supported government officials in their struggle against their own people.

Thus, 5) from the very beginning of its existence, the Russian state was overtly religious-messianic, oriented for two centuries toward sectarian isolation, and for another two and a half toward missionary expansion. The church's position as a pillar of power radically distinguished Russia from European states and brought it closer to Asian states. And even when the militantly atheistic USSR replaced the Orthodox empire, the essence of things did not change — the Soviet Union was equally messianic, only instead of Christianity it spread Marxism-Leninism.

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Rus', and Samogitia immediately became Muscovy's principal enemy. It had begun unifying the lands of former Rus' earlier and had achieved greater success — lands as far as Tver were within Lithuania's orbit, and Lithuanian forces besieged Moscow. Nineteenth-century Russian historians were not without reason in speaking of the phenomenon of Lithuanian Rus' (*more precisely, the Rus' of the Gediminids*).

In its struggle with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 1480s–1530s, Muscovy appealed to the descent of its princes from the house of Volodymyr the Great and did not distinguish between the seizure of Novgorod, Chernihiv, and Ryazan within the framework of the “*gathering of the Rus' lands*.” The “*Orthodox*” card was also actively used in the struggle — under the influence of “*coreligionist*” propaganda, many Rus' frontier princes from Lithuania defected to Moscow's side, bringing their possessions with them. The struggle for the “*Kyivan inheritance*” determined Russian policy in the West until the very end of the 18th century and ended with the conquest of the territories of almost all the historic Rus' principalities.

Later, the fact that the ancient inhabitants of these regions had once paid tribute to Volodymyr became an argument for justifying expansion into the Volga region and the Baltic. And when facts were lacking, falsifications were employed (“*Monomakh's Cap*,” *Astrakhan as Tmutarakan*).

Accordingly, 6) the Russian empires are not merely former colonies; they are colonies that saw the meaning of their existence in subordinating the former metropolis, at least part of it, for dynastic and religious reasons.

Moreover, 7) from the outset, the Russian state used “*historical*” arguments and outright falsifications to justify its aggression.

The newly arisen state found itself in a ring of enemies in the East (*Kazan, Astrakhan, the Nogais, Crimea*) and the West (*the Lithuanian-Rus' state, Sweden*). In wars against them, the First Russian Empire drew on the experience of the service cavalry army and intensified the struggle against the remnants of the appanage order. However, as the Muscovite army grew in size, more land was needed to grant warriors pomestie holdings, which, in turn, required new territorial wars and, correspondingly, further growth of the army. Moscow was not wealthy enough to bribe enemies directly and not culturally developed enough to wield soft power; therefore, it relied more heavily on a large army.

Hence, 8) the Russian empires were primarily military machines, and only in the 19th–20th centuries did they master the art of using soft power (*ballet, literature*).

Yet the rapid territorial growth by 1600 was based not only on brute force, but also on the Kremlin's extensive diplomatic service and administrative flexibility. Like all its neighbors except the Ottoman Empire, Muscovy-Russia was at first a patchwork state — the property of Kalita's descendants. Therefore, loyalty to the ruling dynasty and the regular payment of tribute were sufficient for the central power to leave conquered societies their traditional order. And before outright conquest, the Kremlin employed other measures: it concluded alliances (*albeit unequal ones*), imposed protectorates, granted appanages on Russian territory to foreign rulers, accepted foreign detachments into service, and actively slandered its opponents.

Those state formations, individual cities, or stateless peoples that agreed to pass “*under the high hand*” of the prince/tsar voluntarily or with minimal resistance remained almost untouched. They preserved their dynasty (*or received another*), their own elites, legal relations, and landholdings, conceding to Moscow only their external relations and taxes. In return, the Kremlin “*granted*” local rulers their own possessions and provided armed protection from subjects and neighbors. Even in the event of rebellion, swift “*repentance*” protected the subjugated from large-scale repression.

In several cases (*the Perm and Koda principalities*), the Kremlin deprived the local ruling dynasties of power several decades after their incorporation into Russia. Yet even when individual principalities were abolished, the socio-economic order of the subjugated peoples was preserved until the end of the 18th century, and sometimes even into the end of the 19th century. In such territories, Russians limited themselves to building a network of forts, without encouraging, and sometimes even directly prohibit-

ing, agrarian colonization. The local elites, having retained power over their fellow tribesmen, acted as obedient conduits of Russian rule. Moreover, the Russian authorities deliberately elevated the status of elected tribal elders to the level of hereditary "little princes" and introduced other innovations.

By contrast, fierce resistance from established states (*the Kazan, Siberian, and later Crimean Khanates*) or regular shifts in allegiance (*the Hajji-Tarkhan Khanate*), ultimately taken "by the sword," meant their complete end. The ruling elite and army were destroyed, the middle strata suffered the curtailment of rights, the entire previous social order was dismantled, and the territory became an object of state colonization. In numerous cases (*Novgorod, Pskov, Vyatka, Kazan, Astrakhan*), the urban population was deported, and Russians were resettled into the vacated places.

Thus, 9) Muscovy-Russia first offered the "carrot," and only then the "stick," tried never to wage wars alone without allies, exploited internecine conflicts among its enemies, and, unless absolutely necessary, did not disturb the traditional order of subjugated societies. The combination of this flexibility, active propaganda in the enemy camp, and, once war came, brutal, large-scale repression against the conquered ensured Russia's rapid territorial expansion in the north and east.

In the mid-16th century, the Kremlin simultaneously faced three enemies in the west and south, whom it could not defeat, even one by one: Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, and Crimea. To mobilize society and strengthen personal rule, Ivan the Terrible introduced the oprichnina — a system of systematic state terror against his own country, both the elites and the ordinary population. After the oprichnina, the Muscovite tsars' level of authoritarianism surpassed that of European absolute monarchs. The result of the lost Livonian War, the burning of Moscow by the Crimeans, and the oprichnina terror was first the devastation of Russia, and two decades later, the collapse of the first empire, known as the Time of Troubles. During this period, the garrison of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth stood in Moscow, and Sweden's in Novgorod.

The destruction of the state opened the way to limiting autocracy and even introducing elements of constitutional monarchy. However, after some time, Russia managed to reconquer the core of its state, though it lost most of its gains in the west. At the same time, the unification of the Russians occurred around the figure of a new tsar, and within a few decades, all of society's democratic gains were abolished.

Consequently, 10) after throwing off Horde supremacy, Russia's collapse was caused by the combination of two factors: external military failures and internal crisis (deepened by repression). Mere foreign conquest proved insufficient to destroy the empire.

Moreover, 11) the collapse of Russia may lead to the democratization of society. Still, elites and the people may just as well return to the traditional

authoritarian model if preventive institutions are not built.

Yet even the Time of Troubles did not stop Russian expansion beyond the Urals. From the fall of the capital of the Siberian Khanate (1582) to the arrival at the Pacific coast (1639), only a little more than half a century passed — a pace unprecedented for European colonizers. A distinctive feature of the advance eastward was its "popular" character: the main pioneers were Cossacks, promyshlenniki, and peasants — free people or fugitives. Although the Cossack phenomenon originated in the south, its advance was impossible without state support, just as expansion westward was carried out exclusively by regular forces.

By contrast, eastern "popular" colonization did not merely precede "state" colonization — it did not require Kremlin assistance at all. There were even curious cases in which yesterday's rebels exiled to Siberia united and conquered new lands for Russia. Only Chinese resistance on the Amur halted Russian expansion until the 1860s.

Yet by fleeing oppression by the authorities and economic problems in the center for the sparsely populated borderlands, Russians unwittingly contributed to the transfer of Kremlin power there. Over the years or decades, the central institutions extended their reach to the regions colonized by Cossacks and fugitives and established their own rules there. And since despotism had already become the norm in Moscow, "state" colonization almost always meant a reduction in the level of freedom for both participants in "popular" colonization and the colonized peoples.

Thus, 12) the frontier did not necessarily mean freedom — at least not in the longer term. In the final analysis, everything depended on the central government's institutions. And whereas in the case of the United States the western frontier did indeed promote democratization (albeit only for white Protestants), in the case of Russia the eastern frontier ended with the establishment of authoritarianism both for the Cossacks and for the non-Russian natives.

The conquest of Siberia opened the way for the mass resettlement of ethnic Russians beyond the boundaries of their original territory. Until the twentieth century, most of the peoples of the Russian Empire remained roughly within the borders in which Moscow's expansion had found them, and only some inhabitants of northeastern Siberia and the Caspian steppes expanded their possessions at the expense of their neighbors. Ethnic Russians, by contrast (*and later Ukrainians as well*), actively settled in the conquered lands, altering the demographic profile of many subjugated regions in the same way as other colonizers.

A specifically Russian feature, unlike the Spanish-Portuguese, French, and British colonization of the Americas, was the historical continuity of ties with the colonized peoples. From the Khazar period to the Mongol era, the Slavs and their southern and eastern neighbors interacted and often came under the rule of the same state. This reduced the cultural distance between the two sides during colonization and encouraged more active horizontal ties — not always hostile ones.

At the same time, most of northern Siberia, the Kazakh steppes, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus experienced almost no Russian demographic colonization, and Russians settled westward only on a limited scale. In these regions, the colonizers were concentrated primarily in the cities.

In any case, from the sixteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, no fewer than **30 million** people undertook interregional migration, and the majority of them were Russian settlers moving to Siberia, the Volga region, and the Black Sea region.

The absence of clear geographical boundaries between the metropolis and the colonies, the mass resettlement of Russians to the east and south, and the lower degree of cultural shock in encounters with natives made colonization easier. In those territories where the colonists made up a noticeable share of the population, assimilation with the non-Russian natives became the rule, and segregation the exception.

This reduced the level of everyday racism in Russian society, but at the same time posed a threat to the identity of the colonized peoples.

On the one hand, the number of “*russkie*” people grew through the inclusion in this category of representatives of other peoples by way of a change in their identity or the acquisition of a dual one, such as two names: an ethnic one and a Russian one. This process reached such a scale that it acquired its own term: “*obrusenie*” [*Russification*]. To this day, Russia exhibits cases of dual identification among non-Russian peoples: at home — a representative of one’s own ethnic group, in Moscow or abroad — “*rus-skii*,” and not only in the eyes of Russians, but also in one’s own eyes (“*Obrusevshie inorodtsy vseгда peresalivayut po chasti istinno russkogo nastroyeniya*” (*Russified foreigners always overdo it when it comes to genuine Russian sentiment*), — Vladimir Lenin, 1922). On the other hand, such “*inclusiveness*” on the part of the colonizers, together with Christianization and Russification, sometimes led to a critical decline in the numbers of many indigenous peoples.

Hence, 13) Russian colonialism had not only a “state” but also a “popular” character. The mass resettlement of Russians to the borderlands not only strengthened central power there but also increased the number of “Russians” at the expense of non-Russian natives. In time, this led Russians to perceive conquered and colonized territories as “primordially Russian land,” with Crimea as a textbook example.

The Russian colonization of Siberia proceeded much more mildly than the Spanish-Portuguese or, especially, the British colonization of the Americas. However, it was less benign than the French in terms of the number of victims. Interested in preserving the tax base of the *yasak* (*primarily fur*), the central government hardly ever resorted to the deliberate genocide of the local population. However, it did not rule out large-scale repression in suppressing uprisings.

Ultimately, the indigenous population of Siberia quadrupled under Russian rule, but this growth masked major differences. Whereas the number of the already numerous

Buryats increased more than tenfold, the number of the small Itelmen people declined more than tenfold. The principal losses suffered by the non-Russian natives came not from hostile weapons but from infections brought by the colonizers.

On the whole, the populations of most peoples of the Russian Empire (*including Ukrainians*) increased, but this happened naturally. Russia indirectly stimulated growth by ending internecine strife and wars on its territory. But on the other hand, those same Ukrainians, for example, had to die for imperial interests beyond their own territory. And many people of the Black Sea region and the Caucasus (*Crimean Tatars, Nogais, Circassians*) suffered such losses from state repression and forced emigration that they exceeded natural growth.

In any case, simple demographic growth had no meaning if it occurred simultaneously with the denationalization of an ethnic group.

Therefore, 14) Russian colonialism was milder only for certain peoples and only in comparison with the colonialism of other empires, but by no means a blessing for all the colonized. And in some cases, Russian imperialism resulted in the genocide of conquered ethnic groups.

Recovery after the Time of Troubles and the continuation of external expansion required a larger army. Since impoverished central Russia could not provide the tax base for a professional mercenary army, the Kremlin resorted to strengthening the *pomestie* system. To provide warrior-landowners with a stable labor force, the tsar definitively enserfed the peasants (1649) and, in effect, turned the majority of the country’s population into slaves (*the classic European serf was inseparable from his allotment, whereas from 1675, a Russian could be sold without land*). Later, serfdom spread to other estates, reaching an absolute character under Peter I, when all Russians became slaves of the state.

“Emancipation” began with the nobility in the 1760s, extended to the peasants in 1861, but was brought to its logical conclusion only with the revolution of 1905. Until then, the majority of ethnic Russians remained subjugated and deprived of rights, even in comparison with the non-Russian natives, and therefore derived no benefit whatsoever from imperial expansion. Until the 1920s, Great Russians lagged behind almost all their immediate neighbors within the state in life expectancy.

Thus, 15) the principal beneficiaries of Russian imperialism were the tsarist dynasty and the multiethnic elites, whereas, until the mid-nineteenth century, ordinary ethnic Russians (like the Turks in the Ottoman Empire) remained merely expendable material.

And also, 16) military service to the state is one of the greatest virtues of the population, in the view of the Russian authorities. The subordination of not only the civilian economy but even human freedom to military needs, all the way to mass slavery, has been a tradition since the seventeenth century.

The drawing of Ukraine into Russia's orbit since 1654 has given Moscow the resources and geopolitical position to restore the empire (*the Second Russian Empire*). Russia was not powerful enough to conquer Ukraine directly, so it subordinated it, first, with the help of the Ukrainians themselves and, second, over the course of 150 years, and even then, managed to seize only half of it. Even so, this proved sufficient to deprive the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of its status as hegemon of Eastern Europe. From Bohdan Khmelnytsky to Napoleon, Russian expansion westward did not cease.

Ukrainian cultural and ecclesiastical influence on Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was extraordinarily strong (*like that of Hellas upon Rome*). Still, Ukrainians helped build the walls of their own prison with their own hands. First, Russia limited the autonomy of the Hetmanate, then the Germans gained the upper hand over Ukrainians in the capital, and in the nineteenth century, the empire became openly Ukrainophobic.

Hence, 17) the temporary Russian-Ukrainian alliance ended in Russia's absorption of Ukraine and the denationalization of Ukrainians. On the other hand, the critical importance of Ukraine for Russia's expansion became evident. In Zbigniew Brzezinski's view, Russia cannot be an empire without Ukraine. Norman Davies proposed a more radical definition: only the annexation of Ukraine transformed Muscovy into Russia.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Muscovy-Russia was a patchwork dynastic empire, unlike most of its neighbors except Turkey. But this was not connected with any special tolerance on the part of the Russian people or the mildness of the government, but with the impossibility of implementing alternatives due to the low level of socio-political development. Only under Peter I did a break occur, and Russia began building a "*regular, well-ordered state*" and army according to leading European models.

Among other things, this meant the beginning of large-scale centralization and unification of the empire. Some political entities within Russia, for example, the Don Cossacks, were definitely subordinated to the government. The sovereignty of others, such as the Hetmanate, was restricted much more severely than in the previous era. On the other hand, the Baltic provinces, whose higher socio-political development was acknowledged by the emperor himself, retained their privileges.

Over the following decades, pressure on the regions eased somewhat, and in the center, people began to reflect on constitutional limitations on autocracy. At the same time, isolated colonial excesses did occur, such as the alienation of Ukrainian or Kazakh lands for the construction of Russian fortresses.

However, under Catherine II, centralization and unification not only returned but also deepened, thanks to Enlightenment ideas about the ideal state order. Kalmykia and the Hetmanate were abolished, as was the Zaporozhian Cossack Host, and the Ukrainian elites finally merged with the Russian ones. The brutally conquered Black Sea region and Right-Bank Ukraine were governed with no

regard whatsoever for their ethno-religious specificity. At the same time, in the North Caucasus and Chukotka, local inhabitants were allowed to preserve their traditional way of life.

Finally, in the age of Alexander I, both tendencies were present (*though not strictly simultaneously*). On the one hand, Finland and Poland received their own parliaments and constitutions, which the rest of the Russians could only dream of, while Bessarabia enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy than the Baltic region. On the other hand, Georgia was annexed, the Caucasian vassal khanates were liquidated in a series of steps, and the Kazakh nomads were turned from vassals into subjects. The enslavement of the peasants reached its extreme, and the legal inequality of non-Russian natives was once again codified.

With somewhat less intensity and not with such pronounced regularity, the Christianization of non-Russian peoples also took place — waves of forced conversion to Orthodoxy alternated with periods of religious tolerance.

Accordingly, 18) over the course of more than a century, the late medieval patchwork model of the state gave way to the early modern centralized model, as a result of which St. Petersburg's colonial pressure on the national borderlands increased. This process was pendular: the "tightening of the screws" under Peter I — the Elizabethan "thaw" — intensification under Catherine II, and "multi-vectorism" under Alexander I. The empire became much harsher, although it remained dynastic — national autonomies were restricted not because they were national, but because they did not fit the model of a typical absolutist state. All the empires of that time, without exception, went through this.

The situation changed fundamentally under Nicholas I and his successors, culminating in Nicholas II. First, centralization and unification ceased to serve merely as instruments for improving Russia's governability. After the emergence of the triad "*Orthodoxy — autocracy — nationality*," the place of faceless bureaucratization of the state was taken by its purposeful Russification (*initially in the western provinces*). The Russian Empire began to become Russian not only in name.

Under both Alexanders, the policy of Russification was transformed into a policy of Russophilia, and pressure on autonomies and stateless peoples took on the features of outright chauvinism. The prohibition not merely against studying, but even against speaking one's native language during school breaks, best demonstrated the authorities' fear of the national movements of the large non-Russian peoples.

Although Alexander II became known as the "*Liberator*" for the abolition of serfdom, it was under him that the conquests of the Caucasus and Central Asia were completed, accompanied by large-scale repression and the genocide of the Circassians. He also took the Far East from China (*although he also sold Alaska to the United States*).

Alexander III did not wage new wars of conquest. Still,

under him, Russian great-power chauvinism flourished in Poland, and Russification penetrated regions that had long been unfamiliar with it, for example, the Baltic region. Nicholas II had already begun the forcible "*Russification*" of Finland.

Under all the emperors mentioned, state support for peasant resettlement to Siberia, the Kazakh steppes, and the Far East fundamentally altered the demographic face of many areas. Only the Muslims of the South Caucasus and Turkestan were left in peace (*for the time being?*).

And secondly, in the policy of total Russification, there were no longer any periods of lull or rollback. Once it began, it only gathered momentum.

It is clear that in the modern era, such measures produced the opposite result — among the subjugated peoples, a new intelligentsia emerged in place of the old denationalized aristocratic elite. And as soon as the central government weakened during the First World War, Russia fell apart.

Thus, 19) over the course of the nineteenth century, Russia underwent a process of nationalization, declaring itself, first and foremost, an empire of the Russian people. Beginning with the constitution of Poland, it ended with ethnic cleansing in the Caucasus and Jewish pogroms.

Although the emergence of the zemstvos and then the State Duma improved the position of ethnic Russians somewhat, it remained infinitely far from that of the English in the British Empire. Yes, they became the least disadvantaged ethnic group (*because Russification and Christianization did not affect them*). Still, the state's later nationalization played a cruel trick on them.

Despite certain liberalization in the 1860s and after 1905, Russia remained, above all, an empire of the Romanovs rather than a national state of the Russians. And while Spaniards, Dutch, French, or Britons were able to embark on the path of building modern nations (*even if exclusively in the metropolis*), Great Russians were deprived of this — they still did not govern their own state. Thus, for the new bourgeois elites, the old state order was unacceptable.

The critical mismatch between rapid economic modernization and slow (*or even reverse*) political modernization doomed the Second Russian Empire. In the end, it was not only the non-Russian peoples on the borderlands who wanted the fall of autocracy, but also the new Russian elites in the center. The desire to destroy the archaic political order in Russia briefly united the majority of the empire's subjects.

Hence, 20) blinded by an immense territory not divided into metropolis and colonies, burdened by the consequences of mass resettlements to distant foreign borderlands, and lacking experience of public politics, the Russians at the beginning of the twentieth century remained, on the whole, an imperial people rather than a modern nation. The revolution, meanwhile, temporarily united imperialists with anti-imperialists.

During the period 1917–1921, the Second Russian Empire collapsed, and in 1918–1919, the territory controlled by the Bolsheviks contracted to the borders of the sixteenth century. Most people in the former Soviet Union expressed a desire for independence, and some succeeded in creating their own states. All the empires defeated in the First World War went through this.

For Russians — both white and red — the "*unity*" of Russia remained a priority value. However, the White Guards defended the "*one and indivisible*" primarily by force, and because of this, found themselves at war with all their neighbors and, in the end, lost. The Bolsheviks, by contrast, chose a more flexible tactic — formally proclaiming the right of peoples to self-determination up to and including secession, but recognizing only those states in which the soviets came to power. In other cases, Moscow initiated the creation of formally independent "mirror republics" in non-Russian regions to split hostile national liberation movements.

The skillful combination of populist propaganda, mobilization measures, and mass repression brought victory to the Russian communists. The Soviet Union arose on the ruins of the Russian Empire — an atypical empire that actively denied its own imperial character. However, the forcible retention of rebellious borderlands and the existence of satellite states abroad clearly indicate the USSR's imperial essence.

Only a few states, in which the appropriate conditions had taken shape, managed to defend genuine independence, namely the presence of: **1)** experience of statehood and/or self-government; **2)** their own political elites, national bourgeoisie, and urban intelligentsia; **3)** a high level of urbanization and literacy; **4)** a common border with external allies; as well as the absence of a sizable Russian population, especially in the cities.

However, the other national liberation movements did not suffer final defeat either. The struggle for the freedom of peoples subjugated by Russia forced the Bolsheviks to preserve their formal statehood: the larger nations were granted union republics within the federal USSR. In comparison, the smaller nations received autonomous republics. And although these statehoods were first and foremost communist, and only then national, their formal attributes and structures helped them gain recognition of independence in the 1990s.

It is noteworthy that Vladimir Lenin personally tipped the balance in favor of the Soviet federation. In contrast, Joseph Stalin defended the idea of a unitary state with national autonomies. Thus, it was Lenin who laid the foundations of the modern Russian Federation, something Vladimir Putin cannot forgive him for.

As a result, 21) the Second Russian Empire collapsed in an entirely predictable way, because most of its subjects did not want it preserved in its old form. After that, however, the paths of the white and red Russians, as well as those of the subjugated peoples, diverged. Out of the war of all against all, the Bolsheviks emerged as the complete victors, having managed to revive the Third Russian Empire over most of the territory of the Second. Temporary

victors (until 1939–1940) were the nations with newly created states. Partial success was achieved by those movements whose right to Soviet republics Moscow recognized.

Also, 22) the struggle against authoritarianism and the struggle against imperialism are similar, but not identical things. In the 1830s, Alexander Pushkin was both an enemy of Russian autocracy and of Poland, which had risen against Russia. During the 1917 revolution, it became clear that most Russians (whether red or white) thought similarly — against the tsar, but not against the tsardom. Although under pressure from peasant uprisings, the Kremlin was forced to abandon attempts to quickly build a new totalitarianism (“war communism”), it nevertheless managed to preserve the empire.

The first decade of the USSR’s existence was characterized by concessions from the authorities in both the socio-economic sphere (*the NEP*) and the cultural sphere (*korenizatsiya*). Seeking to popularize their ideas in a language understandable to the population, the Bolsheviks compromised with national movements in the borderlands. The result was a rise in the population’s well-being, the emergence of a new culture — “*national in form, socialist in content*” — the spread of literacy among non-Russian peoples, and the return of notable émigrés. Thanks to the creation of new unions and autonomous republics, a whole number of previously stateless peoples embarked on the path of political modernization.

However, grassroots economic autonomy and international concessions did not mean complete freedom of enterprise and did not save people from the mass famine of 1921–1923. The emergence of a class of non-Russian officials did not mean the republics had real sovereignty — power remained in the hands of the Russian-speaking party elite. Likewise, the creation of nominal statehood often sharpened the territorial disputes of neighboring peoples. The decision to draw a particular border was most often the result of a compromise between the central government and local elites opposed to it. Still, military-political and economic considerations regularly prevailed over ethnographic arguments. As a result, delimitation most often ended in favor of Soviet Russia or created a deep internal conflict in the region, the key to whose resolution remained in Moscow.

Moreover, attempts to go beyond the clearly defined limits of what was permitted even in culture, not to mention politics, were declared “national deviationism” and “bourgeois nationalism” and entailed repression.

Likewise, “classical” imperialism did not disappear anywhere: two old states (*Khorezm and Bukhara*) and two new ones (*Tuva and Mongolia*) became Soviet satellites.

Therefore, 23) the period from the end of the famine to the first political repressions of 1928 (“*Veliibrai-movshchyna*”; the “*Shakhty case*”) was characterized by considerable liberalization within Russia and a weakening of its external expansion. Something somewhat similar was observed in the country imme-

diately after the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth century. However, the noticeable rise in both the standard of living and the level of freedom occurred exclusively in comparison with other periods of Russian history, not with contemporary foreign states. The USSR remained an empire with an authoritarian order. It gave women the right to vote and the opportunity to study in their native language, but they could not vote for any party other than the Communist Party, nor build a career without knowing Russian. Likewise, entire peoples had no opportunity to dispose of their own fate freely.

The short period of liberalization ended with a rapid “*tightening of the screws*.” In less than a decade, the USSR witnessed the rollback of *korenizatsiya*; the forced collectivization of agriculture; the first mass repressions and deportations (“*dekulakization*,” the “*Polish operation*”); the outbreak of armed struggle (*the Pavlohrad uprising*); the Holodomor and the Asharshylyk as a means of finally subduing the rebels and obtaining the funds necessary for industrialization; a new wave of ideologization (“*The Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*,” new school textbooks); the Great Terror among the military-political elites and the ordinary population; and, finally, Russification.

If the previous decade had been characterized by a level of prosperity and freedom in the country previously unseen, the 1930s became the era of the harshest repressions in Russian history. At the beginning of the period, there was, in effect, a renewed enserfment of the peasantry, and at the end, the enserfment of the proletariat (*the prohibition on changing one’s place of work, imprisonment for absence from work*). There remained no source of information alternative to state propaganda. The USSR under Joseph Stalin became the first truly totalitarian country in the world.

Thus, 24) Russian history at the beginning of the twentieth century rhymed with the Time of Troubles: decline — collapse — restoration — liberalization — authoritarianism. Muscovy-Russia followed this path for more than a century, whereas technical progress enabled the USSR to traverse it in thirty years.

The total mobilization of agriculture, industry, and the armed forces, together with a favorable external conjuncture (*the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact*), enabled the Soviet Union to enter the Second World War on the side of the aggressor — Nazi Germany — on September 17, 1939. Thanks to this, in 1939–1940, Moscow managed to seize most of the territories that had freed themselves from its control after the revolution. The USSR’s shift to the Allies’ side in 1941 ultimately enabled it to retain everything it had acquired earlier. The victory over Germany and Japan somewhat expanded the Union’s territory, but, most importantly, it created spheres of influence in Eastern Europe and East Asia.

At the same time, during the war, the USSR committed a number of other large-scale crimes — deportations of populations that in some cases turned into genocide.

And over the course of the next eight decades, victory over Germany would become — in the absence of other alternatives — the foundation of Russia's self-identification and the justification for all its actions.

Therefore, 25) authoritarianism and imperialism in Russian history form a system in which the appearance of one element will inevitably, after a certain time, lead to the appearance of the other. Terror feeds war and vice versa.

Moreover, 26) participation in a war on the side of conditional good against unconditional evil in no way brings Russia into that "good" or justifies its crimes.

Just as the appeasement of the Nazis at the end of the 1930s failed, so too was the attempt to reach an agreement with the communists on the division of influence in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1940s fruitless. Through manipulation and outright pressure, the USSR turned the European countries it occupied into its satellites, and also helped establish communist regimes in Asia. Highly effective Marxist-Leninist propaganda and armed interventions allowed the Kremlin to extend its influence over a third of the planet and half of humanity.

The struggle between the Western world, led by the United States, and the communist countries became known as the Cold War. Restrained by nuclear weapons, the two superpowers avoided direct confrontation, but actively opposed one another on the periphery, splitting individual countries (*Germany, Korea, Vietnam*) and entire continents in two.

At the same time, alongside its obvious successes, the USSR also suffered serious defeats, such as the defections of Yugoslavia and China from the Soviet bloc.

Hence, 27) although Russia has been a player of global stature on more than one occasion, only the postwar USSR became a true superpower. The situation in which most of the world's population listened, or at least heeded, the voice of Moscow finally convinced the Soviet authorities of the correctness of the path and methods they had chosen. Perhaps for the first time, the Russian state, in its expansion, relied more on a messianic ideology than on brute force. The Kremlin projected communist propaganda not only on the periphery (decolonization), but also deep in the enemy's rear ("peace throughout the world," anti-capitalist, anarchist, and revolutionary-terrorist organizations).

Simultaneously with the expansion of its external sphere of influence, Moscow pursued a policy of centralization and unification within the country. A concealed, but no less powerful, wave of Russification descended upon the non-Russian peoples. The volume of book publishing, film production, academic research, and education in native languages declined. Combined with the localized predominance of Russians in certain non-Russian regions and major cities, this process led to another wave of denationalization in Ukraine and, especially, in Belarus and

Kazakhstan.

Although Russians did not constitute the USSR's population in purely demographic terms, it was precisely through Russian culture that the "*new historical community — the Soviet people*" was cultivated.

Therefore, 28) the Third Russian Empire, like the Second, began with cultural diversity and ended with total Russification. But whereas in the Romanov era this process dragged on for more than a century (the 1780s–1905), the USSR accomplished it in some forty years. Despite the officially proclaimed equality and "friendship of peoples," ethnic Russians proved to be more equal than the others.

The USSR's external imperialism and internal authoritarianism after the Second World War provoked resistance. In the first decades, it was predominantly armed, both within the country (*the UPA, the "forest brothers," uprisings in the Gulag*) and abroad (*the uprisings in Poznań and Budapest in 1956*). However, Soviet power was so strong that armed resistance failed. So it was replaced by non-violent movements (dissidents and petition campaigns in the USSR, trade unions in Poland). There were also urban riots (*Novocherkassk in 1962*), hunger strikes, and acts of self-immolation.

Accordingly, 29) for all its rhetoric of liberation and its efforts to present itself as the leader of the global anti-colonial movement, the USSR remained a colonial empire. Any attempts to break free from Kremlin rule — whether by entire countries or by individual people — ended in forcible suppression.

The inefficiency of the planned economic model, the exhaustion of the ideological charge of communism, and the disastrous war in Afghanistan led to the decline of the USSR. In an attempt to save it, the new General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched a series of reforms known as Perestroika. However, glasnost, khozraschyot, and the project of a new Union soon began to threaten the state's stability, as they created new challenges without resolving the old ones.

The country was swept by a wave of unrest on national grounds (*Yakutia*), which in some places later escalated into pogroms and ethnic cleansing (*Nagorno-Karabakh*). Taking advantage of the USSR's weakness, the European satellites slipped out of its control (*the "velvet revolutions" of 1989*). Then, already within the state itself, 1990 saw the "*parade of sovereignties*," and the republican government of Russia, headed by Boris Yeltsin, openly set itself against the union center. Attempts to suppress anti-Soviet protests by force in the Caucasian and Baltic republics only worsened the situation.

The failed attempt at a coup d'état (*the GKChP*) did not save the USSR; it buried it definitively. In 1991, all of its former republics gained independence.

Thus, 30) the Third Russian Empire broadly repeated the path of the Second — it proved so inefficient and so ill-suited to the modern world that most

of its inhabitants, both Russians and non-Russians, did not come out in its defense. The pace of socio-economic transformation at the end of the twentieth century meant that the USSR perished far more quickly than its predecessor. However, a different demographic situation led to a much lower level of drama in the empire's collapse.

The fall of Soviet power did not mean the automatic disappearance of the Soviet empire. Even while in a state of democratic transition (1989–1993), Russia continued to pursue an imperialist policy on the borderlands. As a result of intervention by the Russian army, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia were torn away from Moldova and Georgia and turned into puppet republics under Moscow's control. In 1992–1994, a cold war over Crimea was underway — the Russian parliament laid claim to the entire peninsula and separately to Sevastopol, while the local authorities balanced on the brink of open separatism. The Kremlin succeeded in imposing itself as a mediator in the Karabakh conflict and in the civil war in Tajikistan.

Vladimir Putin's rise to power only strengthened existing tendencies. Under his rule came the provocation over Tuzla (2003) and the invasion of Georgia (2008), while economic wars became routine. Russia actively interfered in the domestic cultural policies of its neighbors and in their electoral processes. Through pressure and bribery, Moscow was able to assemble around Russia both an economic bloc (*the EAEU*) and a military one (*the CSTO*).

At the present stage, Russian aggression has three main causes:

a) Imperialism, that is, the Kremlin's desire to restore Russia as a superpower, acquire spheres of influence, and decide global issues on equal terms with the United States and China, for which it needs to conquer new lands and resources (human and material);

b) Authoritarianism/totalitarianism, that is, the attempt through external aggression to distract the population from internal problems, consolidate the elites, and legitimize extraordinary practices (*terror and expropriations*);

c) The chauvinism of the Kremlin and of the majority of ordinary Russians, who have not overcome the remnants of imperial thinking within themselves and are accustomed to treating surrounding peoples with superiority.

Russian operations in Africa have one cause, the invasion of Syria, two, and the invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 — all three.

The Fourth Russian Empire is significantly weaker than the two previous ones, but thanks to the general destabilization of the world order, it retains the capacity for further expansion.

Hence, 31) the struggle against communism did not mean a struggle against imperialism, and the mass rallies in Moscow gathered in defense of economic, not political, freedoms. Russians, on the whole, did not especially approve of the “restoration of constitutional order” in the Caucasus (that is, the war against Chechnya). Still, they did not oppose the annexation of Crimea. Putin's rise to power was conditioned by the sentiments that prevailed in Russian

society even at the beginning of the 1990s.

Also, 32) the collapse of the global system of communism (read: Moscow's sphere of influence) and of the USSR (read: greater Russia) inflicted on both the elites and the majority of the country's ordinary population such a profound trauma that its consequences have not been overcome to this day. Nowhere in the world did the collapse of empires pass painlessly for the imperial nation, but in continental states (Germany, Russia), this process was much harder than in maritime ones (Britain, France). And just as German trauma after the First World War gave rise to Nazism (the “Weimar syndrome”), so from Russia's defeat in the Cold War there emerged rashism.

While supporting separatism in surrounding states, Russia denies the right to self-determination to its own citizens. This applies both to national republics, such as Tatarstan, and to Russian regions, such as the “Ural Republic” in 1993. From the very first years of its existence, the Russian Federation did everything possible to restrict federalism and strengthen central power — from budgetary pressure and the abolition of gubernatorial elections to mass repressions and the storming of Grozny. At the same time, the Russification of non-Russian regions and, in recent years, the state propaganda of rashism have proceeded by ever harsher methods.

At the same time, both the absolute number and the relative share of ethnic Russians in Russia's population have been steadily declining, and that is precisely why, to “ordinary” Russification, the Kremlin adds such mechanisms as the abduction of Ukrainian children while denying the very existence of a separate Ukrainian people.

Summarizing, 33) the Fourth Russian Empire broadly reproduces the principal practices of its predecessors — armed expansion in foreign policy and repression with Russification in domestic policy. Any attempts to view the contemporary Russian Federation as a genuine federation or a national state are mistaken and lead to errors in dealing with it.

To conclude:

a) Russia continues to remain an empire, and a significant part of its population consists of subjugated peoples;

b) The current Russian-Ukrainian war is not personally Putin's whim, but the consequence of a 500-year tradition of Russian imperialism, and concessions to Putin will not end the war;

c) Russian imperialism threatens not only Ukraine, but the entire world, and with Putin's departure, the threat will not disappear by itself;

d) The only chance for lasting change in Russia is its de-imperialization and decolonization.

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This material was prepared with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation and the Askold and Dir Foundation, administered by ISAR Ednannia within the framework of the project “Strong Civil Society of Ukraine — a Driver of Reforms and Democracy” with funding from Norway and Sweden. The material represents the position of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation, institutional donors, and partners.





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